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Previous studies of trade union structure have relied upon the 
differentiation of taxonomic types. Descriptively, this method fails to account 
for the evolutionary development of trade union form. Analytically, the 
categorisation of unions into ideal types and the accentuation of the pure form 
have acted to emphasise stasis to the exclusion of the dynamic elements 
inherent within trade union structural development. In order to overcome these 
shortcomings this thesis relies upon the identification and analysis of the 
inter-relationships between trade union structural events. There are four such 
structural events: mergers, formations, dissolutions and breakaways. The central 
analytical focus is upon the trade union merger process, its causal influences 
and its relationship with other structural events. 
The wave pattern of occurrence observed in aggregate merger activity forms 
the initial focus. Multivariate analysis is employed to generate a framework 
within which this pattern is examined. The results of the multivariate analysis 
suggest a changing relationship between the merger process and its 
environmental influences during different phases in the institutionalisation of 
industrial relations. Analyses of the changing shape of merger activity and 
differences in its form during the two principal merger waves lend further 
support to the notion that the merger process has undergone an evolutionary 
development. 
The inter-relationships between merger activity and other forms of 
structural events also suggest variation over time. The pattern in these 
variations is related to existing explanations of merger activity in order that 
their merits and limitations can be considered. The extraction of elements of 
these explanations allows for the generation of an alternative account of the 
developments in merger activity based upon the integration of the extracted 
elements. 
COITEITS 
LIST OF TABLES i 
LIST OF FIGURES iii 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYXBOLS v 
1. INTRODUCTION 1 
SETTING THE SCENE 1 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE AIMS, METHODS AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 11 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 18 
FOOTNOTES 20 
2. THE VAVE PATTERN OF TRADE U19ION STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT 21 
OVERVIEW OF THE WAVE PATTERN OF MERGER ACTIVITY 23 
The Aggregate Wave Pattern of Merger Activity 23 
The Merger Wave Pattern Among Unions of Different Sizes 26 
THE WAVE FORM OF TRADE UNION STRUCTURAL EVENTS 30 
The Formation Rate 30 
The Dissolution Rate 34 
The Breakaway Rate 35 
TOWARDS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 37 
Existing Explanations 37 
Long Cycles 41 
Trade Union Organisation 45 
Merger as a Strategy Towards Goal Achievement 50 
CONCLUSION 53 
FOOTNOTES 56 
3. THE DEVELOPIEHT AND OPERATIONALISATIOB OF THE EXPLANATORY 
FRAXEVORK 59 
THE INFLUENCES 01 MERGER ACTIVITY 62 
The Environmental Influences 62 
Organisational Influences 73 
OPERATIONALISATION OF THE EXPLANATORY FRAMEWORK 78 
Methodological Issues 78 
Economic Variables 84 
Unionisation Variables 91 
Political Variables 95 
CONCLUSION 100 
FOOTNOTES 102 
4. XULTIVARIATE ANALYSES 103 
PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 104 
BUILDING THE EXPLANATION 109 
The Economic Explanation 109 
Unionisation and the Merger Process 117 
A Political Explanation 122 
THE AGGREGATE EXPLANATION 127 
Expectations from the Analytical Framework 127 
The Implementation of Collective Bargaining 128 
The Operation of Institutionalised Industrial Relations 133 
CONCLUSION 139 
FOOTNOTES 142 
5. MERGER DIRECTION 143 
MERGER DIRECTION 144 
ACQUIRING UNIONS 153 
Worker Involvement 153 
Size of Acquiring Unions 154 
Acquisition Proportions 155 
THE EVIDENCE ON MERGER DIRECTION 158 
Geographical and National Mergers 158 
The Shape of the Merger Process 160 
TOWARDS AN EXPLANATION OF THE CHANGING SHAPE OF THE MERGER 
PROCESS 162 
Company Mergers and Merger Shape 165 
Union Density 167 
Merger Shape and TUC Policy 170 
CONCLUSION 174 
FOOTNOTES 176 
6. INSIDE MERGER VAVES 178 
SUMMARY STATISTICS 179 
MERGER ACTIVITY OF THE TEN LARGEST UNIONS DURING THE WAVES 183 
Wave I: 1918 - 1924 184 
Wave II : 1966 - 1983 188 
Emergent Themes 193 
FORMATION DATES 195 
Wave I 196 
Wave II 197 
Developing the Themes 199 
CENTRALISATION 200 
Centralisation 1918 - 1924 201 
Centralisation 1966 - 1983 209 
Centralisation 1918 - 1924 and 1966 - 1983: 
A Further Thematic Development 215 
CONCLUSION: A RETURN TO THEORY 216 
FOOTNOTES 221 
7. ORGANISATIONAL INSTABILITY DURING THE DIPLEMENTATIOH OF 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 222 
DISSOLUTIONS: THE DECLINE OF ORGANISATIONAL STABILITY 223 
Regression Results 224 
Life Cycles of Dissolving Unions 227 
Emergent Themes 230 
TRADE UNION FINANCIAL STABILITY 232 
Regression Results 239 
A Further Thematic Development 
ECONOMIC FACTORS AND INTERNAL UNION POLITICS 
1893 - 1914 
1914 - 1918 
1919 - 1939 
CONCLUSION 
FOOTNOTES 
8. ORGANISATIONAL INSTABILITY DURING THE OPERATION OF 
INSTITUTIOJALISED INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
MERGER INTENSITY AMONG UNIONS OF DIFFERENT SIZE GROUPS 
Size Group 1 
Size Group 2 
Size Group 3 
Emergent Themes 
DISSOLUTIONS: THE DECLINE OF ORGANISATIONAL STABILITY 
Regression Results 
Life Cycles of the Dissolving Unions 
Developing the Themes 
BREAKAWAYS 
TRADE UNION FINANCIAL STABILITY 
ECONOMIC FACTORS AND INTERNAL UNION POLITICS 
1946 - 1967 
1968 - 1979 
The Incorporation of Workshop Organisation 
CONCLUSION 
FOOTNOTES 
9 CASE STUDY I: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN THE PRINTING INDUSTRY 
THE INTRODUCTION OF LINOTYPE, 1893 - 1924 
Period Trends 
The Technology 
The Wider Implications 
The Merger Process in 
THE ADVENT OF SILICON-CHIP 
Period Trends 
of Technological Change 
Printing ; 1893 - 1924 
BASED SYSTEMS, 1966 - 1983 
The Technology and its Implications 
The Merger Process in Printing : 1966 - 1983 
CONCLUSION 
10. CASE STUDY II: STRUCTURAL DEVELOPXENTS IN 
THE DATA 
STRUCTURAL EVENTS AND THE WIDER ENVIRONMENT 
The Implementation of Collective Bargaining 
The Operation of Institutionalised Industrial 
MERGER ACTIVITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRINCIPAL 
Civil and Public Services Association 
Society of Civil and Public Servants 
Inland Revenue Staff Federation 
Civil Service Union 
NATIONAL GOVERMNT 
Relations 
UNIONS 
241 
243 
243 
251 
257 
259 
262 
264 
265 
268 
271 
275 
276 
277 
278 
279 
281 
281 
285 
293 
293 
296 
299 
304 
307 
308 
309 
309 
310 
312 
315 
321 
321 
322 
324 
328 
331 
332 
338 
338 
347 
350 
351 
355 
357 
359 
CONCLUSION 361 
FOOTNOTES 364 
11. CONCLUSION 365 
AN OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS 366 
The Implementation of Collective Bargaining 367 
The Operation of Institutionalised Industrial Relations 370 
The Inter-Relationships Between Structural Events 373 
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS OF TRADE UNION STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENT 375 
Undy et al.: The Centrality of the Leadership Role 375 
Collective Bargaining 378 
Expanding upon the 'Level of Bargaining Account' 383 
Suggestions towards an Integrated Explanation of the 
Merger Process 389 
THE FUTURE 395 
FOOTNOTES 399 
APPENDICES 
A. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY DATA SOURCES 400 
B. CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS 424 
C. REGRESSION RESULTS, ECONOMIC, UNIONISATION ANDPOLITICAL 
VARIABLES: DEPENDENT VARIABLE, INTENSITY 426 
D. PRINTING INDUSTRY MERGERS 427 
E. TRADE UNION STRUCTURAL EVENTS IN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT 431 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 434 
-i- 
LIST OF TABLES 
2.1 Merger Activity During Wave and, Non-Wave, Periods 
2.2 Number of Unions Absorbed by Size of Union 
2.3 Membership Absorbed by Size of Union 
2.4 Indices of Merger Activity by Long Cycle of Economic 
Development 
4.1 Regression Results, Economic Variables : Dependent Variable, 
Intensity 
4.2 Regression Results, Economic and Unionisation Variables 
Dependent Variable, Intensity. 
4.3 Regression Results. Political Variables : Dependent Variable, 
Intensity. 
4.4 Regression Results, Aggregate Explanations for the Period 
of the Implementation of Collective Bargaining : Dependent 
Variable, Intensity. 
4.5 Regression Results, Aggregate Explanations for the Period 
of the Operation of Inststutionalised Industrial Relations 
Dependent Variable, Intensity. 
6.1 Composite Mergers and Unions Formed Through Merger. 
6.2 Comparison of Manual and White-Collar Absorptions During 
the Merger Waves. 
6.3 Membership Growth and Merger Activity During Wave I 
of the Ten Largest Unions in 1924. 
6.4 Membership Growth and Merger Activity During Wave II 
of the Ten Largest Unions in 1983. 
7.1 Regression Result, Aggregate Explanation for the Period 
of the Implementation of Collective Bargaining : Dependent 
Variable, Dissolution Rate. 
Page No. 
25 
26 
28 
44 
109 
116 
124 
129 
135, 
180 
182 
185 
189 
225 
ii 
7.2 The Pattern of Union Finances During the Implementation 
of Collective Bargaining. 234 
7.3 Regression Result, Union Expenditure and Merger Activity 
During the Implementation of Collective Bargaining 
Dependent Variable, Merger Intensity. 240 
8.1 Regression Results, Explanations of Merger Intensity among 
Different Sized Unions for the Operation of Institutionalised 
Industrial Relations : Dependent Variables, - 
Size Groups 1,2 and 3. 267 
8.2 Regression Results, Explanations for the Dissolution Rate 
During the Operation of Institutionalised Industrial 
Relations : Dependent Variable, Dissolution Rate. 278 
8.3 The Life Cycles of Breakaway Unions During the Operation of 
Institutionalised Industrial Relations. 283 
8.4 The Pattern of Union Finances During the Operation of 
Institutionalised Industrial Relations. 286 
8.5 Regression Result, Union Expenditure and Merger Activity 
During the Operation of Institutionalised Industrial Relations 
Dependent Variable, Merger Intensity. 290 
A. 1 The Primary Data. 400 
A. 2 (i) Secondary Data 418 
A. 2 (ii) Secondary Data 421 
B. 1 Correlation Coefficients: The Period of the Implementation 
of Collective Bargaining, 424 
B. 2 Correlation Coefficients: The Operation of Institutionalised 
Industrial Relations. 425 
C. 1 Regression Results, Economic, Unionisation and Political 
Variables: Dependent Variable, Intensity. 426 
D. 1 Printing Industry Mergers : 1893 - 1924. 427 
D. 2 Printing Industry Mergers : 1966 - 1983. 429 
E. 1 Trade Union Structural Events in National Government 1893 - 
1979 431 
- iii - 
LIST OF FIGURES ý, .. M 
Following 
Page No. 
2.1 Five-year Moving Average of the Intensity of Merger 
Activity, 1893 - 1983. 23 
2.2 Five-year Moving Average of the Density of Merger 
Activity, 1893 - 1983. 23 
2.3 Three-year Moving Average of Merger Intensity among Unions 
Organising 2,499 Members or Less. 29 
2.4 Three-year Moving Average of Merger Intensity among Unions 
Organising Between 2,500 and 14,999 Members. 29 
2.5 Three-year Moving Average of Merger Intensity among Unions 
Organising More Than 15,000 Members. 29 
2.6 Five-year Moving Average of the Formation Rate. 30 
2.7 Five-year Moving Average of the Dissolution Rate. 34 
2.8 Five-year Moving Average of the Breakaway Rate. 35 
5.1 Five-year Moving Average of Worker Involvement 
in Merger Activity. 153 
5.2 Five-year Moving Average of the Mean Size of Acquiring 
Unions. 154 
5.3 Five Year Moving Average of the Proportion of Unions 
Absorbed By Size Group of Acquiring Union. 155 
5.4 Five Year Moving Average of the Proportion of Membership 
Absorbed by Size Group of Acquiring Unions. 155 
5.5 Five Year Moving Averages Showing the Relative Proportions of 
the Merger Process Constituted by National and Geographical 
Mergers. 158 
5.6 Five Year Moving Averages Showing the Relative Proportions 
of the Merger Process constituted by National and 
Geographical Absorptions of Membership. 158 
iv 
5.7, The Shape of the Merger Process by Unions Absorbed. 160 
5.8 The Shape of the Merger Process by Membership Absorbed. 160 
6.1 The Shape of the Merger Waves. 181 
6.2 Formation Dates of Unions 'Dying' during Merger Wave I. 195 
6.3 Formation Dates of Unions 'Dying' during Merger Wave II. 195 
6.4 The Number of Federations. 201 
7.1 Life Cycles of the Unions Dissolving Between 1889 - 1907 and 
1920 - 1933. 227 
7.2 Formation Dates of the Unions Dissolving 1889 - 1907. 228 
7.3 Formation Dates of the Unions Dissolving 1920 - 1933. 228 
7.4 Unions Dissolving During the Dissolution Wave 1889 - 1907 
by the Industry from which they Recruited. 229 
7.5 Unions Dissolving During the Dissolution Wave 1920 - 1933 
by the Industry from which they Recruited. 229 
7.6 Five Year Moving Averages of Merger Intensity, Strike 
Frequency and Trade Union Membership. 245 
8.1 Formation Dates of Unions Dissolving 1973 - 1980. 279 
8.2 Life Cycles of the Unions Dissolving Between 1973 - 1980, 280 
8.3 Unions Dissolving during the Dissolution Wave 1973 - 1980 
by the Industry from which they Recruited. 280 
8.4 Five Year Moving Averages of Merger Intensity, Trade Union 
Membership and Strike Frequency. 294 
10.1 The External Shape of National Government Trade Union 
Structure. 333 
10.2 Union 'Births' in National Government. 333 
10.3 Union 'Deaths' in National Government. 334 
10.4 Five-year Moving Averages of the Formation Rate, Dissolution 
Rate and Merger Intensity in National Government. 336 
-v- 
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYIBOLS 
UNIONS 
ABS Association of Broadcasting Staff. 
ACA Assistant Clerks' Association. 
ACTT Association of Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians. 
AEOCS Association of Executive Officers of the Civil Service. 
AEOOCS Association of Executive Officers and Other Civil Servants. 
AEU Amalgamated Engineering Union. 
AOT Association of Officers of Taxes. 
APEX Association of Professional Executive, Clerical and Computer Staff. 
ASBSBSW Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Shipwrights, Blacksmiths 
and Structural Workers. 
ASCJ Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners. 
AScW Association of Scientific Workers. 
ASE Amalgamated Society of Engineers. 
ASLEF Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen. 
ASLPA Amalgamated Society of Lithographic Printers and Auxilleries. 
ASPD Amalgamated Society of Painters and Decorators. 
ASSET Association of Supervisory Staffs, Executives and Technicians. 
ASTMS Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs. 
ASW Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers. 
ATC Association of Tax Clerks. 
AUBTW Amalgamated Union of Building Trade Workers. 
AUEW Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers. 
BIFU Banking, Insurance and Finance Union. 
BISAKTA British Iron, Steel and Kindred Trades Federation. 
CCOA County Clerks Officers' Association. 
- vi - 
CMA Communication Managers' Association. 
COA Clerical Officers' Association. 
CPSA Civil and Public Servants Association. 
CPWA Caxton Printers' Warehousemens' Association. 
CSCA Civil Service Clerical Association. 
CSU Civil Service Union. 
CWU Chemical Workers' Union. 
DATA Draughtsmen and Allied Technicians Association. 
DM Durham Miners. 
DWRGLU Dock, Wharf, Riverside and General Labourers' Union. 
EETPU Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbers Union. 
EO(T)A Engineering Officers' (Telecommunications) Union. 
ETU Electrical Trades Union. 
FDA First Division Association. 
GMBATU General, Municipal, Boilermakers and Allied Trades Union. 
GMMGA Government Minor and Manipulative Grades Association. 
GMWU General and Municipal Workers' Union. 
IPCS Institution of Professional Civil Servants. 
IRSF Inland Revenue Staff Federation. 
ISTC Iran and Steel Trades Confederation. 
LSC London Society of Compositors. 
LSW London society of Warehousemen. 
MEA Municipal Employees Association. 
MLSA Ministry of Labour Staff Association. 
NAACT National Association of Assessors and Collectors of Taxes. 
NALGO National and Local Government Officers' Association. 
NAOP National Association of Operative Plasterers. 
NAPWC National Printers' Warehousemen and Cutters. 
NAS, UWT -National Association of Schoolmasters, Union of Women Teachers. 
NAUL National Amalgamated Union of Labour. 
- vii - 
NATSOPA National Association of Operative Printers, Graphical and Media 
Personnel. 
NES National Electrotypers and Stereotypers. 
NGA National Graphical Association. 
NTWF National Transport Workers' Federation. 
NUAAW National Union of Agricultural and Allied Workers. 
NUBE National Union of Bank Employees, 
NUBMR National union of Bookbinders and Machine Rulers. 
NUGMW National Union of General and Municipal Workers. 
NUGW National Union of General Workers. 
NUJ National Union of Journalists. 
NUM National Union of Mineworkers. 
NUPBPW National Union of Printing, Bookbinding and Paper Workers. 
NUPMW National Union of Paper Mill Workers. 
NUPE National Union of Public Employees. 
NUR National Union of Railwaymen. 
NUT National Union of Teachers. 
NUWDAT National Union of Wallcoverings, Decorative and Allied Trades. 
NWQ North Wales Quarryman. 
POEU Post Off ice Engineering Union. 
PPMM Platen Printing Machine Minders. 
PSWCAU Printers ' and Stationers' Warehousemen, Cutters and Assistants 
Union. 
SALSA Sun Alliance and London Staff Association. 
SCPS Society of Civil and Public Servants. 
SCS, Society of Civil Servants. 
SDCA Second Division Clerks Association. 
SGA Scottish Graphical Association. 
ti 
SLADE Society of Lithographic Artists, Designers, Engravers and Process 
Workers. 
SOGAT Society of Graphical and Allied Trades. 
- viii - 
STE Society of Telecom Executives. 
SWM South Wales Miners. 
TA Typographical Association. 
TASS Technical, Administrative and Supervisory Section (of AUEW). 
TGWU Transport and General Workers' Union. 
TUC Trades Union Congress. 
UCATT Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians. 
UCW Union of Communication Workers. 
UKAPE United Kingdom Association of Professional Engineers. 
USDAW Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers, 
VCA Valuation Clerks' Association. 
VOCA Valuation Office Clerical Association. 
VU Workers' Union. 
YM Yorkshire Miners, 
REGRESSORS 
oRW Rate of Change of Real Wages. 
RW Level of Real Wages. 
GWR Rate of Change of Money Wages. 
oP Rate of Change of Retail Prices. 
PEAK Index of Business Cycle Peaks. 
TROUGH Index of Business Cycle Troughs. 
COMER Number of Manufacturing Company Mergers. 
UDEN Level of Union Density. 
oMEM Rate of Change of Union Membership. 
FUNDS Level of Union Funds per Member. 
FORM Formation Rate. 
STCONC State Expenditure as a Proportion of Gross National Product. 
MP Number of Trade Union Sponsored Members of Parliament. 
REPLEG Presence of Legislation Repressive to Trade Unionism. 
CON Presence of a Conservative government. 
- ix - 
1917 Trade Union (Amalgamation) Act 1917. 
1964 Trade Union (Amalgamation) Act 1964. 
BREAK Breakaway Rate. 
DISS Dissolution Rate. 
TREND Time Trend. 
DB Union Expenditure on Dispute Benefit. 
OTHER Union Expenditure on Other Costs. 
PBUB Union Expenditure on Provident and Unemployment Benefits. 
OTHER ABBREVIATIONS 
o The Rate of Change of a Variable. 
D-W Durbin-Watson Statistic. 
R2 Coefficient of Determination, Corr ected for Degrees of Freedom. 
*** Indicator of a Variable Attaining 1 per cent Significance, 
** Indicator of a Variable Attaining 5 per cent Significance. 
Indicator of a Variable Attaining 10 per cent Significance. 
EQ. Equation. 
-1- 
1 
ITT80DUCTIOT 
The objective of this study is to analyse British trade union 
structural development since 1893 and to explain the evolving pattern of 
the trade union merger process. Trade union structure is regarded as the 
'external shape' (Hyman, 1975: 36) or 'morphology' (Turner, 1962: 233) of 
trade unionism. As such, it is distinguished, following Clegg, from 
trade union government, the study of which is focused upon the 
'relationship between the various decision-making bodies within a union' 
(1970: 41). This distinction is not meant to imply that trade union 
government does not influence the development of trade union structure, 
but to indicate the central focus of this study. 
British trade union structure is noted for its complexity and 
heterogeneity. Turner states that this reflects the 'deposit of 
successive waves of trade union expansion' (1956: 58). A primary feature 
of this heterogeneity in form is the widespread overlapping in trade 
union memberships, creating trade union structural tensions which induce 
a continual' process of evolutionary development. External influences 
also impinge upon this development with the- result that trade union 
structure has a continually changing appearance. As Hyman has stated, 
the tension between unifying and divisive pressures is in 
practice almost universal, within individual unions as well 
as between them: and this gives union structure at any point 
of time a dynamic character (1975: 41). 
While mergers are regarded as resulting from pressures towards 
unification, this is not to argue that 'divisive pressures' do not 
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influence their occurrence. Indeed, the observed pattern of merger 
activity would seem to suggest that a widespread , inhibiting effect of. 
divisive pressures on merger activity is dominant throughout the 
majority of the period under study. 
The academic study of trade union structure has rested-upon the 
taxonomic differentiation of unions into 'ideal types'. In broad terms 
two approaches . 
to such classifications have been adopted, based 
respectively upon organisational structure and function. For example, 
Hoxie (1924) structurally categorised American unions into craft, 
trades, compound craft, quasi-industrial, industrial and labour types, 
while functionally he delineated four varieties: business, ýuplift, 
revolutionary and predatory. In Britain it is customary to distinguish 
three union types: craft, industrial and general. Descriptively these 
categories are widely regarded-as inadequate, primarily on the grounds 
that there are no ideal-typical unions in existence. In Britain there 
has never been an industrial union in the sense that no single 
organisation has achieved exclusive jurisdiction over all occupations 
regardless of the procedures employed to define industrial boundaries. 
'Few unions completely achieved the (craft] ideal' (Clegg, 1970: 51), it 
being commonplace to 'bend the rules' to suit specific economic and 
industrial circumstances. Furthermore, if general unionism is regarded 
as referring to unions recruiting irrespective of industry or 
occupation, again the category is inadequate for the recruitment 
patterns of those unions with general aspirations are shaped by the 
existence of prior organisational forms which restrict the recruitment 
bases of the so-called general unions. 
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In appreciation of the analytical inadequacies of such taxonomies, 
they are traditionally applied in combination with the notion of 
membership size to examine the larger unions (for example, by Clegg 
(1970: 43-49) and Hyman (1975: 39-41)). Such reviews illustrate the 
diversity of organisation and the tendencies towards the ideal typical 
form among larger unions. In focusing upon the larger unions, however, 
such an approach fails to take into account variations within these 
tendencies among unions of intermediate and smaller sized memberships. 
Indeed, it can be plauspbly argued that the preoccupation with larger 
unions, their categorisation into types and the accentuation on the 
'pure' form, has acted to obscure the dynamic nature of trade union 
development. This is particularly the case as these categories do not 
allow for differences in policy and strategy arising from membership 
stability. growth and size to be taken into account. Similarly, the 
geographical coverage of a union's recruitment base is excluded from 
explicit examination. 
Turner (1956 and 1962) attempted to break through the impasse of 
reliance upon these taxonomic devices. He drew a distinction between two 
non-mutually exclusive categorical pairs: vertical and horizontal, and 
open and closed. Each dimension refers to a direction in recruitment 
growth. Vertical growth refers to a recruitment pattern concentrated 
-within a particular industry regardless of occupation. Horizontal growth 
indicates a tendency towards recruitment from within a specific 
occupation or group of occupations regardless of industrial boundaries. 
An open union exhibits a tendency towards recruitment from within any 
industry or occupation while recruitment for a closed union is focused 
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upon the achievement of maximum union density within a defined and 
constant recruitment base. 
Amalgamation is one of the means whereby a union may expand its 
recruitment base. Throughout the course of a union's development both 
policy towards, and the direction of, recruitment expansion may change. 
Similarly, as Hughes argues, 
What needs to be recognised, however, in any dynamic inter- 
pretation of union structures. is the great empirical importance 
of intermediate patterns of union response, in which unions 
may be open in certain directions of recruitment interest, 
but closed in others. Relative openers, if it is a feature 
of the environment of a union for some length of time, may 
profoundly affect the consequent shape (and consequently 
membership and'policy interests) of a union. What in terms 
of the traditional classification was a pure form may become 
a hybrid (1967: 5). 
It follows that recruitment expansion, whether attained by merger or 
'natural growth', may act as bath cause and effect. If the recruitment 
base of a union expands, recruitment may become competitive with unions 
which the original union would otherwise have had no contact. To 
ameliorate any deleterious effects of competitive recruitment a merger 
may be sought which, if completed, might create further boundaries of 
competitive recruitment. In this manner an initial limited opening of 
the recruitment base may necessitate a more widespread opening to 
accommodate the consequences of the initial opening. 
These 'intermediate patterns of union response' and the 
difficulties in detecting policy changes towards the direction of 
'natural growth' have precluded the widespread adoption of Turner's 
approach for the empirical study of trade union structural development. 
More recent studies, such as. that of Undy et al. (1981), have reverted, 
therefore, to the establishment of ever more complex taxonomic 
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categories and are exposed to similar criticisms as earlier 
classifications, particularly, their stress upon stasis to the neglect 
of dynamics. 
A further approach to the study of trade union structure has 
centred upon the notion of trade union concentration. Two elements of 
this notion have been identified: organisational concentration and 
membership concentration. Windmuller (1981: 43) refers to organisational 
concentration as being 'the absolute number of organisations at a 
particular level of the union structure'. Membership concentration is 
defined by Estey (1966: 345) as 'the ratio of the membership of a given 
number of large unions to total union membership'. Whatever the chosen 
definition, concentration is a relative concept. As such, any 
suggestions regarding the effects of changes in union concentration on 
union structural development should be proffer/ed with some caution. 
A number of issues preclude the adoption of concentration as the 
central analytical concept for the purposes of this study. Firstly, as 
measured by a concentration ratio,. he-measurement°-of concentration does 
not allow for the analysis of structural developments among smaller. 
unions. For example, assume a concentration ratio of the ten largest 
unions was employed; that is, the concentration ratio is the ratio 
between the membership of the ten largest unions and total trade union 
membership. A merger between the twentieth and the twenty-first ranked 
unions would not be captured by the concentration ratio, nor would a 
union formation or dissolution provided such an event did not add to or 
detract from the list of the ten largest unions. 
Secondly, to draw inferences regarding policy and strategy about 
membership growth, merger and recruitment base expansion from a measure 
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of concentration is fraught with both' analytical and methodological 
difficulties. Hyman (1983: 41-48). for example, notes the divergent 
patterns among unions regarding 'devolution and centralisation' in 
internal union organisation while aggregate union concentration showed a 
continued tendency to increase. 
An approach to concentration employing the 'variance of the loge of 
size' was utilised by Phelps-Brown and Hart (1957) and Simpson (1972). 
While this method, unlike the concentration ratio, allows for the 
analysis to include the impact of smaller unions on structural 
development, a number of implications arise from the assumptions 
underlying the variance of loge method which limit its usefulness. 
Simpson summarises these assumptions: 
First, that large, medium and small unions have the same 
proportionate growth, and second that around this common 
average the dispersion of growth rates is the same for all 
sizes. Third, the distribution is lognormal and lastly, that 
the relative dispersion of the size of unions tends to increase 
over time (1972: 385). 
To restate -these points, if a population of unions of equal size 
experience different growth -rates, there will be an increase in the 
dispersion of sizes. As this process continues so the large unions will 
become relatively larger which will be reflected in an increase in 
concentration. Employing such assumptions Phelps-Brown and Hart were 
able to conclude that 
'the rise in the degree of concentration of British unions 
as measured by the variance, has owed little to the decline 
in the total number of unions or to 'births' and 'deaths' of 
unions; and only a quarter of it can be ascribed to amal- 
gamation. Most of it has been due simply to differences in 
the rates of internal growth of the unions' (1957: 14). 
Obviously, the variance of logs method has an initial attraction in 
so far as there is a substantial body of knowledge available concerning 
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the properties of the log-normal distribution upon which its application 
is based. Additionally, tests of statistical significance can readily be 
conducted on the measures of concentration derived from the 
characteristics of the distribution. Against these points must be 
weighed a number"of disadvantages. 'Firstly, to assume that growth is a 
'random' process is to disregard the' complex of relationships that 
underlie the phenomenon and, more specifically, the divergent policies 
adopted by unions towards membership growth. Furthermore, integral to 
the notion of randomness for the proponents of the variance' of logs 
method is the assumption that union growth- is random in relation to 
economic influences. Bain and Blsheikh (1976) have demonstrated. 
however, that union membership growth is intimately related to 
particular economic factors. 
Further evidence leading to the rejection of concentration based an 
the log-normal distribution as the means to study the dynamics of trade 
union structural development is provided by Hannah and Kay (1977). These 
authors have demonstrated that the proportion of the tendency towards 
concentration that can be attributed to merger activity is undervalued 
through the use of the variance of' logs and, in certain circumstances, 
actually produces a figure which suggests that a merger makes no 
contribution towards concentration. ' 
If taxonomic categories and the methodology underlying existing 
approaches to the study of trade union concentration do not provide a 
satisfactory method to the analysis of the impact of merger activity on 
trade union structural dynamics'', the question arises"as to what approach 
can be usefully adopted? This presentation relies upon the notion of 
trade union structural events. There are four categories of trade union 
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structural "events: formations, "dissolutions, breakaways and mergers. A 
formation involves the establishment of a union where no organisation 
existed previously. The dissolution of a union occurs when an existing 
organisation ceases to exist as an independent entity. A section of a 
union which cedes to become an independent organisation is a breakaway. 
A merger occurs when two (or " more> 'unions' join together, the 
independence of (at least) one of the unions being subsumed within the 
other so that one independent organisation exists where two (or'more) 
did beforehand. 'It is the inter-relationships between' structural 'events 
that allow for the examination of trade union structural dynamics. ', The 
influences acting upon'these dynamics can be studied in isolation or in 
combination. 
As the central focus of the study is upon merger activity, it is to 
the elaboration of aspects of this structural event that the discussion 
now turns. 'Mergers have affected the development of unions' of all 
organisational forms and characters. Single-craft unions, initially the 
dominant form of union organisation, extended their recruitment bases 
both geographically and vertically to form unions tending towards 
national organisation which exhibited kindred craft structures. Mergers 
were influential in this process. The 'new model' form,, ' formally 
initiated by the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE) in 1851, was the 
result' of a merger. ' Similarly, those unions regarded as most closely 
approximating industrial organisation, the National Union of'Railwaymen 
(NUR) and the National Union of Mineworkers'(NUX), were the outcome of 
mergers in 1913 and 1945. The Transport and General Workers' Union 
(TGWU) and the General and Municipal Workers' Union (GMVU), the 
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archetypical general unions, had their origins in multi-union mergers 
following. Vorld Var I. 
The organisations resulting from mergers need not be similar. As 
the above indicates, there may be differences in terms of organisational 
policy, structure and objectives. Furthermore, Chaison (1982b) has 
identified various degrees of integration among post-merger union 
governing structures. Drawing the distinction between amalgamations and 
absorptions, Chaison. delineates three degrees of post-merger integration 
within each merger, category, concluding that 'there is considerable 
latitude- in the degrees of integration of governing structures' 
(1982b: 148). The extent to which fusion, of post-merger governing 
structures is achieved, Chaison argues, is the result of the degree to 
which such structures are . 
'compromise solution[s] to the often- 
conflicting goals of economy and efficiency in union administration and 
structure on the one hand, and the preservation of the interests of 
union members, officers and staff, on the other' (1982b: 149). ý, 
As there are degrees of post-merger integration of organisation so 
there are degrees of closer unity which, while often serving similar 
purposes to merger, do not constitute a merger. Federal forms of union 
organisation, inter-union working arrangements., (for example,. recognition 
of spheres of influence, mutual recognition of union cards and transfer 
of membership agreements) and other forms of 'strategic alliance' are 
illustrations of closer unity in which unions maintain their separate 
identities yet yield a degree of independence. In certain circumstances, 
which are examined in the body of the text, closer unity arrangements 
are intermediary between organisational independence and merger. In 
Britain, for the period covered by this study, "legislative provision has 
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had to be satisfied in order to secure a merger. The distinction between 
closer unity arrangements and merger is, therefore, determined by the 
satisfaction of legislative provision. 
It follows from the discussion above that merger activity in the 
aggregate should be regarded as a 'process'-, along two principal 
dimensions. Firstly, merger activity embraces changes in union governing 
structures, policy and strategy. In this sense the ratification of a 
merger agreement may constitute one incident, albeit an important one, 
in a series. Hypothetically, two unions may establish closer working 
arrangements while both are affiliated to a federation, These closer 
working arrangements may be subsequently formalised by merger which may 
predate the fusion of governing structures. For example, both formal and 
informal closer woking arrangements were established between the GMWU 
and the Amalgamated Society of Boilermakers, Shipwrights, -, Blacksmiths 
and Structural Workers (ASBSBSW) before the 1982 merger between the two 
unions to form the General. Municipal, Boilermakers and Allied Trades 
Union (GMBATU). Subsequent to the formal merger agreement, a set of 
'core rules' applied to all members which were supplemented by separate 
rule books to cover the former GMWU and ASBSBSW sections. Similarly, the 
Executive Council was composed of two sections essentially comprising 
the Executive Councils of the two constituent unions. Moreover, the 
ASBSBSW section maintained a separate Annual Delegate Conference which 
was responsible for the-selection of delegates to the TUC and Labour 
Party. The GMBATU Congress, -constitutionally the merged union's supreme 
authority, was the only formal point of contact between members of the 
two former unions within the new organisation, delegates being elected 
for attendance from each GMWU region and ASBSBSW district. While- a 
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timetable was agreed to further the extent of formal integration between 
the' two unions, the point remains that the ratification of the merger 
agreement was simply a stage along a continuum of integration initiated 
before merger negotiations commenced. 
The second dimension along which aggregate merger activity is 
regarded as a process relates to its historical role within the 
development of trade union structure. ' Trade union structure at any point 
in time imposes limitations on 'merger search' parameters' (Undy et 
al., 1981: 202) through the operation of 'the tensions' inherent' in its 
form. It must also be acknowledged that mergers act to alter trade union 
structure. In, promoting trade union structural realignment, a merger 
disrupts the nature of the structural tensions thereby establishing a 
changed set of merger search parameters. ' In these circumstances the 
ratification of a merger agreement represents the culmination of a"stage 
of structural development while simultaneously enabling further stages 
to proceed. `It can resonably be assumed, therefore, that the influences 
upon the merger process are not fixed but vary, at least in degree, over 
time as trade union structure and behaviour, within the confines of 
which merger activity takes place, a(ß. transformed. 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE AI S. METHODS All) LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
The first section to this introductory chapter outlined the 
weaknesses in the current approaches to trade union 'structure ' with 
respectýto the nature of trade union structural"dynamics. An approach to 
the study of the merger process based upon trade union structural events 
was advocated as a means whereby the developing relationships within 
trade union dynamics could be unearthed. Finally, the breadth of the 
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merger process was discussed. Given that the principal focus is upon the 
merger process, it remains to be established which aspects of this 
process lie within the ambit of the study. 
Two dimensions to the merger process have been identified: that 
relating to the ratification of a merger agreement as a point on a 
continuum of degrees of integration within trade union governing 
structures, and that focusing upon the inter-relationships between 
merger activity and trade union structural development. It is to the 
investigation of this latter dimension of the merger process that this 
study is devoted. Stating this aim is not meant to imply that the, former 
dimension is disregarded, but to concede that it is only considered. in 
detail in those circumstances in which it impinges upon the study's 
central focus. 
Within these confines three aspects of the inter-relationship 
between aggregate merger activity and trade union structural development 
are isolated for detailed analysis. Firstly, _ 
the pattern of occurrence 
of merger activity. A variety of measures are employed to . 'capture' the 
developing form of merger activity on the understanding that reliance 
upon a single measure obscures its complexity in character. Secondly, 
the inter-relationships between aggregate merger activity and other 
forms of trade union structural events. Particular emphasis is afforded 
to the divergent patterns in these inter-relationships between 
historical periods in order that the nature of trade. union structural 
dynamics can be more fully elaborated. Thirdly, those factors impinging 
upon the pattern of aggregate merger activity are examined with the 
object of moving towards an explanation of this aggregate pattern. 
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The aims of the study and the reliance upon the analysis of trade 
union structural events to achieve them necessitates a statistical core 
to the presentation. Such an approach has achieved popularity in studies 
of trade union membership growth and strike activity but has rarely been 
applied to merger activity. Freeman and Brittain regressed the number of 
American trade union mergers in a given year against a series of 
variables representing 'economic stagnation and the labor unrest it 
produces' (1977: 179). Freeman and Brittain's approach and the hypotheses 
attached to it is characteristic in so far as a particular measure is 
abstracted as the dependent variable and specific economic hypotheses 
subsequently 'tested'. The object here is broader, based upon the 
recognition that the merger process takes place within trade union 
structure and, therefore, is influenced by factors additional to those 
traditionally labelled as 'economic'. Furthermore, whereas Freeman and 
Brittain deploy data from 1935 to 1973, a markedly longer time span is 
utilised for this study in order to accommodate an analysis of, the 
developing historical nature of the merger process and its relationship 
with trade union structure and behaviour. - In other words, this study is 
not directly concerned with the testing of specific hypotheses grounded 
in economic theory but with the changing pattern of occurrence of, and 
the character of influences upon, aggregate merger activity. 
In stating an aggregate focus to this study, a number of issues are 
raised regarding the establishment of a general explanation., Chitayat 
(1979), for example, stresses that the capacity to generate an overall 
comprehension of the merger process is limited due to the variation in 
the circumstances of individual unions. Coady (1976: 10, quoted in 
Chaison, 1982b: 199) makes a similar point in stating that 'every merger 
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is a response to the specific needs of the unions involved, and can be 
expressed only tenuously by reference to generalised social conditions'. 
It is, of course, undeniable that the circumstances of individual unions 
are specific both organisationally and at particular points in time 
during their development. While the impact of 'generalised social 
conditions' may effect specific unions according to, for example, their 
organisational form, it is also manifest that these conditions impinge 
upon trade unionism as a whole and, therefore, the merger process in 
aggregate, albeit with different specific organisational effects. In 
other words, each merger is a specific organisational realignment, ' 
imbued with peculiarities, yet is not an isolated event by reference to 
trade union structure and the"factors influencing its development. In 
recognition of this complexity Chaison comments that 
as researchers seek to uncover the common elements in mergers, 
cases will be made for varied degrees of generalisation. A 
middle ground will have to be found between overly detailed' 
case studies and sterile aggregate data analyses (1982b: 200). 
To this end the regression analysis is supplemented by a variety of 
complementary analytical approaches. Firstly, the current research on 
aggregate merger activity is purely reliant upon measures of the rate of 
its occurrence. This study employs additional measures in order that 
aspects of the merger process apart from frequency can be embraced 
within the analysis. 
Secondly, in selecting a focus upon aggregate tendencies within 
the merger process, existing case study material is not disregarded but 
is utilised to inform the analysis of these aggregate tendencies through 
its complemetarity with aggregate statistical analyses. While its use is 
necessarily selective, such material serves to illustrate the patterns 
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discerned and allows for comments to be made regarding the extent to 
which they typify the merger process organisationally and temporally. 
For example, Undy et al. (1981: 167-219) draw generalised conclusions 
regarding merger activity in the 1960s and 1970s on the basis of four 
detailed case studies. The method adopted for this study allows both for 
the situation of these case studies within aggregate merger activity 
and, thereby, for an analysis to be made of their usefulness as a basis 
for generalisation. 
Thirdly, on the understanding that the study of merger activity is 
one of an institution in process, an historical dimension is explicitly 
developed within the analytical framework. This allows for the pursuit 
of a number of analytical opportunities so far left untouched. Research 
on trade union behaviour has been influenced by the debates between 
those researchers respectively advocating the primacy of 
industrialisation and institutionalisation. The historical grounding to 
this study allows for the contrasting of the role of these sets of 
factors in influencing merger activity. Furthermore, this approach 
provides the opportunity to situate existing case study material not 
only in cross section but also in time series. Additionally, and of 
central import to the generation of an aggregate explanation of merger 
activity, the longitudinal basis to the study permits the investigation 
of the changes in the nature of the influential factors and the purposes 
towards which merger activity is directed. This assessment complements 
the contrasts drawn between the impact on merger activity of 
industrialisation and institutionalisation. 
While the deployment of aggregate data facilitate the generation of 
an understanding of the merger process in terms of the contours of its 
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appearance and the relationships underlying its changes in character, 
there are limitations to such an approach. The exactitude of the case 
study is necessarily lost as are the influences of the divergent 
decision-making processes within individual unions. Furthermore, the 
actions of individual trade union members are subsumed in striving to 
grasp a comprehension of the interplay of broader social forces. These 
limitations are acknowledged on the understanding that the objectives of 
this study, if achieved. will inform the selection of material and 
manner of research of those areas methodologically excluded from direct 
consideration here. 
Additionally, a number of aspects of the merger process which would 
assist in the refinement of a general understanding are excluded from 
ti 
detailed scrutiny. These om7{idons are justified for no reason other 
than he duration of the project precluded the allocation of time to 
their analysis. In any case, the research presented here is necessarily 
prior in the compilation of an overview of the merger process. For 
example, excluded fibm explicit analysis are the processes of 
integration discussed above as one of the dimensions of the merger 
process, the influence of divergent patterns of unionisation within 
specific industries, and the impact of merger activity upon the 
development of the recruitment bases of individual unions. The 
examination of this material would allow 4er further refinement of the 
tendencies discerned and the explanations advanced within this study. 
One further caveat concerns the development of the explanatory 
framework. Initially, this is achieved through the application of 
regression techniques to aggregate data. A range of variables is 
employed, each of which is operationalised in terms of economic, 
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unionisation and political categories. Inter-relationships between and 
within these categories exist which influence the fluctuation recorded 
within each variable. In other words, the employed variables cannot 
theoretically be regarded as being entirely independent. For example, 
Bain and Elsheikh (1976) have shown that changes in aggregate union 
membership are influenced by movements in retail prices, money wages and 
unemployment. Where possible the nature of the complex of relationships 
influencing merger activity have been elaborated, particularly so in 
cases involving a variable mediating the impact of another on merger 
activity. But this elaboration is necessarily limited. To develop the 
full nature of the complexity of these inter-relationships would require 
a thesis in its own right. For example, the establishment of a political 
economy of inflation has been the subject of detailed academic scrutiny 
since before the onset of the twentieth century. In this context 
Piachaud comments that 
changes in earnings, profits, investment, unemployment and the 
rate of economic growth, in common with diverse other phenomena, 
ranging almost to England's batting performance, have all been 
connected in various ways with the rate of inflation, both as cause 
and as consequence (1978: 88). 
While strenuous efforts are made to emphasise the complexity of these 
relationships, the focus of this study is the development of an 
understanding of the merger process not the elaboration of a theory of 
political economy. The inclusion of such a theory would certainly 
enhance this, and any other 'industrial relations', presentation. Its 
omission, however, is not regarded as inflicting serious damage to the 
pursuit of the stated aims of the study, as the regression analysis is 
applied as a means to indicate trends and tendencies of influence rather 
than to imply certitude. 
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The structure of the thesis follows from the formulation of the 
theoretical and explanatory frameworks presented in Chapters 2 and 3. 
Chapter 2 also includes the graphical presentation of the wave pattern 
discernible in trade union structural events - the pattern of events 
that forms the central focus of the study. The final sections ofýChapter 
2-, and Chapter 3 are devoted to the establishment of a framework within 
which these data. are to be analysed. Multivariate analysis comprises 
Chapter 4, the results of which inform the directions in which further 
research is pursued. The manner of application of regression techniques 
is described within the text in order that the reader can become fully 
apprised of the particular approaches adopted without breaking to refer 
to an appendix. In contrast, data sources and the methods utilised in 
the assembly of original data series are included in appendicies to 
facilitate continuity in the development of the argument. 
Whereas the data presented and analysed in Chapters 2,3 and 4 
concern the rate of occurrence of merger activity, Chapter 5 examines 
the shape of merger activity within the confines of the framework 
developed earlier. Byway of introduction to the analysis of shape, 
Chapter 5 assesses the current analyses of merger types and the pattern 
of the merger process from the perspective of the acquiring unions. 
Chapter ,6 investigates the peculiar pattern of merger activity observed 
during merger waves. Particular attentionýis placed on the contrasting 
features of the two principal merger waves in order-to establish the 
initial areas for investigation in Chapters 7 and 8. 
Central to the framework established in Chapters 2 and 3 and 
consolidated through the multivariate analyses in Chapter 4 is the 
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distinction drawn between the period of the implementation of collective 
bargaining and that of the operation of institutionalised industrial 
relations. Earlier chapters suggest that the merger process exhibits 
divergent tendencies between these two periods. Chapters 7 and 8, 
therefore, assess in greater detail the nature of these divergencies. 
The two chapters are similar in structure to facilitate comparison. 
Prior to the conclusions, stated in Chapter 11, are two industrial 
case studies examining the impact of technological change on the merger 
process in the printing industry and union structural dynamics within 
national government. These case studies' should not be regarded as 
directly informing the aggregate explanation, but serve to complement 
aggregate analyses through the generation of suggestions whereby such 
analyses may be refined. The literature suggests that technological 
change has a pervasive effect upon merger activity. This effect is not 
'captured' within aggregate analyses. Chapter 9, therefore, investigates 
this proposition with respect to the printing industry. Chapter 10 
extends the aggregate understanding of the inter-relationships between 
structural events with respect to a particular industry. National 
government is the industry selected on the basis that the period for 
which data are available allows for an assessment of almost the entire 
development of unionism within the industry. 
The conclusion consists of an overview of the findings arising from 
the research and a comparison of these findings with existing 
explanations of the aggregate merger process. Aspects of these extant 
explanations consistent with the new evidence presented here are 
extracted and integrated to form a more comprehensive understanding of 
the aggregate merger process. 
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1. For example, the following statement from Hannah and Kay is quite 
unambiguous: 
In our empirical work we compared the actual 1919 distribution 
of firm sizes in the food industry with a hypothetical dis- 
tribution incorporating the effects of all mergers occuring 
in the following twelve years. 58 of the 103 firms in the 
industry disappear through merger, and the largest firm, 
Unilever, acquires 19 of them, including seven of its largest 
fifteen competitors and raises its market share from 22 per-cent 
to 49 per-cent. The CR5 rises from 39 per-cent to 68 per-cent, 
and the CR20 from 72 per-cent to 94 per-cent. A clearer case of 
concentration increase is hard to imagine, but the variance of 
logs records the process as a modest decline. The logarithmic 
transformation greatly understates the significance of gains of 
sales by the largest firm. We can place no reliance-on--an 
indicator with these errant properties (1977: 52). 
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2 
THE VSVB PATTERN OF TRADE UJIOT STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMEIT 
Ideally a study of the trade union merger process should commence 
from the initial phases of industrialisation, during the last quarter of 
the eighteenth century, when the first craft societies were formed. For, 
as Lerner comments, the trend toward amalgamation among craft unions is 
'almost as old as craft unionism itself' (1968: 173). Unfortunately a 
lack of data precludes satisfaction in this regard. The Chief Labour 
Correspondent of the-Board of Trade was appointed in 1886 and published, 
during the following year, The First Report on Trade Unions which 
included data on a limited number of unions. While the coverage of 
subsequent Reports was improved, it was not until seven years later, on 
the establishment of a Labour Department within the Board of Trade, that 
the first comprehensive Report for the year ending December 1892 was 
published. This Report included 'nearly the whole of what may be termed 
the solid and active Trade Unionism of the Kingdom' (C-7436: 2 quoted in 
Clegg et al., 1964: 1). As will become apparent, the use of relative 
measures for merger activity necessitates the use of statistics from a 
preceding year; therefore, this study is based on the analysis of data 
from 1893. 
_ 
Between 1893 and 1983 trade union membership has become more 
concentrated, exhibiting a skewed distribution among individual trade 
unions with a small number of the larger unions coming to organise a 
higher proportion of the total membership. In addition, the number of 
trade unions has fallen dramatically from 1,233 at the year ending 1892 
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to 395 at December 1983.1 The consequence of these tendencies is that 
any absolute measure of merger activity is necessarily biased. For, 
example, if 100 unions had been absorbed by merger during both 1893 and 
1983, these two set of events would have affected trade union structure 
to quite different degrees, yet their absolute measures-are identical. 
Therefore, two relative measure are employed: intensity and density of 
merger activity. Intensity is the number of unions absorbed in a given 
year as a , proportion of the total number of unions existing at the end 
of the previous year. Density is a measure of. the number of trade union 
members absorbed by merger in a given year as, a proportion of A he total 
trade union membership at the end of the previous year. I 
Following the system employed by the Department of Trade (1970) in 
classifying company mergers, and adapted by Buchanan (1974; 37) to trade 
unionism, the number of members regarded as absorbed in any merger is 
the sum of the membership of all unions involved minus the membership of 
the largest union. Similarly. the number of unions absorbed is the-total 
number of unions involved minus one. Symbolically these measures are 
represented as follows: 
intensity of merger activity = UAt/TUt-i 
density of merger activity = Ne/Te-, 
where: UA : the number of unions absorbed by merger 
TU : aggregate number of trade unions 
N; the number of members absorbed by merger 
T: aggregate trade union membership 
t: time 
- 23 - 
Intensity and density are measures of the likelihood of any union or 
union member being absorbed in a merger during the course of a given 
year. 
Between 1893 and 1983,1,619 unions with an aggregate membership of 
3,955.676 were absorbed by merger. The pattern of the merger process is 
illustrated in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 with respect to the intensity and 
density of merger activity. Five year moving averages are employed to 
reduce the effect of 'exceptional' years, thereby allowing for the 
examination of trends in merger activity. The 'wave' form of merger 
activity, first identified by Buchanan (1974: 37), is reproduced for both 
intensity and density. Since Buchanan utilises only absolute measures in 
his study, direct comparison is not possible. 
Three waves of intensity in merger activity are to be discerned 
with peaks recorded for the years 1922,1948 and 1976. The three merger 
waves run approximately from 1918 to 1924,1944 to 1948 and 1966 to 
1983. It is not clear whether the third merger wave is completed, for 
the intensity of merger activity has still to return to the pre-wave 
level. As with the dating of any social process, the beginning and end 
points are arbitrary to a degree. For example, the first merger wave 
might have commenced before the outbreak of hostilities in 1914 and 
-ham been temporarily curtailed by the effects of the initial war 
effort. Similarly, the end point of the first merger wave might be 
regarded as 1926 when the intensity of merger activity first dropped 
below that reached at the end of 1917.2 The closing date of the first 
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merger wave, 1924, is justified on the grounds that the National Union 
of General and xunicipal Workers (AUGXW), the second of the 'general' 
unions, was formed during this year, marking the culmination of a 
distinct phase in the development of trade union structural form. Such 
indeterminancy apart, the point remains that the intensity of merger 
activity exhibits a 'pattern of discontinuity'. As subsequent analysis 
will demonstrate. to shift marginally the limits of the wave features 
does not invalidate the explanatory argument to be developed. 
The 'shape' of the second wave differs from both its predecessor 
and successor in so far as there is no gradual increase and decline in 
the intensity of merger activity, but a sharp rise and fall. This is 
attributable, as Buchanan has indicated, to two specific mergers 'which 
accounted for almost the whole of the rise in mergers' (1974: 42): the 
formation of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) from 44 unions 
organising 671,860 members and the Institution of Professional Civil 
Servants (IPCS) from 122 unions with a membership totalling 27,969. In 
combination, these two mergers constitute 67 per cent of the unions and 
86 per cent of the membership absorbed during the 1944-48 period. 
Furthermore, merger activity between 1944 and 1948 was not as widespread 
in terms of industrial dispersion as the other wave periods. It would 
appear, therefore, that the twentieth century merger movement is 
characterised by two principal periods during which the intensity of 
merger activity constitutes a 'wave'. Table 2. r1 illustrates the 
differences between wave and non-wave periods in terms of both absolute 
and relative measures. It is apparent from these figures that not only 
are there differences between wave and non-wave periods, but also 
between waves. These are examined in Chapter 6. 
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WRRC: RR 
MEASURE 
ACTIVITY DURI 
1893 - 1917 
IG WAVE AID 10 
1918 - 1924 
1- WAVE PERIO 
1925 - 1965 
DS 
1966 - 1983 
WAVE WAVE 
Number of Mergers 14 35 8- 13 
per year 
Number of Unions 18 50 13 16 
Absorbed per year 
]lumber of Members 8,428 152.615 31,310 77,386 
Average Intensity 1.44 3.80 1.42 3.06 
(x100) 
Average Density 3.52 21.55 4.45 7.03 
(X100) 
All absolute numbers rounded to the nearest whole number. 
A similar pattern to that of intensity is recorded for the density 
of merger activity. Comparison of the two graphs, Figures 2.1 and 2.2. 
reveals a number of points to be-considered in the following analysis. 
For example, peaks in the density of merger activity for the principal 
merger waves are recorded for 1924 and 1971 whereas those for intensity 
occured in 1922 and 1976. This suggests that relatively smaller unions 
were absorbed during the early phase of the first wave, the reverse 
being the case during the second. Additionally, the density of merger 
activity recorded for the second wave is less pronounced than that of 
the first but the merger intensity for both waves is similar. It is 
concluded, therefore, that the first merger wave constitutes a more 
fundamental realignment in trade union structure than the second in so 
far as a greater proportion of union members were involved and were 

organised in unions relatively larger in size than those absorbed during 
the second wave. 
The larger Wave Pattern meng Unions of Different Sizes 
f"s TABLE 2.2 
A 
THE NUMBER OP UNIONS ABSORBED BY GT7R OF UHI01 
1893 - 1983 
Unions Absorbed 
Cumulative Percentage 
1893 - 1900 
Unions Absorbed 
Cumulative Percentage 
1901 - 1910 
Unions Absorbed 
Cumulative Percentage 
1911 - 1920 
Unions Absorbed 
Cumulative Percentage 
1921 - 1930 
Unions Absorbed 
Cumulative Percentage 
1931 - 1940 
Unions Absorbed 
Cumulative Percentage 
1941 - 1950 
Unions Absorbed 
Cumulative Percentage 
1951 - 1960 
Unions Absorbed 
Cumulative Percentage 
1961 - 1970 
Unions Absorbed 
Cumulative Percentage 
1971 - 1983 
Unions Absorbed 
Cumulative Percentage 
"i 
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i 
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Table 2.2 shows the distribution of absorption of trade unions by 
size groups. For the whole period almost two-thirds of the unions 
absorbed organised less than 500 members when absorbed whereas only five ' 
26 
organised in unions relatively larger in size than those absorbed during 
the second wave. 
The Xerger Vave Pattern Among Unions of 
TABLE2 
Different 
2 
Sizes 
_ 
THE NUMBER OF UHI OIS ABSORB ED BY SIZ E OF UNION 
Unions Organising a Membership of 
UNDER 100 AND 500 AND 1000 AND 2500 AND 
100 UNDER UNDER UNDER UNDER 
500 1000 2500 5000 
1893 - 1983 
Unions Absorbed 560 510 180 151 76 
Cumulative Percentage 34.6 66.1 77.2 86.5 91.2 i, ' .. 
1893 - 1900 
Unions Absorbed 59 39 15 6 4 
Cumulative Percentage 47.2 78.4 90.4 95.2 98.4 
1901 - 1910 Z 
Unions Absorbed 82 61 11 4 1 
Cumulative Percentage 51.6 90.0 96.9 99.4 100 ,: We 
1911 - 1920 
Unions Absorbed 133 140 42 33 9 1; .., 
Cumulative Percentage 35.3 72.4 83.5 92.3 94.7 
1921 - 1930 ,r 
Unions Absorbed 47 88 16 27 15 
Cumulative Percentage 21.5 61.7 69.0 81.3 88.1. 
1931 - 1940 
Unions Absorbed 39 26 9 5 6 
Cumulative Percentage 42.4 70.7 80.5 85.9 92.4 
1941 - 1950 
Unions Absorbed 121 79 24 15 15 
Cumulative Percentage 42.6 70.4 78.9 84.2 89.5 
1951 - 1960 
Unions Absorbed 13 10 5 5 2 
Cumulative Percentage 34.2 60.5 73.7 86.9 92.2 
1961 - 1970 
Unions Absorbed 22 28 18 27 9 
Cumulative Percentage 18.0 41.0 55.8 77.9 85.3 
1971 - 1983 
Unions Absorbed 44 39 40 29 15 
Cumulative Percentage 21.7 40.9 60.9 74.9 82.3 
Table 2.2 shows the distribution of absorption of tr ade unions'tlby , 
size groups. For the whole period almost two-thirds o f the unions;,: 
absorbed organised less than 500 members when absorbed whereas only five-, 
10000 AND 15000 AND 25000 AND 50000 AND 100000 
AND 
ABOVE UNDER UNDER UNDER, UNDER 
15000 25000 50000 100000 
23 23 16 13 
6 99 
5 
99.9 96.4 97.8 98.8 . 
1 2 4 1 
98.2 98.7 99.8 100.1 
3 5 4 3 1 
94.1 96.4 98.2 99.6 100.1 
3 1 
99.0 100.1 
5 2 4 1 3 
96.6 97.3 98.7 9911 100.2 
1 
100.1 
6 4 1 3 
93.5 96.8 97.6 100.0 
4 9 3 5 1 
91.2 95.6 97.1 99.6 100.1 
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per cent of the absorbed unions organised more than 10,000 members. 
There is a clear inverse relationship between the size of unions and 
their frequency of absorption. Significant variation within and between 
size groups is also apparent. The proportion of unions absorbed 
organising less than 500 members fell throughout the period from a peak 
of 90.0 per cent between 1901 and 1910 to 40.9 per cent between 1971 and 
1983. This trend does show some fluctuation during those periods, 
including the waves, when notable declines in the proportion of such 
unions absorbed were recorded. 
There would also appear to be differences between the two 
principal merger waves in terms of the proportion of unions absorbed 
from the two smaller size groups. For example, during the decade 1911- 
1920, including the initial segment of the first wave, 72.4 per cent of 
unions absorbed organised less than 500 members whereas for the decade 
1921-1930 the same measure dropped to 61.7 per cent. This evidence, 
indicating that during the initial phase of the first merger wave 
smaller unions were absorbed in relatively larger numbers than during 
the latter phase, is in contrast to that for the second wave when the 
proportion of unions absorbed organising less than 500 members remained 
constant throughout the two relevant decades. 
Trends for the absorption of unions from the larger size groups are 
4 
less apparent as their number is small: only 81 unions of 10.000 or more 
"r 
members being absorbed in total. It is discernible during those decades 
including merger waves, however, that the size of unions absorbed 
increased, no union of over 25,000 members being absorbed in a non-wave 
period. 
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TABLE 2.3 
)IRIR RRSH IP ABSORBED BY SIZE OF UN TON 
Unions Organising a Membership of 
VIIDBR 100 AID 500 AJD 1000 ARD 2500 AND 
100 UNDER UNDER UNDER UNDER 
500 1000 2500 5000 
& 1893 - 1983 
Members Absorbed 28,298 115,922 126,824 244,285 277,710 
Cumulative Percentage 0.7 3.6 6.8 13.0 20.0 
1893 - 1900 
Members Absorbed 2,841 8,703 10,291 13,021 13,762 
Cumulative Percentage 4.7 19.1 36.2 57.8 80.6 
1901 - 1910 
Members Absorbed 4,134 12,803 7,175 4,811 4,798 
Cumulative Percentage 12.3 50.3 71.6 85.9 100.1 
1Q11 - 1Wn 
Members Absorbed 6,726 32,692 29,450 54,551 35,240 
Cumulative Percentage 1.4 8.1 14.1 25.2 32.4 
1921 - 1930 
Members Absorbed 2,064 20,052 10,461 45,260 56,087 
Cumulative Percentage 0.2 2.5 3.7 8.9 15.3 
1931 - 1940 
Members Absorbed 1,606 6,008 5,891 8,759 20,453 
Cumulative Percentage 1.3 6.2 11.0 18.1 34,8 
1941 - 1950 
Members Absorbed 5,214 16,999 18,614 24,370 55,012 
Cumulative Percentage 0.6 2.6 4.8 7.7 14.3 
1951 - 1960 
Members Absorbed 569 2,418 3,451 6,842 7,401 
Cumulative Percentage 1.3 6.7 14.5 29.9 46.6 
1961 - 1970 
Members Absorbed 938 6,618 13,453 42,550 32,089 
Cumulative Percentage 0.2 1.5 4.1 12.5 18.8 
1971 - 1983 
Members Absorbed 2,206 9,629 28,038 44,121 52,868 
Cumulative Percentage 0.2 1.2 4.0 8.5 13.8 
Employing the eam basis of classification. Table 2.3 illustrates 
the pattern of membership absorption by merger. Overall more than 50 per 
cent of trade unionists absorbed by merger were organised into unions of 
25,000 members or larger, with less than one per cent of the total 
membership absorbed coming from unions with less than 100 members. Each 
decade including a merger wave or part of one was marked by a 
substantial decline in the proportion of members absorbed from unions in 
10000 AND 15000 AND 25000 AND 50000 AND 100000 AND 
UNDER UNDER UNDER UNDER ABOVE 
15000 25000 50000 100000 
290,027 450,715 610,019 824,816 553,553 
38.3 49.7 65.1 86.0 100.0 
14,080 37.297 133,788 52.466 
54.4 62.0 89.3 100.0 
38,402 102.195 180,955 230,876 115,939 
28.1 39.8 60.5 86.9 100.1 
39,141 20,682 
83.0 99.9 
59.905 35.843 139,433 60,220 323,046 
33.4 37.7 54.3 61.5 100.0 
12.345 
100.0 
71,109 84.192 47,535 173,719 
39.8 56.4 65.8 100.0 
49.045 170.506 108,270 307,555 114,568 
29.3 46.5 57.4 88.4 100.0 
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the smaller size groups. This evidence supports the contention that the 
wave pattern in the density of merger activity is strongly influenced by 
the absorption of unions from the larger size groups. Similarly, the 
relatively snail number of large unions absorbed confirms that 
organisational stability is conferred through a sizeable membership. It 
remains to be explained, however, why such unions merge only during 
merger waves. 
Such absolute figures disguise variations in the rate of absorption 
among the different size groups. Figures 2.3,2.4 and 2.5, therefore, 
illustrate the intensity of merger activity among unions classified by 
size group. The Department of Employment commenced the series of unions 
categorised by size group in 1937. As the size group classification in 
consistent from 1938 and three year moving averages are used, the 
presented data start at 1941. The wave pattern evident in the aggregate 
data is reproduced for the three size groups. The intensity of merger 
activity shows an inverse relationship to increasing union size with 
smaller unions consistently being absorbed at a higher rate than their 
larger counterparts. Indeed, during the relative industrial stability of 
the 1950s, the intensity of merger activity among unions organising more 
than 15,000 members remained at zero. For the principal merger wave 
covered by the data, intensity among smaller unions is seen to increase 
prior to that of the larger unions. This suggests that the factors which 
promote merger activity are either less able to be resisted by smaller 
unions or, alternatively, that the procedures necessary to achieve 
mergers are more rapidly completed by unions with a small membership. 
_4. 
---- --- 
' 
.. -_------. - - 
r. . ý; "o '4) . 
4" " 
(ocý ýcý- ýý IpýLad cSrýrrL- 
1ý1 - 
r 
a 
.4 
o'o 01 
_O 
Ox 
i0 
fl 
D 
_. 0 
a 
'0 rý n- 
(QQA) 'l'o l; býýýýu, ; 1o A119ýlaiNl 
a, 
ý. _ 
Cý"ý-. 
ý 
ýý 
ýý' 
, 
Aý 
(oi) A o! ä1 3w jo hji9 d3jJdi 
h4 VI) car -C 
- 30 - 
THE WAVE FQRII OF TRADE UNION STRUCTURAL EVENTS 
The purpose of this section is to present the data on trade union 
structural events and nave towards an understanding of the inter- 
relationships in their occurrence thereby laying the basis for the study 
of the dynamics of trade union organisation. While the focus here is 
upon trade union structural events, the 'wave form' has been recorded 
for two other aspects of British trade union activity. Cronin (1979) 
identified six strike waves since 1888 and Bain and Elsheikh state that 
'the growth of aggregate unionism is characterised' by cyclical 
fluctuations of varying amplitude and duration' (1976: 1). 
The Formation Rate 
Figure 2.6 shows the wave pattern for the formation rate of unions. 
The formation rate is calculated similarly to the intensity of merger 
activity: 
Formation Rate = Ft/TUt-, 
where F: number of unions formed in a year 
Unions formed through merger and as a result of breakaways are excluded 
from the formation rate which is based solely on those unions formed 
where no previous organisation existed. 
Two principal peaks in the formation rate of unions are recorded 
and a third inferred from the decline in the formation rate between 1897 
and 1900. It would seem reasonable to assume that the third peak was 
associated with the birth of 'new unionism' between 1889 and 1893. The 
majority of the unions formed during this period would, therefore, be 
expected to be those organising unskilled and semi-skilled labourers 
excluded from membership of the craft unions. Both the recorded peaks in 
the formation rate were co-incidental with periods of intense merger 
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activity. The first, covering the years 1917-1925, was concurrent with 
the immediate post-war rise in trade union membership and declined with 
the onset of depression during the mid-1920x. Particularly pronounced 
during this period was the growth in white-collar unionisation which 
rose from 672,800 in 1917 to 939,800 by 1925, having peaked at 1,129,200 
during 1920. Qualitative changes were also apparent in white-collar- 
unionism: 
many white-collar employees were also taking collective action. 
Unions were formed among bank and insurance clerks; many white- 
collar unions affiliated to the TUC; various white-collar groups,., 
including teachers, bank clerks, and insurance agents, threatened 
or undertook strike action; and civil servants demonstrated against 
the government (Bain, 1970: 142). 
It would seem reasonable, therefore, to suggest that a notable 
proportion of the unions formed during the initial recorded peak 
organised white-collar workers. Sidney Vebb, commenting on a partial 
list of 'recently constituted' trade unions, drew a similar conclusion 
in stating that the list 'serves to indicate the contemporary tendency 
towards trade unionism of clerks, scientific workers and others who have 
not before shown much desire for combination' (1921: 46). 
The absence of any peak in the formation rate during the late 1930s 
and the period of the 'affluent society' would seem to suggest that 
union growth. which was marked during both these periods, is an 
insufficient explanation in its own right for increases in union 
formations. The rise in union formations during the early 1970s, 
however, is co-incidental with a 6.8 per cent rise in manual and a 42.9 
per cent increase in white-collar union membership between 1970 and 
1979. This increase was particularly marked among the 'professions'. 
scientists and technicians. This evidence is, however, no more than 
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suggestive that the majority ofý unions formed organised white-collar 
membership. A further influence on the recorded increase in the 
formation rate during this period was the Industrial Relations Act 1971 
which required the registration of unions. Price and Bain (1976: 352) and 
Crouch (1979: 167) report that many staff associations completed the' 
registration procedure. In so doing many of these associations acquired 
union status thereby contributing to the increase in the formation rate. 
The first task is to consider possible explanations for the co- 
incidence of mergers and formations. Three possible explanations can be 
submitted. Firstly, newly formed unions are, by definition, unstable in 
so far as a small membership provides little current income and 
bargaining relationships need to be generated. Merger may, therefore, 
take place between newly formed unions in an attempt to 'strengthen' 
organisation. Implicit in such an explanation is the assumption that the 
memberships of the newly formed unions are conterminous thereby 
simplifying the negotiations preceding merger and allowing for rapid 
amalgamation. 
A second explanation is that the relatively unstable newly formed 
unions faced with competition for membership by more established and 
stable unions succumb to almost immediate absorption. Superficially this 
alternative would appear unlikely, for if the membership were prepared 
for immediate absorption by a larger union it is difficult to explain 
why they were not prepared to join it in the first place. Unions, 
however, require an organisational stability as the foundation to 
effective operation. This explanation is, therefore, based on the 
premise that such unions fail to achieve organisational stability, the 
membership accepting absorption as the means whereby trade union 
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membership cohesion can be retained albeit with a loss of organisational 
independence. 
Thirdly, the co-incidence of intense merger activity and high 
formation rates can be explained in terms of qualitative differences 
between the waves of unionisation. The wave of 'new unionism' 
illustrates the argument. The labourers' unions formed during the 1889- 
1893 period, according to Hobsbawm's evidence, remained weak and fragile 
during the 1890s and 'did not fully recover until after the renewed 
expansion of 1911-14' (1964: 182). It could, therefore, be argued that 
the labourers' unions, formed thirty years earlier, having survived 
precariously during the intervening years, merged in the post-war merger 
wave to consolidate organisational stability achieved in the immediate 
pre-war years. The formation of the Transport and General Yorkers Union 
(TGWU) in 1922 and the NUGAV in 1924 through merger lends tentative 
support to such a contention. Similarly, white-collar unions, formed 
during the post-war expansion of membership, could be regarded as having 
achieved stability between merger waves which was then consolidated 
during the second principal merger wave. Buchanan (1981; 43) reports an 
expansion of white-collar union mergers during the late-1960s thereby 
lending support to this notion of consolidation. 
These possible explanations are not mutually exclusive, nor is it 
supposed that any, or a combination, of these explanations is sufficient 
to provide a basis for the understanding of the entire merger process. 
They are considered in detail in subsequent chapters. This later 
examination does, however, provide a framework within which the 
relationship between structural events can be unearthed. 
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The Dissolution Rate 
A wave pattern is also revealed in Figure 2.7 with respect to the 
dissolution rate of unions. The dissolution rate is calculated as 
follows: 
Dissolution Rate = De/TU -1 
where D: number of unions dissolving in a year 
The number of unions dissolving excludes those unions absorbed by 
merger. ' In effect it is the 'death' rate of trade unions. 
Four waves in the dissolution rate are observed: 1899-1907,1920- 
1933,1945-1951 and 1973-1980. Ceteris paribus it would be anticipated 
that increases in the' dissolution rate would coincide with declines in 
membership which would accentuate organisational instability. This 
expectation is not fulfilled. Only for the period 1920-33 was there a 
decline in aggregate union membership. For each of the other periods 
increases were recorded: of 33 per cent between 1899 and 1907,21 per 
cent between 1945 and 1951 and 15 per cent between 1973 and 1980. The 
increase in the dissolution rate between 1945 and 1951, however, is the 
direct outcome of employing a relative measure. For, as was discussed 
earlier, during 1945 a total of 166 unions were involved in the mergers 
leading to the formation of the NUX and IPCS. These mergers produced a 
rapid decline in the number of unions. As the total number of unions is 
the denominator for the dissolution rate, the relative measure increases 
although the absolute number of dissolutions remains stable. ' 
Dissolution is the final point towards which organisational 
instability tends. Accepting this tenet of organisation theory allows 
suggestions to be made regarding the relationship between merger and 
dissolution among unions. It is apparent that two dissolution waves 
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follow or are concurrent with periods of high intensity in merger 
activity. It has been argued that unions merge in order to achieve or 
maintain organisational stability. It would seen likely, therefore, that 
an increase in the dissolution rate during or immediately following a 
merger wave may be attributed to the dissolution of those unions failing 
to find merger partners and thereby retaining organisational stability. 
An explanation for the wave of dissolutions around the turn of the 
century can be advanced with reference to the formation 
of labourers' 
unions. As was noted earlier, Hobebawm has suggested that these unions 
remained weak until 1911-14. Bain and Blsheikh (1978) have demonstrated 
that aggregate union membership is strongly influenced by the business 
cycle. Membership is one source of organisational stability in so far as 
contributions from members are the primary source of union income. It 
would, therefore, be anticipated that weak unions are particularly prone 
to trade fluctuations. The depression of the late 1890s and that between 
1902 and 1904 were, therefore, likely to be influential in accelerating 
the dissolution rate, particularly as the labourers' unions recruited a 
relatively high proportion of casual and semi-casual workers. 
Between 1893 and 1979 there were a total of 83 breakaway unions 
formed. Figure 2.8 showy the pattern of occurrence of the breakaway 
rate. Synbolically the breakaway rate is represented as follows: 
Breakaway Rate = Bt/TUt-, 
where B: number of breakaway unions in a year 
As with merger intensity and density, the formation rate and the 
dissolution rate, a wave pattern is apparent in the breakaway rate. Five 
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waves in, the breakaway rate are recorded: 1903-1918,1921-1932,1945- 
1953,1956-1964 and 1969-1977. As is the case of the dissolution rate 
the 1945-1953 wave in the breakaway rate can be dismissed as being the 
result of. employing a relative measure. Four waves, therefore,, remain to 
be explained. These waves can usefully be regarded as two pairs. each 
pair being separated by a gap of no more than five years duration. 
The principal merger waves both overlap with the second-breakaway 
wave in each pair. Lerner (1961) and Hemingway (1978) contend that a 
primary influence stimulating breakaways is a higher degree of union 
centralisation which, they argue, acts to limit leadership 
responsiveness to the needs of particular sections of the membership. 
The merging of two unions involves a heightening of the degree of 
centralisation. A partial explanation for the increase in the breakaway 
rate, therefore, may be based on the assumption, that they. occur in 
response to the greater centralisation within union organisation arising 
from merger activity., Merger activity and breakaways might, , however, 
also be mutually reinforcing. -An increase in the breakaway rate may lead 
to, a heightening in merger"intensity, as the breakaway unions seek merger 
as a means to enhance organisational stability. This tendency would be 
expected to be more pronounced during the later years of the period 
under study for, as Lerner (1961) demonstrates, the effectiveness of the 
TUC in limiting the capacity of breakaway unions to attain 
organisational stability is marked during the years following World War 
II. In other words, the data so far deployed do not allow for the 
assignment of causality between the two structural events. 
Whatever the direction of this causality, this explanation cannot 
be used as the basis for the development of an understanding of the 
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first breakaway wave in each of the pairs requiring explanation. A 
second source of centralisation within trade unionism is an increase in 
trade union membership. Between 1903 and 1918 aggregate trade union 
nenbership 'rose from 1,872,000 to 6,471,000 whereas between 1956 'and 
1964 membership declined by 8.000 from 7,562,000 to 7,554,000. Greater 
union centralisation arising from an increase in membership might, 
therefore, provide the basis of an explanation to the wave in the 
breakaway rate between 1903 and 1918, but is unlikely to do so for the 
period 1956 to 1964. 
Despite -the variation in method employed in the study of 
concentration, 'researchers agree that there is a tendency towards 
increased concentration among British trade unionism. The greater the 
degree of concentration of membership the greater the degree of 
centralisation. Hence a further alternative explanation for the waves in 
the breakaway rate between 1956 and 1964 and 1969'and 1977 rests on the 
notion that rising concentration stimulates breakaways. From this 
explanation it follows that breakaways would be expected to take place 
from the larger unions into which trade union membership is most heavily 
concentrated. This proposition is examined in subsequent chapters. 
Existing Bxpla anbona 
The wave pattern evident in the indices of trade union structural 
events presents analytical difficulties for those theorists basing their 
explanation of trade union structural development on the evolutionary 
maturation of union fora. Pelling (1972: 283), in assigning 'the 
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continuity of particular unions' to 'the evolutionary character of our 
political , 
history' is clearly well wide of the mark. 
Institutional teat ion theory identified, with respect, to trade union 
structure, with the work of Lester (1958) also appears inadequate as. a 
means to explain the wave fora. Lester argues, that trade union 
structural change would be expected to occur prior to and during the 
introduction of collective bargaining institutions. Following this 
introduction he would anticipate a decline in the rate of union 
structural change as 'consolidating tendencies', such as inter-union 
arbitration procedures and no-raiding agreements, 'underwrite the 
existing structural system'. While it is unjustifiable to assign a 
specific date to mark the introduction of collective bargaining, there 
can be little doubt that collective bargaining had been firmly 
established prior to the onset of the second principal merger, wave. 
Institutionalisation theory, therefore, leaves this second merger wave 
unexplained. 
Clegg (1970) places a similar emphasis on the evolutionary nature 
of union development, a process influenced by the implementation of 
collective bargaining arrangements and the growth of employers' 
associations. In a later work (Clegg, 1976) he asserts that the 'level of 
collective bargaining is the primary explanatory variable' of trade 
union, structural development. The pattern of occurrence of merger 
activity lends support to this explanation, for co-incidental with the 
two principal merger waves was the growth of shop steward organisation. 
While this development does not necessarily infer changes in the level 
at, which collective bargaining is conducted, its growth does influence 
the scope of issues covered at plant level. Furthermore, the state of 
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development of shop steward organisation is an influence upon the 
, 
'distribution of power within unions' which Clegg (1976: 40-54) also 
assigns as a determinant of the rate of union structural change. 
In designating the level of bargaining as the primary determinant 
of union structural change, Clegg's explanation is subject to question. 
For, as Warner (1977: 297) has argued, it is, far from clear that 
bargaining structures are not subject to the impact of wider 
environmental influences and should, therefore, be treated as 
intervening variables. Ramsay (1980: 106) illustrates the argument: 
these (collective bargaining] procedures appeared at times when 
employers were put under pressure, in particular by tight labour- 
market conditions. At times of high unemployment they resisted 
any calls for institutions of collective bargaining as infringe- 
meats on their sacrosanct authority. 
Furthermore, if unofficial shop steward organisation is a pre-requisite 
for. changes in the level of bargaining, an explanation must be offered 
as to those factors which influence the extent of shop steward 
organisation. Undoubtedly environmental pressures are also influential, 
as Hinton (1973) has demonstrated, again lending support to Warner's 
contention. 
Two theoretical explanations of trade union structural development 
are based upon the explicit recognition of its non-linear pattern. 
Bernstein stresses the notion of the 'structural cycle', commenting that 
when unions are growing slowly and steadily, they need make 
only slight changes in form to accomodate themselves to their 
environment; ... Vith crisis however both the rate and 
direction of growth shift drastically. As a consequence, the 
really critical developments in the morphology of unions .., tend to cluster in these brief time spans (1960: 73). 
It is 'crisis' during 'periods related to social unrest' that Bernstein 
regards as influential to union structural change. Dunlop's (1948: 191) 
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analysis bears some resemblance, in arguing that such change occurs 
during periods of 'fundamental unrest' arising from 'a basic 
dissatisfaction with the performance of the economic system and society 
in general'. These periods, Dunlop argues. occured during the bottom of 
the downswing of Kondratieff cyclee. " Cumulative grievances, with their 
source in 'severe depressions', are regarded by Dunlop as strengthening 
in union structures, and hence bargaining strength, in an attempt to 
remedy the deterioration in the living standards of trade unionists. 
The evidence available in Figure 2.1 offers partial support to the 
explanation advanced by Dunlop. Both principal merger waves occured 
during the downswing of an economic long cycle. It is immediately 
following the turning point from the upswing to the downswing, however, 
that merger activity is at its most intense. Vhile the second principal 
merger wave continues through to the bottom of the downswing, the first 
is restricted to the initial phase of the downswing. 
This point regarding timing apart, long cycle theory does lend 
partial support to Dunlop's contention regarding merger causation. For, 
following the turn from the upswing to the downswing, workers' 
expectations can no longer be met. Economic stagnation, in particular 
the tightening of profit margins, precludes the continuation in the rate 
of improvement in living standards prevalent during the upswing, thereby 
promoting dissatisfaction. Merger in this context can be viewed as a 
means to improve the 'bargaining strength' of trade unions with the 
object of securing better labour market terms and conditions. The co- 
incidence of worker dissatisfaction and intense merger activity does not 
imply causality. However, as has been documented with reference to other 
aspects of worker behaviour - namely membership growth (Bain and 
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Eleheikh, 1976) and strike activity (Cronin, 1979 and Edwards, 1981) - 
economic fluctuation has had a continual, but uneven, influence upon the 
pattern of development. Unlike the study of membership growth and strike 
activity, the study of trade union structural development is one founded 
on the notion of an institution, trade unionism, in process. It is, 
therefore, to the institutional form prevalent during each economic long 
cycle that the next section of this chapter is devoted, with the object 
I- 
of generating a framework within which merger activity may be analysed. 
The purpose of this section is'to outline an explanatory framework 
within which the analysis of merger activity is developed. As such, the 
intention is not to 'prove' the existence of long cycles through the 
deployment of a vast range of data but to generate working hypotheses 
against which the evidence on merger activity can be examined. Trade 
unions are then examined from an organisational perspective and located 
within this explanatory framework, allowing preliminary suggestions to 
be made regarding the 'purpose' of merger. 
Following a lineage traced back to Kondratieff, it is assumed that 
there is a cyclical pattern of economic development, each long cycle 
being of approximately fifty years duration. ' Each long cycle is 
regarded as comprising of two periods. Firstly, an upswing characterised 
by rapid growth, high rates of profit and the expansion of previous 
patterns of production. This is followed with a downswing marked by 
crisis and economic stagnation. During the upswing of the long cycle, 
business cycles are characterised by intense upturns and short 
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depressions whereas the converse is the case for the downswing. Both 
upswing and downswing are of similar duration. 
A number of dating systems for long cycles are available: for 
example, Gordon et al. (1982: 9), Mandel (1980: 1-36) and Hansen 
(1940: 30). Xarginal differences between these systems are apparent. For 
the purpose of this study, however, Xandel's dating system is adopted, 
because those of Gordon et al. and Hansen are based primarily, on 
American data. It is as follows: 
1893 - 1913 Upswing 
Long Cycle 1 
1914 - 1939 Downswing 
1940(46)' - 1967 Upswing 
Long Cycle 2 
1968 - 1983(not yet complete) Downswing 
The adoption of this (or indeed any other) dating system is to imply a 
.a 
degree of precision not readily applicable to social processes. As was 
noted with respect to the dating of merger waves, however, these 
distinctions are justified as analytical mechanisms allowing for the 
generation of an historical framework within which the examination of 
trade union mergers can be conducted. 
Implicit to the theory underpinning long cycles of economic 
development is the assumption that institutional form differs between 
long cycles. This tenet is substantiated with reference to 'industrial 
relations' institutions. For example, the period 1893 - 1939, the first 
long cycle under consideration, was distinguished by the implementation 
of national collective bargaining arrangements. Clegg et al. comment 
with respect to the period 1889 to 1910 that 
the development of collective bargaining was the outstanding 
feature of the period. In 1889 only cotton weaving had a national 
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agreement. By 1910 national agreements had also been signed ... 
in engineering, shipbuilding, cotton spinning, building, printing, 
iron and steel and footwear. Xoreover, almost every other well- 
organised industry ... had evolved its own system of collective 
bargaining (1964: 471). 
Vhile for the following period Clegg states that 'between 1910 and 1933 
the coverage of collective bargaining may have increased as much as 
threefold' (1985: 549). 
Between the culmination of Vorld Var II and 1983 industrial 
relations can be characterised through the operation of the 
institutionalised system. The dominant institutional developments were 
the establishment of tripartite bodies with the object of extending 
participation, thereby reducing 'the area of conflict between unions and 
capital by taking union leaders into a structure in which they could be 
persuaded to co-operate and adopt the views of government and industry 
on economic priorities' (Crouch, 1979: 21). In tracing this development, 
Allen (1960: 34) notes that by 1939 union representatives sat upon twelve 
government committees, a number that had risen substantially to 60 by 
1948-49 and up to 81 by 1951-52. 
The two long cycles of economic development identified within the 
period under study are, therefore, as follows: 1893-1939, characterised 
by the implementation of collective bargaining and 1946-1983, 
distinguished through the operation of institutionalised industrial 
relations. The distinction between these two cycles provides the 
operational basis to the multivariate analysis included in Chapter 4. By 
way of introduction to Chapter 4 and developing the contrast between the 
upswing and downswing within each long cycle Table 2.4 shows the extent 
of merger activity during these periods. 
- 44 - 
IIDICBg OF XBBGEP ACTIVITY BY L. OHG CYCLE OF ECONOMIC DBVBLOPXBBT 
]Measure 1893 - 1913 1914 - 1939 1946 - 1967 1968 - 1983 
Upswing Downswing Upswing Downswing 
Bunber of Mergers 13 18 7 14 
per year* 
, lumber of Unions 17 24 
Absorbed per year* - 
Number of Members 7,117 56,925 
Absorbed per year* 
Formations through 1.71 3.36 
Merger per year 
Average Intensity 1.33 1.91 
(x100) 
Average Density 3.50 9.04 
(x100) 
* rounded to nearest whole number 
8 
22,530 
1.27 
1.09 
2.81 
17 
77,468 
1.88 
3.27 
6.92 
All indices record a lower value for merger activity during the 
upswing by comparison with the subsequent downswing. Trends between the 
two long cycles for which data are available illustrate the tendencies 
towards concentration of membership and the decline in the aggregate 
number of unions. The average size of unions absorbed during downswings 
is larger than that of unions absorbed during upswings, supporting the 
notion that merger activity is not only more intense but also involves a 
wider range of unions. Additionally, the larger number of unions formed 
through merger during downswings lends support to Dunlop's (1948) 
contention that a more fundamental realignment in union structure takes 
place during these periods. 
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Trade Onion Organisation 
The immediate social structure within which trade unionism is 
located both acts upon and is influenced by trade union activity. The 
purpose of this section is to locate trade unions as organisatione 
within the framework of institutions comprising their immediate social 
context in order to move towards an understanding of the nature of the 
influences that impinge upon trade union structural development. As 
such, this section is not concerned with the development of a taxonomic 
categorisation of union organisational form but with aggregate trends 
and tendencies. This is not to dismiss the significance of variation 
within the trade union form but to acknowledge that such variation in 
most beneficially studied in the light of established trends and not 
vice-versa. 
Vithin any social structure of accumulation there is endemic 
competition of interests between workers and employers. As the labour 
process is collective, workers' organisation is promoted by, the 
production process. Trade unions are, therefore, 'secondary' or 
'reactive': 'their existence and activity presuppose the existence of 
economic institutions employing wage-labour' (Hyman and Fryer11975: 158). 
As a consequence of their secondary character, trade unions are both 
historically and geographically specific in so far as trade union 
members are employed within institutions separate from unionism, the 
character and location of which are largely independent of trade union 
influence. 
Writing from within the mainstream of organisation theory, Pfeffer 
states that 'the operations and decisions of organisations are 
inextricably bound up with the conditions of their environments' 
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(1972: 382). As it is beyond doubt that trade unions fulfill criteria 
consistent with their definition as organisations, it is to be expected 
that organisation theory should provide insights as to the nature of 
trade union behaviour. ° Reference to the literature on organisation 
theory and organisational behaviour, however, provides little assistance 
with respect to the analysis of trade union behaviour within the 
constraints provided by its social context. Two aspects of the 
conventional wisdom on organisational behaviour are problematic in the 
study of unionism. Firstly, exactly what constitutes trade union 
behaviour is not simply defined. A particular course of action formally 
sanctioned through agreed constitutional provisions need not be 
consistent with 'unofficial' action, yet both actions fall within the 
ambit of trade union behaviour. This point can be illustrated with 
reference to strike activity. A strike involving all members of a union 
constitutes 'trade union behaviour' in so far as all sections of the 
organisation purposively pursue an agreed policy as a single body. By 
comparison, a local dispute supported by a small proportion of the 
overall membership is more commonly classified as 'shop-floor' or 
'unofficial' action. This is still trade union behaviour, however, in 
the sense that those involved are solely trade union members. 
Secondly, the simple hierarchy commonplace within organisations 
forming the focus of mainstream organisation theory is not replicated 
within trade unions. Constitutionally, trade unions embody the 
principles of 'democratic' organisation in which control is 'a two-way 
process'. As Hyman and Fryer argue, 
the rationale of a union is that it pursues the interests of 
its members and is in the last resort controlled by them. While 
the full-time officials who form its leadership may possess 
specific authority over the rank and file, this is itself 
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constitutionally derived from the members themselves, who can 
assert their will through such processes as conferences and 
elections (1975: 157). 
Both of these shortcomings of organisation theory have their root 
in the relationship between the various sections to be found within a 
union. Industrial relations literature abounds with work reliant upon a 
siaple dichotomy drawn between union leadership and the rank and file. 
But, as Hyman has argued, a dichotomous conception of power in unions 
... obstructs analysis and ultimately confuses strategy' (1979: 61). The 
adoption of such a dichotomy precludes the consideration of positions 
intervening between leadership and rank and file such as the area 
organiser and the full-time plant convenor. 
For the purposes of this study, following Xuller-Jentsch (1981: 4),. - 
trade unions are regarded as 'intermediary organisations'. As such their 
policies are founded upon the 'pragmatic resolution of differences 
between the interests of capital on the one hand and labour on the 
other'. The primary implication arising from the adoption of this 
approach is that trade unionism is both 'goal-oriented and system- 
dependent'. In other words, unions as organisations are concerned with 
the transformation of membership expectations into workable policy 
within the bounds of external constraint arising from the social 
structure of accumulation. Xuller-Jentsch schematically describes the 
internal union processes involved in this transformation as follows: 
It [the union] does this first, by interpreting the existing 
economic and political conditions which are given, and which 
cannot be changed in the short-run (interpretation of the 
situation); secondly, by transforming more or less clearly 
articulated expectations of individual groups into collective 
demands (formulation of interests) and thirdly, by choosing 
the best means for realising these, whilst taking into account 
those interests central to the organisation as a whole (choice 
of strategy). In the course of this mediating process, the 
existing economic and political conditions on the one hand and 
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the spectrum of members' factual and political interests on the -- 
other (organisational input) are transformed by internal processes 
of selection into union strategies and policies (organisational 
output) (1981: 20). 
Merger is, therefore, one possibility for 'organisational output'. As 
organisational output is directed to the achievement of goals, however, 
it is towards an understanding of union goals that the argument is now 
directed. Once these are established, it is then possible to situate 
merger with respect to their achievement. 
Considerable ambiguity surrounds the notion of trade union goals. 
Indeed, accepting that a union is not necessarily a single entity with 
respect to action is to imply that there are likely to be many intended 
goals at a single point in time. A preferred goal adopted as policy is, 
therefore, just as likely to have its basis in conflict between options 
as in agreement. While there are differences in strategy, the overriding 
function of trade unionism is regarded as being to influence the terms 
and conditions operative within the labour market. The dominant methods 
whereby this influence is maintained are subject to development as the 
Webbe illustrated with respect to the trichotomy of mutual insurance, 
legal enactment and collective bargaining. 
Given the uneven tendencies inherent within the development of 
industrial structures, it is evident that conditions among workers vary 
along lines of workgroup, occupation and skill. It is, therefore, 
necessary to generalise with respect to the notion of 'terms and 
conditions operative within the labour market'. In general terms issues 
central to trade unionism are those impinging upon the employment 
relationship, such as the protection of jobs, improvement of real income 
and the shortening of working time. As was discussed earlier, collective 
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bargaining has been the predominant method utilised by trade unionists 
to achieve these goals during the period under study. 
Two implications arise from reliance upon collective bargaining. 
Firstly, possible strategic objectives are pragmatically defined as 
unattainable as agreement from management would not be possible. 
Secondly, and of more central, significance to the thrust of the 
argument, is that a reliance upon the 'method of collective bargaining' 
engenders goals initially peripheral to the central purposes of unionism 
yet essential to their attainment. Among these are the requirements for 
organisational stability and security, and administrative effectiveness. 
The pursuit of organisational stability derived from financial strength, 
membership cohesion and employer recognition exacerbates contradictory 
tendencies within unionism. Strong financial reserves, for example, may 
be regarded as a prerequisite to the pursuance of a 'militant' 
industrial policy reliant upon the extraction of concessions through 
costly strike activity. Accepting this to be the case, in some 
circumstances the attainment of financial strength may become the 
primary goal. Furthermore, the absence of financial strength may 
preclude the adoption of an aggressive industrial policy. For example, 
one of the prime institutional 'benefits' arising from the 'new model' 
form was the centralisation of financial control which allowed 
headquarters staff to influence workshop activity through the release or 
with-holding of funds. Often associated with the goal of administrative 
effectiveness is the tendency towards formalisation, bureaucratisation 
and professionalisation of internal union processes. The rise of full- 
time union staff acts to promote a stratum within the union with vested 
individual interests - salary and pension rights - in the organisation. 
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This tendency, has been compounded through the growth of 'membership 
services', such as research, legal and education departments, imposing 
further demands upon finance. 
Trade union behaviour can, therefore, be regarded as directed 
towards the achievement of two principal goals. The overriding objective 
is to influence terms and conditions in the labour market. As collective 
bargaining is the predominant method whereby this influence is achieved, 
the attainment of organisational objectives prerequisite to effective 
bargaining is also central to trade union purpose. Drawing this 
distinction is not to imply that the former is the sole concern of the 
membership and the latter of trade union leadership, but it is 
recognised that consciousness of the two functions is subject to 
distinction. For example, changes in the terms and conditions of 
employment have an immediate effect upon the membership whereas the 
membership is made aware of organisational requirements through the 
actions of the leadership. 
Merger as a Strategy Towards Goal Achievement 
Having established the goals to which trade union activity is 
directed this section is focused upon merger, as a purposive strategy, 
to assist in their achievement. In other words, how does merger as 
'organisational output' allow unions to more effectively influence terms 
and conditions of employment and achieve organisational objectives 
prerequisite to effective collective bargaining? Since 1876 in Britain 
the terms whereby merger can be achieved have been prescribed through 
legislation. In consequence merger, cannot be achieved without the formal 
sanction of the union executive irrespective of the source of impetus 
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towards merger. G. D. H. Cole develops the point that even with 'rank and 
file' initiative executive action is required in stating that these 
movements towards analgaaation 
may be divided into two types. - official movements, in which 
the Executive Councils and other governing bodies meet for the 
purpose of achieving closer union of forces; and unofficial, or 
rank and file, movements, in which the rank and file members of 
different unions meet for the purpose of propaganda on the subject 
of amalgamation and of stirring the official bodies to act more 
promptly and decisively (1918: 46). 
The organisation of ballots and the' negotiation of terms and conditions 
to be included in the merger agreement are usually left to the executive 
before being submitted to a ballot of the membership. 
With'respect to influencing the labour market, merger is'viewed as 
a means `whereby"bargaining strength may be'increased (Buchanan, 1974: 40; 
Freeman and Brittain, 1977: 174). Bargaining strength, however, does'not 
have its basis in'membership numbers alone, for in order to be effective 
the single union resulting from a merger must be capable of unified 
action. For example, a merger between two unions organising membership 
in the same industry and trade is likely to produce a union of greater 
bargaining strength than one involving two unions the membership of 
which are dissimilar and whose labour-'market interests may differ. As 
Freeman and Brittain comment, 'similarities supplement each other and 
form the basis of -solidarity' (1977: 174). This is not to"'dismiss the 
benefits arising from increased size which, in theory, allows for the 
taking of more widespread industrial action thereby bringing pressure to 
bear on a larger number of employees. Additionally, the TUC (1947) argue 
that the presentation of a single claim promotes better results from 
bargaining as separate claims submitted on behalf of workers engaged in 
similar occupations can be decisively exploited by managements. 
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Bargaining strength is a direct influence upon labour market terms 
and conditions in so far as bargaining is conducted directly with 
management. Influence upon these terms and conditions may also be 
exercised through effecting the formulation of government policy. The 
influence of unions in this regard has been particularly irked during 
the post Vorld Var II period. As Crouch coaaents: 
several major developments can be dated back to the war ... the involvement of trade unions in government policy-making 
bodies over wide areas of the economy; ... the emergence of a 
centralised trade union leadership which was prepared to reach 
understandings with governments and which then had the power 
to enforce acceptance of the results on its membership (1979: 19).,,, 
Trade union influence at both the TUC and Labour, Party conferences is 
dominated by those unions with large memberships -as, a result, of the 
voting systems employed. Xerger may, therefore, be sought as a means to 
increase membership size thereby enhancing the influence that can be 
brought to bear at these conferences. 
Organisational benefits arising fron merger are customarily 
described under the heading 'economies of scale'. As Chitayat states for 
example, 
Substantial economies of scale permit unions-to obtain certain 
advantages: 
1. Increasing financial resources and the union's net worth. 
2. Organising campaigns by large scale activities. 
3. Utilising professional staff and technology in preparing and 
negotiating new contracts. 
4. Centralising staff departments to serve the-union's units. 
(1979: 5) 
Additionally, merger allows for the centralisation of union authority, 
thereby, improving administrative effectiveness. This tendency can be 
overstated, however, for a merger of two unions organising divergent 
memberships raises issues which run counter to the achievement of 
administrative effectiveness. The interests of 'new membership' may 
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require negotiating and administrative expertise not available to the 
original union. The pursuit of membership growth is essential to 
organisational stability as it is from membership contributions that 
union finances are primarily derived. lerger constitutes a means whereby 
the limitations upon the extension of recruitment laid down within the 
'Bridlington provisions' can be circumvented. In this way unions with a 
declining or static membership can enter expanding areas of recruitment. 
This chapter has established the wave pattern in trade union 
structural events. Other aspects of trade unionism, membership growth 
and strike activity, were also noted as occurring in waves. Two° 
principal waves in merger activity were identified covering the periods 
1918-1924 and 1968-1983. A third peak in merger activity was attributed 
to the formation of the HUI( and the IPCS. Disaggregated merger activity 
by size group of the unions involved resulted in the replication of the 
wave pattern. Larger unions cease to be absorbed during the periods 
between merger waves, hence supporting the notion advanced in the 
literature that large meeabership size confers organisational stability. '' 
It follows, of course, that those factors which impinge upon union 
structure to promote a heightening of intensity in merger activity 
during the merger waves do so to the extent of stimulating 
organisational instability among even the larger unions. 
A wave pattern was also established for other trade union 
structural events: formations, dissolutions and breakaways. Two of the 
three waves observed in the formation rate were largely concurrent with 
those in merger intensity. Three explanations were posited as to the 
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nature of the relationship between the formation rate and merger 
intensity. Firstly, that the organisationally unstable newly formed 
unions merge with each other in order to enhance or maintain 
organisational stability. Secondly, established unions engage in 
competitive recruitment with the newly formed unions which are thereby 
forced into merger due to the inequality of this competition. Thirdly, 
the co-incidence of formations and mergers may be explained in terms of 
waves of unionisation. Unions formed during one wave of unionisation 
merge during its successor in order to retain organisational stability 
in the face of newly formed competitor unions. These propositions will 
be examined in more detail as the argument unfolds. 
Dissolution is regarded as an end point on an organisational 
stability-instability continuum. The co-incidence and slight lagging of 
the waves in the dissolution rate behind those in merger intensity 
might, therefore, be explained in terms of the failure of some unions to 
arrest the decline into organisational instability through merger with 
the consequence that they dissolve. The relationships between merger 
activity and the breakaway rate were far from clear. Several tentative 
propositions were advanced employing factors such as union membership, 
increasing membership concentration and TUC policy as intervening 
factors between the two sets of structural events. 
In addition to the presentation of the data on which this study is 
based a brief review of explanatory theories of trade union structural 
development was included in order that an explanatory framework suitable 
for this study could be generated. Integral to the adopted explanatory 
framework is the notion of long cycles of economic development, each 
cycle consisting of an upswing and a downswing in economic activity. The 
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primary implication arising from the adoption of an explanation of 
merger activity, based upon long cycles is that analysis is to be 
conducted on the understanding that each cycle constitutes a distinct 
period of institutional development. Merger activity is, therefore, to 
be examined. on a cycle-by-cycle basis. The distinctive features of the 
two long cycles under consideration were the implementation of 
collective bargaining during the former and the operation of 
institutionalised industrial relations during the latter. 
The nature of trade union organisation and its goals were also 
reviewed. Arising from this review, two principal purposes of trado 
union behaviour were identified: the improvement of the terms and 
conditions operative in the labour market and the maintenance of 
organisational stability in order to be able to effectively pursue these 
improvements. Merger is viewed as a specific policy option which my be 
enacted in order to achieve either of these goals. Given the changing 
nature of the institutional context within which trade unionism is 
located, it follows that the particular strategies which: most readily 
facilitate the achievement of union goals must vary. Similarly, the 
objectives of merger activity should not be viewed as a single. entity 
but as a changing phenomenon in the light' of the variation in 
organisational objectives and institutional environment. 
- 56 - 
1. Unless otherwise indicated data sources are available in Appendix A. 
2. A consequence of using five-year moving averages is to distort the 
appearance of a graph in so far as merger activity from the four 
previous years influences the figure computed for the fifth.. Reference 
to the absolute figures illustrates the point. 
YEAR AUNBER OF UNIONS MEMBERSHIP 
ABSORBED ABSORBED 
1917 29 11,184 
1918 43 43,824 
1919 78 25,710 
1920 78 303,785 
1921 83 335.152 
1922 35 226,489 
1923 17 16,314 
1924 13 117,019 
1925 8 5,524 
1926 13 24,606.. 
1927 9 11,679 
As graphical presentations employing five-year moving averages, Figures 
2.1 and 2.2, portray merger activity as first falling below the 1917 
figure in 1926. Absolute figures, as presented above, indicate 1924 to 
be a more likely turning point. Absolute figures have, therefore, been 
employed in the dating of the merger wave periods. 
3. In order to circumvent the stringent provisions of the 1876 
legislation covering the voting requirements necessary for merger, an 
unknown number of unions were dissolved and then reconstituted as single 
unions. The formation of the British Iron, Steel and Kindred Trades 
Association (BISAKTA) from three unions is the most often quoted 
example. As a result of this procedure the number of dissolutions may be 
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overstated during the period preceding the Trade Union (Amalgamation) 
Act 1917. 
4. The number of dissolutions for the relevant years were: 1944,13; 
1945,18; 1946,24; 1947,12; 1948,21; 1949,10; 1950,9; 1951,5. 
5. Each Kondratieff cycle is regarded as being of approximately fifty 
years duration, divided into an economic upswing and downswing of 
similar duration. In general terms, the upswing is associated with ever- 
higher peaks in the business cycle while the converse is the case for 
the downswing. Garvy (1943) and Rostow (1975) review the evidence 
regarding Kondratieff cycles. There is considerable academic debate 
regarding the mechanisms whereby an upswing is transformed into a 
downswing and vice-versa. Furthermore, disputes exist as to the specific 
nature of these cycles and, indeed, what they should be called. 
Contributions to these debates are provided by Aglietta (1979), Gordon 
et al. (1980), Mandel (1980), (Torton (1986) and Wright (1977 and 1978). 
Barr (1979) reviews the principal positions adopted by the protagonists. 
In the light of this active debate reference throughout this study is 
made to long cycles inferring no more than an economic upswing and a 
downswing of similar duration taking place within a fifty year cycle. 
6. For studies in which empirical evidence is presented in support of 
long cycle dating see Gordon et al. (1980: 41-48) and Mandel (1980), 
7. Mandel (1980) concedes that the initial date of the upswing can be 
assigned to either the pre- or post-war period. Because of the 
peculiarites of the merger data considered in later chapters, the 
upswing is regarded as commencing immediately post-war. 
8. Reference to 'trade union behaviour' is acknowledged as constituting 
reification. Reification is the act (or result of the act> of 'treating 
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abstract collective entities, which are creations of human activity, as 
the active agencies in social relations and in consequence, devaluing 
the part played by huaan actors'. (Hyman, 1975: 13). It is, however, 
recognised during the course of this thesis that trade union behaviour 
is the outcome of action taken by nesbere of trade unions. Indeed, as 
the argument unfolds, it will become apparent that the recognition of 
varying attitudes within trade unions towards mergers is crucial to 
their understanding. The use of the tern 'trade union behaviour' is 
Justified simply on the grounds that it makes for ease of explanation. 
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3 
THE DBYBLOPIgIT AND OffEATIOTALISATIOI OF THE BIPLAFATORY FRAXE'WORI 
Chaison (1982a: 198) categorised research on trade union mergers 
under four headings: historical, legal, organisational behaviour and 
chronicles. From within this body of research a myriad of factors have 
been isolated as determining mergers. Chitayat (1979) concluded his 
review of mergers between unions of different sizes by arguing that the 
primary obstacle to the generation of a theory of union mergers was the 
difficulty in generalising about their causes. Similarly, Coady comments 
that 'every merger is a response to the special needs of the unions 
involved, and can be expressed only tenuously by reference to 
generalised social conditions' (1978: 10). The preliminary intention, 
therefore, is not to describe the impact of each isolated influence at 
this point, but rather to sustain a distinction between those factors 
which explain aggregate trends and those which relate to specific 
mergers. 
To this end, the initial point of departure is to delineate the 
'environmental' from the 'organisational' influences. This delineation 
is founded on the premise that those factors referred to as 
environmental influences have a continual but varied influence upon 
trade union structure and impinge upon this structure during certain 
periods in such a way as to promote the 'urge to merge'. In other words, 
they are factors which encourage unions to attempt to merge. To posit 
that these factors exert a 'continual but varied' influence does not 
imply any gradual cumulative effect over the span of the study, but 
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suggests that during specific periods they act in combination to promote 
conditions in which merger appears as a favourable strategy for trade 
unionists to pursue. 
Factors relating to specific mergers - organisational influences - 
are not considered to provide a satisfactory explanation of the 
aggregate pattern of the merger process as they may, for example, apply 
only to a limited period of the study, such as a particular inter-union 
rivalry; or to a particular 'type' of unionism such as the maintenance 
of 'craft identity'. Indeed, the organisational influences, may be 
regarded as acting as barriers to merger. A case in point would be the 
factors unearthed by Graham (1970) which precluded the completion, of 
several merger initiatives launched in the United States between 1935 
and 1970 by the Pulp, Sulphite and Paper Mill Vorkere and the United 
Papermakers and Paperworkers. Such factors included, at different points 
in time, jidsdictional rivalry, different contributions structures, 
'profoundly different conceptions of trade union government' and methods 
of selecting officials, and differences in disciplinary procedure. Of 
course, in certain situations such barriers can be overcome;, in others 
they cannot. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, that the impact of 
the organisational influences is likely to be most pronounced in 
determining the direction and form that mergers take. 
Clearly, there are relationships and inter-actions between the two 
sets of influences. To attempt to move towards an understanding of these 
is one of the priorities ., of 
this study. While it is impossible at this 
point to specify these, a comment referring to the methods whereby these 
relationships can be elaborated is appropriate. Freeman and Brittain 
(1977) employed regression analysis with the absolute number of mergers 
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in a given year as the dependent variable and lagged explanatory 
variables of gross national product, unemployment and the number of 
strikes. In commenting on this approach Chaison states that 
an important methodological problem-in the Freeman-Brittain 
analysis is the failure to consider the possibility of internal 
union opposition to merger movements, and consequently the 
presence of a large number of unsuccessful merger attempts. 
Their study focuses on the frequency of successful mergers, and 
their discussion does not differentiate between the factors 
which cause unions to attempt to merge and those factors which 
bring about actual mergers (1978: 122). 
To which Freeman and Brittain reply that 'we can only note that it is 
impossible to study non-events scientifically' (1978: 128). 
In differentiating between the environmental and organi eat i anal 
influences it is argued that this 'problem' is overcome. For, given the 
terms of this differentiation, if the organisational influences are 
regarded as barriers to merger, it can be presumed that when a merger is 
completed the 'strength' of the environmental influences is relatively 
greater than that of the organisational influences. If the relative 
effect of the environmental influences is examined by means of 
regression analysis, the relationships between environmental and 
organisational influences can be assessed in the light of the 
investigation of the environmental influences. 
The dominant statistical technique employed with reference to the 
evironmental influences is regression analysis. It is acknowledged, 
however, that the same environmental influence may have a different 
effect across both time and organisation. The reason for using 
regression analysis, therefore, is not only to test explanations 
advanced in the literature but also to investigate what changes have 
taken place over time within the merger process. Roving towards an 
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explanation of these changes allows for elaboration of the' relationships 
both within and between the two sets of influences. 
The Environmental Influences 
For ease of explanation the environmental influences are considered 
in terms of three broad categories: economic, unionisation and 
political. Each of these categoriee is discussed in turn. In so doing 
it is accepted that false distinctions are made as there are intter- 
relationships within and between influences from the different 
categories. Some influences categorised as 'unionisation', for example, 
may be intervening between economic influences and the merger process. 
The initial purpose is to identify the influences. Some of the 
theoretical inter-relationships between the categories of influence are 
discussed below. The elaboration of these inter-relationships 
constitutes an analytical focus of subsequent chapters. 
Economic influences. Closely associated to the impact of the 
business cycle on nemberehip changes are those of inflation and wage 
rates upon union finances and the living standards of trade union 
members. Union contributions in Britain are relatively low, yet the 
breadth of membership services offered by unions has widened. With, many 
unions competing for membership unions are reluctant to raise membership 
contributions above the level of those of , their competitors. These 
factors, in combination with a high rate of inflation. have resulted in 
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financial difficulties for some unions 'which have subsequently sought 
merger. 
A lowering of living standards, when wage rates are rising at a 
slower rate than retail prices, may also stimulate a union to `merge 
through its impact upon bargaining. For example, Buchanan" (1974: 43) 
reports that at times of high inflation the maintenance of differentials 
becomes important. Unions merge in order to strengthen their bargaining 
position and thereby are more able to defend these differentials. The 
merger of the Draughtsmen and Allied Technicians Association (DATA) with 
the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUBW) is a case in point. 
Buchanan argues that because of the position of DATA members within the 
production process strikes tended to be lengthy and, therefore, -costly 
in terms of relatively high strike pay. By merging with the AUBW, "the 
Technical, Administrative and Supervisory Section (TASS), as DATA 
became, strengthened its bargaining position through gaining access to 
larger financial resources and limited its costs in terms of strike pay, 
yet acted to protect differentials. The example of the TGWU is'also 
cited: 
certainly the powerful position of the TGVU and its leader- 
ship of the seni-skilled and unskilled workers has allowed 
it to negotiate a narrowing of the pay differential for skill 
in recent years. and the need for skilled unions to be 
organised into equally large organisations has been behind 
some recent merger discussions (Buchanan, 1981: 47). 
Additionally, Phelps-Brown (1968) has suggested that simultaneous 
bargaining is encouraged when retail prices are rising rapidly because 
employers argue that whatever increase is awarded to one group should be 
awarded to others. This, in turn, is regarded as encouraging unions to 
merge as a result of the close co-operation that is required during such 
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co-ordinated bargaining. Mergers taking 'place within the confines of a 
union federation would be particularly prone to this influence. 
Technological change is also regarded as an economic influence upon 
merger activity. In the introduction to this section it was acknowledged 
tr 
that the effect of some influences is mediated by their impact upon 
others. Technological change is one of these. Its effect on merger 
activity is regarded as being primarily mediated by unionisation 
factors. Technological change is, however, reviewed under the 'economic' 
category as its influence is prior to the unionisation effects it 
stimulates. 
The first stable forms of union organisation, the craft societies, 
were historically characterised by the attempts of their members to 
control labour supply by restricting membership to 'time-served' 
craftsmen and limiting the ratio of apprentices to craftsmen. 
Technological change contributed to the undermining of union 
organisation founded on these methods either through the creation of 
jobs requiring 'new' competing skills or through the de-skilling of 
existing jobs, thereby opening then up to semi-skilled and eventually, 
unskilled workers. In response to the employers' use of technology to 
undermine the craft societies' bargaining power, they adopted a range 
of strategies, among which were the signing of dilution agreements, the 
reinforcement of demarcation lines and merger. The breakdown of 
demarcation lines also often led to competitive recruitment which was 
sometimes resolved through merger. This trend towards the merging of 
craft societies was instrumental in the formation of national craft 
unions and federations of craft unions. 
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The emergence of ' industrial and multi-craft unions can also be 
partially attributed to the impact of technological change. The craft 
societies, unable to resist the introduction of technology on the terms 
they desired, 'opened' recruitment vertically in order to bring semi- 
skilled and unskilled workers into membership in an attempt to retain 
some elements of traditional craft control. This opening of recruitment 
was matched by an opening of 'merger search parameters'. Similarly, 
multi-craft unions were formed through amalgamation as demarcation lines 
were rendered obsolete by new machinery and the new grades of labour 
recruited to operate it. 
Furthermore, the impact of technological change may lead to- an 
increased heterogeneity of membership. Lerner (1961), writing' on the 
breakaway of the Engineering Officers' (Telecommunications) Union EO(T)A 
from the Post Office Engineering Union (POEU), , for example, lays 
emphasis on the rapid technological change in telecommunications during 
World War II which led the POBU leadership to fail to recognise the 
diversity of skills brought about by euch changes. As this 
diversification is repeated among the memberships of other unions, the 
possibilities of new merger 'partners, on the basis of membership in 
similar work, my arise. The recent merger discussions between the 
Society of Telecom Executives (STE) and the Society of Civil and Public 
Servants, Telecoms Group (SCPS, TG), however, illustrate the opposite 
tendency. Technological change led to a convergence in the functions 
carried out by SCPS, TG members with those undertaken by STE members. 
This convergence was one of the influences that prompted the merger 
negotiations. The introduction of silicon-chip technology has been an 
important factor in stimulating unions to search for merger partners. 
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Buchanan reports that 'in printing, technological change has been 
important in producing at least one merger virtually each year 
throughout the 1960e and 1970s' (1981: 44). Recent mergers among unions 
organising in textiles, finance and engineering have also been 
influenced by technical change (Industrial Relations Review . and 
Report, 1983). 
Additionally, Buchanan (1974) and Hughes (1970) have argued that 
corporate mergers often promote union mergers because of their 
'disturbance effect' upon established bargaining relationships arising 
from variations in management attitudes towards unions, their influence 
upon inter-union relationships and the destabilisation of established 
payment systems. While Buchanan's argument is founded on the observation 
that there was 'something of a similarity in trend' between company and 
union mergers, Geroski and Knight (1984) extend this initial formulation 
through a consideration of the different 'directions' of company merger. 
They argue that horizontal, conglomerate and vertical company mergers 
induce union mergers with similar variation in direction. 
Bain and Elsheikh (1980) discerned a positive relationship between 
increasing company size and union membership growth. Therefore it. is to 
be presumed that company mergers, which clearly influence company size, 
will also have an effect on merger activity through unionisation. 
Furthermore, if it is accepted, as Buchanan contends., that the, impact of 
company mergers is through their 'disturbance effect' upon established 
bargaining arrangements and the comparability of employment terms and 
conditions, it would seem reasonable, to suggest that nationalisation and 
civil service re-organisation might have a similar effect. 
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UniDn1 tinn influences. A second range of environmental influences 
arise fron the unionisation process. These influences are not 
independent of other factors. For example, Bain and Elsheikh (1976) 
confirmed that union membership is intimately associated with movements 
in the business cycle and Chaison (1981) has demonstrated that 
membership growth and union merger are related. Union membership is, 
therefore, regarded as a mediating variable through which the business 
cycle influences merger activity. Both Dewey (1971) and Janus (1978) 
suggested that, within specific American industries, membership decline 
or a static membership has been the principal motivating factor for 
several mergers. Since trade unions rely upon membership contributions 
as their primary source of income, a declining membership imposes 
financial restriction. Funding might be improved through an increase in 
membership contributions, although this policy might jeopardise 
recruitment vis-a-vis competitors thereby exacerbating the initial 
problem. Similarly, limited funds might curtail organising initiatives 
launched by a union and the capacity to pay strike and other benefits. 
Additionally, a widening of the range of membership services offered by 
trade unions has led to 'an apparent rise in the threshold of union 
solvency' (Hymn, 1983: 38). 
Indivisible from membership growth are the tendencies towards 
increase in the density of union organisation and the concentration of 
union membership. These are regarded as influencing merger activity 
through their effects upon recruitment patterns. Dewey (1971), Janus 
(1978), Buchanan (1974 and 1981) and Adams (1984) all refer to the 
influence of competitive recruitment upon merger activity. There are, 
however, two principal approaches advanced as to how such circumstances 
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of competitive recruitment arise. Firstly, in times of membership 
decline trade unionists place a high priority on the need to retain 
existing membership and aggressively pursue new members. This pursuit of 
new members may bring unions into competition as they expand their bases 
of recruitment or heighten existing competitive rivalries. 
Secondly, technological change may erode agreed lines of 
demarcation thereby bringing into competition unions which were 
previously separate in terms of membership recruitment boundaries. By 
whatever means conditions of competitive recruitment arise, researchers, 
concur that such conditions promote a duplication of resources, the 
likelihood of expensive inter-union disputes, personality and 
institutional. rivalries. and what may be a costly need to maintain an 
aggressive wages policy to compete for membership, all of which are 
regarded as promoting mergers. 
As trade union membership tends towards increased concentration, so 
differences in relative union size increase in magnitude. Undy et al. 
(1981: 167-219) see such differences as motivating factors to merger 
activity, assigning primacy in merger causation to 'relative size 
considerations'. There can be little doubt that relative and absolute 
size differences stimulate mergers. For example, within a federation a 
relative size advantage may confer additional voting rights. Similarly, 
absolute size may enable the provision of additional membership 
services, Labour Party and TUC patronage, and organisational stability. 
A further consequence of membership concentration is the increased 
heterogeneity of union membership. Several large unions have come to 
organise within an increasing number of industrial sectors. Given the 
organisational stability achieved by such organisations and the wide 
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range of services offered by them, they have come to appear as 
'attractive' merger partners. It has been argued that the presence of 
these large conglomerate unions has itself stimulated merger activity. 
For example, some of the smaller unions in banking and finance opted for 
merger with the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial 
Staffs (ASTHIS) or the Banking. Insurance and Finance Union (BIFU) on the 
grounds that services to their members would be improved. Similarly, the 
TGVU proved an acceptable merger partner to the craft oriented National 
Association of Operative Plasterers (JAOP) because of the negotiating 
expertise in building which existed within the TGVU, the financial 
stability conferred as part of the TGVU and the available range of 
membership services. 
Political influences. The third group of environmental influences 
on the merger process are associated with the institutionalisation of 
trade unionism, with a particular focus on the development of collective 
bargaining. Divergent approaches are apparent regarding the independence 
of the growth of collective bargaining from other influences. In the 
approach associated with Clegg and the 'Oxford School', collective 
bargaining is viewed as having an independent effect on union structural 
development. The effect of changes in the structure of management and 
employers' organisations mediated through variations in the level of 
nF .,. 
collective bargaining are assigned primary importance (Clegg, 1976). A 
contrasting standpoint is maintained by Ramsay (1980), who argues that 
bargaining, 'far from being an independent evolutionary process, is 
impelled by a cyclical need for management re-assertion of the 'right to 
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manage' and is an intervening factor between control of the production 
process and union structural change. The ramifications of this 
divergence of view will be examined in subsequent chapters; the current 
purpose, however, is to consider the suggested impact of the growth of 
collective bargaining upon merger activity. 
Two aspects of collective bargaining are regarded as being of prime 
importance: the growth of the institutions of collective bargaining and 
the relative 'strength' of the parties to bargaining. The impact of the 
growth of the institutions of collective bargaining on merger activity 
is regarded as an evolutionary process. Initially, the formation of the 
institutions of collective bargaining promoted the merging of local and 
regional unions into organisations with national recruitment bases to 
match similar developments in employers' associations. As these 
institutions further developed, so the complexity of bargaining 
increased, compounded by ever more legislative involvement in industrial 
relations. These developments required unions to improve membership 
services, internal government and administration, and negotiating 
practice. These factors promoted mergers as smaller unions were unable 
to finance the necessary services and, therefore, sought merger with 
unions able to provide the services in order to protect their 
menbershipe. 
The second tendency associated with the promotion of mergers within 
a framework centred upon collective bargaining is concerned with the 
'strength' of the parties to bargaining. Buchanan, for example, is 
unequivocal in stating that 'a relatively weak bargaining position in an 
industry seems to have encouraged amalgamation in a number of cases' 
(1974: 40). Of course, a weak bargaining position can be 'relative' in 
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more than one sense. Unions may, for instance, merge to protect their 
bargaining position relative to that of other unions as was evidenced 
earlier in an attempt to protect differentials. By contrast, unions may 
also merge to strengthen their position relative to that of employers. 
Employer strength is derived from two inter-related sources: one is 
broadly associated with profitability and the second with the structure 
of companies themselves. In this context Freeman and Brittain (1977), 
Hughes (1972) and Buchanan (1981) have stressed the pursuit of 
membership size or 'scale' as being a principal merger stimulus. 
An additional impact upon merger activity linked to 
institutionalisation is Labour Party and TUC representation. It is 
argued (Industrial Relations Review and Report, 1983: 2) that unions 
pursue membership size, merger being one of the quickest ways to do so, 
in order to influence decision-making within these organisations. While 
this reasoning may explain the absorption of smaller unions by larger 
unions from the perspective of the absorbing union benefits also accrue 
to the absorbed union. For example, the National Union of Agricultural 
and Allied Workers (NUUAV) absorbed by the TGWU during 1982 dominates 
the agricultural trade group of the TGWU thereby ensuring that TGWU 
agricultural policy is effectively determined by the former NUAAV. But 
this policy will be supported by the entire TGWU membership vote cast at 
TUC and Labour Party conferences. 
Also associated with the institutionalisation of trade unionism is 
the growth of legislative involvement in industrial relations. Since 
1876 the achievement of merger has been legislatively prescribed. The 
history of legislative change covering trade union mergers shows 
increasing ease in the procedures whereby mergers can be achieved. Four 
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pieces of legislation cover the period for which the data on merger 
activity is available. Initially, the procedure was laid down under 
Section 12 of the Trade Union (Amendment) Act 1876. It required that 
any two or more trade unions, by the consent of not less than 
two-thirds of the members of each and every such trade union, 
become amalgamated together as one trade union, with or without 
any dissolution or division of the funds of such trade unions, or 
either or any of them; but no amalgamation shall prejudice any 
right of a creditor of either or any such union party thereto. 
The terms of the Trade Union (Amalgamation) Act 1917 required a 
minimum 50 per cent poll for each, union. The merger was carried if the 
number of votes cast in favour of the proposal exceeded by a minima of 
20 per cent those against. The passing of the 1917 Act coincided with 
the first merger wave. 
The provisions of the 1917 Act were further eased under the terse 
of Section 6 of the Societies (Xiscellaneous Provision) Act 1940. 
Despite requiring two-thirds of a union's membership to vote in favour 
in order for a merger proposal to be carried through, three factors 
facilitated merging. Firstly, only the members of the 'transferor' union 
had to vote; secondly, a two-thirds majority at a delegate conference 
was adequate to meet the provisions of the Act; and thirdly, the Chief 
Registrar of Friendly Societies was empowered to authorise a merger even 
if the voting requirements were not satisfied, provided the union had 
published its intention to merge and the objections of all parties had 
been considered. Elias (1973: 129) cites the example of the Scottish 
Painters' Society in illustration of this third factor, where the 
Registrar permitted the transfer to go ahead even though only 45.6 per 
cent of the membership voted in favour, constituting 73.3 per cent of 
those voting. 
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The current legislation is the Trade Union (Analganation) Act 1964, 
which allows merger to be achieved by two procedures: amalgamation and 
transfer of engagements. Amalgamation is secured by a simple majority 
voting in favour from each amalgamating union. A transfer of engagements 
requires a majority only from the 'transferor' union, no vote being 
required from the membership of the acquiring union. 
Organisational Influences 
Coupled to, and in many instances arising from, the environmental 
influences are those that are 'internal' to trade union organisation. 
For the purposes of this study these factors are referred to as 
organisational influences. The organisational influences are not 
relevant to every merger, nor does their nature and impact remain the 
same both over time within a specific union and at a specific time 
across a number of unions. At this stage of the study it is assumed that 
the effect of the organisational influences upon mergers is most 
pronounced in influencing the direction and form of mergers mediated by 
their constraining effects on specific combinations of unions. Hence 
this review of the organisational influences includes no more than a 
brief summary of the impact of these factors. Clearly. inter- 
relationships exist, but these are not elaborated in detail. This 
generalised account necessarily loses some of the subtlety of these 
inter-actions, but the point is merely to bring to the reader's 
attention the range of organisational influences. 
Conflicting strategy and policy of union groups are frequently 
referred to as representing barriers to merger which need to be overcome 
if combination is to be achieved. Leadership priorities are a case in 
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point. Union leaderships are usually strongly represented during merger 
negotiations where issues regarding the terms of their employment are 
resolved. 'Particular emphasis has been laid on the need to reach 
agreement, on euch factors as jobs within the merged union, their status 
and salaries, and attached pension' rights. Hyman (1983: 39) mentions the 
influence of the compatability of''political sympathies', while Buchanan 
(1974: 40) suggests that 'personalities' of trade union leaders or even 
their 'mental attitude' influences merger. Fears expressed by union 
leaders that merger discussions will provide opportunities for'-their 
political opponents in future elections is suggested by Chaieon 
(1978: 120) as playing a role in merger negotiations. 
The policies adopted by union officials towards membership growth, 
absolutely and in terms of union recruitment base, is regarded by Undy 
et al. (1981: 187-219) as influencing attitudes towards merger. Hughes 
(1972: 152) would seem to concur in stating that 'trade unions, like many 
companies, are caught up in competitive pressures and are conscious-'of 
the need to formulate a viable growth policy. ' Should a positive policy 
towards growth be adopted, then clearly mergers are an attractive 
strategy. For, as opposed to 'natural growth', they allow fora by- 
passing of the Bridlington Principles and for the 'buying in' of 
negotiating expertise in the form of officials from the absorbed union. 
Even when a positive policy' towards 'growth is , adopted 
organisational influences may act to constrain the ` merger search 
parameters'. ' Historical growth priorities are a case in point. These may 
limit a craft union, for example. to consider only another craft union 
as an acceptable merger partner'in order to retain its 'craft identity''. 
Other historicial growth priorities may lead to unions searching for 
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merger partners only within the industry, in which they already organise. 
The syndicalist tradition of some, unions., particularly strong, during, the 
first two decades of the twentieth century, influenced such an 
orientation. Specifically, the rank and file movements, of which the 
Metal, Engineering, and Shipbuilding Amalgamation Committee is a notable 
example, came into sharp conflict with the 'official' amalgamation 
policy in some unions on this issue. 'Traditional hostility' between 
unions. founded on the relative,. position of their members within the 
workplace, is also regarded as having an adverse influence on merger 
opportunities. The POBU voted twice in lese than two years against 
merging with the STE which represents supervisory staff in British 
Telecom. This influence is far from universal as is evidenced by the 
Union of Communication Vorkers' (UCV) conference decision to, continue 
merger talks with the Communication Managers' Association (CXA),., the 
equiv. lent union in the Post Office. w 
Differences in policy towards bargaining issues are also indicated 
as featuring strongly in merger. negotiations. The policy of the National 
Union of Journalists (NUJ) in seeking time-off-in-lieu in compensation 
for overtime was cited by the National Graphical Association (NGA), 
which insists that all overtime, be paid at ,a premium rate, as 
constituting a stumbling block during their unsuccessful, merger 
negotiations. 
Rp, t 
Affiliation to outside bodies - most notably the TUC and the Labour 
Party - is also perceived as influencing particular mergers. The non- 
affiliation of BIFU to the Labour Party is regarded as being a factor in 
encouraging the numerous staff associations in banking and insurance to 
seek a merger, while the same union's affiliation to the TUC is seen as 
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conferring representative advantages. Because both the United' Kingdom 
Association of Professional Engineers (UUPE) and the Chemical Vorkers' 
Union (CVU) were not affiliated to the TUC, they failed to secure the 
bargaining position they desired. Their mergers with the Electrical, 
Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbers Union (EETPU) and the TGVU 
respectively were partially explained in terns of the recognition that 
these mergers granted their nenberships. 
Constitutional differences nay also influence merger activity. The 
best documented distinction is that between a regional and a trade group 
structure. Hughes, ' for example, states that any union absorbed into the 
latter structure can retain a 'significant and continuing degree of 
group identity, elements of autonomy, and specific representation and 
servicing' (1972: 153). Indeed, it has been argued that the trade group 
structure is the primary reason for the TGVU's success in attracting 
merger partners in contrast to that of the General, Municipal, 
Boilermakers and Allied Trades Union (GXBATU), Undy et al. (1981) 
suggesting that the 'concentrated form of national government' typically 
associated with a trade group structure makes for ease of merger 
negotiations. 
11 
The first merger between the National Union of Printing, 
Bookbinding and Paper Yorkers (AUPBPV)/ National Association of 
Operative Printers, Graphical and Media Personnel (NATSOPA) is mentioned 
by Buchanan (1974: 40) to illustrate the problems of comparability that 
arise when unions with different degrees of centralisation in their 
decision-making structures try to merge. AUPBPV branches, with their 
high degree of autonomy in terms of both decision-making and financial 
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control, were reluctant to concede this autonomy which was necessary in 
order to combine with the centrally constituted NATSOPA. 
The method of selecting officials has also influenced particular 
mergers. The AUEV's insistence on the election of all full-time 
officials has prevented TASS from endorsing a move into a full merger as 
its officials are appointed. RUBE is reputed to have overhauled its 
constitution during the early 1970s in order to make it a more 
attractive merger partner for other unions organising in the finance 
sector. This was emphasised in the change of name from RUBE to BIFU. 
G. D. H. Cole reported that the relative financial position of unions 
influenced mergers: 
The [financially] weaker union may find itself confronted 
with the possibility of reduced benefits, or of higher 
contributions for its members in the new amalgamation. The 
stronger union may regard it as unfair to admit the members 
of the other union on terms more favourable than their own 
members have secured by their accumulated contributions (1918: 48). 
He went on to comment that variations in benefit for sickness, 
unemployment, funerals, etc. have led to difficulties in some merger 
discussions. Indeed, Bevin commented in 1925 that 'I have often said 
that when you are trying to bring about amalgamation there is more 
trouble about Funeral Benefit than anything else' (quoted in 
Allen, 1957: 45). Similarly, the servicing departments - research, 
education, legal, etc. - run by the larger unions make them attractive 
to smaller unions, in particular, as many do not organise a large enough 
membership to enable them to finance such departments. 
Two principal 'types' of influence upon the merger process have 
been identified; the environmental influences and the organisational 
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influences. There are inter-relationships between these two sets of 
influences. Indeed, particular organisational influences nay mediate the 
effect of the environmental influences upon merger activity in specific 
circumstances. Three categories of environmental influence have been 
identified; economic, unionisation and political. The object of the next 
section of this chapter is to operationalise the environmental 
influences in order that their relative effect my be analysed. 
The initial focus of this study is directed towards the developnent 
of an explanatory framework of aggregate merger activity. As the 
organisational influences are regarded as being specific to particular 
mergers, it is to the environmental influences that reference is made in 
developing this framework. This is not to suggest that organisational 
influences are not pertinent to an analysis of merger activity, but to 
assume that they do not determine overall trends of merger activity. 
This` section is, therefore, devoted to an elaboration of the 
hypothesised effects and operationalisation of the environmental 
influences. 
Several cautionary points should be noted, however, with respect to 
the methods employed in developing the explanatory framework. The 
central interest is in explaining the pattern of merger activity. The 
principal statistical technique is regression analysis, employing merger 
intensity as the dependent variable and the environmental influences as 
independent variables. The objective in utilising this technique is not 
to test particular models nor to account for the largest amount of 
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variation in the merger variable, but to establish a framework upon 
which the explanation of the pattern of merger activity can be built. It 
is for this reason that the longest time period for which consistent 
data are available has been used. 
Xerger intensity - in effect a measure of frequency - is used as' 
the dependent variable throughout, thereby enabling comparisons to' be 
drawn between the impact of the different sets of influences. 
Additionally, measures of frequency have been shown to be 'more 
intimately associated with structural influences than are `other 
measures. For example, Knowles (1952: 151) has demonstrated that measures 
of frequency are most independent of previous values, thereby making 
them sensitive to economic influences. 
The application of regression techniques necessarily imposes a 
number of limitations on the study. Primary among these is that each 
absorption is regarded as a similar event, thereby excluding from 
consideration variation in the size of unions involved, the 'direction' 
constituted by the absorption, and industrial variation in 'merger 
activity. Such variation is disregarded at this point as only through 
the elaboration of an aggregate explanation can the merger process in 
toto be understood. As so little research has been conducted on the 
merger process, internal variation is best located within an overall 
understanding rather than generalising from the specific. 
In employing regression analysis on aggregate merger activity, 
theories applied to the independent variables - the environmental 
influences - must be stated at the aggregate level. Edwards makes the 
point with reference to the generation of explanatory models of strike 
activity when he states that economists 
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can test micro models on macro data as long as these 
data are closely related to their theoretical counter- 
parts. But when such things as the unemployment rate are 
used they must restrict themselves to theories which are 
stated at an aggregate level; if the rate is used as a 
general index of the tightness of the labour market, and if 
strike activity is viewed in the aggregate, econometric 
methods are successful (1978: 323). 
This point is of central significance. For it is recognised that the 
chain of causation between, for example, unemployment and merger 
activity is. long, and to a degree, indeterminate. Therefore, several 
micro models can be devised for every variable, each of which need not 
necessarily be consistent with others in . terns of the hypothesised 
direction of the relationship. 
Economists argue that in restricting their analyses to relatively 
short time periods the impact of institutional and political factors may 
be operationally overlooked. This study is based on data available since 
1893. It is, therefore, necessary toýinclude unionisation and political 
factors in order to capture the impact, of institutionalisation upon the 
merger process. Certain unionisation and political factors may be 
regarded-as intervening in the chain of causation between, for example, 
economic variables and merger activity. Therefore, in developing the 
explanatory framework the variables are introduced in the . 
following, 
order: economic, unionisation and then political, with the object of. 
determining whether variables from the last two categories --add 
explanatory power to the framework developed through the sole 
application of economic variables. -. - 
The point wade above with respect to the theoretical underpinning 
of the economic variables is also applicable to the unionisation and 
political variables. It,. does not stretch the imagination to argue that 
the rate of change in real wages should influence merger activity. A 
more elaborate imaginative process is required, for example, to generate 
an argument linking merger activity with the political persuasion of the 
government in office., Moreover, even if such, a link is established, it 
does not necessarity follow that a strategy of merger is directed 
towards the polity. The introduction of unionisation and political 
variables raises problems of interpretation. Thus the framework provided 
by the regression results is supplemented with: analyses of merger 
direction and merger waves in Chapters 5 and 6. 
In addition-to questions of interpretation, the introduction of 
unionisation and political variables is methodologically problematic. If 
a unionisation variable is related to an economic variable, for example, 
time series measures of the two variables will be correlated leading to 
problems of multicollinearityl within the regression equation. Where 
extreme multicollinearity exists, the theoretical assumptions underlying 
regression analysis are violated, thereby bringing into question the 
validity of the results obtained. Therefore, in operationalising the 
environmental influences, emphasis is placed on the hypothesised impact 
of the variables rather than that applicable to each regressor used. For 
instance, the variable 'wages' may be employed as a regressor in the 
following forms: rate of change of money wages, level of real wages, and 
the rate of change of real wages. In operationalising the variables, 
hypotheses are generated for each regressor employed. The regressor 
applied in any particular equation is determined by the technical issue 
of avoiding multicollinearity. -In doing so, the impact of the regressors 
on merger activity may vary., -'As the theory applied to the variables is 
developed at the aggregate level, however, this variation is regarded as 
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being accommodated within the different hypotheses "applied 'to each 
regressor. 
A further point is raised by Chaison who argues that-it ' is 
necessary to introduce lag structures or to group mergere'into "broad 
time periods'- in conducting regression analysis because` 'the actual 
negotiations for any merger ... usually begin one to"five years prior to 
the final merger, and in some cases negotiations are conducted on and 
off for over a decade' (1980: 119). His argument is that the influence of 
the environmental factors is incurred prior to the ratification of the 
merger agreement, the'point in time for which the merger is recorded'as 
occuring in the merger series. There is no doubt some substance to this 
argument. For the purposes of this study, however, lag structures are 
not central for two reasons. Firstly, the explanatory* framework is 
developed in the aggregate. As Chaison would no doubt concede, the 
interval between the commencement of merger negotiations and 'the 
ratification of the-merger agreement is subject to widespread variation: 
Given the changing legislative requirements applicable to British union 
mergers and the increasing size of unions, any. particular lag structure 
would be arbitrary and could not be justified a priori. Secondly, in 
establishing the aggregate explanatory framework it is the effect of the 
environmental - influences that is considered paramount. The 
organisational influences are regarded as constituting barriers to 
merger and the principal subject of merger negotiations. The 'merger 
agreement is, therefore, regarded as representing the point, at which-the 
influence of the environmental influences has overcome the-barriers of 
the organisational influences. Therefore a lag structure is not 
required. 
83 
Econometric analyses of social processes, predominantly strike 
activity and trade union growth, have relied principally an 
the 
application of economic variables as explanatory factors. 
In applying 
their analyses to periods of short duration, advocates of 'economic' 
explanations argue that the impact of institutionalisation upon trade 
unionism may be excluded analytically from the regression equation on 
the grounds that the impact of institutionalisation is marginal over the 
short term. This view has recently been brought into question by 
theorists advocating that a broader focus is required if comprehensive 
explanatory models are to be established: see, for example, Shorter and 
Tilly (1974), Snyder and Tilly (1972), Snyder (1975) and Hibbs (1978). 
The central thrust of the argument deployed by these theorists is that 
institutional factors can be ignored only when institutionalisation is 
achieved. Prior to the implementation of the institutionalised system 
they argue that unionisation and political variables are more 
influential upon trade union behaviour. Unionisation factors are 
regarded as being influential, because during institutionalisation 
membership and organisational stability are subject to relatively wide 
fluctuations. Similarly, political factors are considered relevant 
because it is only during institutionalisation that trade unionism gains 
widespread political acceptence. Furthermore, unionisation and political 
variables are regarded as intervening between structural factors and 
trade union behaviour. Their inclusion is, therefore, advocated because 
a purely economic approach constitutes no more than 'a special case of a 
more general theory' (Edwards. 1978: 324). The following sections, 
therefore, are comprised of aggregate, operationalised descriptions of 
the hypothesised effects of economic, unionisation and political 
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variables. Technical details regarding the assembly of the data series 
employed in the regression analysis are provided in Appendix A. 
Unemployment Rate. Trough and Peak. 2 These three regressors are 
measures of the tightness of labour markets, reflecting the amount of 
excess demand or excess supply. This, in turn, determines the ease 
whereby employers can attract and retain labour, thereby, influencing 
the relative bargaining power of employers and unions. 'Disregarding 
inter-firm competition, high or rising unemployment leads to a reduction 
in the level of aggregate demand thereby reducing the costs to employers 
of any lost production arising from strike activity. Indeed, in theory, 
employers are in a position to recruit an alternative labour force from 
among the unemployed when confronted by industrial action during times 
of high unemployment. By contrast, declining or low rates of 
unemployment promote a relative strengthening of the trade union 
bargaining position. If, as has been argued in Chapter 2, merger 
represents a policy option directed towards improving union bargaining 
strength, it is to be anticipated that merger activity will be more 
pronounced during periods of high or rising unemployment. 
In so far as unemployment is a proxy for fluctuations in the 
business cycle, it is likely to be associated with variation in overall 
union membership. Ashenfelter and Pencavel (1969) and Bain and Elsheikh 
(1976) have demonstrated that aggregate trade union membership is 
associated with fluctuations in the business cycle, the latter authors 
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showing that membership declines during redessions. Membership decline 
induces a tendency towards organisational instability. Xerger activity 
would, therefore, be expected to rise during periods of economic 
recession as unions trade off 'independence for uncertainty reduction' 
(Freeman and Brittain, 1977: 176). 
A countervailing theoretical proposition has been developed by 
Buchanan with specific reference to merger activity. Invoking Cartter 
(1959), Buchanan (1974: 43) argues that under certain conditions of 
economic growth 'wages will be the union's main concern and employment 
prospects of less importance; during recession the opposite will be the 
case'. Buchanan pursues this argument by stating that during a recession 
'a union is unlikely to consider handing over its employment prospects 
through merger to another union which has less concern for employment 
opportunities than it has itself' (1974: 43). This is certainly a 
plausible argument. Of similar credence, however, is the argument that 
with a recession inducing organisational instability a union would hand 
over its employment prospects to another rather than dissolve, thereby 
removing recruitment opportunities from within trade unionism as a 
whole. 
Wages. The variable 'wages' is employed as a regressor in three 
forms: the rate of change of real wages, the level of real wages, and 
the rate of change of money wages. In the aggregate, the rate of change 
of real wages is regarded as an approximate index of worker prosperity. 
In addition, union funds are also likely to be high during periods of 
prosperity thereby conferring organisational stability. 'Yorkers' 
utility is related inter alia to the rate of change in real wages' (Bean 
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and Peel. 1976: 206). In developing this approach, Ashenfelter and Johnson 
(1969: 41) assert that the. rate of change in real wages is a measure of 
the discrepancy between the aspirations of workers and their 
achievements, or simply of their aspirations. From this assertion they 
argue that past increases in real wages will reduce workers' current 
demands and, therefore, curtail strike activity. Vhile this argument is 
plausible, it is no more so than that in which past increases in real 
wages are regarded as promoting the expectation that the current and 
future increases should be at least as good. Furthermore, the 
Ashenfelter and Johnson position neglects any consideration of the 
impact of changes in the structure of wages which might not act 
consistently across different groups of workers. The rate of change in 
real wages is, therefore, employed as an index of worker satisfaction on 
the understanding of these limitations. 
It has been argued that merger is a policy option directed towards 
the improvement of union bargaining strength. Therefore, a priori the 
direction of the influence of the rate of change in real wages cannot be 
deduced given the indeterminancy of the 'expectations operator' argument 
developed by Ashenfelter and Johnson (1969). Buchanan, however, asserts 
that the relationship should be positive. This assertion is supported by 
the following reasoning: 
Under such conditions of rapidly rising wages, the maintenance 
of differentials becomes very important and union mergers may 
be sought partly for this reason. But it also encourages simul- 
taneous bargaining by many grades of labour in the sane bargaining 
area, since employers see that, what is given to one group must 
be given to others. There is a-tendency, therefore, to widen the 
bargaining area under these conditions and encourage union mergers 
for this reason (1974: 43-44). 
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While the maintenance of differentials is of undoubted importance, it"is 
unclear why the issue of differentials should be any less important when 
low wage increases are recorded. Furthermore, differentials are 
occupationally specific, or more accurately' inter-occupational. Over the 
period of this study trade uniionism has illustrated a tendency towards 
'openness'. If Buchanan's argument is accepted, therefore, it must be 
accompanied with the recognition that the strength of the effect of 
changes in wages, whether money or real- is likely to have altered over 
time as the issue of differentials has become an internal union matter 
as well as one of inter-union relations. 
Prices. The rate of change in prices is included to capture 'the 
impact of inflation or deflation on the. merger process. Buchanan 
(1981: 48) contends that high inflation tends 'to create financial" 
difficulties for small unions, to make the size and efficiency of large 
unions more important and may also emphasise the need to protect living 
standards by a powerful union negotiating with employers and 
government'. These three points all suggest that the relationship 
between inflation and mergers is positive. Again, however, it should be 
noted that trade unions have exhibited a tendency towards increased 
average size, therefore, suggesting that the impact of inflation is 
likely to vary, at least in magnitude if not direction. 
Inflation may also influence employer activity. A firm's, economic 
position is enhanced, ceteris paribus, when output prices rise. A 
negative relationship between mergers and inflation is, therefore, 
expected in so far as the rate of change of prices is a proxy for 
industrial prosperity. As employers' prosperity increases so they are 
more likely to concede union claims in order to maintain profitable 
production. Unions, therefore, need not merge in order to increase the 
relative strength of their bargaining positions. 
A second countervailing argument to the contention that inflation 
and mergers should be positively related is derived from the literature 
on the influences acting upon aggregate union growth. Hines (1984) and 
Bain and Blsheikh (1976) for Britain and Ashenfelter and Pencavel (1969) 
for America have shown that high inflation promotes the growth of 
aggregate union membership. Membership growth confers organisational 
stability. Merger intensity might, therefore, be expected to decline 
during periods of high inflation. Moreover, these findings also bring 
into question the second of Buchanan's points presented in support of 
the positive relationship between inflation and mergers, namely: that 
high inflation makes the size and efficiency of large unions more 
important. Since high inflation promotes aggregate union growth, 
Buchanan needs to support his contention by demonstrating that the rates 
of growth vary between unions of different sizes when inflation is high. 
This he does not do. Therefore, a priori reasoning leads to the 
anticipation that inflation and mergers will be negatively related. 
Co=anymergers- The incidence of company mergers is regarded as 
causal to union amalgamations by Hughes (1972), Geroski and Knight 
(1984) and Buchanan (1974 and 1981). Two lines of argument are developed 
in elaborating determinancy. Firstly, Geroski and Knight suggest that 
company mergers induce union merger activity through their effect on 
bargaining strength. They state that 
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the growth of firms by merger and the ensuing changes in product 
market structure alters relative bargaining power in favour of 
employers. The opportunities for reducing the product wage below 
the level it would otherwise be exist particularly in respect 
of labour productivity and product prices rather than money wage 
levels (1984: 55). 
Union mergers are, therefore, seen as a response directed towards the 
increase of union bargaining strength to counter that achieved by the 
merged fira. 3 To a degree, therefore, company mergers may be regarded as 
a proxy for industrial concentration. 
Secondly, Buchanan (1974 and 1981) argues that company mergers 
promote union mergers through their 'disturbance effect' upon 
established bargaining procedures. For example, company mergers nay 
involve companies with different views towards union recognition, the 
introduction of new, payments systems, and issues relating to plant 
closure, job security and the inter-plant transfer, of work. 
Additionally, Hughes (1970_: 159) argues that 'the normal post-merger 
pattern appears to have been some wider definition of organisational and 
recruitment interests within the new combines by specific unions'. Such 
'wider definitions' are regarded as leading to inter-union competition, 
which in turn promotes union mergers particularly if disparities of size 
between the unions are marked. That is, where a larger union is able to 
provide superior membership services as a result of greater financial 
reserves and is able to pursue a more aggressive wages policy. 
While a positive relationship between company mergers and union 
mergers is anticipated a note of caution about the causality, of company 
mergers should be entered. Company mergers are themselves the outcome 
of pressures arising from the dynamics of inter-company competition. As 
such company mergers are clearly not 'independent' of other economic 
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factors; indeed, they my be regarded as intervening between these 
factors and union vergers. Care is, therefore, necessary with respect to 
the problem of nu lticollinearity when employing company mergers as a 
regressor. 
. Productivity. The productivity variable reflects the rate at which 
economic efficiency is increasing (Edwards, 1981: 149). As such, _ 
it As, a 
very approximate proxy for the relationship between technological change 
and workers' attitudes. Other things being equal increases in 
productivity improve profitability. A slow rate of increase in 
productivity would be expected to be associated by employers resisting 
union claims for improvements in terms and conditions of employment. 
Kergers would, therefore, be expected to increase in frequency when the 
rate of productivity increase is small as unions try to improve their 
bargaining strength. Furthermore, as was discussed earlier, 
technological change is considered as promoting merger through its 
'blurring effect' on demarcation lines and the convergence in function 
produced by its introduction. On both these counts, therefore, a 
positive relationship between productivity and merger intensity is to be 
anticipated. 
An adjunct to this point should be noted. . 
Hobsbawm (1964: 147) 
identified an expansion of business activity coupled with, a declinevin 
profit margins during the period of technological. stagnation as _a 
contributory causal factor in the upsurge of 'new unionism' between 1889 
and 1893. In other words, the expansion of business activity,. was 
achieved through the intensification of work rather, than through. the 
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introduction of technological-'innovation. * This combination of 
circumstances is reported by'`Garvy (1943) and Handel (1980) as being 
related to specific stages of the"`long economic cycle. The effects of 
technological innovation" are more notable during" the upswing when 
increased aggregate demand allows for their full utilisation. Accepting 
this to be the case necessitates the recognition that productivity') like 
company mergers, is not independent from other factors. Tbat"iso' 'its' 
effect may differ according to the movements in other indicators thereby 
requiring care in the interpretion of the results 'associated-- with , 'the' 
regressor. 
Density of unionisation. Union density is the proportion of all 
employees legally allowed' to belong to a trade union that do so and is 
symbolically represented as follows: 
UDEN = T/P x 100 
where UDEN : union density 
P: potential union menbership° 
Union density is a measure of union organisation intended to capture the 
'saturation effect': 'the greater difficulty of further increasing union 
membership as union 'density rises, partly because there are fewer 
workers left to recruit and partly because those who are left have less 
propensity and/or ability to unionise' (Bain and 8lsheikh, 1976: 67). Voos 
(1983 and 1984) demonstrates that the costs of organising 'union 
membership increases the higher the degree of organisation 'already 
achieved. These additional costs are also supplemented by those arising 
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from conditions of-increased inter-union competitiveness for membership 
euch as the need to maintain an 'aggressive wages policy' thereby 
raising the likelihood of costly industrial action. 
It is to be anticipated that union density and merger activity will 
be positively related. Xerger represents a policy whereby unions may 
expand their bases of recruitment. It also allows for the circumvention 
of the Bridlington Principles. The cost of organising new membership 
increases the more 'saturated' is existing organisation, yet unions 
require a 'viable growth policy'. It is likely, therefore, that merger 
activity will increase as membership density rises causing unions to 
search for new areas for recruitment in order to maintain such a policy. 
Union growth. The regressor employed to capture the, effects of 
membership increase or decline is the rate of change of union growth. 
Contributory factors to the maintenance of union organisat onal 
stability are -membership growth and the financial reserves derived from 
membership contibutions. Declining union membership, therefore, induces 
organisational instability. With reservations, this view was empirically 
supported by Chaison who states that 
absorbed and amalgamating unions most often had declining or-. - 
unchanged pre-merger membership, while absorbing unions were 
generally growing prior to merger. However, the predicted 
membership change-merger relationships were certainly not 
persuasive. Kore than a third of the absorbed and amalgam- LL 
ating unions grew prior to merger and more than a quarter 
of the absorbing unions declined (1981: 106). 
Clearly, different-industrial patterns of employment and policies with 
respect to growth might explain those cases which run counter to the 
aggregate hypothesis. Unfortunately, Chaison does not pursue these 
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points. In the aggregate, however, it is assumed that merger intensity 
and the rate of union growth are negatively related. - 
Two supplementary points relating to membership growth are 
pertinent. Firstly, the average size of unions has increased throughout 
the period under study. A large membership confers organisational 
stability in terms of the accumulation of funds, economies of scale and 
a heterogeneity of membership. It is likely, therefore, that the impact 
of the rate of change in union growth will vary across time, the impact 
being more pronounced during the initial period of the study when unions 
were relatively smaller. -Secondly, the intervening status of, union 
growth-is beyond dispute. Studies covering both British and American 
unionism have demonstrated the influence of structural-factors on union 
growth (Bain and Blsheikh, 1976 and Ashenfelter and Pencavel, 1969). ' Hence 
when used in conjunction with structural variables the-variance in the 
rate of union growth measure may be captured by that in the structural 
variables, thereby eliminating or reducing- the explanatory power 
attributable to it. 
Funde per member. Following from organisation theory it is assumed 
that unions struggle to maintain organisational autonomy through the 
avoidance- of external control and/or manipulation by other 
organisations. For an absorbed union merger is a, cessation of 
organisational autonomy. A high ratio of funds per member confers 
organisational stability thereby acting as an inhibitor to merger. 
Conversely, low funds per member promotes merging by accentuating the 
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desire to achieve organisational stability. A negative relationship is, 
therefore, expected between funds per member and merger intensity. 
Union forffitione. Chapter 2 established that waves in the formation 
rate of unions are broadly co-incidental with those of merger intensity. 
Two explanations are advanced as to why this is the, case. Firstly, the 
organisationally unstable, newly formed unions may merge among 
themselves in order to strengthen organisation. Secondly, an increase in 
the number of unions heightens inter-union competition for membership. 
As the newly formed unions are, by definition, organisationally 
unstable, such competitive conditions promote merger as these unions are 
unable to compete with their more well established counterparts. Both of 
these hypotheses lead to the suggestion that union formations and union 
mergers will be positively related. 
But the co-incidence of occurrence does not necessarily imply 
causality. It could be argued, for example, that an increase- in the 
formation rate is attributable to an increase in rank and file 
organising initiative; concurrent merger activity resulting fron rank 
and file dissatisfaction with the existing trade union structure; In 
other words, the two sets of events have the same - source but are not in 
themselves causally related. Chapter 6 investigates -such possibilities 
in more detail within the framework provided by the regression analysis. 
i 
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Distribution of the national' roduc. " Trade unionism is concerned 
not only with distribution but also with power: power to influence'1`the 
allocation and utilisation 'of labour on' the one hand and power to 
influence the distribution of the national product on the other. `Hibbs 
(1978) and Shalev (1978) have investigated this latter aspect°of trade 
union function with respect to'the incidence of strike activity. °`Strike 
activity is"one aspect of trade union behaviour. Trade union structural 
reform is another. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to "assume that 
merger activity is similarly influenced by the desire to achieve a"trade 
union 'structure which will be' most effective in allowing for the 
influencing of the distribution of the national product. 
The premise upon which such investigations are based is that the 
political process has increasingly come to influence the final 
distribution of the national product. In this sense political 
competition and conflict have developed to supplement industrial 
bargaining and conflict. This point is derived from the insight of Ross 
and Hartman who recognised that 'the state can influence the workers' 
economic welfare more powerfully through tax policy, public spending, 
economic planning, and social welfare legislation than the unions can 
effect it through collective bargaining' (quoted in Shalev, 1978: 479). 
This influence has been made more pronounced by the gradual transfer of 
friendly society functions from trade unions to the state. Indeed, 
Pizzorno (1978) has argued that a 'political barter' now dominates trade 
union behaviour, whereby restraint is exercised at the bargaining table 
in exchange for greater influence at the level of the national polity. 
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In order to achieve this influence unions must act through the TUC, 
which organises access to government comaittees, or the Labour Party. 
The institutional provisions of both the TUC and the Labour Party grant 
enhanced voting status to larger unions. Xerger constitutes a means 
whereby union. membership size my be most rapidly increased. It is 
anticipated, therefore, that there will be a positive relationship 
between increasing state control of distribution and merger intensity. 
The regressor used as a proxy for the increasing state control of 
distribution, following Hibbs (1978), is that of , state expenditure 
expressed as a proportion of Gross National Product. Employing this 
regressor does not imply agreement with the argument - Hibbs develops In 
its support. For, as Shalev connents, N 
What is new about Hibbs's argument is not his expectation 
that working class strategies of conflict are affected by 
political power of the workers. Rather, the novelty is 
Hibbs's belief that this relationship between power and 
strategy is mediated solely by the distributional role of 
the state (1978: 480). 
Hibbs's argument, as with the approach of the economists discussed 
above, represents a 'special case within a general theory'. The 
regressor, state expenditure as a proportion of the Gross National 
Product, is, therefore, employed in the context of this study on the 
recognition that the influence of the distributional role of the state 
is only one aspect, albeit an important one, of the relationship between 
workers' power and strategy. 
Legislative Intervention. 
,A 
further influence upon the relationship 
between trade union power and strategy is that of legislation. Two 
specific aspects of legislation are examined here: the impact of 
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legislation covering the procedural requirements whereby merger may be' 
achieved and the effect of legislation 'repressive' to trade unionism. 
As has been discussed earlier in this chapter, each 'successive 
piece of legislation covering mergers constitutes an easing of the 
voting requirements for merger completion. Therefore, legislation is 
regarded as promoting merger on enactment, resulting in the anticipation 
of a positive relationship between legislation and merger activity. A 
zero-one dummy variable is employed for each piece of legislation, one, 
applying to the year of its introduction and all subsequent years. 
The 'repressive legislation' variable is similar to that employed 
by Cronin (1979: 80) in his study of industrial conflict in modern 
Britain. Four periods are covered by the variable. The first is 1901-OC 
when the Taff Vale judgement was in force. 'This judgement called into 
question the legal immunities granted to trade unions, or more 
specifically trade union funds, through legislation passed between 1871' 
and 1876. It was deemed that unions were 'responsible for civil damages 
in respect of actions taken by their members or officials in furtherance 
of a trade dispute to the extent that 'there was no clear limit, short 
of an empty treasury, to the 'damages which could be awarded against a 
union's funds' (Clegg et al., 1964: 316). Furthermore, the 'legality of 
picketing was also brought into question leading Askwith, the noted 
arbitrator of the period, to declare that strikes were 'for all 
practical purposes absolutely illegal' (quoted in Hutt, 1975: 47). 
The Osborne Judgment, ' 1910-13, sought to restrain unions from 
spending funds for political purposes. In so doing it 'offered 'an 
interpretation of the-law which appeared to render'illegal`not only any 
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political activity in the parliamentary sense, but any"association"'in 
bodies like trade councils or the TUC' (Hutt, 1975: 58). 
The Tradee'Disputee and Trade Union Act, 1927-45, was passed as a 
punitive measure for the General Strike of 1926. It imposed restrictions 
on striking, revised the rules governing trade union political funds 
requiring 'contracting in' and 'precluded civil service unions' fron 
associating with unions outside the service, thus forcing them' to 
withdraw from Congress and the Labour Party' (Clegg, 1985: 423). 
The Industrial Relations Act, 1971-74, deprived unions of 
immunities protecting the right to strike, tried to make the majority of 
collective agreements legally binding, "defined a series `of unfair 
practices for which both unions and individual` members could be legally 
penalised and instituted compulsory strike ballots. 
As with the merger legislation a'zero-onedummy variable is 
employed for each piece of legislation, 'one' app1ying to the year of 
its introduction and continuing until its repeal. ' As all these'measures- 
constitute attacks on the organisational stability of unions it is to be 
anticipated that the repressive legislation' variable will' be positively` 
related to merger intensity. In other words, unions consolidate `through' 
merger during periods of legislation unfavourable to the maintenance of 
their stability. . 'r ` 
Conservative Govern"ont. This regressor is represented by ,a dunaq 
variable: 'one' equals present, 'zero' 'equals absent. In the aggregate 
it is a measure of the 'political climate', in particular the complexion 
of the political centre. To a degree it may also be regarded as an 
indicator of the political status of trade unionism. A Labour government 
is generally regarded as being 'friendly' to trade unionism while its 
Conservative counterpart is more likely to be 'unfriendly'. Its 
inclusion is justified on the grounds that in different political 
climates trade union. behaviour may change (Shorter and Tilly, 1974; 
Snyder, 1975). There is no ap rind expectation of the direction of its 
effect for, as was discussed earlier, the chain of causation for this 
variable is indeterminate due to length. 
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The Number of Trade Union Sponsored Members of Parliament. The 
number of trade union sponsored Us is a proxy for the extent of trade 
union institutionalisation and public acceptance. The 'new unions' of 
1889-1893 immediately sought to protect their organisational stability 
through influencing parliamentary decision-making, This policy was 
adopted on the recognition of the limited 'strength' in collective 
bargaining of such unions once the initial phase of unionisation of the 
semi-skilled and unskilled had subsided. In other words,, the 
improvements in terms and conditions achieved through. collective 
bargaining were supplemented by the pursuit of influence within the 
national polity. For example, Clegg et al. (1964: 92) refer to the 
'tendency to look to parliamentary and municipal action to solve 
labour's problems' as a 'distinguishing feature' of the new unions. The 
interest in parliamentary action among the new unions promoted a similar 
interest within the longer established unions with the result that 
during the period of TUC reform, 1918 - 1927, initial steps were taken 
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towards formalising the means whereby this influence was achieved 
(Allen, 1960): 
During the period of "the operation of institutionalised industrial 
relations the-growth of union representation within Parliament continued 
apace, Coates and Topham (1986: 127) reporting that in addition to direct 
sponsorship unions also engaged parliamentarians as 'consultants'. - A 
negative relationship, is expected between the number of trade union 
sponsored NPs and merger activity. The greater the degree of public 
acceptance of trade unionism so it, is anticipated that organisational 
stability is enhanced thereby reducing the need to merge to maintain'or 
achieve this goal. 
Existing research on merger activity was reviewed on the basis 1 of 
the delineation of the factors influencing its occurrence into 
environmental and organisational- categories. The environmental 
influences are regarded as being influential to aggregate merger 
activity whereas the organisational influences are particularý-to 
specific mergers. The environmental influences are regarded as exerting 
a 'continual but varied' -influence upon trade union structure. which; 
during specific periods, act to promote the adoption of merger-as a 
favourable strategy for trade unionists. By contrast, the organisational 
influences are considered as constituting barriers to mergers. These 
barriers are overcome when the pressure impelling unions towards mergers 
arising from the environmental influences is such that organisational 
stability is put under threat. As the initial purpose of this study is 
to establish an explanatory framework within which the wave pattern of 
aggregate merger activity can be analysed, attention was directed 
towards the examination of the effect of. the environmental influences. 
Three categories of environmental influence were distinguished: 
economic, unionisation and political. In describing the impact on merger 
activity of the influences from each category emphasis was placed on the 
inter-relatedness of these influences both within and between 
categories. In particular, it was noted that some factors are most 
usefully regarded as being of intervening statue between other 
influences and merger activity. For example, the rate of change of union 
membership has been isolated as impinging upon merger activity, yet 
union membership has also been shown to be dependent upon business cycle 
fluctuations. The implications of these inter-relationships for the 
application of regression analysis, the method chosen to establish the 
explanatory framework, were briefly considered. In Chapter 4 they are 
examined in greater detail. 
The final section of the chapter was comprised of operationalised 
descriptions of the impact of the regressors to be employed in the 
regression analysis. These operationalised descriptions were founded 
upon existing theoretical propositions associated with their effect on 
merger activity. The operationalisation of variables within the three 
categories of environmental influence allows for the analysis of the 
purely economic approach to an aspect of trade union behaviour, the 
merger process, and analysis of the more recently advanced theories in 
which emphasis is placed upon causality derived from the socio-political 
status of labour. 
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1. Xulticollinearity my be a problem in regression analysis. It arises 
when two or more of the independent variables are highly correlated 
thereby making it difficult to separate the impact of each of the 
variables on the dependent variable. Xulticollinearity is, therefore, -"a 
problem of degree, the more highly correlated, the independent variables 
so its effect is more likely to undermine the validity of, the 
assumptions upon which regression analysis is based. - 
2. Trough and peak are constructed measures of the depth of depressions 
and the height of booms within the business cycle. The trough index is 
calculated by recording the years for which unemployment was greater 
than in either the preceding or subsequent years. For. the , years 
intervening between these 'recession -years' 
the value of the index to 
the rate of unemployment recorded for the previous trough, unless-the 
rate in the current year exceeds that in the recession year, in which 
case the current rate is substituted' (Edwards. 1981: 63). '-The' peak 
measure is calculated analagously. 
3. Geroski and Knight (1984) discuss the likely consequences on trade 
unions of the 'direction' of company merger activity. This discussion is 
taken up in detail in Chapter 5. 
4. Potential union membership is defined 'to include all employees, 
whether employed or unemployed, who are legally permitted to unionise. 
More specifically, potential union membership is the labour force minus 
employers, the self-employed, and ... members of the armed forces'. (Bain 
and Elsheikh, 1976: 67). A full justification of this definition is 
available in Bain and Price (1980: 6-9). 
4 
IWLTIVLRIATB ULLYSSs 
In Chapter 3 hypotheses were developed from a literature review and 
operationalised in the light of the available data. This chapter 
includes the 'testing' of these hypothe ses I and thereby provides the 
framework for the analysis presented in later chapters. Regression 
analysis is the focus of the chapter. There are two purposes to which 
this analysis is directed. 
The first is the examination of`trade union merger activity under 
different institutional circumstances; namely$ the implementation of 
collective bargaining and the operation of institutionalised industrial 
relations. With reference to other aspects of trade union activity, 
Snyder (1975) has argued that it is`only when industrial relations is 
institutionalised that political 'and unionisation factors can be 
analytically ignored. Conversely. in a non-institutionalised setting 
political and unionisation factors are thought to'have'a more pronounced 
influence in relation to economic factors. This formulation is based on 
the premise that trade unions are 'political' as well as economic 
institutions. As such the impact of political factors is likely to be 
greater before unions become" firmly established. Similarly, prior to 
their institutionalisation unions are particularly prone to unionisation 
influences as they are smaller and less stable. The impact of 
unionisation factors is, therefore, thought to be most pronounced before 
institutionalisation which confers a degree of organisational stability. 
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The first objective of the regression analysis is to test these 
propositions with respect-to merger activity. 
The second objective is to generate aggregate explanatory models 
for both the periods of non-institutionalised and institutionalised 
industrial relations. This allows both for a further testing of the 
propositions mentioned above- and for a thorough examination of the 
relative effect of the explanatory variables. This examination is 
necessary for, as was acknowledged in Chapter 3, the 'intervening 
status' of several of the variables -makes for difficulties in 
interpretation. 
Given these objectives, and the use of regression analysis to 
achieve them, this chapter is; comprised of three principal sections. The 
second and third deal in turn 'wi" th the two aspects of the regression 
analysis. The first includes an outline of the mode of presentation of 
the regression results and a justification of the approaches adopted. It 
is accepted that these approaches will not find favour with all those 
familar r-with the regression technique. Indeed, given the vast range of 
approaches to this matter, universal satisfaction is unobtainable. The 
approaches adopted here are determined by the objectives to which the 
analysis is directed. 
For clarity of presentation the regressors are abbreviated to the 
f o11 owing "f orme: 
RV: the level of real wages 
oRV: the rate of change of real wages 
AWR: the rate of change of money wages 
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In addition to recording the level of significance, the value and 
sign of the regression coefficients are also reported. Following Shorter 
and Tilly (1974) and Cronin (1979), standardised rather than the non- 
standardised regression coefficients are presented; that is, Beta 
coefficients rather than simple As. Unlike purely econometric studies, 
the central concern of which is the overall predictive power of the 
equations, this study is also concerned with the relative causal 
significance of the various influences. Beta coefficients are the 
measure, in terms of standard deviations, of the degree of change 
brought about in the dependent variable by a change of a single standard 
deviation in the explanatory variable. Standardised regression 
coefficients, therefore, allow for direct comparison of causal 
importance. Furthermore, trade union structural form has developed 
throughout the duration of the period studied; for example, average 
union size and membership concentration has increased. It is likely, 
therefore, that the impact of the explanatory variables change in the 
light of these developments. The employment of Beta coefficients allows 
for this likelihood to be examined. In other words, Beta coefficients 
provide the basis of analysis both within and between the different 
models. 
The coefficient of determination (R2) is reported after the 
correction for degrees of freedom has been undertaken. While all the 
equations include a constant term this is not presented for reasons of 
tabular clarity. The final reported measure is the Durbin-Watson 
statistic (D-V)1 the test for first order serial correlation. It is a 
measure of the degree of correlation between residuals, the difference 
between the observed values of the dependent variable and those 
&P: the rate of change of retail prices 
PEAK: index of business cycle peaks *. 
TROUGH: index of business cycle troughs 
COMER: the number of manufacturing company mergers 
UDEJ: the level of union density 
AMEX: the rate of change of union membership 
FUNDS: the level of union funds per member 
FORK: the formation rate 
STCOAC; state expenditure as a proportion of Gross National Product 
MP: the number of trade union sponsored ambers of parliament 
REPLEG: the presence of legislation repressive to trade unionism 
COB: the presence of a Conservative government 
1917: the Trade Union (Amalgamation) Act 1917 
1964: the Trade Union (Amalgamation) Act 1964 
BREAK: the breakaway rate 
TREND: time trend 
The simple correlation coefficients between these variables are shown in 
Appendix B. 
To the knowledge of the author this is the first study in which 
regression analysis is applied to data on British trade union merger 
activity. To this extent the results to be discussed are exploratory. 
The significance of the regressors is, therefore, presented at the 1 per 
cent, 5 per cent and 10 per cent levels. Following the established 
convention, *** represents 1 per cent significance, ** 5 per cent and* 
10 per cent. Regressors not labelled with these conventions do not 
attain significance. 
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In addition to recording the level of significance, the value and 
sign'of the regression coefficients are also reported. Following Shorter 
and Tilly (1974) and Cronin (1979), standardised rather than the non- 
standardised regression coefficients are presented; that is, Beta 
coefficients rather than simple ßs. Unlike purely econometric studies, 
the central concern of which is the overall predictive power of the 
equations, this study is also concerned with the relative causal 
significance of the various influences. Beta coefficients are the 
measure, in terms of standard deviations, of the degree of change 
brought about in the dependent variable by a change of a single standard 
deviation in the explanatory variable. Standardised regression 
coefficients, therefore, allow for direct comparison of causal 
importance. Furthermore, trade union structural form has developed 
throughout the duration of the period studied; for example, average 
union size and membership concentration has increased. It is likely, 
therefore, that the impact of the explanatory variables change in the 
light of these developments. The employment of Beta coefficients allows 
for this likelihood to be examined. In other words, Beta coefficients 
provide the basis of analysis both within and between the different 
models. 
The coefficient of determination (R2) is reported after the 
correction for degrees of freedom has been undertaken. While all the 
equations include a constant term this is not presented for reasons of 
tabular clarity. The final reported measure is the Durbin-Watson 
statistic (D-W), the test for first order serial correlation. It is a 
measure of the degree of correlation between residuals, the difference 
between the observed values of the dependent variable and those 
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predicted by the equation. The Durbin-Watson statistic always takes a 
value between zero and four, a value of two indicating no serial 
correlation. A low or-high recorded value in the Durbin-Vatson statistic 
indicates that there-is a regular pattern within the dependent variable 
unexplained by the included explanatory variables. 
Econometric textbooks include tables for assessing the'value of-the 
Durbin-Watson statistic applicable to a particular equation at. both the 
5 per cent and 1 per cent levels. As the central concern of this study 
is with the examination of the relative effect of the different 
independent variables -rather than with the construction: of an 
econometrically exact explanatory model, such precision is unnecessary. 
The guideline adopted here is that any Durbin-Vatson statistic with a 
value in excess of 1.35. is indicative of an absence of serious problem 
of autocorrelation; values between 1.1 and 1.35 are inconclusive and 
values-below 1.1 suggest severe deficiencies and demean the purpose of 
the significance tests. ' -- 
In addition to these technical matters relating to the presentation 
of, the regression results, there is the question of the order of 
introduction of the different explanatory factors. Edwards (1981: 67-81) 
introduces the factors in the order economic, unionisation and then 
political, -justifying the precedence given to economic- factors on the 
grounds that 'it is a commonplace that economic conditions influence the 
development of the labour movement... not only (its) rate of growth.., 
but also its character' (1981: 60). The initial order of presentation 
follows that of Edwards; the economic influences are discussed and then 
the unionisation factors. The inclusion of the unionisation influences 
at the second stage is justified on the grounds that existing work on 
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union growth. Ashenfelter and Pencavel (1969) and Bain and Elsheikh 
(1976), -has demonstrated the intimate causal effect of economic factors 
upon the process of unionisation. ' The purpose of'*thissecond section is 
to examine whether the inclusion' of the impact of unionisation adds 
explanatory power to the economic influences. 
Edwards '(1980: 79-80) adds political 'variables, or institutional 
variables as he calls them, to a combined economic and unionisation 
model. In thisNatudy a purely political explanation is developed" prior 
to the presentation of the aggregate model. Two reasons are provided in 
support of this alternative approach. Firstly, in supplementing a 
combined economic and unionisation model with political variables to 
test for additional explanatory power is to assume' that the political 
factors are not determinate of the economic. ' Such an assumption, which 
Edwards does not elaborate upon, runs counter to much recent work on the 
relationships between 'the economic and the political; see for example, 
the debates on the' causal factors underlying inflation in Hirsch and 
Goldthorpe (1978). Secondly, to study merger activity is to analyse an 
institution in process. As such it is assumed that there is a wide range 
of political factors impinging upon this process. Their analysis in a 
separate model- allows for consideration of their' relative impact. 
Furthermore, the subsequent development of an aggregate model, rather 
than the addition, of political factors to a combined economic and 
unionisation model, permits a fuller understanding to be gained of the 
inter-relationships between 'individual influences. In particular, the 
intervening or mediating influences of variables can be assessed. 
J6 V; 7 
The Econn fc Explanation 
The unemployment rate and the rate of change of real wages are the 
variables poet frequently used by economists to explain the variation in 
trade union activity. Initially,, therefore, these variables, both singly 
and in, combination.. -, were regressed against the intensity of merger 
activity. The results were unsatisfactory and did not improve with the 
introduction, of lags into the model. A variety of experiments were 
undertaken to produce an economic model consistent in operation during 
both periods. PEAK was found to be the most effective business cycle 
indicator. In combination. with the level and rate of. change y4 of real 
wages and the number of manufacturing company mergers, an operable model 
resulted. -The absence of the. productivity variable confirms the point, 
developed: in Chapter 3, that its impact is intervening between that of 
the included variables and merger intensity. The solutions to the 
prediction of merger intensity employing these variables are presented 
in Table 4.1. 
PEAK COMER RV ORW OP AWR R2 D-W 
1893-1939 `-0.915*** ""0.255** 0.384** 0.305*** 0.49 1.36 
1893-1939 -0.908***, 0.230* 0.426** -0,312* 0.419***0.50 1.37 
. ifs .I 
1946-1979 -0.336* -0.212 1.033*** 0.194 0.57 1.96 
1946-1979 -0.302* 0.072 0,507* -0.034 0.563** 0.62 1.99 
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The results lend'some support to the hypothesis that the impact of 
economic factors"' is greater during the period of institutionalised 
industrial relations. "The proportion of the variance in verger intensity 
accounted for by the economic model is higher for the latter period. 
Furthermore, the lower values recorded in the Durbin-Vatson statistic 
for"'the period 1893-1939 indicate that a'' consistent' pattern of' 
unexplained variance exists suggesting the importance of 'other causal 
factors during the implementation of collective bargaining. It does not 
necessarily follow, of course, that this may be attributed to 
unionisation and political factors. 
'It is also apparent that fundamental differences exist between the 
two periods in` terns of the relative effect of the economic influences. 
The impact of the PEAK variable'was significant within both periods' 
although during the implementation of collective bargaining its effect 
was most pronounced among the economic indicators. As the PEAK measure 
is an indicator of high booms in` the business cycle, the negative sign 
attached to it suggests that merger intensity 'is depressed the higher 
the peak of the business cycle. In Chapter" 2 it was noted that the 
upswing of the economic long cycle is characterised by business'cycle 
booms of long duration and higher peaks than those" of the downswing. 
Given that'- merger activity is more pronounced during the downswing of 
the economic long cycle, it might tentatively be suggested that the 
influence of the business cycle acts to suppress-merger activity during 
the upswing. It is also 'apparent, however, that the impact of the 
business cycle differs in magnitude between the two long cycles being 
less marked during the second. This suggests that increases in'union 
J. J. J. 
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size and membership heterogeneity enhance organisational stability, with 
respect to business cycle influence. 
The significance attained by the company merger variable during the 
implementation of collective bargaining but not during the later period 
is surprising in a number of respects. Firstly, Buchanan asserts that 
company mergers lead to a disturbance in established- collective 
bargaining arrangements which. in turn, promote union merger activity. 
It would be anticipated, therefore, that the impact of company mergers 
would be most accentuated after World War II when collective bargaining 
was firmly established. Secondly, company mergers ipso facto lead to an 
increase in company size. Such increases have been associated with the 
growth of trade union membership (Bain and Blsheikh, 1980 and Brown, 
1981: 53-61). Chaison (1981) demonstrated that union growth exerts a 
positive influence on merger. activity. It would, therefore 
, 
be 
anticipated that during the second economic long cycle, for which Hannah 
(1983) records the incidence of extensive company merger activity, tb" 
a significant positive relationship between the two forme of merger 
activity should prevail. This expectation is further strengthened by 
reference to the institutionalisation theorists who suggest that the 
impact of economic factors is more marked when industrial relations is 
institutionalised. 
It is, apparent that existing explanations of the relationship 
between, company. and union mergers are inadequate. Several other 
possibilities may be, advanced. Prior to World War II, unions were 
smaller, had narrower recruitment bases and, in the aggregate, were more 
homogeneous in membership. The impact of company mergers is likely,, 
therefore, to have been more pronounced as unions strove to match the 
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increases in company bargaining strength derived from such mergers. 
Furthermore, union mergers may have been achieved to correspond with the 
geographical growth of companies through merger. Unfortunately, data are 
not available on company mergers to allow for the- testing of-,, this 
proposition. 
Chapter 3 acknowledged that company mergers are themselves 
'intervening'. The failure of the variable to attain significance during 
the second long cycle may be attributed to the effect of the factors 
causal to the incidence of company mergers 'capturing' the variance in 
trade union merger activity whereas during the initial period company 
merger activity has an independent effect. This view is supported by the 
variation in the sign attached to the variable during the operation of 
institutionalised industrial relations. The regressor COMER is a measure 
of the number of manufacturing company mergers. It excludes those 
company mergers in other sectors such as banking, retailing and other 
services. The growth of trade union organisation in these sectors has 
been particularly rapid since World War II. As the dependent variable, 
merger intensity. is an aggregate measure, it does not allow for 
internal variation within the trade union merger process. The growth in 
service sector trade unionism may be co-incidental with an increase in 
the proportion of the merger process attributed to unions organising 
such membership. The failure of the company merger variable to attain 
significance may, therefore, result from shifts in the internal pattern 
of the trade union merger process. 
The level of real wages had a significant direct effect on merger 
activity during both periods. Its relatively stronger impact during the 
later period is consistent with the institutionalisation thesis. That 
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rapidly rising real wages promotes merger activity supports Buchanan's 
(1974: 43-44) contention that union mergers may be brought about as part 
of a union's policy to maintain differentials. The weaker impact of the 
variable during the implementation of collective bargaining, however, 
runs counter' to Buchanan's position. Given the larger number of unions, 
their more homogeneous memberships and the stronger traditions of craft 
identity prevalent during this period, it is anticipated that the impact 
of the maintenance of differentials would be*most pronounced in these 
circumstances. 
The level of real wages Is an indicator of the workers' standard of 
living. That this standard of living is positively related to merger 
activity is indicative of trade union structural re-organisation being 
pursued when bargaining objectives are being achieved. This evidence is 
problematic for those arguing that merger activity is entered into to 
increase bargaining power and thereby standards of living. The 
relationship between the level of real wages and merger activity may, 
however, be mediated by the effect of the former upon membership growth 
for, as Bain and Elsheikh comment, workers 'are more likely to become 
and remain union members in an attempt to maintain this standard' 
(1976: 62). 
The rate of change of real wages did contribute significantly to 
the causation of mergers during the first long cycle but failed to do so 
during the second. This runs strongly counter to the 
institutionalisation theorists' propositions given the theoretical 
importance of the variable as a measure of the discrepancy between 
aspirations and achievement. Its failure to attain significance after 
World War II does, however, lend support to the view that as trade 
unions come to adopt an 'intermediate' character, influences, upon the 
rank and, file become less determinate' of union behaviour. In other 
words, the direct impact of the rate of change of real wages on the rank 
and file during the implementation of collective; bargaining, has 
immediate consequences in terms of merger activity whereas latterly, as 
the separation between leadership and rank and filewidens,,., the direct 
influence upon the rank and file is not reflected, in-. the leadership 
sanction.. of-merger. 
Breaking down the rate of change of real wages into its price and 
wage elements marginally improves the solution during both periods. 
Whereas both elements, achieved significance before, Vorld War II only the 
rate of change in money-wages did so after its culmination., .. 
High, inflation acts to suppress merger activity. The impact. of 
inflation is,, however, less marked during the later period, suggesting 
that the increase in union average size confers a resistance to its 
impact. The inverse relationship between inflation and merger activity 
runs counter to Buchanan's (1981: 48) assertion that high-inflation is 
the source of financial difficulties for smaller-unions. In so far as 
rising prices are an indicator of industrial prosperity, it is apparent 
that such prosperity inhibits merger activity, a result consistent with 
that. recorded for PEAK, and, suggesting that the achievement of 
bargaining goals in such circumstances reduces the need to improve 
bargaining strength through merger. 
Contrary to the findings on inflation is the consistently positive 
and significant relationship between the rate of, change of money, wages 
and merger intensity. For if the, ! credit effect'. on union membership is 
expected and organisational stability inhibits merger, activity, a 
negative relationship "between 'the= rate of change of money wages and 
merger intensity is to be anticipated. It is apparent, however, that the 
impact of the rate of change of money wages has a stronger alternative 
effect. An explanation my be developed on the lines that as money wages 
increase unions merge to raise their organisational strength in order to 
maintain the rate, of improvement, in money wages. As a corollary to this 
point, Buchanan (1974: 43) suggests that when money wages are rising a 
'widening of the bargaining area' and 'simultaneous bargaining`-- are 
promoted which in turn stimulate union mergers. 
These results suggest that, while the direction of, the relationship 
between the economic variables and merger activity remains constant, ` 
there is considerable variation in their effect between the two periods. 
This variation is the most likely source of the failure of the initial 
experiments to develop an explanatory, model using the unemployment rate 
and the rate of change of real wages. It also provides justification for 
the separate analysis of the two periods as it is apparent that the 
merger process is not subject to constant economic influence between 
1893 and 1979. 
Table 4.2 shows the results of the separate addition of the 
unionisation variables to the economic model for the two periods. Their 
addition provides sore support to the institutionalisation thesis in so 
far as these variables both attain significance and add to the 
explanatory power of the equations during the implementation of 
collective bargaining but do not for the period of institutionalised 
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industrial relations thereby indicating that organisational stability is 
more independent of unionisation factors during the later period. The 
results, therefore, provide further support for the differentiation of 
the merger process into these two periods. Moreover, the overall 
improvement in the Durbin-Watson statistics for the first long cycle 
suggest that .. the pattern of unexplained variance in the dependent 
variable is markedly reduced by the inclusion of the unionisation 
variables thereby implying greater stability in the explanatory model. 
Exceptions exist, most notably in the rate of change of union 
membership, which was the only unionisation variable that did not 
achieve significance during the implementation of collective bargaining, 
and those including the formation rate which attained significance 
during both cycles. 
R GR RS. STON RESULTS , ECONOMI 
TABLE 4.2 
C Awl) UTIOBISA TIOH VARIABLES --DEPENDENT 
1893 - 1939 
V ARIABLE- INTE NSITY 
PEAK COMER RY ARV`' AP AYR UNIONISATION R2 D-V 
-0. 739*** 0.083, 0.160 0.263*** 0.498***(UDEN)0.68 1.74 
-0. 685*** 0.115 0.045 -0.407***0.280**0.535***(UDEN) 0.69 1.86 
-0. 899*** 0.272**0.333* 0.314*** -0.079(AXEX) 0.49 1.38 
-0. 896*** 0.219* 0.402** '-0.186 0. 500***-0.252(AXEX) ' 0.52 1.40 
-0. 959*** 0.113, 0.441*** 0.262*** -0.455***(FUBDS)0.69 1.92 
-0. 962*** 0.083 0.507*** -0.226*0. 352***-0.448***(FUBD)0.69 1.88 
-0. 757*** 0.096 0.636*** 0.045 0.533***(FORX)0.63 1.37 
-0. 747*** 0.107 0.589*** -0.131 0.125 0.503***(FOR))0.63 1.37 
1946 - 1979 
PEAK COMER 
-0.376** -0.068 
-0.337* 0.188 
-0.297* -0.160 
-0.290* 0.070 
-0.500* -0.196 
-0.572** 0.065 
-0.530*** 0.053 
-0.475** 0.134 
RV 
0.818*** 
0.334 
0.929*** 
0.507* 
1.210*** 
0.963*** 
0.474* 
0.337 
ARV AP AWR UNIONISATION R2 D-V 
0.187 0.256(UDEB) 0.56 2.02 
-0.027 0.548**0.215 (UDEN) ' '0.61 '2.07 
0.168 0.155 (AMEX) 0.57 2.02 
-0.038 0.524**0.062 (AMEX) 0.61 2.02 
0.125 -0.171(FUNDS) 0.41 1.36 
-0.396* 0.092 -0.059(FUNDS 0.58 1.85 
0.343*** 0.789***(FORX) 0.67 1.77 
-0.394 0.608***0.630**(FORX) 0.66 1.82 
The level of union density is the aggregate measure of the extent 
of unionisation and is employed to capture the 'saturation effect'. The 
variable achieved significance prior to the onset of World War II at the 
L 
expense of that for the number of manufacturing company mergers and the 
level of real wages. While the level of union density failed to achieve 
significance during the later period, significance was removed from the 
level of real wages in the equation in which the rate of change of real 
wages was broken down into its wage and price components. The removal of 
significance from economic variables by the inclusion of the level of 
union density indicates that this latter variable is itself a function 
of economic influences. PEAK, the level of real wages and the rate of 
change of money wages accounted for 65 per cent of the variation in the 
level of union density between 1893 and 1979, confirming this point. 
The significance attained by the level of union density during the 
implementation of collective bargaining demonstrates that the saturation 
effect is most pronounced in the promotion of merger activity when the 
recruitment bases of unions are inclined towards being 'closed'. Chapter 
3 acknowledged that unions need to maintain a 'viable growth policy'. If 
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union membership is saturated and union recruitment bases are closed, 
such a policy can only be achieved through merger. 
It might be argued that the level of union density was lower in 
absolute` term between" 1893 and 1939 than between 1946 and 1979; 
therefore, the impact of the the saturation effect should be more 
pronounced during the latter period. While this is undoubtedly the case, 
the preponde ance'of craft unions and unions with limited geographical 
recruitment bases effectively imposed an`internal restriction on 'merger 
search parameters'. The failure of the level of union density to achieve 
significance after the culmination of World War II indicates a 
broadening of union recruitment bases thereby allowing for wider merger 
search parameters. For example, this tendency is evidenced by the 
creation of white-collar sections within large unions traditionally 
organising manual workers during the 1960s and 1970s. 
The rate 'of change of union membership, included as an indicator of 
organisational stability, failed to achieve significance during either 
period. Furthermore, between periods the impact of the variable changed 
sign, being initially inversely related to merger activity. During the 
first long _cycle; the rate' of change of retail prices ` loses 
significance. This is not' entirely 'unexpected as Bain and Elsheikh 
(1976) have demonstrated that retail prices have a marked influence upon 
the pattern of union growth. Indeed, the failure of the Durbin-Watson 
statistic to improve' with the inclusion of the rate of change of the 
union membership variable also indicates that there is no improvement in 
the explanation of the pattern of variance in the dependent variable, 
again suggesting that the economic variables are causal to that' covering 
the rate of' change of union membership. The level of real wages, the 
rate of change of retail prices and the rate of change of wage rates 
explained 54 per cent of the variance in the rate of change of union 
menberehip between 1893 and 1979. 
The results, therefore,,, neither confirm nor deny that the rate of 
change of union membership, is a mediating factor between the economic 
influences and merger activity despite its theoretical importance as the 
source of membership contributions and thereby organisational stability. 
The change in sign of, the variable between the two periods, however, is 
of importance. The inverse relationship during the initial period 
supports the notion that organisational instability is a more intimate 
function of membership contributions. The smaller average size of unions 
during this period makes them particularly susceptible to the, impact of 
membership fluctuations. The operation of institutionalised industrial 
relations is associated with unions of larger average size and more 
diverse membership which confers organisational, stability, therefore 
making them less prone to the rate of change in union membership., The 
change in sign of the variable is indicative of the rising impact of 
competitive recruitment on the merger process. The broadening of union 
recruitment bases results in new membership to the trade union movement 
being 'eligible' for membership of a larger number of unions thereby 
bringing the unions into closer contact. Such contact promotes merger 
activity. 
_ 
The level of union funds per member is a, direct measure of 
financial stability. Whereas the rate of change of union membership-. is 
an approximate index of union income, the level of union funds per 
member accounts for the relationship between income and expenditure as 
well as accumulated assets. The negative sign throughout is as 
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anticipated; the more financially unstable unions are the 'more intense 
the merger activity among them. The variable attains significance during 
the implementation of collective bargaining at the expense of that for' 
the level of manufaturing company mergers whereas for the later period 
it remains insignificant although the rate of' change of money wages 
loses significance. 
It would appear that the smaller average size of unions during the 
initial period makes' then more prone to financial adversity. Buchanan' 
(1981: 48) contends that 'rapidly rising prices... tend to create 
financial difficulties for small unions'. The results for the period of 
the implementation of collective bargaining, when-'this condition 'should 
be most strongly operative, 'suggests that the the level of funds per 
member has an impact on merger activity above and beyond that of. 
inflation. In other words, while rising prices may adversely effect the 
level of union funds, they "do not account for all the impact of'the- 
latter an merger activity. Inflation is, therefore, not the primary 
source of financial instability. 
This raises the question'of- why the level of-union funds did not 
add to the explanatory power of the equations during the period of 
institutionalised industrial relations? A number of explanations may be 
developed which will be the` subject of scrutiny in later chapters. 
Firstly, the extent of centralised financial control may have increased, 
thereby limiting the degree to which financial decline may occur. For 
example, the executive of a union may refuse to sanction strike action, 
and thereby the payment of strike benefit, if union resources are at a 
low ebb. Secondly. the internal reorganisation of union finances may 
lead to the measure, the level 'of funds per member, differing in form. 
Latta (1972) suggests that there is an increasing tendency towards a 
greater proportion of union income being derived from investments and 
that unions substantially increase their assets during the operation of 
institutionalised, industrial relations. Finally, the index of funds per 
member is an aggregate measure.. Phelps-Brown and Hart (1957), Simpson 
(1972) and Buchanan (1981b) have demonstrated a continuing tendency 
towards increasing concentration of union membership. Despite changes, in 
the sources of union income, membership contributions still remain the 
predominant source (Latta, 1972). It seems reasonable, therefore, to 
assume that in tandem with increasing membership concentration there is 
a greater concentration of union funds. This raises the likelihood that 
the level of union funds per member, as an aggregate measure, 
increasingly fails to reflect the impact of financial adversity on those 
unions most susceptible to its influence; namely, the smaller ones. The 
large financial resources of the larger unions -acts as a 
disproportionate influence on the index. = ," "t 
The formation rate was the only unionisation variable to attain 
significance during both periods. During the initial period this was 
achieved at the expense of that for the number of manufacturing company 
mergers, the rate of-change of real wages and both its component parts, 
whereas during the second there was a loss of significance for the level 
of real wages and the rate of change of retail prices. As with both the 
level of union density and the rate of change of union membership, this 
widespread lose of significance among the economic variables suggests an 
intimate causal association between the economic factors and the 
formation rate. The impact of the formation rate was relatively stronger 
during the second period. Indeed, in terms of explaining the variance in 
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the dependent variable, the formation rate was the most effective 
unionisation variable during this later period. 
The results offer support for both hypotheses developed in Chapter 
3: namely, that the emergence of new unions promotes merger activity as 
such unions merge among-themselves to achieve organisational stability 
or that such unions are absorbed by larger competitor unions as they are 
unable to provide equivalent membership services. The aggregate nature 
of the variable precludes differentiation between these hypotheses at 
present; a more detailed analysis is provided in Chapter 6. 
In so far as the inclusion of unionisation variables adds, to the 
explanatory power of the equations- these results support the tenet of 
the institutionalists who argue that unionisation factors will have a 
stronger effect on trade union activity prior - to the 
institutionalisation of trade unionism. It would be to overstate- the 
case, however, to argue that this analysis 'proves' that unionisation 
factors have no influence once institutionalisation is established. 
Earlier work on trade union growth and the results of this study suggest 
that while unionisation factors do not add to the explanatory power of 
the economic influences after institutionalisation, they may mediate the 
impact of the economic influences upon merger activity. 
In justifying the order of presentation of the regression results, 
the development of a unilinear model was rejected. For the sake of 
conpletness the results of such an approach are presented in Appendix C. 
Only two political variables, the number of trade union sponsored XPs 
and the proportion of GNP constituted by state expenditure, achieved 
significance. -`These findings illustrate' the technical difficulties in 
specifying political variables. The purpose of regression analysis is to 
explain -the variation in the dependent variable. Clearly political 
variables such as repressive legislation, merger legislation and party 
of government have limited variance; for example, a particular piece of 
merger legislation can only be introduced once. The political variables 
attaining significance in combination with their economic and 
unionisation counterparts were those with annual or, in the case of the 
number of trade union sponsored JPs, almost annual variation. Examining 
for the relative effect between -political" variables is, therefore, 
technically problematic arising fron the character of- the' variables 
themselves. 
Numerous experiments were tried'to develop an operable model using 
solely political variables applicable to both periods. The lack of 
success with this venture was not entirely unexpected on two counts. 
Firstly, the political variables are not internally consistent and, as 
such, are fundamentally dissimilar fron the economic and unionisation 
factors. For example, the character of the legislative changes, whether 
repressive or merger, are substantially different with a variety of 
effects, yet these are not differentiated within the regression 
analysis. Similarly, the presence of a Conservative government does not 
imply a constancy in policy. The policies of the MacMillan 
administration towards trade unionism differed in many crucial respects 
from those adopted by the Heath government, although both are 
represented by the same variable. Secondly, and arising from the first 
point, the impact of the political variables is likely to affect both 
the character and the rate of the merger process. This impact may differ 
in relative effect between these two cömponents, the single dependent 
4 
variable has been employed at this point, however, for reasons of 
comparability with the other models. Table 4.3 shows the relative 
effects of the political influences in isolation. 
Repressive legislation had a different effect between the two 
periods, acting to suppress merger activity during the implementation of 
collective bargaining and stimulating it with institutionalisation. This 
is contrary to the overall expectation of institutionalisation theory 
from which it is expected that repressive legislation would initially 
stimulate merger activity as unions strove to maintain organisational 
stability in a hostile legislative environment. As was mentioned above, 
however, such a discrepancy may be explained in*terms of the specific 
nature of the legislation involved rather than by reference to aggregate 
theory. 
1893-1939 -0.210(REPLEG) +0.825(1917)*** -0.521(CON)***+0.193(STCONC) 
-0.981(TREJD) R2= 0.50, D-W = 1.72 
1946-1979 0.309(REPLEG)**+0.595(1964)***+0.268(STCONC)** 
R2= 0.56, D-W = 2.39 
The Industrial Relations Act 1971 stimulated merger activity. It 
would appear, therefore, that the exposure of unions funds to the 
actions of the courts promoted mergers in an attempt to forestall any 
financial consequences that might undermine organisational stability. Of 
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course this explanation would be'on firmer ground had the level of union 
funds per member proved significant during the period of 
institutionalised industrial relations. In combination the findings 
relating to both variables suggest that it was the smaller unions that 
were particularly prone to the provisions of the Industrial Relations 
Act. An additional effect of the Industrial Relations Act was to promote 
the registration of staff associations as trade unions. These newly 
registered unions may have been organisationally unstable when placed in 
competition with extant unions. The stimulating effect on merger 
activity of the Industrial Relations Act may, therefore, also be 
partially accounted for in terms of the increase in the number of small, 
organisationally unstable unions. 
As both the Trade Union (Amalgamation) Act 1917 'and its successor 
of 1964 eased the voting requirements necessary for merger consummation, 
the positive signs attached "to the variables meet expectations. The 
provisions included in the respective Acts lead to increases in merger 
activity, but these provisions are quite clearly distinct in character. 
Chapter 6, therefore, " includes an examination of these 'differences in 
character and'how they impinge upon the merger process. 
The negative sign attached to the variable signifying the presence 
of a Conservative government indicates that a political climate 
unf avourable 'to' trade unionism leads to a' reduction in merger activity. 
Again this finding is contrary to institutionalisation theory from which 
such a climate would be' anticipated to'promote merger activity in the 
pursuit of organisational'stability. 
The impact of the increasing distributional role of the state was 
to stimulate merger activity. That the regressor, STCONC, achieved 
significance during the operation of institutionalised industrial 
relations lends weight to Pizzorno's (1978) contention that striving for 
influence at the level of the national polity has become a determinant 
of trade union activity. 
Before developing an explanation of merger causation within the 
framework established in Chapter 2 for the two periods, it is necessary 
to comment upon the effect of the variable for the number of trade union 
sponsored MPG, an index of the extent of trade union 
institutionalisation, to which the reader has yet to be introduced., No. 
satisfactory equations employing only political influences and including 
this variable were produced. Tables 4.4 (page 129) and 4.5 (page 135) 
show that the variable has a marked effect during both periods. 2 During 
the implementation of collective bargaining the number of trade union 
sponsored NPs is- inversely related to merger activity whereas it is 
positively related-during institutionalised industrial relations. These 
relationships are as expected from the rise of trade unions as 
intermediary organisations. The greater the degree of institutional 
acceptance during the implementation of collective bargaining the more 
organisational stability is secured. Mergers, being a means whereby 
organisational stability is, achieved, therefore decline as security is 
achieved institutionally rather than by internal union reorganisation. 
Once institutional acceptance is secured during institutionalised 
industrial relations, trade union activity is directed towards the 
influence of the national polity in order to achieve conditions 
favourable to bargaining. Union membership size is a central factor in 
attaining this influence. Merger is the policy that most rapidly 
increases a particular union's membership size. Merger activity would be 
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expected to increase, and indeed does, the more pronounced the union 
influence upon the national polity as indexed by the rise in the number 
of trade union sponsored MPs. 
T HR AGGREGATE EXPLANATION 
Expectations from the Analytical Framework 
From the analytical framework developed in Chapter 2, it is 
assumed that trade unions have both bargaining and organisational 
objectives. The economic influences, therefore, have two causal routes 
of effect upon the 'merger process. The first is through their impact 
upon the economic circumstances of' trade union membership. If such 
circumstances are regarded as unsatisfactory, improvement will be 
sought. As a prerequisite to securing this improvement, merger may be 
pursued to strengthen organisation and thereby enhance opportunities for 
the improvement of economic circumstances. 
Economic factors also impinge upon the maintenance of 
organisational stability. This effect is mediated by the unionisation 
influences. It was also acknowledged that changes in the character of 
trade union organisation and the nature of the environment within which 
trade unions function suggest that inter-relationships between these 
routes of influence are subject to variation between the two delineated 
periods. These inter-relationships were seen as a function of the stage 
Of development of trade unions in their rise to 'intermediary' status. 
During the implementation of collective bargaining' the impact of "the 
economic circumstances of trade union members was 'thought to'be' most 
influential upon merger activity as the relationship between membership 
. and 
leadership was relatively close. The smaller average size of unions 
during this period`resulted in their organisational stability being at 
its' most susceptible 'to 'adversity in unionisation and political 
situation, as smaller unions have less accumulated financial reserves and 
a'"-limited 'membership 'fron '`which contributions may be drawn. The 
organisational stability of such unions is, therefore, prone to 
relatively small adverse changes in the unionisation and political 
influences which effect their financial status. 
It was hypothesised that once industrial relations was 
institutionalised these inter-relations would change. Trade unionists, 
or more specifically trade union leaders, being more involved in the 
national polity strive to influence policy formulation and thereby 
provide a favourable framework within which collective bargaining can be 
conducted. The increase in the average size of unions cushions the 
impact of the unionisation influences upon organisational stability. As 
membership has become more concentrated this 'cushioning' is uneven in 
impact. Furthermore, the more pronounced separation between membership 
and leadership points towards a weakening of the potehtial of the 
membership to promote merger directly through its own initiative. It is, 
therefore, the theory of the rise of trade unions as intermediary 
organisations that form the backdrop to the discussion of the aggregate 
equations. 
I lementation of Collective Bargaining 
Equations 2,3 and 4 of Table 4.4 all include unionisation as well 
as economic influences. These results confirm the results presented in 
Table 4.2. Furthermore, they support the contention that organisational 
stability Is particularly prone to the impact of unionisation 
influences. The combined inclusion of economic and unionisation 
variables also indicates that the economic circumstances of trade union 
aenberehip is a determinant of merger intensity during the 
implementation of collective bargaining. 
TABLR 4.4 
REGRE SIOi RESULTS. AG RGAT BTPLAIIA IOES FOR THE PERIOD OF THE 
II[PLEMEETATIOII OF COLLECTIVE BARRGAIIIIIG : DEPENDEIT VARIABLE. IITEBSITY 
EQ. 1.0.191(COXER)* -0.520(JXEX)*** +0.623(FORX)*** -0.488(COI)*** 
-0.222(REPLEG)* R2 - 0.79 
D-W = 1.61 
EQ. 2.0.515(FORX)*** -0.252(NOSX)*** -0.223(COI)*** -0.642(PEAK)*** 
+0.518(1917)*** R2 - 0.76 
D-V = 1.92 
EQ. 3.0.248(UDEI)** -0.249(PEAK)** -0.500 (MSX)*** +0.495(FORX)*** 
-0.262(COI)*** R2 = 0.87 
D-V = 1.51 
EQ. 4.0.757(UDEI)*** -0.422(PEAB)*** +0.264(&RV)*** -0.323(XP)** 
R2 = 0.71 
D-V = 1.59 
High peaks in the business cycle, associated with membership 
prosperity and heightened bargaining power achieved through labour 
market tightness, act to reduce merger activity. Ashenfelter and Johnson 
(1969) show that the 'expectations-achievement gap', as measured by the 
rate of 'change of real wages, is of theoretical importance in the 
promotion of strike activity. That is, it is' directly related to the 
economic circumstances of trade union members. From Equation 4 it is 
clear that these circumstances are also influential in the promotion of 
merger activity. Given the theoretical proposition that trade union 
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leadership and membership are most closely inter-linked during the 
implementation of collective bargainingo : it would appear that there is a 
direct influence upon merger activity by the membership during this 
period. 
The inclusion in Equations 1,2 and 3 of an inverse effect of the 
rate of change of union membership and the positive impact on merger 
activity of the formation rate lends further support to the notion that 
the organisational instability of recently constituted unions promotes 
merger activity. Similarly, the appearance of both the formation rate 
and the level of union density in Equation 3 suggests that the extension 
of the aggregate union recruitment base by newly formed unions and their 
subsequent merging acts as a means whereby the 'saturation' of union 
membership does not preclude the maintenance of 'viable growth 
policies'. 
The inverse relationship between repressive legislation and merger 
intensity in Equation 1 and the absence of those economic variables most 
directly associated with membership conditions is again indicative of 
the pertinence of the membership role in merger activity. The 
fundamental component of the repressive legislation regressor is the 
Trades Disputes and Trade Union Act passed as a punitive measure 
following the General Strike of 1926. It was accompanied by an 
'unprecedented calm' in industrial relations during 1927,1928 and the 
first half of 1929 (Clegg, 1985: 427). Regression technique does not 
allow for the differentiation in effect between the legislation and the 
sobering after-effects of the General Strike. However, the suggestion of 
the centrality of the membership role in the promotion of merger 
activity is supported on both counts. The impact of both these factors 
_ IA lv-- 
" was to constrain and curtail membership initiatives. As was shown in 
Figure 2.1, this constraint was co-incidental with a decline in merger 
activity. Analyses by both Cronin (1979) and Shorey (1974) have 
demonstrated that strike activity was dampened by repressive legislation 
and the 'after-effects of the General Strike', thereby further 
supporting the contention developed here. 
The voting requirements to secure merger necessitated a 
considerable degree of membership involvement in balloting. The easing 
of the terms of this involvement is shown in Equation 2 to have provided 
a further stimulus to merger activity additional to that of the economic 
influences and organisational instability. It is apparent, therefore, 
that prior to 1917 there were legislative limits to the extent of 
merger activity. 
Assuming that economic factors influence the rate of change of 
union membership, the inclusion in Equations 1,2 and 3 of both the 
variables for the rate of change of union membership and the presence of 
a Conservative government suggests that a political climate unfavourable 
to trade unionism dampens merger activity prior to institutionalisation. 
As Equations 2 and 3 also include the regressor PEAK. it is clear that 
this effect is supplementary to the effects of membership economic 
circumstances and the impact of unionisation. Two principal explanations 
can be developed. 
Firstly, the policies pursued by the Conservative governments of 
the period bolstered union organisational stability thereby reducing the 
need to attain such stability by merger. To support or reject such a 
hypothesis would require an extensive review of the successive 
Conservative governments of the period. Clegg et al. (1964: 484) comment 
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that between 1889 and 1910 'the privileges of trade unions had been 
extended by statute and nade far more precise'. Conservative governments 
were in office between 1895 and 1905 and were partially responsible for 
this extension of privileges. Some support is, therefore, lent to the 
proposition that Conservative governments enhanced organisational 
stability by means of institutional provision. Evidence to the contrary, 
however, is also available. Conservative governments were in office when 
the Taff Vale judgment was passed and the Trades Disputes and Trade 
Unions Act enacted, both of which induced organisational instability. 
A second explanation for the dampening effect of a Conservative 
government upon merger activity is derived from the assuption that their 
election is indicative of a 'political climate' that runs counter to the 
principles of trade unionism. In other words, if rank and file activity 
is a major source of propulsion of merger activity, the election of a 
Conservative government reflects a dampening of this source and. 
therefore, of merger activity. Such an explanation is consistent with 
the earlier findings regarding the REPLEG variable and the inter- 
relationships between the economic and the unionisation influences. 
Similarly, the election of a Conservative government may turn membership 
interests inwardly towards the maintenance of existing labour market 
terms and conditions; that is, away from the wider issues of 
organisational structure. Cronin (1979: 212) records a decline in the 
number of strikes concerning 'trade union status' for the periods of a 
Conservative government lending some weight to this contention. 
Increased institutional acceptance of trade unionism, as measured 
by the number of trade union sponsored MPs, also acts as a constraint 
upon merger activity during the implementation of collective bargaining. 
The negative sign attached to this variable and that for a Conservative 
government appear contradictory., The nature of the process measured by 
then unravels this apparent contradiction. -The election of a 
Conservative government is a national phenomenon necessitating; the 
participation of the population en masse. The sanctioning of trade union 
sponsorship of a potential member of:, parliament lies within the ambit of 
responsibility of a union's executive. Furthermore, the relationship 
ensuing from the election of that member of parliament is conducted 
primarily through the union leadership. A Conservative government is 
indicative of the broader situation of labour whereas the.. number of 
trade union sponsored MPs is a more specific indicator of institutional 
acceptance prior to institutionalised industrial relations. 
The negative signs attached to the variables are, therefore. 
consistent in the light of earlier findings. A Conservative government 
is indicative of a dampening of membership initiative, a pre-requisite 
for merger activity given the legislative requirements. The increase in 
the number of trade union sponsored MPs evidences a , greater political 
influence of , trade unionism conferring organisational stability. Such 
stability is a goal of the merger process. Furthermore, it follows from 
the assumptions underlying intermediate organisation theory that trade 
union structural stability is particularly susceptible to the extent of 
political acceptance during the implementation of collective bargaining. 
Operation of Inetitutinnalised"Tndustrial Relations 
By comparison with Table, 4.4 the outstanding features of Table 4.5 
are the changes in the-. direction of the relationship between merger 
activity and the rate of change of union membership, the presence, of- a 
Conservative government and the number of trade union sponsored MPs. In 
combination with the appearance of the level of 'union funds in'Equation 
1, these features all confirm the notion that merger causality is not 
constant- but is"a function of the institutional setting of trade 
unionism. The operation of institutionalised industrial relations is 
marked by a relatively pronounced effect on merger intensity of the 
economic and political factors as measured by the Beta coefficients 
attached to the variables. The unionisation variables included are those 
concerned with the institutional aspects of the process, the formation 
rate, the breakaway rate and the level of union funds per member; rather 
than with membership variation with the exception of Equation 3. 
As with the earlier period, there is a strong positive influence of 
the formation rate upon the merger process. It would appear that the 
organisational instability of such unions is a continual source of 
merger partners. That the formation rate is supplemented in Equation 2 
by the breakaway rate also. lends supports to this contention. As with 
the legislation enacted in 1917, the Trade Union (Amalgamation) Act 1964 
led to an increase in merger intensity. 
In addition to the change in sign attached to some variables 
evidence is also available suggesting different inter-relationships 
between the causal factors. Equation 3 shows that both the formation 
rate and the rate of change of union membership are positively related 
to merger intensity; this suggests that it is the inability of the newly 
formed unions to compete with longer, established unions rather than 
organisational instability derived from their small size that is 
instrumental to their involvement in the merger process. The inclusion 
of the level of union funds per member in Equation 1, the only equation 
from which the formation rate is excluded, further supports this notion. 
It may be, as Hyman argues, that the 'apparent rise in the threshold of 
union solvency' in the light- of the 'expanding range of activities 
undertaken by British unions' (1983: 38) precludes successful competition 
by-these smaller unions. - 
EQ. 1.0.159(COXER)*** +0.157(eVR)** +0.415(CON)* +0.218(TROUGH)** 
+0.209(XP)*** -0.219(FUHDS)** R2 = 0.67 
D-W = 1.89 
EQ. 2.0.388(1964)*** +0.217(BREAK)** +0.564(FORX)*** +0.339(. RW)*** 
R2 = 0.74 
P-V = 1.56 
EQ. 3.0.625(XP)** +0.297(oIEK)** +0.459(RW)*** +0.567(C08)** 
+0.468(FORX)*** R2 = 0.77 
P-V = 1.67 
EQ. 4.0.456(1964)*** -0.440(PEAK)*** +0.654(eVR)*** -0.561(AP)** 
+0.261(FORX)** R2 = 0.72 
P-W = 1.89 
Organisational stability,; is derived from both membership growth and 
bargaining status. A further factor involved in the promotion of mergers 
among smaller unions is likely to be, therefore, their failure to 
secure recognition for bargaining purposes. For example, Lerner comments 
that 
the centralisation of negotiations has fostered many breakaways; 
it has also been one of the most important reasons why breakaway 
or even 'legitimate' new unions usually fail to gain recognition 
(1961: 194). 
In addition to the increased centralisation of negotiations, the policy 
of excluding from affiliation those unions organising a membership which 
overlaps with that of an existing TUC affiliate effectively precludes 
recognition from within the trade union movement, further promoting 
organisational instability. `chile regression analysis does not allow for 
a differentiation between the impact of these two explanations, they are 
both concerned with the institutional security aspects of organisational 
stability. From the perspective of acquiring unions, the absence of a 
significant saturation effect influence upon merger activity points 
towards the broadening of union recruitment bases, thereby permitting 
the absorption of these smaller unions irrespective of their scope of 
recruitment. 
With the exception of Equation 3, the results in Table 4.5 indicate 
that the impact of the economic variables is not mediated through 
membership variation during the operation of institutionalised 
industrial relations. The strong influence of the economic factors in 
combination with that of the political variables lends tentative support 
to the notion that the increasing differentiation in function between 
leadership and membership impinges upon the merger process. In this 
context the leadership function can be primarily regarded as the 
maintenance of organisational stability and the political promotion of 
conditions favourable to collective bargaining whereas that of the 
membership is more centrally directed towards bargaining. 
It is a theoretical assumption of the rise of the intermediate 
organisation that trade unionism is accepted as a 'legitimate' 
institutional form and is strongly represented at the national polity 
once institutionalisation is achieved. The positive sign attached to the 
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election of a Conservative government suggests that when the political 
climate is such that the trade union influence over policy formulation 
is limited merger activity increases. Two hypotheses can be generated in 
explanation. Firstly, it might be argued that unions merge in order to 
increase their size and, therefore, secure political influence. In this 
context it is the relative size of unions and influence within the trade 
union movement and the Labour Party towards which merger is directed. 
Factionalism within both the TUC and Labour Party provide the impetus 
towards increased union size. 
A second explanation related to the rise in merger activity 
associated with a Conservative government concerns the assumed impact of 
the political climate. The election of such governments night be 
concomittant with a hardening in employer bargaining attitudes. Unions 
would, therefore, merge in order to counter this hardening in attitude 
through enhanced bargaining strength. These explanations are not 
mutually exclusive. Regression analysis does not allow for their 
differentiation. These propositions will, therefore, be discussed in 
more detail in Chapters 6 and 8. 
With the operation of institutionalised industrial relations a 
rise in the number of trade union sponsored liPs is also associated with 
heightened merger activity. Membership size is a determinant of a 
union's political influence and mergers are a means whereby size is 
maintained or increased. Political influence may, therefore, be enhanced 
through the pursuit of a merger policy. It is also to be suspected that 
union relative size is of importance regarding influence within the TUC 
and the Labour Party. Assuming a merger involving two unions. 
'political' benefits are derived by both acquiring and absorbed unions. 
. 
For the acquiring union there is an increase in voting strength. Smaller 
unions are limited in political influence by reasons of their size. 
Xerger may afford a smaller absorbed union access to such influence 
particularly if the absorption takes place within the framework of a 
trade group structure which allows the smaller union a degree of 
independence in policy formulation yet still enables it to call upon the 
entire membership vote - that is, of both acquiring and absorbed unions 
- in support within the national polity. 
During the operation of institutionalised industrial relations the 
impact of the economic factors appears, to be more directly influential 
rather than being mediated through membership fluctuation. Equation 4 
indicates that high peaks in the business cycle suppress merger activity- 
whereas Equation 1 shows troughs promote it. In so far as these indicies 
are measures of industrial prosperity, it is apparent that a strong. 
union bargaining position in such circumstances reduces the need for 
structural reorganisation. The number of manufacturing company mergers 
is positively related to merger activity. This finding supports 
Buchanan's contention (1974: 43 and 1981: 49) that company mergers disturb 
established bargaining arrangements thereby promoting union mergers. 
The presence of the rate of change of money wages (Equations 1 and, 
4), the level of real wages (Equation 3) and the rate of change of real 
wages (Equation 2) indicate that merger is pursued to improve bargaining 
strength. The positive signs attached to the variables suggest that 
merger is adopted as a strategy when membership conditions are 
improving; that is, mergers are pursued in order to meet membership 
expectations that existing improvements in their economic circumstanes 
will be maintained. i 
CONCLUSION 
The application of regression analysis to the merger data has 
: allowed for the development of the explanatory framework 
for merger 
t. causality. Primary among the features of this framework is that merger 
causality is not a constant phenomenon but is a function of the 
: institutional setting within which trade unionism is located. The 
evidence confirms the theoretical expectation that between 1893 and 1979 
twos principal periods can be delineated: the implementation of 
, collective 
bargaining and ; the operation of institutionalised industrial 
relations. The findings of the regression analysis suggest that merger 
. causality 
differs between the two periods., 
The - pattern of these-differences lends some support to the view 
that, the determination of the merger process is dependent upon the stage 
reached by trade unionism in its rise as an 'intermediary' form. The 
: mediating effect of the membership aspects of unionisation between the 
economic influences and merger activity coupled to the sensitivity of 
-merger, activity to the impact of political factors, distinguish the 
implementation of collective bargaining. In combination these findings 
, point 
towards organisational stability and its preservation as being the 
central purpose of the merger process. They also suggest that the 
membership influence upon merger activity was pronounced. 
During the operation of institutionalised industrial relations 
-economic 
influences impinged more directly upon merger activity; - the 
, 
institutional aspects of unionisation rather than the mediating role of 
membership fluctuation were more central, while, the relationship of 
merger activity to its political influences altered. Bargaining status 
appeared to be more central as the object of merger activity during this 
period. Such status is determined by both political and economic 
circumstances, union involvement within the national polity being 
directed towards the establishment of a situation favourable for 
bargaining. 
Vithin this periodisation the explanatory framework was developed 
in four distinct stages: an economic- explanation. one based on both 
economic and unionisation factors, a political explanation and aggregate 
equations. Developing the explanation of merger activity in this manner 
allowed both for the examination of the relative effect between and 
within models and for the establishment of the nature of the inter- 
relationships between the sets of influences. Of particular note was the 
stronger impact of the economic factors after institutionalisation and 
the additional explanatory power achieved by the inclusion of 
unionisation variables during the period of the implementation of 
collective bargaining. Furthermore, the variation in effect of the 
political influences precluded the development of a single stable 
political model across both periods. Higher Res were achieved through 
the generation of aggregate explanatory models indicating that the 
merger process is a function of economic, unionisation and political 
influences during both periods although the inter-relationships in 
effect are subject to variation. 
Within the constraints of regression analysis it has been 
acknowledged that the specification of the effect of political variables 
upon social processes raises particular difficulties of interpretation 
(for example, Edwards, 1978 and Shalev, 1978). Such difficulties were 
encountered here, as alternative explanations could be developed 
regarding the impact of specific variables. These problems are 
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compounded by the mediating status-of several variables. This chapter 
has, therefore, served as a building block in the elaboration of merger 
causation. The included results suggest the directions in which further 
analysis would be acet fruitfully pursued. Clearly. the initial 
objective must be the more precise specification of effect upon the 
merger process of the political and mediating variables. Chapters 5 and 
6, therefore, are directed towards this object by means of analyses of 
merger direction and merger waves. 
S 
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FOOTIOTES 
1. A value between 2 and 4 for the Durbin-Vatson statistic means that 
the regression equation exhibits negative autocorrelation, the 
implications of which are similar to those of positive autocorrelation. 
The same guideline applies to negatively autocorrelated equations by 
subtracting the computed value of the Durbin-Watson statistic from 4. 
2. The number of trade union sponsored XPe was employed as a variable in 
the experiments to produce a purely political model. The experiments in 
which the variable was included were rejected due to the unacceptability 
of the Durbin-Watson statistic. 
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5 
XERGER DIRECTION 
Mergers involve both acquiring and absorbed unions. To this point the 
discussion has focused upon measuring and analysing the frequency of 
absorptions. The wave pattern of merger activity has been examined by using 
regression analysis to provide a framework for subsequent investigation. The 
objective of this chapter is to add a further component to this framework 
through an analysis of acquiring unions and merger direction. Initially, a 
review of existing classifications of merger type and direction is conducted' in 
order to isolate those features which can be usefully employed in the context of 
this study. These features are then drawn together and an approach to the study 
of merger direction developed. Distinctions are made between the different 
categories of merger direction in terms of both the extension of the acquiring 
unions' recruitment base and the goals to which the different merger directions 
are aimed. 
Transferring the focus of the study away fron merger intensity to that of 
merger direction is not to imply that the analysis of merger intensity' is 
complete. It is to acknowledge that the subject of this study is the merger 
process in aggregate, a process with many dimensions. The intention in 
considering a second dimension is to inform the analysis of intensity in 
addition to broadening the initial. narrow focus. In Chapter 2 it was 
acknowleged that the organisational influences are likely to have a marked 
effect on the direction of merger activity. The emphasis in this chapter 
- 144 - 
remains. on the environmental influences on. the., understanding that the initial 
purpose of the study is to elaborate their effect on the merger process. 
. Three classifications of merger direction have been advanced in the 
literature by Undy-et al. (1981), Hughes (1967) and Freeman and Brittain (1977). 
These will be critically examined in order to introduce the reader to the 
dimensions of merger, direction regarded as central to this study. 
Undy, et mal. (1981: 167-219) categorise mergers, as being defensive, 
consolidatory or aggressive by reference to the size of the unions involved. 
'The change agents that promoted mergers were of two, not mutually exclusive 
kinds. First, there, -were absolute changes . in size--and second, relative size 
developments' (1981: 214). There - is some ambiguity in how, the authors relate 
other influences - to , these developments - in size, or relative size, as only single 
examples are given of both defensive, and consolidatory mergers, making it 
impossible to establish, - whether these other influences are common . to, for 
example, all defensive, mergers "or - simply the, one case recorded. With this 
proviso in mind, it would. appear., that, a , defensive merger is characterised by 
two or more unions with declining absolute memberships merging to 'mitigate or 
reverse their numerical and, financial decline'. Relative changes are seen as 
instrumental in bringing about a consolidatory merger. In the example provided, 
the formation of the AUEV, the- relative - size changes - that acted, upon the AEU 
and its merger partners 'were, those that challenged the individual union's 
growth expectations and/or adversely influenced its position in some sphere of 
inter-union competition'. An aggressive merger-. -is characterised by a relatively 
larger union absorbing a smaller one in order-to 'seek the basis for further 
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expansion and development, sometimes into quite new job territories. ' Undy et al. 
refer to the extensive merger activity of ASTXS and the TGVU as typical of 
aggressive mergers. 
The categorisation presented`'by Undy et al. is problematic on a number of 
counts. Firstly, ' the categories employed have only one direction. What maybe an 
aggressive merger for the TGWU or ASTXS may also be defensive or consolidatory 
for the smaller union involved in so far as°it may be experiencing a decline in 
membership and merge in order to reverse this decline. Indeed, a small union 
may merge with a large union 'aggressively' in order to make use of the 
servicing facilities of the large union to'expand its own membership which can 
be achieved, within a trade group, structure, while still maintaining a degreeVof 
autonomy. 
Similarly, the distinction drawn between a coneolidatory and a defensive 
merger is far from clear. A distinguishing' feature of a consolidatory merger. 
according to Undy 'et al., is the perceived' need of the unions involved to 
strengthen their position in some sphere of inter-union competition. Yet they 
also concede that a 'change agent' stimulating the UCATT defensive merger was 
the poaching activity of the TGWU. Of course, this is just the sort of inter- 
union competition that distinguishes a onsolidatory merger. 
A final point which Undy et al. fail to take into account is that of the 
nature of the' relationship between'the different forms of influence on merger 
activity, in general, and its direction. in particular. Using the terminology 
employed in this study, they fail to specify the nature and impact of the 
relationship between the environmental and organisational influences. 
Specifically, they seem to consider mergers. regardless of whether they are 
consolidatory, aggressive or -defensive, as taking the same form. This is 
surprising for, given their emphasis on generalising from particular case 
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studies, no . account is taken, for example, of post-merger union 'governing 
structures. In a subsequent study, Chaison (1982b) discovered that there was 
considerable variation in the 'degrees of integration' of such structures. 
Omissions such as these lead to internal inconsistencies, particularly in 
the case of craft unions, which,, as is conceded in the study, place some 
emphasis on the need to maintain, 'craft identity'. The explanatory power of the 
consolidatory, defensive, aggressive differentiation is limited in this context 
as is evidenced by the AAOP's-. preference to join the TGWU rather than be 
involved in the merger to form UCATT. As Undy et al. =indicate, the pre-merger 
circumstances of the BAOP were. - remarkably similar to those of the constituent 
unions that formed UCATT in terms of declining membership, financial resources 
and bargaining power coupled with inter-union competition and -a desire to 
maintain 'craft identity'. Given the similarity in the 'change agents' and the 
single, direction to their merger categories, how is it that the NAOP was 
'aggressively' absorbed into a trade group structure, whereas the ASY, ASPB and 
AUBTW 'defensively' merged involving a fusion of their governing structures? 
Hughes (1967: 15-23) focuses upon the type of union merger that has occurred 
during 'recent years' within, an investigation of the role of amalgamation in 
'simplifying' trade union structure. The categorisation of mergers is based upon 
the traditional breakdown of unions into general, occupational, craft and 
industrial 'types', to which he introduces the classification of sectoral or 
sector-general in order to 'identify unions which are by historical origin, or 
principle of organisation concentrated in a particular sector of the economy, 
but prone to take an open approach to the definition of that sector and ready 
to extend into allied fields' (1967: 6). Employing such an approach Hughes 
derives seven categories of merger. ' 
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Hughes's classification, is founded upon. -the 'type' of unions combining in a 
merger. - The drawbacks of 'fitting' unions into such types are well documented. 
In essence the argument is that the complexity of British trade union structure 
does not lend itself to such precise types. For example, it is questionable if 
some union types, in particular industrial unions, exist or indeed have ever 
done so in their - 'pure' form. Furthermore, such a typology conveys a static 
picture. The historical legacy; unique to each union, is lost. 
Although not specifically relevant to the purposes of Hughes's study, two 
further points -arise from within the 'frame of reference of this project. 
Firstly, Hughes's analysis is based upon mergers reported during 'recent, years'. 
As he would'no doubt acknowledge, a study encompassing more than 'recent years' 
would necessitate the introduction of several additional merger types. For 
example, two such types might be the amalgamation of two local unions to form a 
regional union, and the amalgamation of a local or regional union with a union 
organising nationally. Secondly, a, primary drawback of - an analysis based upon 
union types is that unions develop over time and therefore defy classification 
within a single category. To illustrate this, the Dock, Wharf, Riverside and 
General Labourers' Union was' initially a, labourers' union, became enlarged, 
arguably into a sectoral union, and then, -as the absorbing union in the TGWU 
formation, became a general union. 
The analysis of Freeman and Brittain (1977: 173-85) is based on the 
development of an assumed theoretical link between company and union behaviour 
in terms of merger activity. In extending Pfeffer's (1972: 382-94) work on 
organisation theory, Freeman and Brittain argue that the same 'logic of 
combination' applies to both companies and unions. Their argument is based upon 
either of two principles for increasing the 'power of action'. 'The first is a 
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process of combination whereby individuals or sub-units conjoin on the basis of 
perceived similarities.:. The second means of' increasing 'the power of action 
involves combination on the basis of differences 'which complement each other' 
(1977: 174). 
From these assumptions Freeman and'Brittain derive three types of'mergers: 
symbiotic, commensalistic, '-and for scale. A`symbiotic merger is operationally 
defined as occurring when 'the unions' Jurisdictional descriptions, and the 
industries in which their members were employed, must be such that they did not 
claim jurisdiction over the same workers but worked with a technology such that 
the output(s) from one group-of workers served as the input(s) for the work of 
the other' '(1977: 177). A commensalistic merger occurs 'between two' unions which 
appeared to organise the same workers and were thus in "competition with each 
other' (1977: 178). The "for' scale' category is composed' of' mergers between 
unions which represented workers 'with no apparent connection'. 
There are some difficulties with this presentation. For example, the 'for 
scale' category is based solely on the dimension of size and would appear to be 
a residual type into which mergers that do not fit into the first two 
categories can be allocated. Furthermore, all mergers' could be considered as 
being for scale as by definition they involve' an increase in 'membership size. 
The for scale category would also appear to be incompatible with the symbiotic 
and commensalistic categories as the latter include"a dimension for direction, 
whereas the 'first does not. Seltzer (1977: 124-26) relates this point to the 
categories such as 'conglomerate' used by economists and organisation theorists 
in classifying company mergers. These researchers, 'Seltzer argues, use the 
conglomerate category in much the same way as Freeman and Brittain use the 
category for scale, but in so doing imply 'more than the 'mere -dimension of 
size'. This issue will be taken up'in more detail below. 
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Research on trade union structural development has relied upon various 
combinations of taxonomic devices, such as trade union 'types', -thus conveying'a 
static rather than a dynamic view of structural development. Turner (1956: 1962) 
attempted to break through the impasse of reliance upon' these static taxonomic 
devices. He-employed two categorical pairs: ' 'vertical and horizontal' and 'open 
and closed'. Vertical expansion refers to membership growth, within a particular 
industry whereas horizontal growth is restricted to a particular occupation. 
Open` and -closed refers to, the recruitment preferences rin the vertical and 
horizontal directions. Hughes (1967: 5), in criticising the open/closed dichotomy, 
points out that of 'great empirical, importance' are the 'intermediate patterns of 
union response, in which unions may be open in certain directions"-of 
recruitment interest, but closed in others'. As the present focus is upon the 
direction of aggregate merger activity, Hughes's comment is less salient than if 
specific unions were the main concern. 
Merger is clearly a means whereby the recruitment base of the acquiring 
union may be expanded in either the vertical or horizontal-direction. It follows 
that a union may be involved in a single merger in which its recruitment base 
is opened in both the horizontal and vertical directions: this is termed a 
diversifying merger. Three directions of merger activity are therefore employed 
here: horizontal, vertical and diversifying. Each of these is founded on the 
recruitment base of the acquiring union. In other words, the extension in 
recruitment constituted by a- merger is assessed by relation to the scope of 
organisation of the largest union involved in the merger. 
:..: In reviewing Hughes's merger categorisation, it was noted that a historical 
study of trade union structure should take into account the geographical 
expansion of the recruitment base: that is. the tendency towards national union 
organisation away from that based upon region or locality. In order to 
t 
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accommodate this tendency within the analysis, mergers are also, considered 
within the dichotomy geographical/national. A geographical merger is one in 
which two or-more unions organising on a local or regional basis are involved. 
A national merger involves at least one union which recruits nationally. 
In, deriving these different dimensions on which merger. - activity is 
conducted, it is also assumed that there are different implications in terms. of 
the objectives achieved. In Chapter 2: the goals towards which merger was 
directed, were discussed in terms,, of. organisational pre-requisites and labour 
market influence; the latter being achieved through collective bargaining and by 
affecting . the, _ 
formulation . of government policy. To the extent,. that, 
organisational 'econonies. of scale': are, in theory, met by any merger, in so far 
as merger leads to an increase in,, membership size, they can be,. disregarded at 
this point, 1 
ýs Collective. bargaining is the means whereby 'direct' labour market, influence 
is achieved, In Britain collective bargaining is conducted on an industry basis. 
That-is, bargaining is conducted within i* single industries, albeit at a: number 
of levels. A vertical- merger is therefore viewed as primarily conferring 
advantages. in terms of enhanced, bargaining strength - this enhanced bargaining, 
strength being derived-not only from the increased membership of the merged 
union. -but . also from the organisational centralisation - of union authority. It 
must be. recognised that. other benefits might accrue from. a vertical merger such 
as., . 
the- elimination of inter-union competition for membership. On the 
understanding that the, current concern is with aggregate merger activity, such 
possibilities are not considered as, being central to this discussion. 
A horizontal merger crosses industrial boundaries while occupation remains 
constant. Therefore a horizontal merger does not. improve union bargaining power 
in direct relation to industrial collective bargaining. - Through increased 
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membership, however, the organisational - stability, a pre-requisite to 
'successful' collective bargaining, of the union may be enhanced. This point 
should not be understated for, as Buchanan (1981: 47) has indicated, the weaker 
numerical position of some of the craft-oriented unions in relation to their 
general counterparts has led to a narrowing of the differential for skill which 
in turn has promoted mergers among the craft oriented unions. The horizontal 
merger is, from first principles, associated with the craft form of union 
organisation. It is based on the principle of 'maintaining the rate' for a 
particular occupation or craft; the greater the number of workers organised 
from within a specific craft so the bargaining position in relation to 
individual employers or groups of employers is enhanced. 
As has been discussed, Freeman and Brittain (1977: 178) regard diversifying 
mergers, or in their terms 'for scale' mergers, purely in terms of the pursuit 
of increased membership size. While size is of undoubted importance, other 
objectives may also underlie such mergers. For example, diversifying mergers 
represent a means whereby a union may overcome any restriction arising from 
the Bridlington Principles and thereby move into a new area of recruitment. 
Such moves can be considered as either 'aggressive' or 'defensive'. They are 
aggressive in the sense that an expansionist union is brought into competition 
for membership with unions from which it would otherwise have remained 
separate. ' Defensively a diversifying merger might enable a union to spread 
organisational risk by moving into an area of expanding employment while its 
initial recruitment base contracts. 
Seltzer (1978: 125) argues that diversifying mergers may also be undertaken 
to raise 'effectiveness in political action'. This can be viewed in two 
dimensions. Firstly, as a variant of the absolute size argument. increased 
Political influence is achieved within the TUC and Labour Party through weight 
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of numbers in the 'block vote' system. Secondly, a heterogeneous membership 
allows for more widespread committee representation within the TUC industry 
committee structure. For example, the TGWU was represented in 1982-83 on eight 
of the nine industry committees, the exception being the printing industry 
committee. It is also common practice for absorbed unions to retain separate 
TUC affiliation. The North Vales Quarrymen (NVQ) were absorbed by the TGWU in 
1923 yet retained separate affiliation to the TUC until 1960 thereby raising 
overall TGVU representation. This arrangement was beneficial to both unions, for 
as Allen comments, 
the merger overcame a difficulty concerning Transport and General 
Workers' Union representation on the General Council of the Trade 
Union Congress. After the re-organisation of the Trade Union 
Congress in 1920 seats on the General Council were allocated 
to trade groups and only unions within each group could nominate 
candidates for the seats allocated to that group. The whole 
Congress, however, cast votes to determine who sat on the 
General Council. This meant that a small union which became 
absorbed in another union in a different trade group, lost its 
right to nominate for the General Council(1957: 50). 
Of the seven TGVU members on the General Council for 1982-83, two were from 
the Agricultural and Allied Yorkers' National Trade Group and the Dyers, 
Bleachers and Textile Yorkers' National Trade Group and are former general 
secretaries- from unions absorbed by the TGVU whose former memberships form 
majorities within these trade groups. 
Argumente relating to the achievement of organisational stability through 
increased membership size also apply to the attainment of national organisation. 
Similarly, enhanced bargaining strength is derived from national organisation 
given the tendency towards increase in company size, the establishment of 
national collective bargaining and the more pronounced distributional role of 
the state. These benefits can be achieved through federation as well as through 
merger, however; a point to be considered in detail in subsequent chapters. 
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The notion of merger direction, as described above, is founded on the 
extension of the recruitment base of the acquiring union. In previous chapters 
attention has been focused on the pattern of absorptions to the neglect of the 
role of acquiring unions. By way of introduction to the discussion of merger 
direction, therefore, the following section is comprised of a summary of the 
patterns to be found within acquiring unions. Additionally, suggestions are 
advanced in explanation of these patterns. At this juncture, however, these can 
only be considered as tentative, for assessment in the light of the evidence 
presented in the chapters to follow. 
The index of worker involvement2 in merger activity is symbolically 
represented as follows: 
worker involvement = Vt/Tt-i 
where W: total membership of acquiring and absorbed unions. 
T total trade union membership. 
In Figure 5.1 the now familiar wave pattern is reproduced with peaks 
occurring at 1921,1947 and 1972. The minor peak at 1937 is attributable to the 
absorption of the Saw Handle Trades Protection Society organising 24 members 
by the GXVU with a membership of 358,869. In Figure 2.2, showing the density of 
merger activity, the peak for the first merger wave is markedly higher than 
that for the second principal wave. The reverse is clearly in evidence for 
worker involvement. This is partially explained in terms of the provisions of 
the legislation enacted in 1917 and 1964. In effect the graphs show that during 
the first merger wave the proportion of the worker involvement index made up 
by the membership of the acquiring unions was not as pronounced as during the 
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The ond. amalgamation provisions introduced in 1917 necessitated substantial 
votes from both the memberships of acquiring and absorbed unions thereby 
penalising larger unions. By contrast, the transfer of engagements provisions 
included in the 1964 Act required a ballot only of the absorbed unions' 
membership. 
An explanation of the discrepancy between the two graphs in purely legal 
terms would, however, appear unsatisfactory as the transfer of engagement 
provisions were initially introduced in 1940, yet there is no marked divergence 
between the density and worker involvement measures between 1940 and 1964. Two 
other explanations are applicable. Firstly, during the second wave the tendency 
towards increased concentration of union membership resulted in the larger 
unions being proportionately larger than their counterparts during the first 
wave. Secondly, there may have been more composite mergers3 during the first 
wave than during the second thereby acting to reduce the relative proportion of 
workers involved from the acquiring unions. 
The mean size of acquiring unions is derived from the following formula: 
mean size of acquiring unions - Ac/X. 
where A: the aggregate aeabership of acquiring unions. 
X: the number of merger cases. 
The trend, illustrated in Figure 5.2, is towards an increase in the mean size of 
acquiring unions. From first principles this is to be anticipated from both the 
tendencies towards increase in the average size of unions and concentration of 
union membership. Two points are, however, of salience to the development of the 
argument here. 
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Before World War II the mean size of acquiring unions rose steadily. Yet, 
between 1893 and 1940, the CR, 04 rose from 40.1 per cent to 48.7 per cent. The 
mean size of acquiring unions during the post-war period showed wide 
fluctuation, albeit within a more rapidly rising trend. Between 1946 and 1982 
the CR, o rose by 2.4 per cent from 55.3 per cent to 57.7 per cent. In other 
words, when the rise in the CR, o was most pronounced the increase in the mean 
size of acquiring unions was least marked. This suggests that the tendency 
towards increased concentration is of little assistance in explaining the trend 
in the mean size of acquiring unions. A significant rise in the trend is 
recorded after 1964 indicating that the legislation is influential. The transfer 
of engagements provisions, by eliminating the need for a ballot among the 
membership of the acquiring union, effectively removed any restriction on 
merger activity arising from membership size. 
Acquisition Proportions 
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 illustrate the proportion of unions and membership 
absorbed by unions of different size groups: this proportion is termed the 
acquisition proportion. Figure 5.3 illustrates that the acquisition proportion 
for larger unions has increased whereas that for smaller unions has declined. 
The 'acquisition proportion of unions from the intermediate size groups has 
remained broadly constant. The pattern within these trends is, however, uneven. 
Given that by 1916 there were only four unions organising more than 100,000 
members, it is unsurprising that the acquisition proportion for these unions 
remained relatively small. During the first merger wave the acquisition 
proportion attributable to these unions rose slightly before tailing off during 
the depression of the mid-1920s. A further increase coincided with the rise in 
aggregate trade union membership after 1933, again followed by a reduction 
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during Vorld Var II. During the period characterised by the 'operation of 
institutionalised industrial 'relations', the acquisition proportion of the larger 
unions continues to increase but with less marked fluctuation: The impact of the 
transfer of engagements provisions introduced` in 1940, and their easing with 
the enactment of the 1964 legislation, does not appear to be significant. 
The pattern of the acquisition proportion for smaller unions-exhibits more 
fluctuation. Immediately prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1914, it peaked 
at 88 per cent only to fall significantly during the first merger'wave. The rise 
in the acquisition proportion attributable to intermediate sized unions was 
marked during the first merger` wave. ' The subsequent depression saw a further 
increase in the acquisition proportion of the smaller unions largely at the 
expense of that of intermediate sized 'unions. As the acquiring union is the 
largest union involved in any merger. it follows that the mergers during this 
period were between smaller unions, again suggesting that the depression was 
most hard felt by the `smaller unions. It is noteworthy, however, that the 
acquisition proportion of the intermediate sized unions declined significantly 
during this period indicating that the smaller 'unions predominantly merged 
among themselves rather than with unions from the larger size groups. With the 
upturn in union membership' in 1933, this trend was reversed as intermediate 
sized unions acquired proportionately more of those 'unions absorbed. 
The peak in the acquisition proportion of the smaller unions recorded in 
1946 is largely accounted for by the formation of the IPCS, the 'absorbing' 
union of which was the Aeronautical Inspection Directorate Technical Staff 
Association of 6118 members. The post-war decline in the acquisition proportion 
of the smaller unions is marked by less extreme fluctuation than that during 
the implementation of collective bargaining. Preceding the second principle 
merger wave, however, consecutive increases in the acquisition proportion of 
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both smaller and intermediate sized unions are recorded followed by increased 
activity of their larger counterparts. 
Figure 5.4 illustrates the trends in the acquisition proportion by 
membership. The tendencies are similar to those. revealed in Figure 5.3 with the 
larger unions acquiring a greater proportion of the absorbed membership at the 
expense of the smaller unions, the acquisition proportion of which shows a 
marked decline. The pattern within these tendencies is, however, divergent fron 
that of of the acquisition proportion by unions. Notably, the acquisition 
proportion by membership of the larger unions exhibits a wave pattern broadly 
consistent with that of the density in aggregate merger activity. This is to be 
expected given that merger waves are associated with the absorption of larger 
unions. Also of note is the relatively large acquisition proportion of 
intermediate sized unions between 1935., and the onset of the second principal 
merger wave. 
Comparison of Figures 5.3 and 5.4 reveals that although the acquisition 
proportion of smaller unions remained at about 35 per cent after 1967 the 
proportion of membership absorbed constituted by such mergers remained well 
below 10 per cent. In other words smaller unions continue to absorb similar 
sized unions at a substantial rate, yet the total membership absorbed is 
marginal to the aggregate merger process. It remains to be answered why such 
unions merge among themselves rather than into larger unions with more 
substantial financial resources and, wider provision of membership services. 
Chapters 6 and 10 move toward the development of an explanation of this 
phenomenon. 
While the proportion of unions absorbed by larger unions hovered around 
the 80 per cent mark during the years following World War II, the proportion of 
membership constituted by such absorptions fell. This suggests that smaller 
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unions were absorbed by the larger unions during this period. By contrast the 
acquisition proportion by membership of the intermediate sized unions rose 
during the same period whereas by unions a less significant rise is recorded, 
indicating that intermediate sized unions were merging together. 
It would appear that both the 1917 and 1964 Acts were influential in 
allowing larger unions to acquire a more substantial proportion of the total 
membership absorbed. The influence of the transfer of engagements provisions 
introduced in 1940 appears negligible with respect to both acquisition 
proportion measures. 
Geographical and National Xergers 
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 illustrate the relative proportions by unions and by 
membership of the merger process constituted 'by geographical and national 
mergers. Figure 5.5 illustrates a slight tendency towards increase in the number 
of unions absorbed nationally, a tendency more marked in recent years. The 
first principal merger wave was preceded by increases in geographical mergers 
during the recessions following the turn of the century and between 1910 and 
1912. The slight increase in the proportion of: geographical mergers between 
1919 and 1922 is coincidental with the occurrence of the absorption of small 
unions recorded in Chapter 2. It is, of course, to be anticipated that unions 
involved in geographical mergers are relatively smaller than those organising 
nationally. 
The increase in the proportion of geographical mergers during the mid- 
1940s is attributed primarily to the formation of the NUX from the regionally 
organised Miners' Federation of Great Britain. Similar to its predecessor, the 
second principal merger wave was preceded by marked geographical merger 
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activity followed by a steady increase in national merger activity which, peaked 
at the termination of the wave. 
Figure 5.6 reveals a similar pattern for geographical and national mergers 
by membership as that for unions. The different proportions exhibited in the 
two graphs is explained by the relatively smaller size of geographical unions. 
Of particular note is the relatively higher proportion of geographical 
membership absorption during the non-wave periods, indicating that those 
influences exerting a continual effect on merger activity have a relatively more 
pronounced effect on geographical mergers than upon national mergers. Little 
observable difference is recorded in. terms of the periods characterised by the 
implementation of collective bargaining and the operation of institutionalised 
industrial relations with the partial exception of the period around the turn of 
the century. This does not readily support those who advocate the growth of 
collective bargaining as being the central explanatory factor of merger 
patterns. For, if this were so, the post-1945 period would consist in the main 
of national mergers. Similarly, theorists supporting an explanation of merger 
activity based upon the determinacy of industrialisation and. in particular, 
company structure could not anticipate the recorded pattern. 
Explanations can be developed within the context of the unionisation 
process. The first of these is based upon the understanding that union 
formations, as was noted in Chapter 2. continue to occur albeit in a wave 
pattern. Such newly formed unions are unlikely immediately to achieve national 
status for their organisation. It is therefore possible that these unions 
constitute a large proportion of the post-World War II geographical component 
of the merger process. A second, and complementary, explanation is derived from 
the existence of industrial federations of unions. Federations allow for the 
achievement of national organisation for collective bargaining purposes while 
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the organisation of their constituent unions-need not attain national status. It 
could be suggested that geographically based unions might merge within the 
confines of a federation should, for example, a contraction in industrial 
employment and therefore membership threaten the organisational stability of 
individual unions. 
Three directions to merger activity have been identified: horizontal, 
vertical and diversifying. Following the method adopted initially by Shorter and 
Tilly (1974: 46-56) with reference to strike activity, the data are presented in 
the form of boxes. The dimensions of the boxes represent the different 
directions of merger activity as follows: 
V 
H 
The data are presented in Figures 5.7 and 5.8 as a percentage of the aggregate 
merger process, meaning that: V+H+D = 100 per cent. A particular acquiring union 
is regarded as only being -able to diversify into a specific industry and 
occupation once. Therefore, with reference to the historical base of recruitment 
of that union, the diversification measure is understated-5 As it is the 
aggregate merger process that constitutes the focus of this study, however, 
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understatement with respect to specific unions is regarded as marginal to the 
development of the aggregate argument. 
Figure 5.7 illustrates the shape of the merger process by decade with 
respect to unions absorbed. It is apparent that vertical mergers predominate 
throughout with horizontal absorptions constituting a consistently small 
proportion of aggregate merger activity. There is considerable fluctuation 
within the diversifying dimension. During the implementation of collective 
bargaining, there is a marked trend towards increase in the proportion of 
unions absorbed in diversifying mergers. With the exclusion of the decade 1941- 
50, which as has already been discussed was 'exceptional', diversifying 
absorptions constituted a similar proportion of aggregate merger activity 
throughout the period of institutionalised industrial relations. 
Horizontal mergers occur least frequently throughout. As has been 
commented, such mergers are to be associated with the dominance of the 'craft 
type' of union organisation. The small proportion of horizontal mergers during 
the twentieth century can therefore be explained in terms of merger activity 
during the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Both G. D. H. Cole (1924: 77) and 
Clegg et al. (1964: 7) refer to the wave of merger activity among craft unions, 
sparked by the adoption of the 'new model' administrative form and aimed at 
'national coverage'. Trade union function during this period was based on the 
'method of mutual insurance' whereby union organisation was directed towards 
the protection of workers in specific occupations regardless of industry. It is 
to be anticipated, therefore, that such mergers would include a strong 
horizontal dimension. The infrequency of horizontal mergers can be viewed in 
terms of the abandonment of the method of mutual insurance in favour of 
collective bargaining. Collective bargaining, established on an industrial basis, 
requires vertical rather than horizontal organisation for maximum effectiveness. 
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The shape of the merger process by membership absorption is exhibited in 
Figure 5.8. Comparison of Figures 5,7 and 5.8 reveals that the shape of the 
boxes covering the years 1893 to 1920 are similar, indicating that the size of 
the unions absorbed in the different directions was broadly constant. Between 
1921 and 1930 relatively larger unions were absorbed in the diversifying 
direction. This period includes the formation through amalgamation of the two 
major general unions and the subsequent absorption by the TGWU of the Workers' 
Union. The final decade associated with the implementation of collective 
bargaining, was marked by a similarity in size of unions absorbed in the 
different directions. 
A more marked trend is discerned for the poet-war period. During the 
decade 1951 to 1960 relatively small unions were absorbed in diversifying 
mergers whereas in the two subsequent decades the larger unions absorbed were 
in such mergers. It has already been established that larger unions are 
absorbed during the wave periods. The relative proportion of the merger process 
by membership is smaller than that by unions in both the vertical and 
horizontal directions between 1961 and 1983 suggesting that it was the 
diversification in recruitment base that was the primary feature of the second 
principal merger wave in terms of the larger unions absorbed. 
TOWARDS Al SZP. ABATI01 QF T HR GHABGIHG SHAPE QF THE XERGER PROCESS 
Several explanations have been offerred as to why there has been variation 
in the shape of the merger process. These will be examined in detail below. By 
way of introduction, however, this variation is discussed in terms of the 
development of institutionalised industrial relations. Two periods have been 
delineated: 1893-1939, characterised by the growth of collective bargaining, and 
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1946-1983, regarded as the period of the operation of institutionalised 
industrial relations. 
The growth of collective bargaining was co-incidental with a predominance 
of vertical mergers although during the final two decades diversifying mergers 
increased markedly. Vertical mergers are associated with an increase in union 
industrial bargaining power. The predominance of vertical mergers is therefore 
consistent with the rise of national collective bargaining and the growth of 
employers' organisations. The vertical expansion of recruitment base, and hence 
increasing bargaining strength, being required to match that acquired by the 
employers through their combination in associations. 
The increase in diversifying mergers between 1921 and 1940 can be 
explained in similar terms. The diversification in recruitment base during this 
period is associated with the formation of the major general unions. Unions 
with a tendency towards craft organisation relied upon the difficulties 
encountered by employers in the replacement of their skilled members as the 
foundation to their bargaining stance. General unions were not in such a 
position as Will Thorne, first General Secretary of the NUGXW noted: 
If we should confine ourselves to one particular industry 
such as gasworks, alone, and if those other people in various 
parts of the country are let go unorganised, then, if we had a 
dispute with any of the gas companies, these men would be 
brought up to be put in our places(quoted in Hobsbawm, 1979: 18). 
In other words, the tendency towards diversification among the labourers' unions 
was the principal means whereby such unions could improve their industrial 
bargaining position; to recruit into membership all those who could 'blackleg' 
on the existing membership. 
Although vertical mergers continued to predominate throughout the period 
of institutionalised industrial relations, diversifying mergers consistently 
increased proportionately. As collective bargaining had been firmly established 
- 164 - 
by the outset of this period, an explanation based upon this feature is clearly 
inadequate. It has been acknowledged, however, that collective bargaining has 
been supplemented by political influence as a means whereby employment terms 
and conditions can be improved. It has also been argued that the pursuit of 
increased membership size enables such political influence to be exerted more 
effectively. The tendency towards diversification could therefore be viewed as a 
means whereby acquiring unions achieve enhanced political influence. 
It could also be argued, and the evidence so far presented does not allow 
for firm rejection or acceptance, that the Bridlington Principles introduced in 
1939 coupled with the reduction in the aggregate number of unions promoted 
merger diversification. The Bridlington Principles laid down, in general terme, 
restrictions upon the scope of union membership recruitment. Unions need to 
maintain membership growth in order effectively to pursue their functions. 
Diversifying mergers may therefore constitute the means whereby growth can be 
achieved while simultaneously overcoming the restrictions imposed at 
Bridlington. While not refuting this argument, data exist to show that 
individual unions could achieve the required rates of growth without the 
necessitity of merger: for example, between 1951 and 1979 aggregate trade union 
membership rose from 9,247,000 to 12,702,000. However, aggregate figures may 
disguise industrial variation in membership patterns. It is unlikely therefore 
that this argument can be developed to provide a full explanation of the 
diversification in the merger process during this period although it may 
account for some of the tendency. 
In aggregate terms the changing shape of the merger process is not 
inconsistent with the development of institutionalised industrial relations. 
More specifically, three other explanations can be derived from the literature 
to explain this changing pattern. These are the variation in the direction of 
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company merger activity, the effects of increasing density in union organisation 
and the policy of the TUC. 
Company MArgars and Merger Shape 
Buchanan (1974: 42) observes that company merger waves have been 'largely 
simultaneous' with those among unions. Geroski and Knight (1984) argue that 
company mergers have two effects upon union structure. Firstly, through their 
impact on company size they promote an increase in unionisation. This 
proposition, based on the earlier work of Bain and Elsheikh (1980), will not be 
considered here for the impact of unionisation on merger diversification is 
discussed below. The second effect is the result of the influence of company 
mergers upon product market concentration and hence employer bargaining 
strength. Geroski and Knight state that 
corporate merger enhances product market power making price 
increases easier, and this permits the firm to more readily 
offset money wage increases by price increases to restore control 
over the product wage and of profits. In addition, it may 
provide a firm with the opportunity to restore its control 
over work organisation and labour productivity (1984: 53). 
Based upon this latter point Geroski and Knight argue that it is the direction 
taken by company mergers that is central to their impact upon unions. For this 
to be the case, however, their principal reference must be the merging of 
British companies or the extension through merger of a multi-national holding 
in Britain rather than the initial entry into the British market by a multi- 
national corporation. 
A horizontal company merger unites competitors in the same product market 
thereby raising industrial concentration. As such a merger reduces the number 
of immediate competitors and 'increases the ease of collusion between those 
remaining' the cost of any dispute to the combined firms is reduced. Since 
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horizontal company mergers raise the capacity of firms to predict industrial 
output, 'there is a clear incentive for workers to establish intra-industry and 
inter- plant/ intra-firm links' (1984: 54). 
By contrast, a conglomerate company merger enhances company bargaining 
power through the broadening of both financial resources and product market 
diversification. An inter-industry response on behalf of workers is anticipated 
in order to match the increase in company bargaining power. In other words, the 
pursuit of membership size is regarded as the expected union response to 
company diversification. It is in this context, however, that differences in 
internal 'government' between companies and unions have their most direct effect 
upon bargaining. For, whereas a conglomerate company merger produces an 
organisation of unified government and action, a diversifying union merger need 
not have the same consequences. Inter-industry union co-operation, even within 
the same organisation, is notoriously difficult to achieve. 
Finally, Geroski and Knight argue that a vertical company merger enhances 
company bargaining power by protecting 'the upstream firm against the 
permanent loss of sales to its downstream customer' (1984: 54). It is, therefore, 
the bargaining position of the workers in the upstream firm that are adversely 
affected by such a merger. In order to retain relative bargaining position, 
antra-industry union mergers are to be anticipated as unions attempt to 
maintain influence against both upstream and downstream firms. 
In the absence of a consistent data series covering company mergers 
disaggregated by direction, it is impossible to apply regression analysis to 
'test' these propositions. Recent studies by Hannah (1974) and Cowling et al. 
(1980), however, allow for a partial examination of the Geroski and Knight 
position. Of the large company mergers occuring between 1880 and 1918, Hannah 
(1974: 11) reports 87 per cent as being horizontal, 12 per cent as vertical and 
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1 per cent as diversifying. 6 The expectations of the Geroski and Knight stance 
are lent tentative support by reference to Figures 5.7 and 5.8. Vertical union 
mergers dominated both in terms of unions and membership absorbed between 1893 
and. 1920. Moreover, during the same period, the diversifying proportion of the 
union merger process remained small as did that among conglomerate company 
mergers. 
-By comparison with this earlier period, Cowling et al. (1980) report a 
relatively higher proportion of vertical and conglomerate company mergers as 
occuring between 1954 and 1974 although horizontal mergers remained in the 
majority. Reference to Figures, 5.7 and 5.8 again confirms, the expectations of 
Geroski and Knight. Specifically the more substantial proportion of the trade 
union merger process constituted by diversifying mergers 'fits' the evidence 
presented by Cowling et al, who report a growing proportion of conglomerate 
company mergers, particularly between 1970-and 1974. 
The co-incidence of evidence, as is the case between union and company 
merger direction. does not necessarily imply causality. However, this co- 
incidence, given the fulfilment of theoretical expectations, does at least 
suggest that the direction of company mergers might be influential in 'shaping' 
the trade, union merger process. 
It, has been established that union organisational stability is derived 
largely from membership contributions. If membership is declining, merger 
constitutes one of the policies whereby organisational stability can be re- 
established. The impact of the organisational influences is regarded as acting 
as a barrier to merger. In particular some of the organisational influences, for 
example the, maintenance of craft identity. preclude the ratification of mergers 
I 
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in certain directions. It is likely, however, that if organisaional stability is 
threatened the organisational influences will be 'assigned relatively less 
importance as the maintenance of organisational stability is considered 
paramount. Should this be the case the likelihood of diversifying mergers will 
increase, for the inhibiting effect of the organisational influences upon certain 
directions of merger activity will be reduced. 
These are the principles which support an explanation of the trends in 
diversification of merger activity founded upon variations in the pattern of 
union membership. Buchanan (1974: 39) has argued that conditions of competitive 
recruitment -influence merger activity. Conditions of competitive recruitment 
arise from the 'saturation effect'. Given that union density 'captures' the 
saturation effect, and that union membership is the numerator of the union 
density equation, it is by comparison with union density that merger 
diversification is examined. During the implementation of collective bargaining, 
two 'decades, 1921-1940, were, noted for diversification within the merger 
process. Union density fell from 37.9 per cent in 1921 to 33.4 per cent by 1940, 
having 'bottomed out' at 22.9 per cent 'during 1933. Superficial support is 
therefore lent to an explanation of merger diversification based upon movements 
in union density. 
The absorption of the Workers' Union (WU) by the TGWU in 1929 illustrates 
the impact of the organisational instability. Having rejected merger overtures 
in 1922 for amalgamation with the National Amalgamated Union of Labour (HAUL), 
the VU had continued to lose membership at a higher rate than its competitors. 
'By 1927 the union's financial straits had made amalgamation not merely a 
desirable objective but an urgent necessity if bankruptcy was to be avoided' 
(Hyman, 1971: 160). Furthermore, one of the organisational influences that had 
proved insurmountable during the merger negotiations with the HAUL, lower WU 
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membership contributions and more generous benefits, was resolved, as 'the 
Workers' Union was in no position to bargain' (Hyman, 1971s161). Declining 
membership induced organisational instability which was exacerbated by the 
effects of inter-union' competition promoting a relaxation in the organisational 
barriers to merger in order that organisational stability could be re- 
established albeit with a loss of independence. I 
During the period of the operation of institutionalised industrial 
relations, there is a continual rise in the diversification of merger activity 
between' 1951 and, 1983. 'The introduction of the Bridlington Principles in 1939 
would be anticipated to heighten the effects of the variations in union density 
in so far as they precluded recruitment from outside the existing scope of 
individual union's organisation. The theoretical expectations are, however, not 
fulfilled: Between 1951 and 1979 union density rose from 44.6 per cent to 53.6 
per cent. Organisational instability is therefore not the source of the, post- 
World War II tendency towards diversification. 
This is not to reject the influence of the level of union density outright. 
The central difference between the two periods in question is that the overall 
level " of union density was considerably higher during institutionalised 
industrial relations. It iss therefore, -likely that it is the saturation effect 
that influences merger diversification' during the latter period. In other words, 
unions embark upon a policy to diversify membership through merger to either 
extend their bases of recruitment with the purpose of expanding membership or 
to spread organisational risk should the initial recruitment base be 
contracting. . .. I... 
-3 Two other influences are likely, to have exacerbated the impact of the 
saturation effect. Firstly, the increasing influence of the state in controlling 
the distribution of the national product sets the pre-requisite of large 
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membership size if unions are to CLffect this distribution. If aggregate union 
density is high and therefore the opportunities for 'natural' growth limited, 
diversifying mergers constitute the most rapid means whereby membership size 
may be increased. Furthermore, such mergers also involve the 'buying in' by the 
acquiring union of negotiating expertise covering the issues particular to the 
'new' membership thereby providing the. basis for further expansion. Secondly, 
the Bridlington Principles may restrict the pursuit of membership size in 
limiting diversifying recruitment opportunities. If membership is saturated, a 
diversifying merger represents a means whereby these restrictions can be 
circumvented. 
The sectionalise inherent in trade union structure has historically been 
regarded by -the TUC as a source of weakness. Three principal surveys have been 
conducted by the TUC, reports being published in 1927,1947 and 1963, each with 
the theme of 'closer-unity' and 'recommending merger as the most advantageous 
method whereby this may be achieved. The purpose of this section is to examine 
the development of policy as contained within these reports and to relate this 
development to the observed changes in merger shape. 
At Congress in 1924 the TUC resolved -that the objective of any 
amalgamation 'should be as far as possible organisation by industry, with every 
worker a member. of the appropriate organisation'. The object of such a policy 
was viewed solely in terms of the improvement in the bargaining position of 
unions. This policy is clearly consistent with, the observed predominance of 
vertical mergers. In reporting to this resolution in 1927, however, the General 
Council concluded that the difficulty in defining industrial boundaries and the 
cross-industry organisation of craft unionism precluded the attainment of 'pure' 
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industrial unionism. In an attempt" to facilitate the achievement of industrial 
organisation, the General Council promoted a series of industrial amalgamation 
conferences covering the metal trades, textiles (other than cotton), printing 
trades, post office workers, insurance workers and dyeing and bleaching. These 
conferences were markedly unsuccessful with the TUC reporting only the 
absorption of one small post office union as arising from them (1947: 16). 
Organisational influences covering trade identity'and autonomy, differences in 
scales of contributions and benefits, conflicting policy, differences in 
financial resources and the difficulty in placing officials were considered as 
the principal barriers'to the greater success of these conferences. 
A reiteration of the object of industrial unionism was the these of the 
1947 TUC Report entitled " Trade Union Structure and Closer Unity. To the 
attainment of' improved bargaining 'position mentioned in 1927 the TUC added 
that industrial unionism would facilitate the provision of more widespread 
'research, statistical and specialist technical services'. These additional 
objectives were stressed in acknowledgement of the increasing complexity of 
bargaining. 
A third formal enquiry was implemented' on adoption of the following 
resolution at the 1962 Congress: ' I 
Congress agrees that it is time the British trade union' 
movement adapted its structure to modern conditions. It 
instructs the General Council to examine and report to the 
1963 Congress on the possibility of reorganising the structure 
of both the TUC and the British trade union movement with a 
view to making it better fitted to meet modern industrial 
conditions (TUC, 1962). 
The General Council Report to this resolution constituted a shift in emphasis of 
policy. It was stated that 
diversity-is a characteristic of British trade unionism 
and always will be... Ve agree... with the conclusion in this 
respect of the 1927 Report on Structure ... [We] know that many 
people who have spoken at this Congress time and time again 
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have a yearning towards a neater trade unionism in the form 
of industrial unionism. We believe that it would, apart from 
its undesirability, be impractical (TUC, 1963: 162-63). 
This affirmation of pragmatism, notable for its rejection of 'even the 
principle, 
. 
of . industrial unionism as -a -guide . 
to structural change' 
(Flanders, 1970: 39), was followed by the TUC defining its role 'to a greater-or 
lesser extent' as that of a 'marriage broker'(1968: 209) in the promotion of 
merger. In this role the General Council convened a series of consultative 
conferences,, the , common -agenda of which was centred , upon recommendations 
concerning merger, inter-union agreements and spheres of influence. The focus of 
this agenda was three-fold. Firstly, amalgamation would reduce wasteful inter- 
union . competition. 
Secondly, larger unions,, are able to provide more 
comprehensive membership services, thereby enabling them to formulate and give 
effect to broader policy options. Thirdly, larger unions are more effective at 
the national level, the TUC. specifically mentioning the Economic- Development 
Committees and the Industrial Training Boards in this context. 
In other words, the. original TUC emphasis on industrial organisation as a 
means of improving bargaining strength had been, replaced by a stress upon 
enhanced membership size, irrespective of recruitment base, in order to service 
the bargaining function and. achieve influence at the political centre. Clearly, 
the pursuit of membership size per se is more readily achieved through the 
diversification of recruitment base. It is also noted that the change in TUC 
policy is concurrent with , the constant tendency : towards diversification in 
merger activity. .II-, 11 
It would be to overstate the case, however, tto argue that the shift in TUC 
policy is a primary determinant of the tendency towards merger diversification. 
The prime reason for this to be an overstatement lies -in the. degree of 
influence the TUC has had in effecting mergers. The TUC's authority over its 
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affiliates is limited with the consequence, as Hughes points°out, that 'the TUC's 
initiatives in calling unions together in various sectors has been less 
influential than individual union initiatives' (1967: 23). The question that lies 
unanswered, therefore, is why the change in TUC policy is consistent with the 
variation in the direction of merger activity while the TUC influence--upon 
individual union's merger policy is minimal? 
The composition of the TUC General Council is the source of a partial 
understanding to the question posed. Effectively the General Council is composed 
of senior officials from the `larger TUC -affiliates. These officials have a 
pronounced influence upon the merger behaviour of individual unions. In Chapter 
2 it was noted that the legislative procedure whereby British trade union 
mergers are brought about necessitates union leadership consent. The 
introduction of the transfer of engagements provisions allows for greater 
leadership influence with respect to 'merger within the acquiring unions. 
Furthermore "as the worker involvement measure indicates, the larger unions have 
been more pronounced in acquiring unions during the period following World War 
II. Therefore, it would seem likely' that TUC policy is not necessarily a 
determinant of the change in the shape of merger activity but is a reflection 
of what is already current policy within individual unions. 
Accepting this to be the case allows for an elaboration of the changing 
purpose of union mergers fron the perspective of the union leadership. During 
the period of the implementation of collective bargaining, the emphasis was 
upon merger as a means to secure a stronger bargaining position. By the outset 
of the operation of institutionalised industrial relations, this purpose had been 
complemented by"a leadership desire to pursue merger as a means to improve 
financial resources' and thereby the servicing of the bargaining function. By 
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1963 nenbership size was the over-riding objective of verger in order, to both 
improve services and influence the polity. 
In rejecting existing classifications of merger direction ,& classificaion 
appropriate to this study was generated. As this is founded upon the notion of 
the extension of the recruitment base of acquiring unions, the preliminary 
section of this chapter was comprised a review of three measures of the merger 
process by acquiring unions. These were worker involvement, the mean size of 
acquiring unions, and acquisition proportions. 
The wave pattern observed in the index of worker involvement retched 
expectations derived from the impact of the legislative changes enacted in 1917 
and 1964. It was surprising, however, that the introduction of the transfer of 
engeagements provisions in 1940 had no marked effect on the index., It, was 
suggested that the discrepancy between the worker involvement and the density 
of merger activity measures is due to the increasing concentration, of union 
membership and the different rates of occurrence in composite mergers during 
the two delineated periods. 
The mean size of acquiring unions showed an increasing trend. This trend 
was not consistent with movements in the CR, o, however, indicating that the two 
principal merger waves were qualitatively distinct. This indication was 
supported by an examination of the merger acquisition proportions, Larger 
unions were shown to have increased their relative role in the merger- process, 
particularly after 1964. While the role of smaller unions has diminished, they 
continue to absorb one another at a-substantial rate, although the membership 
absorbed iný such mergers is , insignificant as a proportion of the total 
membership absorbed. - 
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The evidence on merger direction showed a reduction in the geographical 
component of the merger'process. This is anticipated as the rise of collective 
bargaining is regarded as promoting the national basis of organisation. It was 
suggested that the geographical mergers occuring during the period of 
institutionalised industrial relations arise from the continual formation of 
unions and from mergers agreed within the structure of federations. 
Vertical expansion dominates the extension of recruitment base with a 
limited number of horizontal mergers and a varied pattern within the 
diversifying tendency. This pattern is consistent with the broad expectations 
associated with the institutionalisation thesis. The variation within the 
patterns meets the theoretical propositions arising from both the current work 
on the direction of company mergers and the recorded fluctuations in the 
pattern of union density. 
It is unlikely that TUC amalgamation policy is a determinant of merger 
shape, it being more probable that' it is a reflection of the policy adopted by 
its affiliates. This policy is notable for the changing emphasis included within 
it regarding the purpose towards 'which merger is directed. The initial focus 
was upon the achievement of industrial unionism to secure effectiveness within 
the emerging institutions of collective bargaining. 'As collective' bargaining 
became more complex, the policy was directed towards the pursuit of membership 
size in order to maintain and improve the provision of membership services. 
Additionally, as labour market terms and conditions came to be increasingly 
influenced through the polity, so a further emphasis was placed upon membership 
size as a means to secure objectives through political means. 
In general terms the evidence on merger direction provides further support 
to an explanation of merger activity based upon a differentiation of the period 
under study into two distinct phases: the implementation of collective 
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bargaining and the operation of institutionalised industrial relations. The next 
chapter further elaborates. on this distinction by means of an analysis of the 
differences in merger; activity between the two principal merger waves. 
_". .. 
FOOTNOTES 
1)These categories are: 
D amalgamation of regionally based unions into a single national union of the 
same type; ii) amalgamation of closed craft unions thus forming a multi-craft 
union; iii) amalgamation of more open unions within a particular sector; iv) 
amalgamation of craft and more open unions within a particular sector; v) 
amalgamation of occupational unions; vi) amalgamation of primarily industrially 
based unions, or occupational unions. with a general or general-sectoral union; 
and vii) amalgamation of primarily craft unions with a more open union. 
2) To a degree the term worker involvement is a misnomer for the transfer of 
engagements provisions introduced as part of the Societies (Miscellaneous 
Provisions) Act 1940 and further relaxed under the terms of the Trade Union 
(Amalgamation) Act 1984, wish removed the necessity of the membership of the 
acquiring union from voting. 
3) A composite merger is one in which more than two unions are involved. 
4) The CR, o is the concentration ratio based upon the largest ten unions. It is 
the proportion of total trade union membership organised by the largest ten 
unions. See Appendix A for details. 
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5) For example, consider the case of a union organising in industry A with 
members in occupation B. Should this union merge with a second union organising 
in industry C with membership in occupation D the merger would be classified as 
diversifying. Should the merged union then acquire a third union organising in 
industry C with membership in occupation D the merger will not be classified as 
diversifying; for the initial merger had involved the expansion of recruitment 
base, and the second is an internal extension of this initial expansion. 
7) To avoid confusion between union and company mergers those company mergers 
labelled 'diversifying' are termed 'conglomerate' for the purposes of this study. 
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ASIDE 112GER VAVES 
In Chapter 2 three merger waves were discerned, two of which were 
regarded as being 'principal' merger waves whereas the third was 
attributed primarily to the formation of the AUX and the IPCS. This 
chapter is concerned centrally with the two principal merger waves. For 
ease of explanation these are termed Wave I and Wave II. Wave I runs 
from-1918 to 1924 and Wave II from 1966 to 1983. To this point Wave I 
and Wave II have been regarded as being essentially similar phenomena. 
Table 2.1 illustrated that quantitatively the waves were comprised-of 
both intense and dense merger activity, although clearly the duration of 
this' heightened activity differs between waves. Both waves are 
immediately preceded by a change in the legislative provisions 
stipulating the procedure whereby merger is achieved. Similarly, they 
both occur during the downswing of an economic long cycle and are co- 
incidental with waves in the formation of unions. 
Throughout the preceding chapters a distinction has been maintained 
between the long economic cycle associated with the implementation of 
collective bargaining and that of the operation of institutionalised 
industrial relations. If this distinction is valid in terms of merger 
activity, it follows that the two waves will be qualitatively distinct, 
reflecting the changing function to which merger is directed. The 
purpose of this chapter is, therefore, to unearth any qualitative 
distinctions between Vaves I and II, thereby providing a further strut 
to the framework provided by the regression analysis and leading the 
argument to Chapters 7 and 8 in which the effect of the independent 
variables is considered in terms of their impact upon union 
organisational stability. Initially, the focus of this chapter is to 
compare quantitatively the two waves. This evidence is subsequently 
employed to draw qualitative conclusions regarding differences between 
Waves I and II. 
In Table 2.1 some summary statistics were presented to draw the 
distinction between wave and non-wave periods. By way of introduction to 
the quantitative evidence presented here the reader is referred to this 
table. In total there were 245 merger cases during Wave I whereas there 
were 237 during Wave II. Three hundred and forty-seven unions organising 
1,068,302 members were absorbed in the 245 merger cases of Wave I; by 
comparison, 281 unions organising 1,392,947 members were absorbed during 
Wave II. From the outset, therefore, it is apparent that more unions 
were absorbed in each merger case during Wave I than in Wave II while 
the unions absorbed were larger during Wave II: Wave I, mean size of 
union absorbed equals 3079 members; Wave II, mean size of union absorbed 
equals 4957 members. Such aggregate figures disguise differences in 
structural events as is demonstrated by Table 6.1. 
Wave I involved a greater degree of trade union restructuring by 
merger than did Wave II. For example, the intensity of composite merger 
activity was greater during the first wave. While during Wave II such 
mergers occured almost biennially, in Wave I there were on average more 
than seven every year. Composite mergers most frequently involve unions 
organising similar memberships. Wave I would, therefore. appear to 
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Humber of Composite Average Annual Composite Mergers 
Mergers Occurrence as a Proportion 
of Composite of Merger Cases 
Mergers 
WAVE I 22 7.33 8.98% 
WAVE II 10 0.58 4.22% 
UNIONS FORMED THROUGH MERGER 
WAVE I VAVE II 
Number of Unions Formed through Merger 51 34 
Annual Average lumber of Unions Formed 7,29 1.89 
through Merger 
Number of Unions 'Dying' in Mergers 204 110 
Resulting in a Formation' 
Number of Unions 'Dying' per Formation 4.0 3.2 
through Merger 
Merger Formations as a Proportion of 20.8% 14.3% 
Merger Cases 
Membership of Unions Formed through 2,252,482 3,727,419 
Merger' 
Membership of Unions Formed through 210.85% 267.59% 
Merger as a Proportion of Total 
Membership Absorbed2 
involve a re-grouping of such unions possibly in accoiNdation to the 
growth of industrial collective bargaining. This evidence also confirms 
the proposition advanced in Chapter 5 (page 154) that the discrepancy 
between the worker involvement and density measures of merger activity 
can be partially explained in terms of the more frequent occurrence of 
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composite mergers during Wave I. During both waves, however, composite 
mergers did not form a significant proportion of the total number of 
merger cases. 
Table 6.1 also includes details concerning the number of unions 
formed through merger during the wave periods. Again the evidence 
provided indicates that Wave I involved a more extensive restructuring 
than its successor. In all, 51 unions were formed from a total of 204 
unions at an annual rate of more than seven per year during Wave I. 
Additionally, more than one in five merger cases resulted in the 
formation of a new union. While the number of unions formed through 
merger. 34, and the annual rate, 1.89, were considerably lower than in 
Wave I, the number of unions 'dying' per formation was similar, 3.2 in 
Wave II and 4.0 during Wave I. The unions formed during Wave II were 
considerably larger (mean size equals 109,630) than during Wave I (mean 
size equals 44,166). 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the shape of the merger waves. In terms of 
the unions absorbed there is very little difference between the waves, 
although Wave I has marginally larger horizontal and vertical dimensions 
than Wave II. Superficially, this runs counter to the expectations of 
the periodisation of merger activity which assumed that Wave II should 
comprise a relatively higher proportion of diversifying mergers. The 
equity in shape is explained, however, in terms of the formation of the 
general unions during Vave I. This factor is also likely to be the 
source of the relatively higher proportion of membership absorbed in 
diversifying mergers during Wave I. Both the TGWU and the NUGIIV were 
formed from unions organising more members than the average absorbed 
union. 
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A COMPARISON QF MATU L AID WHITE-COLLAR ABSORPTIONS 
DURING THE MERGER WAVES 
MANUAL WHITE-COLLAR 
Unions % Members % Unions S Members S 
Absorbed Absorbed Absorbed Absorbed 
Total Wave I 271 78.1 1,035,755 97.0 76 21.9 32,547 3.0. 
Total Wave II 159 56.6 972.028 69.8 , 
122 43.4 420,919 30.2 
WAVE I 
1918 - 
1921 - 
1920 
1924 
173 
98 
86.9 
66.2 
363,962 
671,793 
97.5 
96.7 
26 
50 
13.1 
33.8 
9,357 
23,190 
2.5 
3.3 
WAVE I 
1966 - 
I 
1968 32 84.2 238,006 86.3 6 15.8 37,663 13.7 
1969 - 1971 31 55.4 203,794 74.2 25 44.6 70,830 25.8 
1972 - 1974 34 48.6 116,239 59.9 36 51.4 77,879 40.1 
1975 - 1977 19 39.6 15,078 13.3 29 60.4 98,670 87.6 
1978 - 1980 18 46.2 38,837 24.5 21 53.8 119,727 75.5 
1981 - 1983 25 83.3 360,074 95.7 5 16.7 16,150 4.3 
Table 6.2 shows the pattern of absorption of both unions, and 
membership disaggregated into manual and white-collar categories. In 
terms of both unions and membership, Wave I consisted predominantly, of,, 
manual absorptions with the manual unions absorbed being larger than 
their white-collar counterparts. Wave 2 exhibits a more balanced. 
distribution although manual absorptions remained in the majority.. As. 
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during Wave I. the manual unions absorbed were larger. than the - white- 
collar unions. I 
Within Wave I the proportion of white-collar unions absorbed 
increases significantly during the second half although the membership 
organised by such unions remains marginal. Within Wave II the pattern of 
distribution between the two groups is more complex. Initially, both in 
terms of unions and membership absorbed, the white-collar component was 
in the minority, although by 1972-74 the number of white-collar unions 
absorbed exceeded the number of manual unions. Between 1975 and 1980, 
however, the majority of the merger process was white-collar whichever 
measure was used. This evidence confirms that of Buchanan, who reports 
that from 1963 till the early 1970sß the merger movement was primarily 
manual, but during the 19709 it became more of a white-collar 
movement' (1981: 41). The final three year period of the wave shows a 
marked decline in white-collar merger activity concurrent with a 
heightening of activity among manual unions, with the result that it is 
the manual, component that constitutes the majority by the wave's 
culmination. 
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 illustrate the relationship between merger 
activity and 'natural growth' during the two wave- periods. For the 
purposes of this discussion natural growth is regarded as the increase 
in aggregate membership minus that achieved through the acquisition of 
membership by merger.. It is assumed, therefore. that the membership 
acquired increases or declines subsequent to the merger at the same rate 
as the pre-merger membership. Such an assumption is admittedly dubious. 
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As it is the differences in character between the two merger waves with 
which this section is concerned, however, this assumption is justified 
as it is applied to both waves thereby enabling comparisons to be drawn. 
During both waves unions were formed through merger with the result that 
they were placed in the largest ten at the culmination of the wave. 
Clearly, for such unions there is no membership figure' available for the 
outset of the wave. In order for comparisons to be drawn, the membership 
figure provided is that of the acquiring union in the formation. For 
example, the AEU was formed in 1920 during the course of'merger Wave I. 
The largest union involved in this formation, the acquiring union, was 
the ASE. It is, therefore, the membership of the ASE that is provided 
for 1917. 
A total of 49 unions were acquired organising 596,764 members 
during Wave I by the ten largest unions in 1924, six of which achieved 
natural growth while four incurred a'membership loss. Four of the ten 
largest unions of 1924 were formed through merger during the course of 
the merger wave. The three unions with the most marked decline in 
natural growth, the ABU/ASB, AUGIIW/AUGW and VU are those that absorbed 
the largest number of unions. The exception is the TGVU/DVRGLU which 
acquired a total of 21 unions. This should be regarded as a special 
case, however, in so far as 14 of these 21 unions were involved in the 
huge composite merger of 1922 out of which emerged the TGVU. Of the 
three unions sustaining a marked membership decline, two were formed 
during the wave: the AUGXV and the ABU. 
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Union Unions Membership 
Code Acquired Acquired 
1989 0 0 
3873, 21 228,210 
4113 11 190,854 
3018 9 132,854 
122 0 0 
115 0 0. 
171 1 6,659 
1266 5 17,781 
2221 0 0 
3005 2 20,406 
Membership Membership Membership Natural 
1917 1924 Growth/Decline Growth 
401,579 367,473 -34,106 -34,106 
80,000*- 356,711 +276,711 ; +48,501 
256,373*b 316,372 +59,999 -130,855 
249,210*° 211,643 -37,567 -170,421 
145,527 165,841 +20,114 +20,114 
111.119 160,040 +48,921 +48,921 
168,293 148,469 -19,824 -26,483 
230,000 137,000 . -93,000 -110,781 
97,351 112,030 +14,679 +14,679 
83,461*11 102,012 +18,551 -1,855 
where 1989: National Union of Railwaymen (NUR) 
3873: Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU) 
4113: National Union of General and Municipal Workers' (NUGXV) 
3018: Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) 
122 Yorkshire Miners (YX) 
115 : Durham Miners (DX) 
171 : South Wales Miners (SWX) 
1266: Workers' Union (WU) 
2221: National Union of Teachers (NUT) 
3005: Amalgamated Society of Woodworkers (ASV) 
'-: union at onset of wave was 843: Dock, Wharf Riverside and General 
Labourers' Union (DWRGLU) 
rb: union at onset of wave was 1256: National Union of General Workers 
(AUGV) 
*°: union at onset of wave was 231: Amalgamated Society of Engineers 
(ASE) - 
union at onset of wave was 1787: Amalgamated Society of Carpenters 
and Joiners . 
(ASCJ) 
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The constituent unions of the 
JAUGMW - the AUGW, 2 the Municipal 
Employees' Association (? IBA) and the National Amalgamated Union of 
Labour (HAUL) - each acquired a number of smaller unions during the wave 
prior to the FUGXV formation. Furthermore, they all had negotiated with 
other larger general unions with the intention of amalgamating. These 
negotiations were unsuccessful due to an inability to overcome 
difficulties arising from the incompatability of organisational 
influences. It was the intention of the ASE that additional unions be 
involved in the merger that produced the AEU. As S. Webb (1921: 52) 
reports, however, 'nine other engineering societies, having among them 
100,000 members, also agreed to come in, but failed to comply with the 
requirements of the law'. The most notable of these were the United 
Pattern Makers' Association and the Electrical Trades Union. 
While the VU acquired five small unions during the wave, 
'its 
attempts to merge with its larger general counterparts foundered on the 
barriers constituted by the organisational influences. In the face of 
continuing membership decline, the VU merged in 1929 with the TGWU. The 
point here is that those 'unions sustaining the heaviest membership 
decline were not only actively involved in acquiring unions but also 
pursued further merger opportunities albeit unsuccessfully. 
Three unions -' YX, DX and NUT - achieved an increase in natural 
growth and were not involved in the merger process. Both the YX and DM 
were'affiliated to the Miners' Federation of Great Britain and adopted a 
policy inclined towards industrial unionism. Such a policy limited the 
'merger search parameters' of these unions whose only merger 
opportunities were with unions recruiting the various mining crafts. 
These unions resisted merger on the grounds of retention of craft 
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autonomy. The NUT, the third union recording an increase in natural 
growth, organised in an expanding sector of trade union membership which 
conferred organisational stability, without the necessity of growth 
through merger. Furthermore, in 1913 the NUT, which Clegg suggests had 
interests 'akin to those of the craft unions' (1985: 6), had successfully 
acted in conjunction with other teachers' associations in lobbying the 
Board of Education for increased staffing and salaries. In other words, 
loose working arrangements had been established with other teaching 
associations which, given the opportunities for membership expansion and 
hence organisational stability, reduced external.. pressure,,, towards 
merger. Moreover, relations with the National Union of Women 
, 
Teachers 
(NUWT) remained strained after the NUWT had broken away from the NUT in 
1909 over the issue of equal pay for men and women. 
Three unions incurred relatively small declines in natural growth 
yet had limited merger involvement, namely: the NUR,, SWI[ and ASV. Both 
the NUR and the SWI[ were industrially inclined thereby, limiting, their 
scope for merger activity. The NUR, which had been formed through merger 
in 1913, had subsequently made persistent merger overtures to both the 
Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen (ASLEF. ) and the 
Railway Clerks Association (RCA). These were rejected on the grounds of 
retention of craft autonomy and differences in bargaining, objectives. 
Furthermore, the dominant position in, Fterns. of numerical strength of the 
NUR allowed it to wield both political and bargaining 'muscle' within a 
framework of organisational,.. stability. The SWX, strongly , influenced by 
the syndicalist tradition, had been actively acquiring smaller unions 
organising on the South Wales coalfield before the_onset, of the merger 
wave. The union absorbed during-the wave was a.. craft union., organising 
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colliery enginemen. stokers and craftsmen. suggesting that the strength 
of the syndicalist tradition in South Wales was sufficient to overcome 
the desire to retain craft autonomy. The ASW, organising in a sector 
particularly hard hit by the early effects of the depression, was 
relatively inactive during the merger wave. However, through merger it 
had retained its predominant numerical position in relation to its 
competitor unions. The centralised constitution of the ASV, which had 
been laid down during the nineteenth century. enabled the union's 
leadership to influence strongly the policy of the union side of the 
National Federation of Building Trades Operatives. Inter-craft 
hostilities among the affiliates of the Federation precluded more 
widespread merger activity. 
Wave II: 1966 - 1983 
Eighty-eight unions organising 752,778 members were acquired by the 
largest ten unions of 1983, two of which recorded a membership loss 
while four were formed during the merger wave. The absorbed unions 
constituted 31.3 per cent of the total number of unions and organised 
54.0 per cent of the total membership absorbed during Wave II. By 
comparison, the ten largest unions of 1924 acquired 14.1 per cent of 
unions and 55.9 per cent of the total membership absorbed during Wave I. 
Several distinct patterns are discernable within the merger activity of 
the second wave. 
The two unions with the most marked natural growth. NUPE and NALGO, 
each acquired a single small union. Again this would lend support to the 
notion that unions organising in sectors of employment expansion 
allowing for natural growth do not frequently merge. Contrary to this 
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Union 
MEIBRR 
Unions 
SHTP GROWTH 
THE TE 
Membership 
AHD MERGER ACTIVITY DUR 
N LARGEST UNIONS IN 198 
Membership Membership 
ING WAVE II O 
3 
Membership 
F 
Naturals, 
Code Acquired Acquired 1965 1983 Growth/Decline Growth` 
3873 21 245,161 1,382,509 1,547,443 +164,934 -80,227 
5525 6 98,056 1,021,026*` 1,005,087 -18,939 -114,995 
4113 13 131.047 780.424 875,187 +94,763 -36,284 
2500 1 861 348,528 780,037 +431,509 +430,468 
1362 1 800 255,096 689,046 +433,950 +433,150 
5192 1 8693 341,119 403,446 +62,327 +53,544 
5522 36 106,165 41,894*b 390,000 +348,106 +241,941 
5527 6 73,552 282,660*c 365,000 +82,340 +8,788 
3005 3 117,508 174,263*° 260,000 +85,737 -31,771 
5111 1 370 571,857 208,051 -363,806 -364,176 
where 3873: Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU) 
5525: Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW) 
4113: General and Municipal Workers' Union (GXWU) 
2500: National Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO) 
1362: National Union of Public Employees (NUPE) 
5192: Union of Shop, Distributive and Allied Workers (USDAW) 
5522: Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs 
(ASTMS) 
5527: Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications and Plumbers' Union 
(EETPU) 
3005: Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians (UCATT) 
5111: National Union of Mineworkers (KUM) 
union at onset of wave was 3018: Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) 
*b: union at onset of wave was 1862; Association of Supervisory Staffs, 
Executives and Technicians (ASSET) 
*C: union at onset of wave was 315 : Electrical Trades Union (ETU) 
*d: union at. onset of wave was 3005: Amalgamated Society of 
Woodworkers(ASV) 
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generalisation, however, is the behaviour of ASTXS which achieved a 
significant increase in membership by both natural growth and merger. 
Several explanations may be advanced for this divergence. Firstly, ASTXS 
organised in expanding areas of employment but was in competition for 
recruitment with other unions; for example with TASS and APEX in 
engineering, with BIFU in banking and insurance and more generally with 
the white-collar sections formed by the longer established ex-craft and 
general unions. In order to improve its position vis-a-vis these 
competitors, an expansionist policy may have been pursued to incease 
size and status thereby allowing for greater influence upon 'national 
salary and employment policies'. Secondly, it was noted earlier that 
merger waves coincide with formation waves and that the formation wave 
concurrent with merger Wave II was likely to consist predominantly of 
white-collar union formations. Such unions constitute competition for 
membership. ASTXS may, therefore, have absorbed some of these newly" 
formed unions in order to reduce recruitment competition. A third 
explanation rests on the earlier findings referring to the trade union 
influence on the polity. Unlike several of its white-collar competitors, 
ASTXS was affiliated to both the TUC and Labour Party. It has been 
earlier acknowledged that membership size is a primary determinant of 
influence within these bodies. Support for this explanation is derived' 
from the document, distributed to the memberships of the founding unions" 
of ASTXS in support of amalgamation, in which it is stated that ASTXS 
would be a union capable of wielding immense influence, 
both inside the TUC where pressure could quite 
legitimately then be exerted to secure more adequate 
representation, and with employing organisations, 
Ministries and other policy-forming institutions. 
(AScW and ASSET, 1967) 
,., 
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These explanations are not mutually exclusive; indeed, they may each 
constitute an element of a single overall strategy. 
Four unions sustained a decline in natural growth, the AUBY, UCATT, 
TGWU and AUX. Three of these are older established unions with a 
principal focus of organisation in sectors of declining employment. The 
AUEW and UCATT were formed during the wave by merging with unions with 
which they were in competition for membership. During merger Wave I, the 
mergers ratified during Wave II were the subject of unsuccessful 
negotiations. These broke down on the failure to overcome the barrier of 
the organisational influences. These two mergers are also notable in as 
far as the acquiring unions - the AEU and ASV - were both formed during 
the first merger wave. Furthermore, the acquiring unions of the mergers 
during merger Wave I- the ASE and the Amalgamated Carpenters, Cabinet 
Makers and Joiners - were both the result of the 'new model' wave of 
amalgamations of the mid-nineteenth century. In other words, the major 
merger activity of these unions and their forebears has been cyclical in 
occurrence. 
While both the AUEV and UCATT are oriented towards craft 
organisation, the NUR is industrially inclined. Its membership has 
declined in tandem with employment in the mining industry. The single 
union absorbed by the NUM. the Yorkshire Winding Enginemens' 
Association, was the final regional section of the National Union of 
Colliery Winding Enginemen to be re-absorbed by the RUM after it had 
broken away in 1946 in an attempt to retain craft autonomy. The 
industrial organisation of the NUX implies that a loss of membership, if 
consistent with a decline in mining employment, does not adversely 
influence the union's direct bargaining power. Furthermore, the trade 
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group structure of the TUC effectively guarantees NUM representation on 
the General Council. The pressure towards merger for a union such as the 
' AUK is, therefore, likely to arise from financial instability. 
The final union of the ten largest-in 1983 formed during the second' 
merger wave was the EETPU. It achieved an increase-in'natural growth in' 
addition to being involved in a modest amount of merger activity. The" 
unions absorbed were, however, " small. The five unions absorbed in the', 
formation in -addition to the Plumbing Trades°'Union accounted for in` 
total 22,402 members. ` Of these, 'four were white-collar unions absorbed 
as part of a policy to bolster the Electrical' and Engineering Staff 
Association (EESA), constituted as a separate' white-collar section 
within the union. This section, "formed as a result of 'feelings 'of 
external vulnerability from the enormous effects of electronic and' 
technological change' (Eaton and Gill, 1983: 140), represented an''attempt 
to diversify membership and to establish a counter to ASTXS's 
expansionist recruitment drives. 
USDAW achieved moderate natural growth and, as a consequence, only 
absorbed one union which is allowed considerable autonomy'as'a Scottish 
Bakers' section. The limited merger activity of USDAW does, ' however, - run 
contrary to theoretical expectations. Hughes comments that` 
in the trades in which it'(USDAW) is primarily con-" 
cerned it faces high Job turnover and consequent member- 
ship wastage. In later years it has needed to recruit' 
about 100,000 new members a year to maintain its static 
total membership (1967: 11). r 
It would, therefore, be anticipated that USDAW should be actively 
involved in the merger process in an attempt to consolidate" its 
recruitment base thereby conferring organisational stability, an 
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expectation supported by the heightened recruitment interests of the 
TGVU=and GJM in USDAV'e area, of recruitment. 
The, two principal general unions were the most active throughout 
the second merger wave in terms of membership acquired. The membership 
acquired figure for the GXWU is distorted, however, by the absorption of 
the Boilermakers organising 114,568 members, constituting 87.4 per cent 
of the total membership acquired. Excluding this acquisition the average 
size of union absorbed by the GXWU was 1,373 members. By comparison the 
similar figure' for the TGWU was 11,674. These figures lend support to 
the contention' that the TGWU's trade group structure allows for the 
assimilation of , larger unions. The regional structure of the GiVU 
precludes senior officials of acquired unions from being awarded poet- 
merger positions of influence. The regional, structure of USDAW may also 
offer a partial'explanation of that union's relative merger inactivity. 
During - both merger waves four of the largest unions at their 
culmination were formed. For each wave two of these unions formed by 
merger rose into the largest ten whereas-at the outset of the wave the 
acquiring union was not so placed. Three of the unions formed during 
Wave I were the result of composite mergers whereas only one union was 
produced by composite merger during the 'second. This confirms the 
'summary statistics' results on composite mergers and lends further 
support to the notion that Wave I involved a more fundamental 
restructuring than did its later counterpart. I 
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The achievement of pronounced natural growth appears to-limit a 
union's involvement in merger activity. This finding is applicable to 
both waves with the single exception of ASTMS during the second wave. It 
is suggested, therefore, that organisational stability achieved through 
natural growth is the dominant preference for a 'viable growth policy' 
supplemented by merger activity during periods of membership stagnation 
or decline. 
During both waves there was a minimal involvement in merger 
activity of the industrial unions. The activity that did occur was 
restricted to the absorption of smaller craft unions organising in the 
same industry, reflecting the limited merger search parameters of euch 
unions. This tendency occurred regardless of the recorded pattern in 
natural growth. suggesting that direct bargaining strength is perceived 
as a function of the density of unionisation. - 
Stronger. traditions of craft identity and, autonomy were prevalent 
in Wave I by comparison with Wave II. This is evidenced within two 
tendencies. Firstly, the resistance of certain unions to particular 
amalgamations during Wave I had been broken down by Wave II when mergers 
initially proposed during Wave I were consummated. Secondly, merger Wave 
II witnessed the relaxation of"recruitment boundaries of craft unions 
particularly towards white-collar unionism. These" tendencies are 
consistent with the historical decline of the 'pure' craft form of union 
organisation. Of particular note is the cyclical pattern of 
restructuring mergers among dominant craft unions. 
Those unions making the most numerous acquisitions during Wave I 
were those involved in composite mergers, the outcome of which was a 
newly constituted union. The overwhelming majority of the unions 
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acquired were involved in these formations. That is, the majority of 
absorptions of the largest ten unions were directed towards 
restructuring. By contrast, the unions most actively involved in 
absorbing other unions in Wave II absorbed them into an existing 
structure. This observation also applies in principle to ASTX. S, formed 
in 1968, the constituent unions of which did not absorb any unions prior 
to the formation. Clearly. therefore, restructuring through merger was 
not the dominant theme of Vave II. From the evidence so far presented it 
would appear that the majority of Wave II acquisitions were directed 
towards the maintenance or, in the case of ASTDIS, improvement in 
numerical strength. 
FO MATION DATES 
Figures 6.2 and 6.3 show the formation dates of unions 'dying' 
during the two merger waves by five year periods and those formed during 
the waves themselves. For the purposes of this section deaths include 
both those unions absorbed and those which cease to exist as the result 
of a merger in which a new union is formed. For instance, in 1920 the 
AEU was formed. To this point the ASE has been regarded as the acquiring 
union into which nine other unions were absorbed and hence 'died'. In 
this section the number of deaths is regarded as ten, nine absorbed 
unions plus the ASE, on the understanding that the ASE ceased to 
function as an independent union but only as a part, albeit a 
significant part, of the newly constituted AEU. Contrary to what has 
gone before, formations are regarded as including those 'from scratch' 
and those by merger. Therefore, the formation date of the AEU is 
regarded as being 1920. 
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Figure 6.2 illustrates that the overall pattern of dying unions 
during Wave I is an inverse relationship between number and age-3 The 
overwhelming majority of the unions dying were 'young' with those unions 
formed during the wave being the most numerous single category. There is 
a marked 'kink' in the pattern covering the years 1888-1892 suggesting 
that the labourers' unions formed during the period of 'new unionism' 
were heavily involved in the merger activity of Wave I. 
Sixty-three unions, constituting 18.4 per cent of the total deaths 
by merger, were both formed and died during the merger wave. These 63 
unions represent 12.4 per cent of the total of 510 unions that were 
formed from scratch between 1918 and 1924. Forty-five of these 63 unions 
died in mergers after 1920 when aggregate trade union membership fell 
away with the onset of the post-war recession. Of the 510 unions formed 
during the merger wave 390,76.5 per cent, were constituted during or 
before 1920. This evidence would suggest that the early' phase of the 
merger wave was marked by organisational initiatives which dissipated in 
the face of aggregate membership decline. Some of these initiatives 
appear to have then been protected through merger as organisational 
stability was threatened by membership loss. 
An examination of how these 63 unions died further illustrates the 
nature of this process. Twenty-five. 39.7 per cent, were absorbed by 
other unions formed during the wave in non-composite mergers. Thirteen, 
20.6 per cent, died in composite mergers consisting' solely of unions 
formed during the wave whereas four. 6.3 per cent, died in composite 
mergers with unions constituted prior to the onset of the wave. The 
remaining 21,33.3 per cent, were absorbed by longer established unions 
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in non-composite mergers. In other words, of the 63 unions which were 
both formed and died during the course of the merger wave, 38 merged 
among themselves. Such an action would both maintain organisational 
stability and allow for greater influence vis-a-vis competitor unions 
and. employers. That these unions merged among themselves is also 
indicative of a similarity in membership of the newly formed unions 
which enables merger to be so rapidly achieved. 
Reference to Figure 2.6 shows that the formation rate declined 
between 1897 and 1905, bottomed out and then rose again substantially 
after 1916. This pattern is broadly reproduced in Figure 6.2 in so far 
as the pattern of unions dying during Vave I bottoms out for the period 
corresponding with that in Figure 2.6. Two questions are therefore 
posed. Firstly, why is it that these unions did not merge earlier? 
Secondly, what were the influences impelling the formation rate during 
this period? Other than to note that the dissolution rate (see Figure 
2.7) declined after 1904 and that aggregate trade union membership, with 
the exception of small decreases during 1908 and 1909, showed a 
consistent tendency towards increase after 1904 indicating 
organisational stability, these questions are left unanswered at this 
point to be dealt with in the section on centralisation below. 
Wave II 
The pattern of union deaths in Wave II illustrated in Figure 6.3 is 
divergent from that of its predecessor in so far as the periods of 
formation from which the deaths occur are more widespread. The pattern 
is consistent with the waves in the formation rate shown in Figure 2.6, 
the three periods of peak formation activity co-inciding with the peaks 
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in formation dates of unions dying. As, in the case of Vave Ia large 
number of unions formed during Wave II died through merger before the 
culmination of the wave. 
Fifty-three unions were both formed and died during the course of 
the wave. These unions represented 17.2 per cent of the total deaths 
through merger, a similar proportion to that of Vave I. Two hundred and 
twenty-six unions were formed from scratch between 1966 and 1979,1 the 
unions dying constituting 23.5 per cent of this number which is almost 
twice as great as the corresponding figure for Wave I. This evidence 
supports Lerner's (1961: 194-95) contention that both TUC and employers' 
associations' hostility towards the newly formed union has risen 
throughout the period characterised as the operation of 
institutionalised industrial relations -a hostility which led such 
unions to find sanctuary within their longer established counterparts. 
Eleven of these 53 unions (20.8 per cent) died after the-downturn in 
aggregate trade union membership during 1980, corroborating the idea 
that organisational stability is paramount yet precarious ", for such 
unions. 
The manner in which these newly formed unions died is, however, 
quite distinct from that of Vave I. Twenty-seven. 50.9 per cent, were 
absorbed by seven of the major unions of the period. These were ASTXS 
which acquired 8, AUBY 2, TGWU 4, EETPU 3, APEX 4, GXVU 1 and BIFU 5. 
Seven died in composite mergers with other unions formed during the wave 
and a further seven died in composite mergers with longer established 
unions. The remaining twelve were absorbed in non-composite 'mergers by 
longer established unions other than those mentioned above. ' In=other 
words, the predominant pattern during Wave II is that of the absorption 
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of newly formed unions by longer established unions whereas during Wave 
I it was consolidation with their newly formed counterparts, this being 
achieved through both absorption and composite merger. 
In the earlier section covering the absorptions of the ten largest 
unions of 1983 during Wave II, it was noted that ASTMS was an 
'exceptional case' in so far as it achieved a substantial membership 
increase both by natural growth and merger. That ASTMS absorbed eight of 
the newly formed unions is indicative of a policy to acquire such unions 
as a means both to reduce competition for recruitment and to, expand 
recruitment interests in sectors of expanding employment. As BIFU and 
APEX, among the most immediate competitors to ASTMS, - in combination 
absorbed a further nine of the newly formed unions, it is apparent that 
inter-union- competition was also instrumental in these absorption 
patterns. 
It is accepted for this section that formations occur both 'from 
scratch' and through merger. In Table 6.1 it was noted--that 51 unions 
were formed through merger during Wave I. Twelve of these unions died 
during the course of Wave II of which eleven were originally craft 
oriented unions pointing towards the cyclical pattern of merger activity 
among unions of this form. 
Developing The Thee 
In Vave I the majority of newly formed unions that merged did so 
among themselves in both absorptions and composite mergers. 
Predominantly, these mergers occured after the downturn in aggregate 
trade union membership. As such unions are organisationally unstable, 
these mergers are regarded as being directed towards the achievement of 
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organisational stability. Organisational stability is also dependent 
upon bargaining status in relation to employers. Newly formed unions, by 
definition, have not secured such a status. Therefore, in addition to 
being directed towards organisational stability in terms of membership 
retention, these mergers may be considered as a means whereby bargaining 
status is achieved. As in the case of merger activity among, the larger 
unions, a significant proportion of amalgamations among the newly formed 
unions were directed towards re-grouping. 
A divergent pattern of merger activity is prevalent for Wave II. 
While newly formed unions were heavily involved in the merger process 
their involvement was primarily in terms of their absorption into the 
structures of larger unions. This tendency was pronounced in areas in 
which competitive recruitment was particularly fierce. This confirms the 
findings derived from the evidence on the larger unions among which re- 
grouping was limited and primarily achieved through absorption. In Wave 
I both large and small unions were involved in the sane manner of. merger 
activity whereas during the second their merger activity was with each 
other. x 
Both waves are noted for a change in the CR, o: Wave 1 46.2 per cent 
to 47.1 per cent; Wave II 55.7 per cent to 58.5 per cent. Such changes 
are indicative of a tendency towards centralisation within trade 
unionism. Apart from differences in the degree of centralisation, 
indicated by changes in the CR, o, differences between the waves in terms 
of the type of merger activity pursued suggest that the nature of the 
tendency towards centralisation differs. Wave I is noted for the 
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pronounced restructuring of union organisation, the high intensity of 
unions formed through merger and of composite mergers reflecting the re- 
grouping of unions into larger entities. During the wave itself, 
however, the largest unions which incurred the higher membership decline 
were the most actively involved in merger activity, suggesting that 
unions were absorbed to arrest the drift towards organisational 
instability. By comparison with its predecessor there were relatively 
few unions formed by merger and composite mergers during Wave II. In 
other words, the increased concentration of union membership during Wave 
II was achieved primarily within the structure of trade unionism 
existing prior to the commencement of the wave. 
Federations. G. D. H. Cole (1924: 77) describes the formation of the 
'great federations' of the 1880s and 18909 as the third of the 'closer 
unity movements in the history of trade unionism' . This movement 
continued in momentum throughout the first two decades of the twentieth 
century. By 1903 there were 90 federations in existence, a number that 
had risen to 182 by 1917. Ad is shown in Figure 6.4, however, the onset 
of the first merger wave saw a sharp decline in the number of 
federations, a decline which has not been reversed to the present day. 
The federal form of union organisation and its purpose is regarded 
by the TUC as 
a loose form of industrial unionism, and is an example 
of where the industrial, craft or general workers' unions 
who are concerned in any industry, may get together to 
pursue jointly the problems affecting the industry with 
which they are all concerned.... As a medium between loose 
forms of joint working arrangements and the complete amal- 
gamation of associated bodies, the federation is a half way 
house which usually does a tremendous amount of good work 
lot 
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in presenting a common point of view in negotiations with 
employers and also in assisting to avoid inter-union 
competition and overlapping (TUC, 1947: quoted in Roberts, 
1956: 397). 
In other words, the tendency towards the federal form of organisation 
was consistent, in so far as it was directed towards industrial 
organisation, with the pronounced vertical form of merger activity 
between 1893 and 1920. 
The limitations of the federal form of union organisation have been 
expressed by Allen: 
like cartels, they (federations] suffered from an inherent 
instability and were threatened with disintegration whenever 
matters arose on which uniform policy could not be achieved 
without a disproportionate sacrifice by some unions in the 
federation; or whenever a union thought it could benefit 
from unilateral action. The autonomy of the unions in the 
federations prevented effective co-ordinated industrial 
action (1957: 41). 
The initial question that needs to be answered is, why were unions 
forced to settle for this 'half way house' of 'loose. inherently 
unstable' forms of organisation rather than enter into full amalgamation 
before the first merger wave? If it is accepted, as Sidney Webb asserts. 
that 'the path to amalgamation' is 'made easy' by the union of societies, 
in a federation (1921: 55), why is it that the first merger wave did not 
occur earlier? 
Legislative change. Initially, the procedure for- merger was laid 
down under Section 12 of the Trade Union (Amendment) Act 1876. This Act, 
required the consent of a minimum of two-thirds of the, membership of 
each union involved. As union membership increased, these terns came to. 
constitute a formidable obstacle to the completion of a merger. S. Vebb. 
(1921: 59) referred to the 'impractical requirements of. , 
the law', 
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G. D. H. Cole (1924: 79) to the 'absurdity'. of the 'law as it stood till 
1917', while Elias (1973: 127) speculates that it was 'based on the 
philosophy of divide and rule'. It may be argued,, therefore, that the 
legislative provisions operative until 1917, when co-incidentally the 
number of federations peaked, precluded merger and thereby stimulated 
federation as the best, in the sense of closer unity, that could be 
achieved in the circumstances. 
This argument can be regarded only as a partial explanation of the 
preference for federation over amalgamation. Two examples illustrate 
this partiality. Firstly, in spite of the demands of the 1876 
provisions, the NUR was formed through amalgamation during 1913. At the 
time the Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, the largest of the 
three unions involved, organised 132,002 members. To argue that the 
larger unions were prohibited from merging is, therefore, to overstate 
the case. Secondly, in order to circumvent the obstacle constituted by 
the 1876 provisions, the Associated Iron and Steel Workers, the British 
Steel Smelters Amalgamated Association and the National Steel Workers' 
Association under the direction of John Hodge, a 'champion of 
amalgamation'(Clegg, 1985: 108), formed two bodies: the Iron and Steel 
Trades Confederation, which took over the negotiations function and 
other trade union 'duties, and the. British, Iron, Steel and Kindred 
Trades Association (BISAKTA), a new trade union which joined the 
Confederation. Members of the three original unions were encouraged to 
transfer to BISAXTA, into which new members were also recruited. 
Gradually the membership of the three original unions transferred-their 
allegiance to BISAKTA, thereby eliminating the need to invoke the 
legislative provisions. Buchanan (1974: 42) reports that 'in many cases' 
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a similar procedure was followed. The central point is that while' the 
legislation undoubtedly limited-merger activity, it did not preclude 
mergers among the larger unions; nor were its terms immutable as the 
BISAKTA case demonstrates. 
Rargain_ A further point made by the TUC is that a federal 
structure allows for the combination of 'industrial, craft or general 
workers' unions... 'in any industry'. In other words, federation allows 
for combination without prejudicing principles of organisation and 
avoids the raising of the `other organisational influences. ' The 
'looseness' of the federal"form of organisation. while disadvatageous in 
so far as it does not allow for authority to emanate from a single*body, 
does allow affiliates to retain autonomy-and hence retention of their 
organisational principles. Accepting this to be the case, it must follow 
that these organisational influences dissipated during the course of the 
first merger wave across a wide` range of federations and their 
affiliates. 
The movement away from local bargaining towards that conducted at 
the national level began during the later' years of the nineteenth 
century. This tendency was reversed during the early stages of World War 
I with the introduction of plant level negotiations on dilution, the 
spread of piecework and the negotiations over the shortages of skilled 
labour. The first counter to ' this-movement towards the plant was the 
Munitions of War Act 1915 which 'enabled the government' to refer 
disputes to binding arbitration' (Clegg, 1985: 12? ). The 'government 
reconstructionists', supported byý both trade union leaders and 
employers' representatives, vigorously promoted the consolidation of 
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existing national collective bargaining arrangements and their extension 
into further industries. As a-result, national collective bargaining was 
established in the-shipbuilding, wool, engineering, chemicals, and road 
transport -industries. Immediately post-war, such - bargaining was 
reinforced through arrangements arising from the recommendations of the 
Whitley Committee mostly in the form of Joint Industrial Councils 
(JICs). Charles (1973: 124-25) reports that 'there were twenty (JICs] 
formed in 1918, thirty-two in 1919, sixteen, in 1920 and six in 1921 - 
seventy-four in all'. 
The implementation of widespread collective bargaining had the 
effect of requiring trade union leaders to 'deliver the goods'. This 
requirement was two-fold. On the one hand they were-required to ensure 
the maintenance or improvement of their members' living standards and on 
the other were required to act, in conjunction with employers, in 
ensuring that the terms -of a ratified agreement were enforced. Both of 
these requirements necessitated a more centralised form of -trade union 
government. 
Reference to the formation of the TGWU lends support to this 
explanation of merger 'causality. The National Transport Workers' 
Federation (NTWF) was formed in 1910 on the initiative of the Dock, 
Wharf, Riverside and General Labourers' Union (DWRGLU). Initially, 36 
unions were affiliated, organising primarily 'seamen, dockers, carters, 
and others engaged in waterside transport work'(Allen, 1957: 41). 
Formally it was an extension of the General Labourers' National Council 
which had been established in 1908 to ensure the mutual recognition of 
membership cards from affiliated unions, the avoidance of demarcation 
disputes and the promotion of amalgamation. The NTWF 'simplified and 
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improved negotiations in some of the industries (it] covered by raising 
industrial issues to a national level and by concluding agreements with 
the national representatives of employers'(Allen, 1957: 41). 
Immediately following its inception the NTWF became the rallying 
point throughout the waterfront strikes of 1911 which culminated in an 
'extraordinary series of victories' for the unions (Clegg, 1985: 72), The 
NTVF successfully co-ordinated the actions of its affiliated unions 
through issuing federation cards and forming district committees. In May 
1912 a series of disputes arose concerning the interpretation and 
implementation of the agreement concluded during the previous year. 
Centred on London the dispute was supported by the Executive of the HTVF 
who called a national strike in sympathy. The response was poor; the 
Executives of some affiliates refused to heed the call of the ATVF and 
the dispute was lost in consequence. 
The failure of the 1912 dispute had at its root the lack of a 
centralised authority within the affiliates of the RTWF. In 
acknowledgement of this an amalgamation scheme was drawn up. This was 
rejected, however, as it made no provision for the separate handling of 
the trade affairs of the different sections of membership. Specifically, 
there had developed in certain of the ports... a system 
of registration for the purpose of restricting the number of 
work-people who could seek work on the docks. The provision 
in the amalgamation scheme... would have rendered that system 
ineffective, and, as a consequence, the Liverpool Union (the 
National Union of Dock, Riverside and General Workers) and 
certain other unions refused even to take part in the dis- 
cussione (TGVU ' n. d.: 6) . 
During 1915 Ernest Bevin visited America as a fraternal delegate for the 
TUC. The American Federation of Labor, at the time dominated by craft 
unionism, was organised into a series of 'trade departments' which 
- 207 - 
allowed for the, protection of trade. autonomy. This principle of, 
organisation, imported by Bevin, was to form the foundation to the TGWU 
(Allen, 1957: 43). 
The spark which led to the succesful amalgamation initiative was 
the 1920 Report. of the Shaw Inquiry which recommended the establishment 
of national collective bargaining machinery for the ports, a development 
viewed by-Bevin, among others, as necessitating a single organisation 
offering a uniform direction to union policy. The two principal dockers! 
unions convened an, amalgamation conference during August 1920 at which 
fifteen unions were -represented. A further six were invited to 
participate at subsequent negotiations. Based on achieving commonality 
of` contributions and benefits after the' establishment, of a united 
executive and the implementation of the innovatory trade group system 
agreement was reached, the TGVU formally came into existence, on-l' 
January 1922. 
The resultant form of government, described by Undy et al. 
(1981: 59) as 'centralised and concentrated', remains 'much the same as 
the original rulebook designed for the amalgamation' (Clegg, 1979: 194). 
The primary changes were those introduced to accommodate additional 
trade groups. Given the failure of, earlier merger attempts, it Gis 
apparent that the trade group form of organisation was instrumental- in 
facilitating the amalgamation success, of 1922 through allowing the 
protection of trade autonomy and the appointments of pre-merger general 
secretaries to trade group secretaryships. 
The events preceding the TGWU merger in terms of the 'easing' 
effect of federation affiliation and governmental--innovation, is not 
universally replicated. For example, the Executive of the ASE seceded 
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from the Federation of Engineering and Shipbuilding Trades on the 
understanding that no amalgamation 'scheme handled by the Federation has 
a chance of success ... The spirit of sectionalism 
is there too strongly 
entrenched' USE Executive, quoted in Jefferye, 1945: 192). Having seceded 
from the Federation the ASE successfully concluded a merger to form the 
AEU in 1920 based upon a 'constitution whose main lines had been 
established before the end of the nineteenth century' (Clegg, 1979: 195). 
Furthermore, the amalgamation resulting in the, formation of the AUGMV 
'did not come through the new federation [within which] there were far 
too many jealousies and other difficulties to overcome' (Clegg, 1954s9). 
In addition, 'the arrangements for the government of the (NUGXV) were 
taken over bodily from the NUGW' (Clegg. 1954: 21) which were 'drawn up 
within the old Gasworkers' union before 1914'(Clegg, 1979: 195). 
It would appear, therefore, that the consolidation of national 
collective bargaining was a primary influence upon the centralisation of 
trade unionism during Wave I. Among the labourers' unions national 
collective bargaining raised particular problems of organisation to 
which merger was an apposite remedy. The majority of such unions, while 
claiming a national recruitment base, were centered upon specific 
localities from which a substantial proportion of their membership was 
recruited. Geographical divisions were exposed by the implementation of 
national bargaining. Merger was, therefore, a means whereby the impact 
of such divisions could be reduced, hence enhancing bargaining power. 
Similarly, mergers among smaller unions are likely to have been agreed 
as a means to achieve recognition on the JICs I 
A cor/ollary to the implementation of collective bargaining was the 
desire on behalf of union leaderships to influence government. Such a 
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desire became particularly pronounced during World War I. The case of 
the ASH illustrates why merger was desirable as a means to achieve this 
influence. Throughout the war, the ASH unsuccessfully claimed the right 
to negotiate separately with government on the grounds that its 
membership equalled that of the other engineering unions in combination. 
This claim arose because the smaller societies outvoted the ASH in 
negotiations with government to the detriment of the ASE's membership 
since 'the government's man-power and dilution proposals did not affect 
the patternmaker, boilermaker or blacksmith as much as it did the fitter 
and turner membership of the ASS' (Jefferys, 1945: 191). Merger for the 
ASH was therefore a means whereby such craft distinctions could be 
transformed into an internal union issue allowing for the generation of 
a unified bargaining stance with external-bodies. 
Centralisation 1966 - 1983. 
Legislative change. A merger can only be consummated by means of a 
de jure change. The Trade Union (Amalgamation) Act 1964 constitutes the 
final 'easing' in the legislative procedure covering mergers. Its terms 
allow for an amalgamation, requiring a simple membership majority of all 
unions involved, or a transfer of engagements in which a simple majority 
among only. the transferor union's membership secures merger. Introduced 
as a Private Xember's Bill it received support of both principal parties 
in passing through Parliament without debate. The TUC, with approval 
from employers' organisations, had pressed for legislative reform. The 
object of the Act was 'to promote and encourage the modernisation of the 
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trade union movement by facilitating the merger of trade unions' 
(Rideout, 1972: 453). 
In addition to easing the process whereby merger may be achieved 
the Act influenced the internal union processes relating to merger. Undy 
et al. state that the membership 'were faced with a series of faits 
accomplis arising out of the considerable discretion enjoyed by their 
national leaders and 
ational full-time leaders of major unions [were able] to launch znl 
1initiatives without having to refer constantly to the wider mem- 
bership for authority. In minor unions. on the other hand, there 
was normally some pressing need for amalgamation which under the 
right merger terms could provide the national full-time leaders 
with sufficient discretion to conclude merger negotiations free 
, of mass membership involvement"(1981: 170). 
While it is undoubtedly the case that the full-time leadership does 
have a crucial role to play, and that the 1964 Act accentuated this 
role, it is to over-simplify the merger process to regard it as being 
'free of mass membership involvement'. For example, the leadership of 
the Sun Alliance and London Staff Association (SALSA) was engaged in 
merger talks with both BIFU and ASTXS during 1981-82, but the 
Association's 1983 Annual Conference voted in favour of a motion from 
the floor against merger with either union. Similarly, the proposed 
merger agreed between the leaderships of the SCPS and the CPSA was 
rejected by delegates at the CPSA Annual Conference (Industrial 
Relations Review and Report, 1983: 4). This decision reflected the doubts 
held by CPSA members about being in the same union as the staff who 
supervise and manage them. 
'Furthermore, merger discussions may be conducted by working parties 
selected from the membership or, at least, including a substantial 
proportion of lay representatives. The Amalgamation Working Party of the 
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BUJ is a case in point being comprised largely of members elected at the 
union's delegate meeting to engage in merger discussions with the NGA. 
Indeed, it is reported (Industrial Relations Review and Report, 1983: 5) 
that the AGA was only prepared to continue merger discussions if the 
NUJ's National Executive Council- took responsibility for the 
negotiations. 
Relations with the political centre Until the mid-sixties 
relatively low unemployment enabled trade unionists to secure 
improvements in labour market terms and conditions directly through 
collective bargaining with employers. During this period the unions'- 
central political concern was with the protection of the environment for 
'free collective bargaining'. Voting at both the TUC and the Labour 
Party Conferences was dominated by the 'Praetorian Guard', the General 
Secretaries of the three largest unions - TGWU, GMVU and AUK - who 
Minkin reports as casting 2,328,000 trade union votes out of a total of 
5,552,000 at the 1959 Labour Party Conference (1974: 13). He continues in 
arguing that 
the influence of these major union leaders extended, to 
the process of voting for the National Executive Committee 
and to the performance on that body of those dependent an 
union votes. Their influence also extended to the Trade 
Union Group of MPs... Within the TUC, a similar alignment 
of the big battalions was carefully orchestrated on policy 
" votes and in elections for the General Council (1974: 13-14). 
The close- working arrangements between the union leadership and the 
Labour Party NEC resulted in the party leadership only losing 'one minor 
vote' at Conference between 1948 and 1960. 
The demise of the Praetorian Guard with Cousins' election to the 
General Secretaryship of the TGWU in 1956 presaged the destruction of 
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'the equipoise of the postwar relationship between British unions and 
the Labour Party' (Xinkin, 1974: 15). Concurrent with the onset of the 
second merger wave rising unemployment reduced unions' direct bargaining 
power and led to disputes, both within and between the TUC, unions and 
the Labour Party, regarding policy remedies, accentuated by the election 
of a Labour government in 1964. Factionalism, the Labour Party's 
encouragement of white-collar union affiliation and structural shifts in 
employment patterns contributed to a heightened awareness among trade 
union leaders that membership size provided the means to influence 
strategy at the political centre. 
This awareness was particularly pronounced among the growing white- 
collar unions, whose membership affiliated to the TUC rose by 75x, per 
cent between 1964 and 1970 to 2.046,187 (Lumley, 1973: Appendix 1) while 
their leadership representation on the TUC General Council doubled 
between 1960 and 1972. As has been discussed, white-collar unions in 
general. and ASTAS and BIFU in particular, used merger as a means to 
obtain rapid membership increase. Furthermore, many of the smaller, 
white-collar unions absorbed during this period were not affiliated to 
the TUC, absorption thereby allowing for TUC involvement. In the 
-political context, merger among the longer established unions can be 
viewed as both a 'jockeying' for political influence between themselves 
and as a means to stabilise 'naturally' declining memberships to combat 
the growing political impact of their white-collar counterparts. Some of 
these unions, most notably the TGYU and the EETPU, were actively 
involved in acquiring white-collar unions in order to maintain 
membership and influence. 
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The political influence derived from membership size is illustrated 
by reference to the composition of the union side of two key committees. 
the National Economic Development Council (NEDC) and the TUC-Labour 
Party Liaison 'Committee. In 1980, apart from the TUC's General 
Secretary, the five union representatives on the NEDC were all General 
Secretaries from unions placed in the largest ten which, as has been 
shown, were heavily engaged in acquisitions. Similarly, if the TUC 
General Secretary and President are excluded, the seven remaining union 
representatives on the TUC-Labour Party Liaison Committee were again 
General Secretaries of the largest ten unions. Furthermore. Coates and 
Topham (1986: 124) report that the largest ten 'unions sponsored no lees 
than 71.1 per cent of the total number of trade union sponsored XPs. 
Internal TUC policy. Chapter 5 established that the TUC supported 
amalgamation as a means to reduce the total number of unions yet was 
relatively ineffective in securing mergers between affiliates. Two 
aspects of TUC policy have, however, promoted unions to seek merger. 
These are the policy of the Disputes Committee and the granting of 
recognition. 
Kalis(1978: 47) reports that many officials of small unions 'are of 
the opinion that the entire TUC framework within which inter-union 
relations operate is nothing more than a protective cloak for the larger 
unions'. This opinion is derived from the infrequency of Dispute 
Committee awards allowing for inter-union membership mobility. The 
historical claims of large unions to wide areas of recruitment prohibits 
the expansion of the smaller unions. As the Disputes Committee generally 
upholds these historical claims, smaller TUC affiliates are condemmed to 
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a curtailed scope of recruitment thereby precluding the attainment of 
organisational stability which, in effect, the TUC institutionally 
prohibits. Additionally, organisational stability is a prerequisite to 
effective collective bargaining. Employer recognition and membership 
satisfaction may not be 
, 
forthcoming, therefore acting to further 
inhibit development. 
The TUC policy regarding recognition of smaller unions has also 
acted to promote merger. In acknowledging the historical claims of the 
larger unions. -to wide recruitment 
bases the TUC has refused recognition 
to those smaller unions which impinge upon recruitment bases of existing 
affiliates. TUC recognition allows access to the polity and to the TUC's 
internal services as well as providing the union,,, concerned with 
additional,. status which may be significant in securing employer 
recognition. In response to such applications for affiliation. the TUC's 
Organisation Committee has recommended that the applicant union should 
seek merger with an existing-affiliate thereby denying the smaller union 
independent access to TUC facilities. The following example illustrates 
the pattern: 
On June 3,1975, the NALHX [National Association of Licensed 
House Managers] applied for affiliation, saying that they had 
held talks with a number of TUC affiliates about a possible 
merger and that they did not intend to extend the field they 
currently organised. A copy of the NALHX's letter was sent to 
the TGVU, USDAV, GXVU and CSU seeking their comments. The CSU 
said that they supported the NALHX's application, but the other 
three unions opposed it. The General Council decided that cir- 
.. cumstances 
had not changed since the NALHM's [previous] applic- 
ation had been... rejected and reaffirmed the advice given in 
January 1974 [that is, to merge with an affiliated organisation] 
(TUC, 1975: 37). 
The TUC not only rejected the application of the NALHX but did so on the 
advice of those unions that stood to benefit from its exclusion in terms 
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of both competitive membership pressures and as potential- merger 
partners. " 
Centralisation 1918 - 1924 and 1966 - 1983: 
I Further Thematic Developnpnt 
The quantitative evidence on merger waves lent support to the 
notion that the primary distinction between the two lay in the extent of 
re-grouping among- unions. The evidence on centralisation in Wave I 
allows for the specification of the nature of this re-grouping. The 1876 
legislation was found to have had a prohibitive effect upon merger 
activity. As a result less formal arrangements of closer unity such as 
federations came to- dominate trade union structure. Within these 
federations a fragile closer unity was achieved which, when stressed, 
disintegrated in the face of both craft and geographical bargaining 
pecularities. The fragile nature of the federal form was perceived as a 
source of weakness among trade union officialdom as it precluded the 
pursuit of centralised bargaining objectives. Re-grouping during Wave I 
can, therefore, be viewed as 'formalising' existing federal arrangements 
directed towards greater bargaining coherence. 
During Wave II centralisation was primarily achieved within the 
structure of unions existing prior to the onset of the wave. The 
tendency towards centralisation was reflected in both the high 
proportion of newly formed unions absorbed by their larger counterparts 
and the expansion of the larger unions' recruitment bases into areas of 
expanding employment. Additionally, the relaxation of principles of 
craft autonomy allowed for the expansionýof recruitment through merger 
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of larger unions into-previously organised; ' but' declining, areas of 
employment. - 
The introduction of the Trade Union (Amalgamation) Act 1964, in 
particular the transfer of engagements provisions, allowed for a higher 
degree of leadership 'influence over: the merger process. 'The advent of 
this rising influence was coupled with'"increased union 'activity' within' 
the polity and the introduction of policies adverse to the consolidation 
of status by smaller 'unions. Higher'' unemployment and accentuated 
factionalism within the Labour Party heightened the desire to achieve or 
maintain influence over policy at the political centre. Given the 
disparate union membership`patterne, one of the-purposes of merger, from 
the perspective at' the' centre of union organisation, was to consolidate 
or expand membership 'to achieve political' influence. Additionally, the 
representatives of the most influential unions within the TUC acted to 
defend existing-' organisation- through- the exclusion 'of' emergent 
organisations. This' exclusion prohibited' the development of these 
organisations which'promoted their interest'in merger activity to secure 
organisational stability. 
' CONCLUSIOL: A' RETURN TO THEORY 
Two 'types" of argument are developed in conclusion to the 
preceding presentation. Firstly, ' that which" relates to ', "existing 
theoretical propositions and, secondly, that which the data allow for a 
fuller specification''of the operation of the regressors` employed in 
Chapter 4. 
-The Undy et al: - study'is restricted to' 'the development -of U. K. 
unions since the 1960s'. During'this'period the authors discerned three 
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types of merger: aggressive, consolidatory and defensive. It is apparent 
from the preceding analysis that this categorisation is inapplicable to 
a study of the merger process covering a longer period; that is, one 
that, includes an analysis of merger Wave I. During Wave I pure 
'aggressive' merger appears non-existent. Those unions which were most 
actively involved in the merger process in terms of absorptions were 
those engaged in large composite mergers reflecting the re-structuring 
that characterised the wave. Indeed, these re-structuring mergers could 
'fit' into any one of the three categories. They are aggressive in so 
far as they resulted in an expansion of the recruitment base of the 
acquiring unions, defensive to the extent that they 'were associated 
with declining absolute levels of union membership', and consolidatory 
as the -union formed through merger was comprised of pre-merger 
competitor unions. 
The evidence also suggests that the category 'aggressive' is 
problematic even for the period studied by Undy et al. The two unions 
regarded as aggressively pursuing merger are the TGWU and ASTXS, whose 
purpose in such acquisitions was to 'significantly increase their actual 
or potential membership'. The data presented illustrate that crucial 
differences existed in the recruiting circumstances of the two 
archetypical aggressive unions. During Wave II the TGWU recorded a 
decline in natural growth and used acquired membership toýmaintain a 
numerical dominance; that is, to sustain membership levels. By contrast, 
ASTI(S organised sectors rapidly expanding in terms of employment and 
trade union organisation. 'Natural' growth was high. Its augmentation 
through merger allowed ASTDES to achieve a predominance in relation to 
its white-collar competitors. Whereas the unions absorbed by the TGWU 
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were, in the main, longer established competitor unions, a substantial 
proportion of those acquired by ASTMS were recently formed. 
Additionally, the evidence covering the merger waves lends further 
eupport. to the differentiation-between the periods characterised by the 
implementation of collective bargaining and the operation of 
institutionalised industrial relations. Merger Wave I is distinguished 
by a re-grouping of union structure. This is reflected in a high 
incidence of composite mergers and unions formed by merger, the merger 
activity of the ten largest unions and the inter-merging of recently 
formed unions. This re-grouping was coincidental with a sharp decline in 
the number of federations, indicating that it was directed towards the 
formalisation of existing loose structures in response to the 
consolidation of national bargaining following the, effectuation of the 
Whitley Committee recommendations. By contrast, merger Wave II is 
characterised by the absorption of unions into the structure of, unions 
existing prior to the onset of the wave. This was reflected in the 
acquisition patterns of the largest ten unions, the low incidence of 
% composite mergers and of unions formed through merger and inter-herging 
of newly, formed unions. Evidence suggests that this dominant pattern of 
acquisition was partially directed towards the struggle-for influence at 
the political centre. As such it was assisted by both the powerful 
influence of senior officials from dominant unions in formulating TUC 
policy, and the introduction of the transfer. of engagements provisions 
under the terms of the Trade Union (Amalgamation) Act 1964. 
In Chapter 3 two hypotheses were posited as to the influence of an 
increase in the formation rate on the level of merger intensity. These 
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were that newly formed unions may merge among themselves or 
alternatively my be absorbed in order to prohibit inter-union 
competition for membership. The evidence suggests that the dominant 
influence of the regressor FORM is distinct between periods, the first 
hypothesis predominantly applying to Wave I and the second to Wave H. 
It was also suggested in Chapter 3 that the formation rate is, to a 
degree, a proxy for 'grass roots' organising initiative. The waves in 
the formation rate are coincidental with the spread of unionism during 
Wave I into both manual and white-collar sectors of national and, local 
government and limited inroads into private sector white-collar 
employment; during Wave II into the private service sector industries 
such as banking and insurance. It is apparent, therefore, that such 
organising initiatives during-Wave I were consolidated by mergers among 
newly formed unions. This consolidation was directed towards recognition 
and bargaining status; that is, organisational' stability was achieved 
through the influence of an external source - the state. Organisational 
stability was achieved during Wave II, by contrast, internally to the 
-trade union movement as such organising initiatives -were dissipated 
: through absorption. 
The study of merger waves* also allows for a differentiation to be 
drawn between the impact of the Trade Union (Amalgamation) Acts of 1917 
and 1964. -The evidence presented in Chapter 4 illustrated that both 
Acts promoted an increase in merger intensity. The nature of these 
increases was, however, ' distinct. The 1917 Act promoted the 
'formalisation' of existing federal forms into more centralised 
structures. The 1964 Act allowed for an accentuation of the leadership 
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role in merger activity and the rapid absorption of small unions into 
existing structures. 
Hobsbawm (1964: 179-203) relates that the labourers' unions had been 
politically involved from the outset. Federation, no doubt, was the 
structural means whereby this involvement could be most successfully 
pursued. Furthermore, federation allowed for the convening of a unified 
union side in negotiations with employers. The state legitimation of 
trade unionism through the promotion of collective bargaining induced a 
centralisation of union structure so as to be more effective within this 
bargaining framework. This confirms the action 'of the number of trade 
union sponsored XPs in Chapter 4. Increased trade union involvement in 
the national polity conferred organisational stability, a stability 
which was legislatively limited by the . 
terms of the 1876 Act. The 
widespread introduction of collective' bargaining improved such stability 
which was further enhanced with the easing of the merger provisions in 
1917. 
Similarly, the evidence on merger Wave II supports the impact for 
the same regressor during the operation of institutionalised industrial 
relations. Factionalism within both the TUC and Labour Party accentuated 
the advantages derived from larger membership size. As trade union 
representation within the national polity increased, so union 
leaderships strove for larger memberships to secure their relative 
position. The Trade Union (Amalgamation) Act 1964 eliminated the 
necessity for involvement of the acquiring unions' membership thereby 
easing the pursuit of this leadership function. 
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1. The 'number of unions dying in mergers resulting in a formation' and 
the 'membership of unions formed through merger' include, what has been 
termed to this point, the acquiring union and its membership. Therefore, 
the 'membership of unions formed through merger as a proportion of total 
membership absorbed' has a value greater than 100 per cent for it 
includes more than what has been defined the 'absorbed membership'. 
2. The National Union of General Workers (NUGW) was formally known as 
the National Union of Gasworkers and General Labourers. 
3. As these are absolute figures caution must be expressed in their 
interpretation, particularly with respect to the older unions. A 
relative measure would have further informed the study. The extraction 
of the formation dates of unions in existence prior to the onset of the 
two waves. however, requires a data assembly task beyond the time limits 
of this study. 
4.1979 is the terminal date for the data on union formations. 
5. The AALHX was subsequently admitted to TUC affiliation following an 
industrial dispute involving the TGWU during which inter-union hostility 
was marked thereby undermining the TUC's recommendations. 
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7 
ORGATISATIOJAL INSTABILITY DURING THE IXPLIABTTATI01 OF COLLECTIVE 
BARGAINING ' 
The use of regression analysis in'previous`chapters has established 
an explanatory framework for the analysis of merger activity. -During the 
implementation of collective bargaining the principal features of this 
framework are the marked influence of unionisation variables, the 
relatively weak direct effect of economic factors and the sensitivity'of 
organisational stability to political influences. The analysis of merger' 
shape suggests that the implementation of collective bargaining 
influences merger activity in so far as vertical mergers are predominant' 
prior to the first merger wave. Both during and following this wave 
there was a more pronounced tendency towards diversification within the 
merger process, indicating the ' emergence' of the maintenance of 
organisational stability as an object of merger activity. This notion 
was reinforced by the analysis of merger activity among the ten largest 
unions and those unions formed during the concurrent formation wave. 
The central theme of this chapter is, therefore, the' notion of 
organisational stability or instability. Chapter 2 discerned three 
components to the preservation of ' organisational stability: F the' 
achievement and maintenance of bargaining status; the protection of 
bargaining strength and the impact= of internal 'union authority 
relations. These three components are'necessarily inter-related. It is 
to the unravelling of the nature of these inter-relationships that' this 
chapter is directed. 
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Three approaches are adopted. The first comprises an examination 
of the dissolution waves of 1899-1907 and 1920-1933 on the basis that 
dissolution is the end-point of-organisational instability. In addition 
to informing the analysis of the merger process, this examination also 
allows for furthering the understanding of the dynamics of trade union 
structural events. The second approach considers trade union financial 
stability and the relationships between the different components of 
union expenditure. As these components are not independent of 
environmental economic influences, this second section forms the 
introduction to the third: namely, the examination of internal union 
politics. This third aspect of the chapter also allows for an assessment 
of the- impact of the economic influences upon merger activity as 
mediated by their effect upon the economic circumstances of trade union 
members. 
From Figure 2.7 two- waves of dissolutions were identified as 
occuring during the implementation of collective bargaining. Between 
1899 and 1907,350 unions dissolved while during the second, 1920 to 
1933. a total of 384 unions dissolved. Both dissolution waves follow 
'explosions' of unionism when rapid membership-growth and waves in the 
formation rate are recorded. The first dissolution wave, albeit with a 
six year lag, followed the establishment of new unionism between 1889 
and 1893. -. Similarly, its later counterpart is concurrent with and 
follows the period 1919-25, earlier identified as being characterised by 
the introduction of unionism to national and local government and to 
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some private white-collar sectors. Both dissolution waves coincide with 
periods of economic stagnation or decline. 
Between 1899 and 1907 aggregate trade union membership increased 
from 1,775,000 to 2,355,000 although a decline was recorded between 1900 
and 1904. By contrast, membership declined during the second dissolution 
wave from 8,253,000 in 1920 to 4,350,000 by 1933, with a particularly 
marked fall between 1920 and 1922 when aggregate membership was 
5,573,000. It is apparent, therefore, that organisational instability 
arising from membership lose is-likely to have had a marked impact upon 
the dissolution of unions during the second dissolution wave. Moreover, 
this view is supported as trade union membership increased during-the 
years immediately following the termination of the dissolution wave. A 
further point of dissimilarity between the two waves is founded upon the 
recognition that the first dissolution wave occurred before the 
implementation of national pay bargaining-whereas the second was largely 
co-incidental with this implementation. As it has been acknowledged that 
bargaining status is a prerequisite to organisational stability, it is 
possible that the unions dissolving during the second wave were those 
that had not secured recognition from employers for bargaining.. This 
explanation may also, in part, apply to the first dissolution wave, for 
national procedural agreements were operational at the time of its 
occurrence. 
Regression Results 
Organisational instability, as was discussed in Chapter 2, is 
regarded as a factor impelling unions to merge. Dissolution is the end-, 
point of organisational instability. Therefore, the explanations of the 
effect of the variables described in Chapter 3 with respect to"merger; 
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determination is the same regarding their impact upon they dissolution 
rate. Table 7.1 includes an aggregate equation for the causation of 
dissolutions. 
" The inverse relationship between the dissolution rate and the rate 
of change of union membership fulfills theoretical' expectations `and 
confirms the sensitivity of organisational stability to' membership 
fluctuation during the implementation of collective bargaining. 
Dissolving unions are, in the main, of restricted 'membership" size. 
Aggregate trade union membership decline induces competition for 
membership. Smaller unions are less able to ' compete in such 
10 
circumstances as their resources are more' limited and their size is 
likely to restrict opportunities for securing employer' recognition. ` 
+0.419(CON)***-0.428(, &XEX)***-0.230(XP)*-0.489(PEAK)***+0.278(RW)* 
R2 = 0.62 
D-W = 2.14 
The pronounced sensitivity of trade union organisational stability 
to political factors during the implementation of collective bargaining 
is evidenced by the inclusion of both the presence of` a'Conservative 
government and the number of trade uniön sponsored I1Ps. The positive 
relationship between the dissolution' rate and the election of a 
Conservative government is indicative of a political climate hostile to 
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trade unionism promoting the dissolution of unions. In Chapter 4 two 
explanations were developed regarding the, impact of a Conservative 
government an merger intensity, the relationship between the two being 
inverse. The first of these is that the -policies pursued by the 
Conservative governments of the period acted to promote organisational 
stability and thereby curtail merger activity. %-The second is that the 
presence of a Conservative government is indicative of a political 
climate hostile to trade unionism which, in turn, reflects. a dampening 
of rank and file activity. If rank and file -activity, is a force 
impelling merger activity, and the election ofla, Conservativeýgovernment 
dampens this force, so merger activity is also dampened. 
In Chapter 2 it was argued that merger . 
is "an strategy which maybe 
pursued to arrest the decline towards organisational-instability, albeit 
with a loss of organisational independence. - Failure to arrest this 
decline results in dissolution, the end-point of =organisational 
instability. The positive relationship between-the dissolution rate and 
the presence of a Conservative government, therefore,, -allows for the 
rejection of the first of the two alternative- explanations regarding 
merger activity, or at least the recognition that its effect is not,, as 
strong as that of the second. For, if the-first explanation were-to 
apply, a negative relationship between-, the presence-, of, a, Conservative 
government and the dissolution rate would be anticipated, 
The negative effect on the dissolution rate of increased 
institutional acceptance of trade unionism, as measured by the number of 
trade union sponsored NPs, - also meets theoretical expectations. 
Institutional acceptance confers' organisational, stability and, 
therefore, inhibits the rate at which unions dissolve,, -The regressor, 
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the number of trade union sponsored MPs, however, was the weakest 
influence of the included variables in the equation as measured by the 
value of the Beta coefficients. It is concluded, therefore, that 
organisational instability arising from institutional acceptance does 
not have such a pronounced effect upon the dissolution rate as 
organisational instability arising from the rate of change of union 
membership. 
High peaks in the business cycle suppress the rate at which unions 
dissolve. Such peaks are associated with enhanced union bargaining power 
arising from labour market tightness. It is inferred from the inverse 
relationship between PEAK and the dissolution rate that organisational 
instability arising from a decline in bargaining position also impinges 
upon the dissolution rate. The nature of this relationship can be 
further elaborated in the light of the positive sign attached to the 
level of real wages variable, an index of the workers' standard of 
living. In other words, the rate at which unions dissolve increases as 
workers' standard of living rises. Given the relationships between union 
dissolutions and PEAK and the rate of change of union membership, it 
would seem reasonable to suggest, therefore, that the dissolution rate 
increases when the bargaining strength of smaller unions declines with 
the result that they are unable to secure rises in living standards 
equivilent to those achieved by the memberships of larger unions. 
Life Cycles of the Dissolving Unions 
The previous section provides a further strut to the framework 
within which organisational instability can be elaborated. Figure 7.1 
shows the mean age of the dissolving unions by the year of the 
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dissolution wave for the two waves of dissolutions. For the first wave 
no clear pattern is evident although there is a tendency for those 
unions dissolving later in the wave to have had a longer life cycle or 
survival time. A clearer inverse relationship is evident between 
survival time and the progression of the second merger wave. For both 
waves the duration of the survival times point towards the majority of 
the dissolving unions having had a formation date during the formation 
waves preceding the dissolution waves. 
Figures 7.2 and 7.3 lend some support to this suggestion. Clearly, 
Figure 7.2 illustrates that organisational instability is particularly 
pronounced among recently formed unions. Indeed, of the 350 unions 
dissolving between 1899 and 1907, only 51,14.6 per cent. had been 
formed prior to 1888. Eighty-nine unions formed during the 'explosion' 
of new unionism dissolved in the subsequent dissolution wave. In the 
years immediately following 1893, aggregate union membership tended to 
rise, although fluctuation within this tendency is recorded. Given the 
large number of unions with formation dates between 1894 and 1899 that 
dissolved during the first dissolution wave, it is apparent that while 
membership was rising slowly unions were still being formed at a marked 
rate. This would seen to call into question the allocation of 1893 as 
the termination date for new unionism. 
In Figure 7.3, covering the second dissolution wave, the number of 
unions dissolving with formation dates within the preceding formation 
wave are provided on an annual basis together with formation dates of 
unions dissolving in adjoining periods. In all, 237 of the 384 unions 
dissolving during the wave were formed during the preceding formation 
wave. A further 19 unions were formed and dissolved between 1926 and 
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1932. For both dissolution waves, therefore, the overwhelming majority 
of dissolving unions were those constituted in the preceding formation 
waves. 
It has been assumed that the predominant 'type' of unionism 
constituted during the formation waves of 1899-1907 and 1917-1925 
differs substantially. Between 1889 and 1893 new unions organising semi- 
and unskilled workers are regarded as the dominant type. By contrast, 
the 1917-25 formation wave is characterised asconsisting, in the main, 
of unions organising in national and local government and in some 
sectors of private white-collar employment. If this assumption is 
correct, it follows, given the tendency of recently constituted unions 
to dissolve in subsequent dissolution waves, that there should be a 
different pattern of industrial distribution of the dissolving unions 
between the two dissolution waves. A comparison of Figures 7.4 and 7.5 
reveals this to be the case. In the absence of an annual series showing 
the number of unions organising in each industry, the data provided are 
absolute. It is not possible, therefore, to infer from them, for 
example, that the engineering industry was harder hit than other 
industries for it may be that there were simply more unions organising 
in engineering. The rate at which they dissolved may, indeed, be less 
than that for other industries even though the absolute number is 
higher. Comments must, therefore, be restricted to those comparing the 
two dissolution waves. 
During the first dissolution wave unions dissolving from 
engineering, other textiles and the construction industries were the 
most numerous, constituting 44.9 per cent of the total number of 
dissolving unions. By contrast, the engineering, banking, insurance and 
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finance and national government industries provided 47.9 per cent of the 
dissolving unions during the second dissolution wave. In all 262 (74.9 
per cent) unions dissolving during the first wave organised in 
manufacturing whereas only 153 (39.8 per cent) did so during the second. 
Nine (2.6 per cent) unions organising in local government, health and 
education and national government dissolved during the first wave 
whereas for the second this number had risen to 109 or 28.4 per cent. In 
other words, there is a significant shift in the industrial distribution 
of dissolving unions between the waves, indicating developments in the 
structure of unionism between the two dissolution waves. 
Emergent Th laws 
It is assumed that dissolution is an end-point on an organisational 
stability-instability continuum. Merger is assumed to be a policy option 
whereby this end-point can be avoided. The regression results support 
these assumptions on two counts. Firstly, the theoretical propositions 
developed for the various regressors in Chapter 3 with respect to merger 
activity apply to the dissolution rate. Secondly, the variables included 
in the equation for the causation of dissolutions are similar to those 
included in Table 4.4. Additionally, the inclusion of the regressor for 
the'presence 
of a Conservative government with a positive sign attached 
in the 'causation of dissolutions allows for further specification of 
this regressor's impact upon merger activity. That is, it is the'hostile 
political climate and its effect upon rank and file trade unionism that 
leads to a dampening of merger activity when a Conservative government 
is elected during the implementation of collective bargaining. In the 
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light of this'result the following two'sections of this chapter examine 
the nature of rank and file influence upon the merger process. 
The differences in the internal composition of the dissolution 
xwaves and the 'survival times of the dissolving unions also allows for 
`further elaboration of the nature of the inter-relationships between 
, "structural events. It is apparent that a large proportion of unions 
constituted during formation waves dissolve within a short period of 
itheir inception. In other words, rank and file initiative is transformed 
into new organisational forms which cannot be sustained. In Chapter 6'it 
was'noted that 63 unions were both formed and merged during merger Wave 
I. By comparison, no less than 237 unions formed during the formation 
wave 1917-25 dissolved in the subsequent dissolution wave. 
-Organisational survival would, therefore, appear to be enhanced by 
merging although within only a minority of unions was such apolicy 
-adopted. 
It may be that a similar pattern of events occured among the unions 
emerging from the 'explosion' of new unionism. Figure 6.4 shows that the 
number of federations climbed sharply from 1905 before the first 
'disslolution wave terminates. It is possible that this rise in the 
number of federations can be attributed to the 'new unions' achieving 
organisational stability by federating. ' If this were the case, 
federation and merger perform a similar function in conferring 
organisational stability through- enabling unions to achieve employer 
recognition and, hence, bargaining status and increases in size thereby 
allowing for greater political influence. 
The questions that remains are why unions are formed en masse and 
why then the majority of them dissolve within a short period? Two 
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explanations may. be advanced which are not mutually exclusive. The first 
of. these, is that inter-union competition promotes dissolution as the 
'losers' in such competition fail to maintain organisational stability. 
Inter-union -competition in this context is primarily conducted over 
issues of membership size and bargaining status. As the rate of increase 
of"union membership declines after both formation waves, some support is 
lent-to-this position. Furthermore, the employers' 'counter-offensive' 
to new unionism is coincidental with the first dissolution wave. 
-- A second explanation is based upon the similarity of the 
memberships of the newly formed unions and the likelihood that the 
influence of organisational dissimilarities would not be pronounced. 
These unions were often factory based or, in the case of national and 
local government unions, based upon government departments or 
authorities. Considerable overlap would, therefore, be expected to 
arise. In such circumstances the memberships of such unions may have 
simply transferred their allegiance to another organisation thexby 
improving the likelihood of organisational survival. In other words, 
'informal merger' may. have occurred among these unions whose membership 
was -concentrated on a specific plant, department or locality. Such 
structural rationalisation would circumvent the existing legislative 
requirements. 
In regarding trade unions as intermediary organisations, it follows 
that the economic circumstances of trade union members have a marked 
influence upon trade union behaviour during the implementation of 
collective bargaining. The regression results presented in Chapter 4 
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demonstrate that this influence is mediated by the unionisation 
variables. ''he similarity between the aggregate regression results 
fot'merger intensity and the dissolution rate suggests that 
organisational instability is a primary factor in the promotion of 
merger activity. The immmediate question that arises, therefore, is how 
do the economic circumstances of trade union members promote 
organisational instability and. in turn, merger activity? 
The first avenue of investigation of this relationship is through 
an assessment of trade union financial stability. Such an approach 
allows for examination of the impact of membership fluctuation upon 
unions' income, the effect of unemployment upon union members in terns 
of its financial cost to trade unions, and the influence of membership 
militancy through the payment of dispute benefit. Table 7.2 shows the 
nature of these financial inter-relationships on an annual basis for the 
period of the implementation of collective bargaining. The purpose of 
their assessment is to establish trends within union finances. As it is 
likely that considerable internal variation is disguised by the 
aggregate figures, the conclusions drawn from their examination should 
be treated with some circumspection. 
At the aggregate level the financial status of trade unionism 
exhibits a pronounced tendency towards greater financial reserves. 
Between 1892 and 1939 total funds increase 7.7 fold. During the first 
dissolution wave, 1899-1907, total funds consistently increased in 
continuation of the pattern commencing in 1893. This suggests that 
financial instability was not the source of the increase in the 
dissolution rate. As such. this confirms the evidence presented in the 
previous section of this chapter and points towards organisational 
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instability arising from bargaining status, or lack of it, and political 
factors as being relatively more influential. During the first merger 
wave, total funds declined sharply as is anticipated from the regression 
results presented in Table 4.2. Also of note is that marked variation 
within the tendency towards increase is introduced in 1910 with the 
onset of labour unrest. Indeed, no consistent pattern is evidenced 
between 1910 and the first merger wave, suggesting an inability to 
maintain growth in financial reserves. 
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1915 93,669 0.848 1.269 66.9 0.435 0.51 0 027 1916 91,940 0.776 1.236 62.8 0.378 0.49 # . 0.025 
1917 1111607 0.762 1.176 64.8 0.358 0.47 10,031 
1018 1140806 0.825 1.174 70.3 0.340 0.414 0.056 1 1019 113,324 1.205 1.303 92.5 0.395 0.33 0,327 
1920 93,394 1.838 1.618 113.6 0.458 0.25 p'475 P. 475 
1921 85,292 3.096 2.075 149.2 1.688 0.55 
1922 85,748 2.250 1.967 114.2 1.054 0.47 3, p, 288 
1923 95,319 1.671 1.828 91.4 0.692 0.41 0.112 
1924 99,426 1.021 1.848 104.0 0.717 0.37 0.271 
1925 112,308 1.600 1.792 94.6 0.817 0.48 0.071 
1926 70,585 3.121 1.633 191.1 0.975 0.31 1.308 
1927 92.213 1.671 1.825 91.6 0.825 0.49' 0.046 1928 100,684 1.758 1.842 95.4 0.900 0.51 0.033 
1929 108,926 1.863 1.870 90.2 0.888 0.48 0.104 
1930 110,510 2.008 1.879 106.9 1.088 0.54 083 1931 122#132 2.125 1.850 114.9 1.204 0.57 
9,046 
1932 123,942 2.088 1.875 111.4 1.154 0.55 0.075 1933 131,839 1.908 1.892 100.0 1.017 0.53 0.058 1034 144,540 1.804 1.958 92.1 0.004 0.50 0.029 1935 153,323 1.074 1.848 90.6 0.793 0.47 0.061 
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1939 219,634 1.504 1.767 85.1 0.670 0.45 0.033 
where, PBc Provident Benefit 
UB: Unemployment Benefit 
Dös Dispute Benefit 
0 Prior to 1910 dieaggregated data for the different components of union 
expenditure are unavailable for all unions. Data are available for the 
100 principal trade unions. The expenditure/income ratio is, therefore, 
provided for all unions while the different components of expenditure 
apply to the 100 principal trade unions. In order to calculate the 
ratios of these components to total expenditure the total expenditure 
figure for the 100 principal trade unions was used as the denominator 
prior to 1910, but in not tabulated. For this reason the sun of columns 
3,4 and 5 do not equal the figure provided in column 1 until 1911. On 
balance, it must be assumed that the presented figures overstate 
expenditure on these components with respect to smaller unions. 
Overlapping with the merger wave is the second dissolution wave of 
1920-33. The initial years of this period, 1920 and 1921, witnessed a 
sharp decline in accumulated funds concurrent with a drop in trade union 
membership from 8,263,000 to 6,512,000. The tendency towards increase 
was resumed in the years to 1920 when the most marked decline throughout 
the whole period was recorded. After the General Strike total funds 
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# Prior to 1910 disaggregated data for the different components of union 
expenditure are unavailable for all unions. Data are available for the 
100 principal trade unions. The expenditure/ income ratio is, therefore. 
provided for all unions while the different components of expenditure 
apply to the 100 principal trade unions. In order to calculate the 
ratios of these components to total expenditure the total expenditure 
figure for the 100 principal trade unions was used as the denominator 
prior to 1910, but is not tabulated. For this reason the sum of columns 
3,4 and 5 do not equal the figure provided in column 1 until 1911. On 
balance, it must be assumed that the presented figures overstate 
expenditure on these components with respect to smaller unions. 
Overlapping with the merger wave is the second dissolution wave of 
1920-33. The initial years of this period, 1920 and 1921, witnessed a 
sharp decline in accumulated funds concurrent with a drop in trade union 
membership from 8,253,000 to 6,512,000. The tendency towards increase 
was resumed in the years to 1926 when the most marked decline throughout 
the whole period was recorded. After the General Strike total funds 
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continued to rise until 1939. the impact of the depression appears not 
to have influenced the capacity of unions to accumulate funds, although 
it- nay have had an influence upon the rate at which this accumulation 
took place for after 1933 the rate of increase improved. 
The relationship between membership contributions and union 
expenditure exhibits marked variation throughout, indicating the impact 
of membership variation on immediate cash flow. In the aftermath of the 
birth of new unionism. 1889-93, the expenditure/contribution ratio was 
particularly high suggesting that trade union membership growth need not 
necessarily be associated with union financial stability. Between 1894 
-- and 1899, when membership fluctuation, was limited, the 
expenditure/contribution ratio remained fairly stable although it 
exhibited a tendency". towards decline. The year 1897 appears as spurious 
in so far as the ratio is particularly high by comparison with 
immediately prior and successive years. This figure is, no doubt, 
evidence of the financial impact of the engineering lock-out which led 
the Parliamentary Committee of the TUC to establish a strike fund in 
support of the engineers (Clegg et al., 1984: 165). 
Between 1899 and 1907 the trend in the expenditure/contribution 
ratio continued to rise. It was earlier acknowledged that the recently 
constituted new unions . were unlikely to have accumulated , strong 
financial reserves. Financial stability among these unions would, 
therefore, be particularly sensitive to changes in the 
expenditure/contribution ratio. While the accumulation of total funds 
disguises internal union variation, -it would appear from the pattern in 
the expenditure/contribution ratio that immediate cash flow problems may 
have contributed to the first dissolution wave. Figure 7.2 illustrated 
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that the majority of unions dissolving in this-period were recently 
constituted lending some support to this notion. Furthermore,. Hobsbawm 
(1964: 192) reports that the labourers' unions 'could not charge the high 
dues of the craft unions' suggesting that the aggregate figures 
overstate the financial stability of these recently constituted unions. 
With the exception of the war years, 1915-18, the 
expenditure/contribution ratio remained high from 1908 to 1933. This 
period is coincidental with labour unrest, the. first merger, wave and the 
second dissolution wave. Indeed, for twelve of these years. expenditure 
exceeded income from contributions. Four of these twelve years are 
coincidental with the first merger wave and nine with the second 
dissolution wave. In order to establish the relationships between, the 
different aspects of expenditure, the remaining columns of Table 7.2 
include breakdowns of expenditure into components covering unemployment 
and provident benefit. dispute benefit and other costs of, which 
administrative costs are assumed to constitute a substantial proportion. 
Expenditure on unemployment and provident benefits exhibits a wide 
fluctuation throughout the implementation of collective bargaining, but 
some degree of periodisation is evident. Prior to 1910 expenditure on 
unemployment and provident benefits tended to rise, albeit unevenly. 
This increase is, however, unlikely to have influenced the first 
dissolution wave for, as Clegg et al. (1964: 92) report, the low 
contributions paid by Mabers of the labourers' unions allowed 'for. the 
payment only of fighting benefits'. With the tightening of the, labour 
market the proportion of total union expenditure spent on unemployment 
and provident benefits declined from 1909, although until 1916 it 
remained the highest single item of expenditure. The onset of the post- 
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war depression saw unemployment and provident; benefit expenditure rise 
again but it did not reach the levels preceding 1910 even through the 
depth of`the depression between 1929'aný1933. 
Expenditure on dispute benefit exhibits the sharpest fluctuation 
among the three' disaggregated items- of expenditure. An initial decline 
in the proportion of expenditure constituted by dispute benefit is 
recorded as the' industrial ferment 'associated' with new' unionism 
dissipated. With the exception of the years 1897-98, marked by the 
engineers lock-out, about'"11 per cent of total expenditure was spent on 
dispute benefit until 1908. From this point until' '1921, excluding the 
war years 1915-18, expenditure on dispute benefit was well above 
average, particularly during 1912,1920 and '1921. 'This pattern is 
broadly consistent with that of merger intensity which shows an upward 
trend from 1910 and falls during the mid-war years before rising again 
following the enactment of the Trade Union (Amalgamation) Act 1917. 
Furthermore, the pattern of expenditure on dispute benefit is similar to 
those of the expenditure/contribution ratio and total funds. While this 
similarity in pattern does not infer causality, earlier analyses in 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that the level of funds per member' provided 
additional explanatory power to the basic economic 'model during' the 
implementation of collective bargaining. In other words, while it is-the 
level of funds per member that has been shown to be associated with 
merger' activity, it is expenditure on dispute benefit that influences 
the expenditure/contribution ratio which, in turn; affects the level of 
funds per member. ` The similarity in pattern is reproduced in the years 
following 1922. Total funds increased as the' expenditure on dispute 
benefit declined. A 'kink' in both indicators is recorded for 1926 after 
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which total funds steadily increase whereas expenditure on dispute 
benefit does not exceed five per cent of total expenditure. 
Other costs'exhibit a gradual tendency towards, increase-with little 
fluctuation in terms of their proportion of,, total expenditure. , Given 
that administrative -costs --constitute a substantial proportion of these 
other costs, - this tendency is not entirely unexpected on two counts. 
Firstly, the introduction of bargaining necessitates an increase in 
expenditure - to --maintain the bargaining function. Secondly, 
administrative costs are most susceptible to internal union control, a 
factor which would account for their steady and consistent increase. Of 
particular-note is the, substantial rise in other costs in 1920 when they 
more than doubled whereas retail prices rose by 21 per cent indicating 
that this increase arose from policy decisions rather than external 
factors. After 1920 expenditure on other costs never returned to the 
1919 money levels. 
Regression Results-' P, 
Table 7.3 shows the result of regressing merger intensity against 
the three principal components of union expenditure, each of which is 
expressed as a. 'real' cost. The positive relationship between merger 
intensity and expenditure on dispute benefit is as expected and suggests 
that an increased frequency of strike activity promotes mergers among 
trade unions. In turn, this result implies that rank and file activity 
impinges upon the merger process during the implementation of collective 
bargaining through its impact upon union financial stability., 
The negative and significant-association between merger intensity 
and expenditure on other costs lends tentative support to the notion 
that organisational stability derived from recognition for bargaining is 
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a primary union objective during the implementation of collective 
bargaining. It is accepted that administrative costs comprise a 
significant proportion of these 'other costs' and that union 
administrative costs rise on the implementation of collective bargaining 
arrangements. The achievement of recognition for bargaining purposes has 
been assumed to confer organisational stability. The negative 
relationship between merger intensity and other costs may, therefore, be 
explained in terms of the rising administrative costs, reflecting 
enhanced organisational stability arising from recognition for 
bargaining purposes. In other words, rising administrative expenditure 
is an internal union cost traded off against the benefits, in terms of 
organisational stability, derived from recognition for bargaining. 
0.169 (DB) -0.424 (OTHER): "** -0.236 (PBUB) 
R2 = 0.28 
D-W = 0.802 
where DB : union expenditure on dispute benefit 
OTHER : union expenditure on other costs 
PBUB : union expenditure on provident and unemployment benefits 
The three regressors are expressed in real terms. That is, they are 
corrected for changes in the retail price index. 
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The inverse relationship between merger activity and expenditure on 
provident and unemployment benefits remains a puzzle. It is anticipated 
from the results obtained employing the regressor PEAK that high 
unemployment, and hence high expenditure on unemployment benefit, should 
promote merger activity. An explanation may, however, be deployed to 
explain this discrepancy. The negative relationship may be understood in 
terms of internal control over union finances. For example, if 
expenditure on provident and unemployment benefits is rising within a 
union to the extent that the organisation's financial viability is 
threatened such benefits may be cut in order to retain organisational 
stability. The relationship between PEAK and expenditure on unemployment 
benefit is, therefore, likely to exhibit marked variation in the light 
of union policy changes. Furthermore, it must be acknowledged that many 
unions did not pay such benefits, again pointing to the lack of any 
direct relationship between unemployment and aggregate union expenditure 
on unemployment benefit. 
A Further Thematic Development 
This review of the financial status of trade unions allows for the 
positioning of further struts to the argument. Recently formed unions do 
not have large accumulated financial reserves. It is not to the total 
funds accumulated by unions but to the expenditure/contribution ratio, 
therefore, that reference should be made to establish the financial 
status of such unions. During both dissolution waves, which consist 
predominantly of the demise of recently formed unions, the 
expenditure/contribution ratio was relatively high, implying that 
financial constraint was an influence upon these dissolutions. 
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During the first dissolution 'wave Pthe - combined effect of 
expenditure on Unemployment and provident'°benefits and other costs acted 
to raise the expenditure/contribution ratio. Given that the majority of 
the new unions did not- pay such benefits' and that, by- definition, ` the 
administrative costs of recently formed 'unions 'are small, 'however$' it 
would be to overstate the case to argue that financial stringency was 
the sole cause of the'first dissolution wave., -' 
A different picture emerges for the second dissolution 'wave. 
Between 1920 and 1933 the expenditure/contribution ratio remained high 
although the inter-relationships between the' different components of 
expenditure changed. Initially, the, proportion of expenditure spent on 
dispute benefit rose to be followed by a- rise in that--allocated to 
unemployment and provident benefit. Fron 1920 "onwards substantially 
larger sums were required to meet other costs, In"Chapter 6 it was noted 
that the introduction of national pay bargaining was influential, in the 
determination of structural change. Such bargaining requires the 
establishment of an administrative apparatus. Mergers among recently 
formed unions were prevalent during the first merger wave in an attempt 
to secure bargaining status through increased membership size, which 
also allows for the establishment of an administrative apparatus. In 
other words, there is a membership size threshold'which both enables the 
achievement of recognition for bargaining and the provision of-resources 
to support bargaining. - Financial stringency , arising from increasing 
administrative costs-is, therefore, likely to have been an important 
influence upon the second dissolution wave. 
Chapter 4 demonstrated the inverse relationship between the level 
of trade union funds per member and merger activity. Throughout the 
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merger wave 1918-24 the expenditure/contribution ratio was high and had 
been so since 1908 suggesting a cumulative draining of funds. Initially, 
the source of this diminution of funds was the increase in expenditure 
on dispute benefit arising from the labour unrest. This was latterly 
supplemented by a rise in the proportion of expenditure allocated to 
unemployment and provident benefit. Throughout, other costs rose in 
tandem with the more widespread introduction of bargaining. In 
particular, 1920, when merger activity was steeply rising, saw a 
substantial increase in such costs. It is, therefore, the confluence of 
these three factors that imposed a financial impetus towards merger. The 
next section of this chapter examines the internal union political 
inter-relationships that underpin this variation in union finances 
thereby adding a further component to the understanding of the merger 
process: namely, the relationship between environmental economic factors 
and merger activity as mediated by their influence upon membership 
behaviour. 
1893 - 1914 
The culmination of the 'Great Depression', 1873-96, was marked by 
the 'explosion' of new unionism. Widespread strike activity was coupled 
with a rapid rise in trade union membership and the formation of the 
labourers' unions organising the semi- and un-skilled. Hobsbawm, 
commenting on this and similar preceding periods, points out that 'they 
are, in fact. generally expansions of the [trade union) movement into 
new industries, new regions, new classes of the population; they 
coincide with a clustering of new organisations. and the adoption of new 
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ideas and policies`by both new and existing units' (1964: 127). The Webbs 
would appear to, concur in reporting that the' increase in union 
membership 'was of less importance than what may, without exaggeration. 
be termed the spiritual rebirth oft organisations which'were showing 
signs of decreptitude' (1920: 420). 
The economic stagnation which set in after this explosion was to 
last to the turn of the century. It acted to curtail union membership 
growth to 1.2 per cent between 1892 and 1899. Realm wages continued to 
increase until about the mid-1890s when both prices and wages 
stabilised. Strike activity declined, Cronin(1979: 49-50) describes' those 
that did occur as 'small and localised' with union leaderships' having 
'played a minor role in initiating the struggles'. Indeed. Lovell 
comments that 'survival'was the basic problem for the new organisations. 
they were assailed by attacks from the employers even before the trade 
boom had subsided, 'and once the downswing did commence in 1891 they were 
pushed even further on the defensive'(1977: 24). 
The defeat 'of the engineers in 1898 together with the'effects of 
the employers' 'counter-offensive', culminating with Taff Vale in' 1901, 
had a depressing effect upon rank and file trade unionism. This effect 
was compounded between 1900 and 1908 by a period in which real wages 
remained'static and the rate of 'increase in productivity declined in the 
face of strong international competition particularly from America and 
Germany. While productivity declined output rose, indicating that the 
employers increased working hours to meet orders. Littler (1982: 80-98) 
suggests that this intensification of work was accompanied by a 
tightening of management work-shop control through reorganisation of the 
labour process, the spread of piece-work and the introduction of 
-245- 
innovative management techniques. Concurrent' with these developments 
Saville (1960) --has shown that new unionism was constantly vilified 
in 
the press and contingents of strike breakers made available to employers 
with the consequence that public support for unionism dissipated. After 
having peaked in 1893, unemployment remained stable between 2.0 and 3.3 
per cent until the turn of the century, ensuring some degree of 
bargaining strength. 
Figure 7.6 illustrates that strike frequency steeply declined 
during this period. This decline has been primarily attributed to the 
implementation of collective bargaining in cotton, coal mining, 
engineering and ship-building, all of which were prone to large scale 
strike action (Clegg et al., 1964: 362). The impact of collective 
bargaining was to divide 'the unions internally rather than unite them' 
(Lovell, 1977: 34). From the perspective of the union leadership 
collective bargaining conferred organisational stability through 
bargaining status and enhanced their prestige and authority within 
unions. Furthermore, the centrality of procedural negotiations limited 
the 'wasting [of] unions' resources in a series of local disputes over 
which [the leadership] had no control'. Clegg et al. succinctly make the 
point that 
some of the national agreements represented a joint victory 
for employers and trade union leaders over the hostility of 
a rank and file which was still wedded to the traditions of- 
unilateral regulation (1964: 471). 
The twin prongs of the employers' counter-offensive following the 
birth of new unionism ran concurrently with a limited but consistent 
level of merger intensity and were implemented during the Conservative 
administrations between 1895 and 1905. Trade union structure was far 
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from stable, however, as is evidenced by the first dissolution wave 
1899-1907. In other words, structurally the impact of the employers' 
counter offensive was measured in terms of organisational dissolution 
rather than formal restructuring. Similarly, as was evidenced in Figure 
6.4, the period was also marked by a decline in the number of 
federations again pointing to the predominant pattern of organisational 
instability and decline. 3 
Strike activity, in addition to membership growth and merger 
intensity, remained stable throughout the first decade of the twentieth 
century but with the 'sharp improvement in trade and employment visible 
by the summer' (Clegg, 1985: 11) of 1910 strike activity escalated into 
the labour unrest of 1910-14. Cronin records that wages and union 
recognition were the main demands underpinning the increase in strike 
frequency. Of more significance to the present purpose, however, is his 
assertion that 'surrounding all such efforts was a surge of sentiment in 
favour of broader and more effective forms of labour solidarity as the 
only effective tactic against the combinations of the employers and the 
apparent duplicities of the state' (1979: 52). Phelps-Brown (1965) 
concurs in reporting a widening of 'orbits of coercive comparison'. The 
labour unrest 'ultimately touched most groups of workers, the dispersion 
actually broadening in 1913 as the numbers involved declined' 
(Cronin, 1979: 51). Xerger activity rose in intensity during 1910 and 
continued to do so until 1913 when a slight decline was recorded. Union 
membership, by contrast, showed a consistent upward tendency over the 
same period. 
In tracing the development of British syndicalism between 1900 and 
1914, Holton (1976: 27-29) refers to falling real wages, 'the 
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incorporation of labour leaders within collective bargaining systems and 
parliamentary politics' and 'the development of business amalgamation 
into larger units of production, which led to a higher degree of 
concentration in patterns of ownership and control' as, in combination, 
providing the spur to the growth of syndicalist influence. While the 
impact of the syndicalists was limited to specific industries and, more 
often than not, specific localities within these industries, there can 
be little doubt that they influenced the pattern of merger activity. In 
particular industries syndicalists 'helped to initiate federation and 
amalgamation campaigns' whereas in others they sought to influence 
existing industrial union movements. Prominent among these was the 
Provisional Committee for the Amalgamation of Existing Unions which by 
1912, two years after its inception, had formed Amalgamation Committees 
in building, printing, engineering and transport. 
The formation of the Amalgamation Committees Federation in 1912 was 
to lead to the constituting of the Industrial Democracy League. Holton 
reports that by this time union amalgamation was. increasingly seen by 
rank and file trade unionists 
not simply as organisational reform to achieve 
greater efficiency in collective bargaining, but 
more ambitiously as an integral part of the struggle 
for revolutionary industrial unionism (1976: 144). 
The campaigns of the building industry amalgamation committee compelled 
the TUC to convene an amalgamation conference in 1912 at which the 
principle of merger was supported by 31,541 votes to 12,156, a poll 
representing about 40 per cent of those eligible to vote. Holton 
(1976: 158) comments that this initiative f/oundered upon the opposition 
of leaders who were concerned about the undermining of their status and 
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believed that the federal form of organisation was sufficient to obtain 
trade union goals. 
Policy differences between the rank and file and trade union 
leadership were also manifest in the most notable of the pre-war 
mergers: the formation of the NUR in 1913. Although the Railway Clerks 
Association and the Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and 
Firemen rejected overtures to join the amalgamation in attempts 
respectively to preserve white-collar and craft status, the NUR was the 
first union approximating to the 'ideal typical' industrial union. 
Undoubtedly syndicalist influence was prominent in this case, for as 
Holton comments 
The experience of the 1911 strike (called in response to the 
failure of the 1907 Conciliation Schemel certainly gave a boost 
to syndicalism on the railways. In the first place. joint action 
by different grades of railwaymen at the rank and file level 
stimulated the movement towards industrial unionism as a means 
of maximising trade union strength. Secondly, the syndicalist 
critique of conciliatory trade unionism was further vindicated 
by the manner in which the national strike was settled' (1976: 
107). 
Bagwell (1963: 309) expands this point in stating that between '1890 and 
1913 there were no less than twelve major attempts at 
the fusion of 
forces', success being recorded in 1913 
because unofficial action in 
1911 led 'the leaders of the railway unions (to feel] obliged 
to act 
promptly and together if they were to retain control of 
the situation' 
(1963: 325). This prompted a realisation of 
the benefits to be gained 
through merger given increasing financial stringencies and 
increases in 
membership size which mde it 'more difficult 
for full time officers to 
keep fully in touch with opinion in the branches where 
the membership 
was increasingly influenced by syndicalist doctrines' 
(1963: 337). 
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Rank and file initiative was prominent in other aspects of 
trade 
union activity. An ASE official, for example, commented 
in 1913 that the 
'Workers' Union is not so much directing the strikes as 
following them, 
and is making members by the thousand' (quoted in Hyman, 1971: 56). Figure 
7.6 lends weight to this notion in the aggregate, showing that strike 
frequency and membership growth markedly increased during the 
immediately pre-war years. Cronin (1979: 100) reports a 'general 
dissatisfaction prevailing at the base ' of industry' which was 
accompanied by the 'strategic innovation of the sympathetic strike'. 
This tendency towards shop floor unity, no doubt spurred in. certain 
quarters by the syndicalists, created a dynamic within unions in which 
both officialdom and shop floor unionists came increasingly to support 
closer unity whether achieved" by merger" or federal forms of 
organisation. 
The propulsion towards closer'unity differed in degree between the 
different strata within unions. The'development of collective-bargaining 
or conciliation, described by Clegg et al. (1964: 471) as` 'the 
outstanding feature' of this period', took two forms. Industrial 
procedural agreements, ' largely "-ratified at the national level, 
established a mechanism whereby-, disputes not settled locally were 
referred 'to a central joint conference of the industry before any 
resort to strike action could take place' (Lovell, 1977: 41). Substantive 
issues remained located at the-workshop, dealt with through local 
bargaining or the 'remnants of 'unilateral craft regulation. ' Clegg 
(1970: 203) reinforces the distinction between substantive and procedural 
issues in stating that before 1914 'it was difficult to discern a 
definite trend towards industry-wide pay settlements'. 
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As signatories to the procedural agreements, union officialdom 
viewed collective bargaining as -permanent conferring organisational 
stability through bargaining status . coupled 
to enhanced personal 
influence. - Procedural requirement-for the leadership sanctioning of 
strikes, moreover, increased the authority of officials within their 
unions. In consequence, the number of trade union officials grew. As 
Clegg et al. comment 
any attempt to estimate, totals would produce highly suspect 
figures, but it seems probable, with the coming of the new 
unions and the changes in the craft' societies, that the number 
of officials grew faster than total trade union membership 
(1964: 478). 
From the perspective of the wage earner different priorities held 
sway. Sectionalism, inherent in trade union organisation, prohibited the 
development, of bargaining strength for the realisation of substantive 
goals. Concurrently, with the implementation of collective bargaining 
employment terms and conditions deteriorated. Workshop commitment to 
existing institutional forms was, therefore, qualified at best. Rank and 
file agitation for realignment within trade union structure was 
pronounced, arising from the experience of working in conjunction with 
workers organised in other unions during the labour unrest. Merger 
activity did not rise at the same rate as either strike frequency or 
trade union membership during the immediate pre-war period, however, 
suggesting that the, impact of the:: organisational influences remained 
strong enough to prohibit widespread merger. activity. 
Among the organisational influences, G. D. H. Cole '(1924: 79) mentions 
financial inequalities in terms of accumulated. "funds and benefit 
provision as being particularly inhibitive to merger activity. 
Additionally, he notes the difficulties in placing officials in an 
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amalgamated union. In an attempt to ease this area of difficulty the TUC 
formulated a plan to establish a general pension scheme for officials of 
affiliated unions. The intention of the scheme was to equalise rates of 
pension contribution-thereby eliminating this as an area of negotiation. 
The scheme was not well received, however, and was eventually dropped. 
In summary, the period prior to the outbreak of World War I can be 
characterised by the deepening of internal divisions within trade 
unionism. Union officialdom placed relatively greater strategic emphasis 
upon. the introduction of bargaining, albeit primarily in a procedural 
form, as a means to enhance organisational stability. In contrast, the 
membership spurred by the decline or slow rate of increase in their 
living standards more readily embraced merger as a strategic option to 
strengthen their 'industrial muscle'. Although limited in influence, the 
impact of syndicalism promoted, the adoption of merger as the means 
whereby economic improvement could be achieved. In other words, prior to 
World War Ia degree of differentiation within the trade union movement 
towards merger as a policy option is observed. 
The trends evident prior to the outbreak of hostilities followed 
divergent paths after 1914. Both the number of strikes and merger 
activity declined during the initial phases of the war although trade 
union membership growth, as-is shown in Figure 7.6, continued unabated. 
The later war years saw the resumption of the upward trends in both 
strikes and mergers, the turning point for the latter coinciding with 
the enactment of the Trade Union (Amalgamation) Act 1917.. 
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Inevitably the war induced a high denand for labour which was 
reflected in the growth of membership. This growth led to the expansion 
of trade union organisation into new areas, however, and can be regarded 
as the second of Hobebawm's 'explosions'. Particularly sharp increases 
are also reported in the unionisation of women. Concurrently, Clegg 
(1985) records that the coverage of collective bargaining broadened and 
was reinforced from 1915 onwards by the promotion of national wage 
bargaining by the Ministry of Munitions and the Committee on Production. 
Institutional support was later provided through the implementation of 
the Whitley recommendations. _,,. 
During the early years of the war, wage rates lagged behind prices 
with a resulting decline in living standards. By 1919 similar increases 
in the two indices were recorded, followed by a period when increases-in 
wage rates surpassed those in prices. By 1921, however, the initial 
post-war downturn set in. Marked variation in the pattern of incomes is 
reported. Bowley (1937) notes the squeezing of differentials for skill 
arising from wartime industrial practices, whereas Routh (1980) points 
to both the relative and real decline in the pay of white-collar workers 
during the immediate post-war period. 
The war heralded profound changes in production techniques, 
accelerating pre-war tendencies. The introduction of mass production 
methods in the munitions industries was the forerunner-of their more 
widespread application throughout engineering generally. The gradual 
extension of wartime controls on an industry by industry basis and the 
central control of staffing policy generated a governmental reliance 
upon trade union officials to 'deliver the goods'. Wartime controls also 
acted to increase the number of issues handled within the workshop. 
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Specifically- the introduction of 'dilution agreements 'and bargaining 
surrounding the terns of craft status accentuated the growth in the 
number of shop stewards, notably in the craft oriented sectors'of the 
economy. 
Clegg et al. (1964: 432) suggest that 'by 1909 stewards were being 
elected. '.. in most of the major centres, -and their-number and functions 
continued to grow'. Furthermore, G. D. H. Cole (1923) noted that 'shop 
stewards formed workshop committees which bargained with management over 
local bargaining issues in general' and piece-rates in particular. Such 
committees were' comprised of representatives from all the unions 
organised in-the workplace. In other words, '' workshop organisation 
transcended the boundaries of-national'trade union organisation. This, 
in turn, led to shop floor pressure directed towards the adoption of the 
principles-of workshop organisation at the national` level; that is, 
amalgamation to ' form more broadly based unions. 'By' "November `1916-, 
infuriated by the dilatory attitude of the trade union Executives 
towards amalgamation, and encouraged by the growing power' of the shop 
stewards, the [Amalgamation Committee] movement presented the Executives 
[of the' engineering unions] with a three'month ultimatum to amalgamate' 
(Hinton, 1973: 284). When the deadline` passed- the Amalgamation Committee 
Movement merged with that of the Shop Stewards'and Workers' Committee in 
January 1918 as a mans to increase leverage-on the'unions' executives. 
The emergent breadth` of workshop organisation ' in engineering, 
shipbuilding and, to a lesser extent, among} the building trades and 
transport workers led to a shift in the locus 'Of`authority 'within 
unions. -- 
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Employing the notion of the 'servile state'`,, first=coined by Belloc 
(1913), Hinton points to the unprecedented level of cooperation between 
the government, employers and trade union officialdom generated'in'order 
to pursue the 'war effort'. In many regards the rapid-growth"of'the shop 
stewards organisation constitutes a reaction against this collaboration. 
The point here' is that the combination= of economic 'and political 
circumstances accentuated'; by"a"rise'in unionisation led to, -the emergence 
of workshop organisation which-threatened, to undermine the very basis of 
the tripartite" collaboration. namely: the' authority of trade union 
officials over their'members. Hinton makes the point that-, 
wartime pressures-on the craft workers,, intensified the desire 
for closer unity, and rank and file initiative in the con- 
struction of joint organisation at the, workshop level showed , - 
the union officials that the maintenance of their authority 
depended on achieving amalgamation (1973: 49). 
It is likely` that this view was also held, by , employers, and the 
government; hence the change in', the legislation relating to mergers, in 
1917. N. . 
Mr. Peto, 'Conservative MP, for'Devizes, expressed the same position 
in the debate on the Trade Union , (Amalgamation) Bill in stating that he 
hoped that the, Bill when - enacted would enable ,. the accredited 
representatives of trade' unionism to regain all the command they, had 
formally over -their-members' (H. C. Deb., 14= May 1917,1429). - The 
prevalent politicalldistrust of unionism and its workshop manifestations 
were further evidenced during the same debate when the spectre ., of one 
big union' was invoked in the tabling of an-amendment with. the object, of 
restricting amalgamation- between, unions to those organising in the same 
industry. ° While = support for this amendment wilted, in, the face of 
forceful opposition from trade union sponsored_MPs,. it is, indicative-of 
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the extent to which-workshop organisation was perceived as a threat to 
the nascent tripartism. The question raised, by this analysis is how did 
amalgamation, enable . control 
to be regained, by union executives? 
Tendencies both within.,. unions and in the . environment 
impinging upon 
unionism can be deployed in explanation. 
Novel constitutional arrangements, such as the 'bifurcated' 
structure of the TGWU,, -, allowed for a. concentration of power. As was 
mentioned in Chapter 6, 
however, the TGWU was unique among the larger 
unions in introducing new rules and procedures. Clegg (1985: 551) reports 
that between 1910 and 1933 national executives replaced local ones, more 
unions introduced national delegate conferences and, with the exception 
of general secretaries and; full-time. presidents, an increasing number of 
union officials were appointed T_rather than elected..,., Clegg et al. 
(1961: 38) suggest that between .. 
1921. and 1927 the number of trade union 
officers increased almost twofold while, during the same period trade 
union membership . 
fell . from 
6,512,000 to 4,860,000, -Merger, by 
definition, also leads to. increases in membership size and, as was 
evidenced by Figure . 6.1 for. merger 
Wave I, the enlargement of 
recruitment bases, -Fand, therefore, membership heterogeneity. Martin 
(1968) has argued that both these tendencies reinforce the tendency 
towards union bureaucratisation, thereby facilitating the centralisation 
of internal union. authority., 
These, tendencies internal to trade unions were, undoubtedly 
influential in the 'upward shifting of power and influence within the 
unions to the full time officials'. Environmental factors also impinged 
upon this process. More widespread union recognition and the 
introduction of national pay bargaining following the implementation of 
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the Whitley Committee recommendations placed in the hands of the union 
executives power regarding the sanctioning of strikes. Additionally, the 
rise in unemployment during 1921 and its continuation at a high rate 
throughout the twenties acted to erode the influence of. workshop 
organisation and allowed for the victimisation of the shop floor 
leadership by employers. Hinton and Hyman (1975) also suggest that the 
degeneration of the shop floor leadership was accentuated by the 
sectarian policies adopted by the Communist Party in the same period 
which acted to fragment shop floor organisation. 
In terms of trade union policy towards merger, World War r-I may be 
summarily regarded as a period of convergence. As was noted above, there 
was considerable rank and file pressure in favour of mergers prior to 
the outbreak of hostilities. This pressure continued throughout the war, 
albeit with a brief lull during its earlier years, fueled by rapidly 
increasing prices and ever-tighter management control at the work place. 
The development of workshop organisation in certain industrial sectors 
placed union officials under greater pressure to 'deliver the goods' 
with respect to improvements in the terms and conditions of employment 
of their members. Furthermore, this rank and file organisation was 
perceived as threatening to undermine the authority of some union 
officials. As a result, there was a change in attitude towards merger 
among the threatened union officials who came to regard a merger policy 
as a means whereby they could consolidate their authority. 
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1919 - 1939 1,, ý1 
The tendencies prevalent until 1933, when membership' growth 
resumed, were present early in 1920 with the onset of the post-war 
economic downturn. As is shown in Figure 7.6, trade union membership, 
strike activity and merger intensity fell after peaking between 1921 and 
1922. 'Lovell (1977: 57) reports that during 1919-25 'an annual average of 
nearly 28 million working days were lost through strikes and lockouts' 
whereas 'during the period 1927-39 the average was a little over 3 
millions'. Clegg (1954) suggests that the divergent pattern in strike' 
activity prior to and following the General Strike is explained in terms 
of the wild fluctuations in prices before 1926. These fluctuations, he 
argues, upset the balance within national pay bargaining thereby 
inducing a high incidence of national strikes. After 1928 prices were 
more stable and, for those in work, real wages increased enhancing the 
security of national pay bargaining. 
Such a unilinear explanation obscures the complexities of the 
social processes involved. For example, it was prior to the General 
Strike that the trade union leadership reasserted its authority within 
trade unionism. Furthermore, Hobsbawm (1964: 327) comments on the 
political swing to the right of trade union leadership in this period. 
Cronin (1979: 128) lends weight to this position in pointing to the 
'overwhelming majority' of the vote at the 1927 special conference of 
the TUC endorsing 'great satisfaction with the General Strike of 1926'. 
Liaison between union leadership and employers was further fortified, in 
reputation if not in practice, by the Mond-Turner talks of 1927-28. 
Further evidence of the upward shift in power within trade unionism is 
provided by the enhanced degree of centralisation inherent in the TUC 
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reorganisation undertaken between 1918 and 192T. Allen (1960: 38) 
comments that by 1927... the TUC was able to accumulate authority 
amongst trade unions which had no constitutional basis but which was 
derived from its knowledge and integrity. It thereby contributed more 
positively than ever before to the establishment of a Trade Union 
Movement'. 
The preservation of organisational stability also became a dominant 
theme during the depression years to 1933. Figure 7.6 shows a minor 
surge in merger intensity between 1929 and 1933. Among the major unions, 
the Workers' Union was particularly hard hit by membership loss and 
merged with the TGWU in 1929. The second dissolution wave between 1920 
and 1933 accounted for no less than 384 unions. Both the number of 
mergers arising from organisational instability and dissolutions might 
have been greater had it not been for the curtailing of unemployment 
benefit. Clegg makes the point that 
the unions would have been overwhelmed had not many, of them 
terminated their unemployment benefits in 1921-22 to avoid 
bankruptcy. Disengagement continued slowly thereafter, and 
quickened again in 1930, either by abandoning schemes or by 
temporary suspension, so that union expenditure on unemployment 
benefit actually fell in 1932, despite the continued rise in 
the unemployment figures (1985: 553). 
The termination of the dissolution wave in 1933 coincided with a return 
to steady membership growth. By 1940 trade union membership had only 
been bettered during the peak years of 1919-20. This upsurge was 
accompanied by an increase in strike frequency initiated during 1934. In 
1932 there was a national stoppage in textiles which was to be the last 
national dispute until 1953. Merger intensity declined over the same 
period, the unions absorbed being small. 
x. 4 . -f 
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With the diminution of the influence of the' rank 
and file upon the 
formulation of union merger policy, the post-war period was 
characterised by the enactment of 'official' policies towards merger. 
Spurred by the formalisation of bargaining and organisational 
instability, arising principally from membership decline, such policies 
were primarily enacted to facilitate the achievement of goals within the 
formal bargaining process. 
This chapter has examined three aspects of organisational 
instability: dissolution waves, the end-point of organisational 
instability; financial instability; and instability arising from 
internal union politics. As such it has served two purposes. The first 
was to establish organisational instability as a motivating force for 
merger activity. The second was to further the understanding of the 
dynamics of trade union structural events. Clearly, there are inter- 
relationships between the different aspects of organisational 
instability which, to a degree, have been obscured by their examination 
in isolation. These must now be elaborated in order to establish the 
nature of the impact of the economic influences upon merger activity 
during the implementation of collective bargaining. 
The pivotal role in the merger process during the implementation of 
collective bargaining is that of trade union officialdom. The growth of 
collective bargaining provided, to those unions securing employer 
recognition, a measure of organisational stability through institutional 
acceptance. Additionally, the status and authority of union officialdom 
wie 
'warms enhanced both within unions, by means of their knowledge and control 
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of national bargaining, and in the relations of unions with, external 
bodies notably government and employers. During the,, twenty, 'years 
surrounding the turn of the century, the economic circumstances of wage 
earners remained static or, at best, did not significantly , 
improve. 
Concurrently, work intensified and new workplace methods were, introduced 
in order-to meet overseas competition. Financially, however, unions were 
weak. This weakness was exacerbated during periods of increasing 
unemployment which acted. to raise the expenditure/contribution ratio. 
Accumulated rank and file grievances, coupled. with a tightening in 
the labour market induced the, -, 
labour unrest during. which strike, 
frequency. and membership increased rapidly... Led . 
from the workplace, the 
proliferation, of _ strikes,, produced,,, a 
further-, increase 
_in 
the 
expenditure/contribution ratio. Moreover, workshop organisation, overcame 
the sectionalism inherent innational union organisation. The separation 
of procedural and substantive issues into, different levels of bargaining 
provided a further impetus to workshop organisation. In combination, 
these factors threatened the status of, officialdom, for, the procediural 
aspects of collective bargaining, -from,, which external , 
status, was 
derived, was reduced in effectiveness by rank and file pursuit of the 
substantive. In the knowledge that substantive benefits were more 
readily realised through broader based action, the basis of national 
union organisation was threatened from below, constituting an internal 
threat to officialdom's status. The predominant pattern within the pre- 
war rise in merger activity can, therefore, be viewed as a strategy to 
re-establish this status by incorporating membership initiative into 
national organisation, thereby allowing for the development of 
collective bargaining. 
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The war effort initially dampened the fervour of rank and file 
unrest , but the deterioration in 
living standards, the tightening of 
workshop control in war related industries and the formalisation of 
workshop representation in the form of shop stewards: organisation 
threatened the status of officialdom. Merger was again the, response, no 
doubt eased by the introduction of the Trade Union (Amalgamation) Act 
1917. 
The post-war depression coupled with the introduction of widespread 
national pay bargaining led to a change in emphasis. Organisational 
stability was threatened by membership loss with its consequent effects 
upon bargaining status. To add to this, disputes within existing federal 
structures weakened the bargaining position of affiliated unions.. In 
these circumstances merger was pursued to maintain bargaining status and 
centralise authority upon a single executive. Increases in 
administrative costs reflect the deployment. of more full-tine officials 
with the purpose of-consolidating this centralised authority. Workshop 
organisation no longer constituted a threat to organisational stability 
as it was decimated by employers when economic circumstances turned the 
tide in their favour. 
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1. This point is to be regarded as speculation based upon the 
coincidence of events. In order to substantiate the point it would be 
necessary to establish the constituent unions of the federations formed 
in the period and to ascertain their formation dates. Such a task is not 
central to the central thrust of this study and has, therefore, not been 
undertaken. 
2. Chapter 4 set acceptable limits for the Durbin-Watson statistic at 
1.35 or greater. The value recorded here clearly falls outside this 
parameter of acceptability; therefore, the regression results should be 
treated with some circumspection. The Durbin-Watson statistic records 
the degree of correlation between the residuals. A low recorded value 
for the Durbin-Watson statistic suggests that there is a marked pattern 
of unexplained variance in the dependent variable. This equation is 
presented on the understanding that such a marked pattern of unexplained 
variance is anticipated as only a limited range of independent variables 
are included. The object of their inclusion is to examine the relative 
effect of the three components of union expenditure, not to assess the 
impact of these components by reference to other influences upon the 
merger process which has already been achieved in the aggregate through 
the use of the regressor FUNDS. 
3. It was discussed in Chapter 6 that the federal form of union 
organisation is a source of organisational stability. This notion could 
be more fully investigated by examining both the reasons for the decline 
in the number of federations during this period and whether those unions 
forced to dissolve were affiliated to federations. Such an examination 
would also allow for an assessment of the extent to which federal 
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organisation . 
facilitated mergers for, given the climate,,. of 
organisational decline, it is expected that the level of mergers among 
federation affiliates would be pronounced. 
ý. . 
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8 
ORGANISATIONAL INSTABILITY DURING THE OPERATION OF INSTITUTIONALISED 
INDUSTRIAL RELATI01S 
During the operation of institutionalised industrial relations the 
application of regression analysis in Chapter 4 illustrated the 
sensitivity of merger intensity to economic and political influences and 
the limited impact of unionisation factors. Chapter 5 examined the shape 
of merger activity. A tendency towards increased diversification within 
the merger process during institutionalised industrial relations was 
discerned, suggesting that mergers are directed towards more than an 
increase in union bargaining strength for industrial collective 
bargaining. The absorption pattern among the ten largest unions during 
Wave II showed that recently formed unions tended to be acquired into 
existing union structures and that TUC policy restricted opportunities 
for the small unions to establish a recruitment base sufficient to 
maintain organisational stability, thereby further promoting mergers. 
Five aspects of organisational instability during institutionalised 
industrial relations are examined here within the framework provided by 
earlier chapters. The association between environmental influences and 
merger intensity among unions of different sizes is examined. It has 
been assumed that organisational stability is related to membership 
size. It follows that the relationship between the environmental 
influences and the membership size of merging unions will differ. The 
initial section of this chapter, therefore, examines this proposition. 
The second section examines the association between the dissolution rate 
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and environmental influences in order to further-both the understanding 
of the dynamics of - trade' union-structural events and to elaborate the 
factors underpinning the tendency towards organisational instability, 
dissolution being its end-point. Breakaway unions are organisationally 
unstable on two primary counts. Firstly, as with recently formed unions, 
breakaway unions have to compete with longer established unions. 
Secondly, the TUC has voiced a consistent opposition to such unions and 
its affiliates have implemented policies, with the object of their 
demise. The third section, therefore, examines the life-cycles of 
breakaway unions: , The fourth and fifth sections investigate the 
relationship between economic influences, internal union circumstances 
and merger intensity through an assessment of union financial stability 
and internal union politics. 
The wave pattern for aggregate merger intensity was demonstrated in 
Figures 2.3,2.4 and 2.5 for unions from different size groups. The 
plots illustrated that larger unions tend to be absorbed only during the 
wave periods of intense merger activity. Merger activity among smaller 
unions is more constant although increases in intensity are recorded 
during the'-merger waves. In other words, organisational instability 
among smaller unions is a more constant feature suggesting its 
sensitivity to-regular fluctuation in the environmental influences. 
Three size -group- categories were employed: unions organising=°2,499 
members or less, unions organising between 2,500 and 14,999 members and 
unions organising more than 15,000 members. For ease of reference these 
are referred to as Size Groups 1,2 and 3 respectively. 
' ---- --- - --G ---- 
Earlier evidence suggests that factors associated with merger 
activity among unions of different size exhibit dissimilarities. Smaller 
unions, for example, are generally more prone to organisational 
instability. Furthermore, the 'explosions' of union membership into 
different sectors of employment are associated with peaks in the 
formation rate of unions, thereby promoting the availability for merger 
of large numbers of organisationally unstable unions. Among the larger 
unions the achievement of political influence by means of increases in 
membership size is regarded as a primary influence upon merger activity, 
particularly during institutionalised industrial relations. Affecting 
all unions is the increasing professionalisation of bargaining, 
necessitating an extension of the servicing function to bargaining which 
implies that there is a membership threshold below which adequate 
servicing cannot be sustained. It has also been noted that merger 
intensity is most sensitive to economic influence during 
institutionalised industrial relations. The object of this section, 
therefore, is to develop the understanding of these themes by applying 
regression analysis to merger intensity among Size Groups 1,2 and 3. The 
results are tabulated in Table 8.1. 
It is apparent from Table 8.1 that the proportion of variance 
explained by the regression equations is inversely related to increasing 
size, suggesting thatr organisational influences play a more significant 
role in the merger process among larger unions. This result is 
consistent with earlier findings on the high intensity of merger 
activity among smaller, recently formed unions and implies that"the 
larger the union the more complex the merger negotiations regarding-the 
resolution of organisational differences. Additionally, the category of 
variables included in the equations varies across size groups. For Size 
Group 1 predominantly economic and unionisation variables explain the 
variance in merger intensity. The included unionisation variables, 
moreover, relate to institutional form rather than directly to 
organisational stability/instability or membership saturation. The Trade 
Union -(Amalgamation) Act 
1964 is the only political variable entered. 
Even this -relates strongly to 
institutional form in so far as it 
represents an easing in the institutional access to merger. 
TABLE 8.1 
REGRESSION RESULTS, EXPLANATIONS OF MERGER' INTENSITY AMONG 
DIFFERENT SIZED UNIONS FOR THE OPERATION OF INSTITUTIONALISED 
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; DEPENDENT VARIABLES, SIZE GROUPS 1.2 AND ND 3 
Size Group 1 
EQ. 1 0.239(COMER)* -0.532(PEAK)*** +0.454(&RW)*** +1.181(FORM)*** 
R2 = 0.65 
D-V = 2. '01 
EQ. 2 0.289(1964)** +0.254(BREAK)** +0,595(FORX)*** +0.356(ARW)*: * 
R2- = 0.66 
D-W = 1.89 
Size Group--2. 
EQ. 3 0.299(STCONC)*** -0.560(CON)** +0.395(RW)*'** -0.293(FORM)*** 
-0.689(MP)** 
Rý-' = 0.59 
D-W = 1.82 
EQ, 4 0.381(LRW)* +0.631(UDEN)**« 
R2 = 0.34 
D-V = 2.24 
Size Group 3- 
EQ. 5 0.521(STCONC)* -0.727( EX)*"K* 
R-- = 0.29 , 
D-W = 2.02 
The three categories of environmental influences are equally 
represented in Equations 3 and 4 covering Size Group 2, For Size Group 3 
no economic variables appear suggesting that there is a membership 
threshold above which membership size 'protects' organisational 
stability from adverse economic influences. This result is consistent 
with the wave pattern of merger intensity among unions from Size Group 3 
which were only found to be absorbed' during merger waves. That is, 
organisational instability for such unions is not induced by short-term 
economic fluctuation. 
Size Group--I. 
The inclusion of the regressor PEAK in Equation 1 with a negative 
sign attached indicates that. small unions are more stable during the 
boom of the business cycle. As employers are less resistant to union 
bargaining claims during business cycle booms, on the grounds that high 
rates of profit are recorded which employers do not wish disturbed, the 
PEAK regressor. suggests that small unions are at their most effective in 
securing improvements in their members' economic circumstances during 
these booms thereby facilitating the retention of independence. 
Organisational stability would also be anticipated to be most secure 
during the peaks of the business cycle, as aggregate trade union 
membership is positively related to such peaks, reinforcing the capacity 
to retain organisational independence. 
The relative bargaining position of -small unions appears 
significant regarding their merger intensity in. other respects as is 
indicated by the presence of the regressors ARW and COMER. The rate of 
change of real wages is positively related to merger intensity among 
unions in Size Group 1 and appears in both equations. This suggests that 
bargaining power and membership size are intimately related. When the 
bargaining power of other, presumably larger, unions is deployed to 
secure rapid increases in living standards, it would appear that small 
unions cannot compete in achieving similar increases and, therefore, 
merge. Given that many of the smaller unions during the operation of 
institutionalised industrial' relations were company based staff 
associations achieving 'a density of organisation comparable with' other 
unions, albeit with a limited recruitment base, the nature of the 
relationship between relative bargaining power and merger intensity is 
not straightforward. Two possible explanations may be deployed. Firstly, 
the -small size of these 'unions makes their bargaining position 
particularly sensitive to membership fluctuation. As the PEAK "variable 
influences membership growth, its inclusion in Equation 1 in conjunction 
with the rate of change 'of real wages lends some support to this 
explanation. Had the 'rate of' change of union' membership been included 
the argument would, however, be more strongly supported. 
The second explanation Is based upon the bargaining status attained 
by the smaller unions. The inclusion 'in Equation 1 of the number of 
company mergers supports Buchanan's (1974: 43) contention that such 
activity among companies particularly disturbs the 'bargaining 
relationships established by smaller unions. That this effect is most 
pronounced among' smaller unions is evidenced by the non-appearance of 
the regressor COMER, representing the number of manufacturing company 
mergers, in Equations 3,4 and 5 the dependent variables for which were 
unions in Size Groups 2 and 3. It would appear, therefore. that it is 
bargaining status and its protection that "underlies the promotion of 
merger activity among unions in Size Group 1. It follows that it is not 
only bargaining power relative to that achieved by larger unions that is 
the sole stimulus of merger intensity in Size Group' 1 but also 
bargaining power relative to that of companies. This would again appear 
to call into question the validity of the Undy et, al. (1981: 203-214) 
aggressive merger category whereby large unions absorb small unions on 
the initiative of the former to expand their recruitment bases. The 
results presented above suggest that the initiative may lie with the 
smaller unions which pursue mergers in order to retain bargaining 
status. 
The significance and positive signs attached to the economic 
variables provide support to the institutionalisation thesis in that the 
direct impact of economic factors is marked during the operation of 
institutionalised industrial relations. Further support is lent to this 
thesis -by the inclusion of the formation rate in Equation 1 and its 
combined inclusion with the breakaway rate in Equation 2. In terms of 
the Beta coefficients, the formation rate is the most influential of the 
factors promoting merger intensity in Size Group 1. Chapter 6 showed 
that recently formed unions were predominantly absorbed into existing 
unions during Wave-II. Given the propositions associated with the 
economic variables, it would appear that the newly formed small unions 
seek the support of their larger counterparts to attain or retain 
bargaining status. A further factor- impelling such unions towards merger 
may lie in the TUC's policy preventing their affiliation if their 
recruitment bases overlap with that of an existing affiliate. If this 
overlap does occur, it implies that the larger unions do not expand 
their recruitment base in acquiring the recently formed unions. This 
would again point to the initiative for such mergers lying'within the 
smaller unions, 
The appearance of the breakaway rate in Equation 2 provides further 
support to the TUC exclusion policy affecting mergers as the TUC has 
repeatedly confirmed its hostility to breakaway organisations. A more 
detailed examination of the life-cycles of' breakaway unions is included 
in a following section to this chapter. 
Further support to both the institutionalisation thesis and the 
centrality of the attainment of bargaining status by smaller unions is 
provided by the inclusion in Equation 2 of the impact of the Trade Union 
(Amalgamation) Act 1964. In Chapter 6 it was pointed out that this 
legislation arose from a TUC initiative. That is, its introduction was 
heavily influenced by larger unions which have a marked impact upon TUC 
policy formulation. A reason provided by the TUC for its initiative was 
the desire to reduce the multiplicity of unions. Given the increasing 
professionalisation of bargaining, some smaller unions may have been 
spurred to merge due to an internal inability to service the bargaining 
function, the TUC setting the institutional circumstances whereby such 
mergers are facilitated. Benefits also accrue to the larger unions from 
such mergers in so far as they eliminate competition. 
The inclusion in Equations 3 and 4 of the level of real wages and 
the rate of change of real wages suggests that the failure to attain 
adequate bargaining strength -is a primary stimulus to merger among 
unions organising between 2.500 and 14,999 members. In other words, 
during the operation of institutionalised industrial relations a 
membership of up to 14; 999 is not sufficient to maintain improvement in 
the economic circumstances of those members and service the bargaining 
function. The positive influence upon merger intensity in Size Group 2 
of an increasing level of union density points to the significance of 
inter-union competition. Two aspects of such competition may be central. 
Firstly, larger unions may secure higher increases in wages and benefits 
than secured by unions in Size Group 2 thereby stimulating the 
membership from the latter to adopt merger as a strategy to secure 
similar increases. This explanation is supported by the inclusion of the 
regressors RV and eRW. Secondly, the rising saturation effect may 
promote the absorption of unions in Size Group 2 as a means to expand 
recruitment bases. The increasing diversifying proportion of the merger 
process evidenced in Chapter 5 lends some support to this explanation. 
The presence of the formation rate as a inhibitor of merger 
intensity in Size Group 2 indicates that recently formed unions are 
absorbed in preference to those organising between 2,500 and 14,999 
members. Again two principal explanations may be deployed. Firstly, 
recently formed unions may be 'nipped in the bud' in order that they do 
not establish a broad enough recruitment base to constitute a 
competitive threat to their larger, contemporaries. Secondly, it may be 
that difficulty of merger negotiations is inversely related to size. 
Newly formed unions are absorbed in preference to those from Size Group 
2 because the acquiring union would not have to make bargaining 
concessions within their existing organisational framework. For example, 
a union from Size Group 2 is likely to have full-time officers, an 
administrative apparatus and a political perspective which would have to 
be accommodated by the acquiring union. In other words, the 
organisational influences constitute a, larger obstacle to merger the 
more established the absorbed union. 
An increasing number of trade union sponsored liPs leads to the 
suppression of merger activity among unions in Size Group 2. This result 
fulfills theoretical expectations in so far as the greater institutional 
acceptance of trade unions the more pronounced is organisational 
stability and the less likely are larger unions to pursue merger as an 
active policy. The presence of the regressor K? in Equation 3 and' its 
omission from Equations 1 and 2 indicates that a size threshold exists 
with respect to organisational stability achieved through institutional 
acceptance. 
The inverse relationship between the presence of a Conservative 
government and merger intensity among unions in Size Group 2 is a 
curious result as it runs counter to the aggregate equations presented 
in Table 4.5 where the regressor CON had a positive sign. In other 
words, for unions organising less than 15,000 members the relationship 
between the presence of a Conservative government and merger intensity 
during institutionalised industrial relations is similar to that between 
aggregate merger intensity and Conservative governments during' the 
implementation of collective bargaining. Given the result associated 
with the regressor IMP, it would appear that membership size and 
institutional acceptance are closely associated. Chapter 7 shows that 
organisational stability during the implementation of collective 
bargaining was a function of membership size. The positive relationship 
between the presence of a Conservative government and the dissolution 
rate seems to indicate that a political climate hostile to unionism 
induces organisational instability. It would appear, therefore, that 
such a climate inhibits merger activity among unions in Size Group 2 
during the operation of institutionalised industrial relations. This, in 
turn, suggests that membership pressure towards merger is a principal 
influence upon merger intensity in Size Group 2. This would be 
consistent with the results for the regressors RW and ORW. A failure to 
achieve improvements in the membership's economic circumstances 
promoting both a rank and file dissatisfaction with achievements 
attainable within existing organisational structures and an interest in 
merger as a means whereby improvements can be acquired. 
The nature of this pressure from below towards merger may, however, 
relate specifically to the form of shop-floor organisation within unions 
of Size Group 2. For example, Brown and his colleagues (1981: 62) 
discovered that shop steward organisation is 'almost as widespread as 
union recognition' and exists in '73 per cent of cases for manual 
workers and 34 per cent for non-manual'. It is less likely that smaller 
unions will be recognised by employers and, as Chapter 6 illustrates, 
merger activity among white-collar unions was marked during Wave II. It 
may well be, therefore, that the effect of a Conservative government 
upon membership pursuit of merger is compounded by the specific nature 
of shop floor organisation within those unions involved in the merger 
process. 
The proportion of GAP constituted by state expenditure is the only 
political variable with a positive sign. This positive relationship 
suggests that increasing state control over distribution promotes the 
pursuit of larger memberships in order that larger unions may more 
strongly influence the priorities within this distribution. Clearly, the 
larger the union absorbed the more immediate the increases in membership 
size achieved. It should be noted that this argument cannot be regarded 
as providing a complete explanation, however, for the formation rate has 
a negative impact upon the absorption of unions from Size Group 2. As is 
mentioned earlier, this effect may be due to the ease with which 
organisational dissimilarities may be overcome during merger 
negotiations. In other words, increases in membership size may be most 
rapidly achieved through the absorption of recently formed unions, 
Alternatively, a recently formed union may constitute a higher potential 
for increases in membership size, their absorption being undertaken on 
this basis. 
Size Group 
-a 
No economic influences appear in Equation 5 suggesting that the 
bargaining climate does not have a direct effect upon the absorption of 
unions organising more than 15,000 members. This would seem to indicate 
the presence of a size threshold. Furthermore, the absence of economic 
factors runs counter to the tenets of the institutionalists from which a 
marked direct economic influence is anticipated. The inclusion of-the 
rate of change of union - membership. does not, however, exclude the 
possibility that economic influence is indirect, being mediated through 
its effect upon membership growth. 
The - inverse relationship between the rate of change of union 
membership and merger intensity in Size Group -3 demonstrates that 
organisational stability is a function of membership increase. At least 
two explanations, are available which are not mutually exclusive. 
Firstly, the loss of membership for unions organising more than 15,000 
members may preclude such unions from adequately financing the servicing 
function to bargaining. This would again lend weight to Hyman's point 
regarding the increasing threshold of union solvency. Secondly, a loss 
of membership reduces the influence of larger unions at the TUC and 
Labour Party. Tierger is, therefore, pursued to reverse this decline in 
influence. This explanation is also supported by the inclusion of the 
-- 
regressor STCONC in Equation 5, In other words, membership decline in 
tandem with increasing state control over distribution promotes merging 
among larger unions. This would point towards the validity of Undy et 
al. 's (1981: 215) suggestion that 'relative union size' is a determinant 
of merger activity. Whereas Undy et al. regard improvement in relative 
size as an object in its own right. it is apparent from the inclusion of 
the regressor STCONC that improvements in relative size are more 
usefully viewed as a means to an end: namely, enhanced political 
influence. 
Emergent Themes 
The aggregate equations presented in Table 4.5 clearly disguise 
variation in the impact of the environmental influences upon merger 
intensity between unions from different size groups. The association 
between economic factors and merger intensity among unions from Size 
Groups 1 and 2 is consistent with the expectations from 
institutionalisation theory. The pronounced effect of unionisation and 
political influences on merger activity among larger unions, however, 
runs counter to expectations from institutionalisation theory. This 
suggests that membership size is a crucial determinant of organisational 
stability and that additional determining factors depend upon the 
membership size attained by the particular union. In turn, this implies 
that an aggregate theory such as institutionalisation is misconceived in 
so far as it fails to take into account the dynamics inherent within 
trade union structure; in particular, the emergence of new 
organisations. 
The direct economic influence upon merger intensity among smaller 
unions suggests that the achievement of a secure bargaining position, in 
relation to both other unions and employers, is the primary object of 
such unions. With larger unions the achievement of political influence 
is paramount. Additionally,. the support of membership bargaining, 
services is important, their provision being dependent upon -the 
maintenance-of a 'viable growth policy'. The absence of direct economic 
influence upon merger activity among, the -larger unions indicates the 
presence of a size threshold above which organisational stability-is 
cushioned from the adverse effects of economic fluctuation. A further 
size threshold would appear to apply to the achievement of bargaining 
objectives through political influence. 
DISSOLUTIONS: THE DECLINE OF ORGANISATIONAL STABILITY 
Figure 2.7 identified a single dissolution wave occuring during the 
operation of institutionalised industrial relations: between 1973 and 
1980 112 unions dissolved. This dissolution wave is largely concurrent 
with the formation wave earlier associated with the spread of unionism 
into technical, - scientific and service " occupations. It is also 
contemporary with the second principal merger wave, suggesting that this 
period is associated with a high degree of organisational instability. 
Between 1973 and-1980 aggregate trade union membership increased by 15.3 
per cent although a decline was recordedfor, the final two years of the 
period. It gis unlikely, therefore, that organisational instability 
arising from membership decline is a primary factor stimulating 
dissolutions. Throughout the dissolution wave the rate of economic 
growth continued to decline with a consequent slowing in the improvement 
of living standards. 
Regression Results 
Table 8.2 includes two equations illustrating the association 
between the dissolution rate and the environmental influences. Equation 
1 shows that high inflation is related to increases in the dissolution 
rate. This confirms Buchanan's (1981: 43) assertion that 'rapidly rising 
prices... tend to create financial difficulties for small unions, make 
the size and efficiency of large unions more important and may also 
emphasise the need to protect living standards by a powerful' union 
negotiating with employers or government'. The 'relatively, weak 
bargaining position of small unions no doubt exacerbates organisational 
instability among such unions. The results recorded in Equation 1 
confirm those presented in Table 8.1 in that organisational instability 
and economic influences are intimately related among small unions during 
the operation of institutionalised industrial relations. In combination 
these results provide some support for the institutionalisation thesis 
regarding the importance of the economic influences. 
EQ. 1 0.680(oP)*** +0.059(TREND) ` R2 = 0.48 
D-W = 2.30 
EQ. 2 0.806(FORM)*** -0.141 (TREND) R2 = 0.49 
D-W = 2.32 
Comparison of Tables 7.1 and 8.2 reveals that the factors inducing 
organisational instability vary between the implementation of collective 
bargaining and institutionalised industrial relations. The sensitivity 
of organisational stability to political factors during the former 
period is not reproduced during the latter. Furthermore, whereas a 
decline in the rate of change of union membership was the unionisation 
influence promoting organisational instability during the implementation 
of collective bargaining, it was organisational appearance, the 
formation rate, that was more central during institutionalised 
industrial relations. This difference supports the contention advanced 
in Chapter 6 that the threat of inter-union competition stimulates 
larger unions to instigate policies through the TUC that promote 
organisational instability in smaller unions during institutionalised 
industrial relations. In contrast, organisational instability during the 
implementation of collective bargaining appears to be more independent 
of policies enacted internally to the trade union movement. 
Figure 8.1 shows that 31 unions formed between 1970 and 1979 
dissolved during the largely concurrent dissolution wave constituting 
27.7 per cent of the total number of dissolving unions. As for both 
dissolution waves occuring during the implementation of collective 
bargaining, the recently formed unions were most numerous in dissolving. 
Irrespective of institutional setting, therefore, recently formed unions 
are the most unstable although, as is shown by a comparison of Tables 
7.1 and 8.2, the source of this instability clearly differs. 
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Unlike its predecessors, the 1973-80 dissolution wave exhibits no 
tendency towards an inverse relationship between age and the number of 
dissolving unions. Indeed 24,21.4 per cent, of the dissolving unions 
were formed during the nineteenth century, further suggesting a 
divergence in causality between dissolution waves as these unions had 
clearly survived those pressures inducing organisational instability 
during the earlier waves. A further divergence in the life cycles of the 
unions dissolving between 1973 and 1980 and the earlier dissolution 
waves is evidenced by Figure 8.2. The mean survival time of unions 
during the third dissolution wave was 41.5 years whereas that for the 
first was 10.5 years and the second 9.7 years. It would appear, 
therefore, that while many recently formed unions rapidly dissolved 
because of their inherent organisational instability the factors 
inducing such instability in other unions were widespread in so far as 
they affected unions across a broad age range. 
The industrial dispersion of dissolving unions between 1973 and 
1980, illustrated in Figure 8.3, also exhibits a divergent pattern from 
its predecessors. Thirty-six of the dissolving unions organised in local 
government, health and education with a fulther 11 from banking, 
insurance and finance, representing the extension of unionism into the 
occupations represented within these industries. Forty-four of the 
dissolving unions organised from within manufacturing of which 13 were 
in engineering and 16 in cotton. The average age of the dissolving 
unions from engineering was 42.2 years whereas that of those organising 
in cotton was 77.2 years, indicating that the federal forms adopted by 
the cotton unions allowed for relatively longer survival times. By 
comparison, the average age of dissolving unions from banking, insurance 
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and finance was a mere 17.2 years suggesting that unionism; was a more 
recent phenomenon in this industry. 'x 
Developing the Themes 
High inflation and the presence of large numbers of recently formed 
unions are associated with increases in the dissolution rate. Given that 
dissolution is an end-point on an organisational stability-instability 
continuum the association between high inflation and dissolutions 
confirms the regression results for merger intensity among smaller 
unions where economic factors were dominant. Similarly, the appearance 
of the- regressor FORM in the equation for merger intensity among Size 
Group 1 unions and the equations for the dissolution rate points to the 
inherent organisational instability of recently formed unions. The 
longer mean survival times of dissolving unions during the operation of 
institutionalised industrial relations, however, points to the 
institutional setting within which unionism functions as influencing 
organisational stability. That this institutional setting and trade 
union structure are in continual flux is evidenced by the different 
industrial dispersion of dissolving unions between 1973 and 1980 by 
comparison with earlier dissolution waves. 
Lerner (1961) and Hemingway (1978) unearthed a variety of factors 
which promoted the formation of breakaway unions. Predominant among 
these were the inability of the members that broke away to secure 
adequate representation within the unions' democratic structures. In the 
main, breakaways were found to be based upon a particular craft or 
occupation, or upon a geographical locality, and, albeit to different 
degrees. were regarded as a revolt against internal union 
centralisation. Chapter 6 showed that a principal feature of the period 
of institutionalised industrial relations was a centralisation of 
authority within the trade union movement enacted primarily through the 
auspic/es of the TUC. Lerner(1961) records the widespread hostility 
within established unions towards breakaways reflected in terms of the 
refusal to accept-the breakaway organisation into TUC affiliation and 
the exclusion of -breakaway union representatives from the trade union 
'sides' of negotiating committees. It follows, therefore, that while the 
initial breakaway constitutes a revolt against internal union 
centralisation the subsequent maintenance of the breakaway's 
independence represents organisational consolidation in the face of 
institutional centralisation. Hence the attainment of organisational 
stability for breakaway unions is particularly fraught. 
That breakaway unions are unable to sustain organisational 
stability is evidenced by the appearance of the regressor BREAK in both 
Equation 2, Table 4.5 for aggregate merger intensity and Equation 2, 
Table 8.1 for merger intensity among unions in Size Group 1. Pronounced 
organisational instability among breakaway unions is also illustrated by 
reference to Table 8.3 showing the life cycles of such unions. Of the 27 
breakaway unions emerging during institutionalised industrial relations, 
15 dissolved, 8 merged and 4 retained their independence in 1979., The 
average survival time of the breakaway unions that died was 8.0 years, 
with that for those that dissolved being 8.4 years and for those that 
merged 7.1 years. Given that the mean survival time for all dissolving 
unions is 41.5 years, it is apparent that the impact of active trade 
G03 
union hostility towards breakaways has a marked limiting effect upon 
their survival times. 
Accepting the argument advanced by Lerner and Hemingway that 
breakaways represent a revolt against internal union centralisation, it 
is also apparent that the failure to attain organisational stability 
limits the capacity to resist incorporation within a centralised 
structure. For example, four of the eight breakaway unions that merged 
rejoined the union from which they originally broke away and 2 
breakaways transferred their allegiance from one of the ten largest 
unions to another. 
YEAR OF UNION BROKEN AWAY FROM FORMATION YEAR OF SURVIVAL ," DEATH EVENT 
BREAKAWAY DATE OF 'DEATH' TIME 4L'"D=DISSOLUTION 
UNION OF (YRS) M=KERGER 
BROKEN BREAKAWAY 
AWAY FROM 
1946 CIVIL SERVICE CLERICAL ASSOC 1921 1955 9 D 
1947 RADIO AND ELECTRONIC OFFICERS NA 1951 4 D 
1947 UNION OF POST OFFICE WORKERS 1920 1954 7 D 
1947 IPCS 1945 1949 2 N 
1948 POST OFFICE CONTROLLING OFFICERS 1910 1956 8 D 
1949 POST OFFICE ENGINEERING UNION 1915 1953 4 'M 
1949 RUBBER, PLASTIC AND ALLIED WORKERS NA 1957 8 D 
1949 SOCIETY OF CIVIL SERVANTS 1930 1969 20 H 
1953 CIVIL SERVICE UNION 1917 1961 8 H 
1955 AMALGAMATED ENGINEERING UNION 1920 1973 18 D 
1956 AMALGAMATED ENGINEERING UNION 1920 1978 22 D 
1956 ASSOCIATION OF BROADCASTING STAFF NA 1968 12 D 
1957 CHEMICAL WORKERS' UNION NA 1962 5' D 
1957 ELECTRICAL TRADES UNION 1889 1964 7' D 
IF MERGER NAME OF 
ACQUIRING UNION 
acquired two other unions to form THE 
SOCIEI 
TECHNICAL CIVIL SERVANTS 
POST OFFICE ENGINEERING UNION 
INSTITUTION OF PROFESSIONAL CIVIL SERVANTS 
CIVIL SERVICE UNION 
1960 AMALGAMATED ENGINEERING UNION 1920 1968 8 D' 
1960 ELECTRICAL TRADES UNION 1889 1963 3 D 
1960 NUGMW 1924 1968 8 U NATIONAL UNION OF GENERAL AND MUNICIPAL WORKERS 
1961 TGWU 1922 1965 4 x TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS' UNION 
" 1966 NUGUW 1924 EXISTING IN 1979 
1970 NAT UNION OF INSURANCE WORKERS 1964 1976 6 D 
1970 ASTMS 1968 1979 9 U TRANSPORT AND GENERAL WORKERS' UNION 
1970 FIRE BRIGADES UNION 1918 1977 7' D 
1970 NATIONAL UNION OF TEACHERS 1910 EXISTING IN 1979 
1971 NUGMW 1924 1973 2 N AMALGAMATED UNION OF ENGINEERING WORKERS 
1972 USDAW 1947 EXISTING IN 1979 
1972 USDAW 1947 1974 2 D 
1973 ASSOC OF TEACHERS IN TECHNICAL 1910 EXISTING IN 1979 
INSTITUTIONS 
A further breakaway left one major civil service union to later 
rejoin another. As civil service unions recruit from within a specific 
section of the civil service occupational hierarchy, the transfer may 
have been undertaken to maintain status within this hierarchy. A final 
breakaway became the acquiring union in a subsequent merger uniting 
three unions organising civil service draughtsmen, again suggesting an 
occupational basis to the breakaway. This single union would, however, 
appear to be the only breakaway that achieved a fundamental change in 
the extent of its independence with respect to trade union structure. 
This is not to invalidate Lerner and Hemingway's initial argument. The 
breakaway transferring to the TGWU may have achieved greater autonomy. 
within its trade group structure. Similarly, the breakaway joining the 
AEU from the regionally based NUGHW, the Glass and General Workers' 
Union, had left the former following a lengthy and acrimonious dispute 
ýo; s== 
which had strained intra-union relations beyond the point of no return 
(Lane and Roberts, 1971). 
A trade union merger, by definition, leads to a centralisation of 
membership within the authority of a single executive. Similarly. 
heterogeneity of membership is likely to increase when unions merge. 
Both these factors are regarded by Lerner and Hemingway as promoting 
breakaways; It follows, therefore, that the inclusion of the regressor 
BREAK in the equations mentioned above may arise not only because it 
represents a supply of organisationally unstable unions but also because 
merger may be a promoting influence to breakaways. Little support is 
available for this hypothesis. Reference to the formation dates of the 
unions from which the breakaways emerged, reveals that only three 
breakaways took place within ten years of this formation date. In these 
three cases, however, the union broken away from was formed by merger. 
It would appear, therefore, that the influence of breakaways upon merger 
activity arises primarily from the organisational instability of such 
unions founded upon' the opposition to breakaways from within trade 
unionism as a whole. 
Table 8.4 shows the pattern in union finances on an annual basis 
for the period of the operation of institutionalised industrial 
relations. Total funds increased annually between 1946 and 1950, 
fluctuated between 1951 and 1954 before falling during the years to 
1957. Indeed, by 1957 the level of union funds had fallen to below that 
attained by 1947. A further period during which total funds steadily 
increased was 1958 to 1967, although a slight decline was recorded 
-GVV- 
during 1966. This decline presaged a period of financial decline 
stretching from 1968 to 1979. In short, 'during the course of the second 
merger wave, 1966-83, the level of total union funds diminished. Chapter 
4 established that the regressor FUNDS did not add to the explanatory 
power of the economic variables. It is reasonable to assume, therefore, 
that this diminution in the level of union funds is closely associated 
with economic factors. 
The expenditure/contribution ratio was low during the initial post- 
war years of Labour government rising sharply with the election of the 
Conservatives in 1951. This high level in the expenditure/contribution 
ratio was maintained throughout the period of the operation of 
institutionalised industrial relations. While remaining high, however, 
there are marked fluctuations in the expenditure/ contribution ratio. 
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ABLE 8.4 
NANCES DURING 
ED INDUSTRIAL 
THE O 
RELAT 
PERATION OF 
IONS 
YEAR TOTAL FUNDS AVERAGE AVERAGE RATIO AVERAGE RATIO AVERAGE RATIO AVERAGE RATIO 
AT CONSTANT EXPENDITURE CONTRIBUTION 1/2 EXPENDITURE 3/1 EXPENDITURE 4/1 EXPENDITURE 5/1 
PRICES PER MEMBER PER MEMBER PER MEMBER PERK MEMBER PER MEMBER 
(L000s) FOR ALL FOR ALL ON PB/UB ON DB ON 
PURPOSES PURPOSES 3 4 OTHER COSTS 
1 2 5 
1946 306439 1.517 1.854 81.8 0.538 0.35 0; 012 0.01 0.967 0.64 
1947 314975 1.637 1.897 86.3 0.539 0.33 01007 0.01 1.091 0.67 
1948 320365 1.650 1.967 83.9 0.504 0.31 0: 034 0.02 1.112 0.67 
1949 332298 1.787 2.015 88.7 0.565 0.32 0.009 0.01 1.213 0.68 
1950 344321 1.771 1.988 89.1 0.542 0,31 0.029 0.02 1.200 0.68 
1951 328894 1.946 2.000 97.3 0.567 0.29 0.021 0.01 1.358 0.70 
1952 314451 2.029 2.063 98.4 0.608 0.30 0.042 0.02 1.359 0.67 
1953 318796 2.075 2.146 96.7 0.621 0.30 0.029 0.01 1.425 0.69 
1954 327078 2.129 2.204 96.6 0.629 0.30 0.059 0.03 1.441 0.68 
-GVI - 
1955 324428 2.300 2.296 100.2 0.638 0.28 0.075 0.03 1.587 0.69 
1956 320803 2.396 2.400 99.8 0.671 0.28 0.096 0.04 1.629 0.68 
1957 314381 2.846 2.642 107.7 0.713 0.25 0.345 0.12 1.788 0.62 
1958 318500 2.779 2.763 100.6 0.771 0.28 0.162 0.06 1.846 0.66 
1959 323985 3.063 2.825 108.4 0.813 0.27 0.320 0.10 1.930 0.63 
1960 335815 2.925 2.971 98.5 0.804 0.27 0.054 0.02 2.067 0.72 
1961 342209 3.054 3.163 96.6 0.817 0.27 0.062 0.02 2.175 0.71 
1962 347961 3.267 3.421 95.5 0.879 0.27 0.084 0.04 2.286 0.69 
1963 359077 3.442 3.567 96.5 0.933 0.27 0.055 0.02 2.454 0.71 
1964 364519 3.638 3.729 97.6 0.904 0.25 0.059 0.02 2.675 0.74 
1965 367413 3.796 3.850 98.6 0.967 0.25 0.075 0.02 2.754 0.73 
1966 366562 4.338 4.163 104.2 1.142 0.26 0.108 0.02 3.088 0.71 
1967 373712 4.508 4.288 105.1 1.263 0.28 0.087 0.02 3.158 0.70 
1968 363888 4.900 4.363 112.3 1.279 0.26 0.138 0.03 3.483 0.71 
1969 353142 5.004 4.429 113.0 1.254 0.25 
0.188 0.04 3.562 0.71 
1970 336498 5.590 4.860 115.0 1.250 0.22 0.400 0.07 3.940 0.70 
1971-74 NO DATA AVAILAB LE 
L 
1975 257940 9,097 8.673 104.9 1.149 0.13 287 0.03 7.661 0.84 
1976 251755 10.456 10.894 95.9 1.356 0.13 0.171 0.02 8.929 0.84 
1977 246248 11.960 12.345 96.9 1.436 0.12 0.348 0.03 10.176 0.85 
1978 250226 14.030 13.594 103.2 1.600 0.11 10.726 0.05 11.704 0.83 
1979 241375 16.728 15.590 107.3 1.702 0.10 ; 0.982 0.06 14.044 
0.84 
Between 1957 and 1959, three years of Cronin's (1979: 48) first post-war 
strike wave, the ratio had a value greater than one hundred. Similarly, 
the expenditure/contribution ratio was greater than one hundred for 
1968-70, the years for which financial data are available that coincide 
with the second of the post-war strike waves. 
Between 1966 and 1979 there were only two years for which 
contributions were greater than expenditure. Given that these years are 
all coincidental with the second merger wave, the data point to 
immediate cash flow issues promoting a diminution of accumulated funds 
which, in turn, impinge upon the merger process. This point-is ssupported 
by the regression results presented in Chapter 4 in so far as the 
expenditure/contribution ratio is clearly closely associated with 
economic variation. It is also apparent that financial-stringency among 
unions is concurrent with the dissolution wave. The impact of high 
inflation upon the dissolution rate also points to the strong effect of 
economic factors on organisational instability. 
The Labour governments of 1945-51 'created a system of universally 
available social insurance, which provided guaranteed -minimum -incomes 
and provisions to those subject to unemployment, ill-health, industrial 
accidents, disablement, infirmity and old-age' (Coates, 1975: 46).,, The 
introduction of these provisions is reflected in the lower proportion of 
total expenditure spent on unemployment and provident benefits- during 
institutionalised industrial relations than during the implementation of 
collective bargaining. Moreover, as a proportion of total expenditure, 
the cost of unemployment and provident benefits steadily declined 
throughout suggesting that the introduction of further state benefits 
acted to reduce proportionately this aspect of union expenditure, Latta 
(1972: 402) suggests that this decline is also, in part, attributable to 
union policy regarding superannuation which 'in 1960 accounted for 38 
per cent of total benefits paid, in 1970 only 19 per cent'. - In cash 
terms, however, this component of expenditure increased, This cash 
increase is partially accounted for by some of the larger unions 
broadening their range of benefits during the early 1960s. For example, 
Latta (1972: 404) reports that the GMVU established a sick and accident 
benefit scheme only in 1962.1 1 
The proportion of expenditure spent on dispute benefit is also 
markedly lower during institutionalised' industrial relations than the 
average for the implementation of collective bargaining. Throughout the 
later period this component of expenditure was more than 7 per cent of 
total expenditure only in 1957 and 1959. Both of these years fall within 
the strike wave identified by Cronin. The high proportion of expenditure 
spent on dispute benefit is likely to account for the high 
expenditure/contribution ratio and reflects the increase in the number 
of official strikes called during the wave. There was no corresponding 
proportional increase in dispute benefit expenditure during the second 
of the strike waves dated by Cronin for 1968-72 although high money 
expenditure on dispute benefit was recorded for 1968-79. Given Edwards' 
(1982: 18) finding that the 'official national strike... has continued to 
play a small role' in aggregate strike activity throughout the 1970s, it 
must be assumed that these money increases in dispute benefit 
expenditure are due to an increased proportion of local disputes being 
declared official. 
During the implementation of collective bargaining, administrative 
costs were assumed to form a substantial proportion of 'other costs'. 
This assumption is also made for the operation of institutionalised 
industrial relations. Between 1950 and 1970 proportional expenditure on 
other costs remained fairly stable, the fluctuations arguably arising 
from variation in the other components of union expenditure. After 1975, 
however, proportional expenditure on other costs increased 
substantially. This increase may have occurred earlier but data 
unavailability for 1971-74 precludes the precise dating of the rapid 
increase. ' Regardless of data problems it is apparent that the 
substantial rise in the proportion of total union expenditure allocated 
to other costs is concurrent with the merger wave 1966-83. 
The regression results presented in Table 8.5 support the 
expectations derived fromýthe preceding review. Expenditure on dispute 
benefit was inversely associated with merger intensity. Furthermore, the 
association was not significant. In other words, strike activity did not 
promote mergers through its impact upon union financial stability. A 
similar relationship is evidenced for expenditure on provident and 
unemployment benefits, confirming the notion that'-the introduction of 
state' welfare schemes reduced the impact of this component of 
expenditure on union financial viability during the operation of 
institutionalised industrial relations. 
REGRESSION RESULT. UNION EXPENDITURE AND MERGER ACTIVITY-, 
DURING THE OPERATION OF INSTITUTIONALISED INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS. 
-0.105 (DB) -0.063 (PBUB) +0.666 (OTHER)*** 
R2 = 0.39 
D-W = 1.202 
where DB : union expenditure on dispute benefit 
OTHER : union expenditure on other costs 
PBUB : union expenditure on provident and unemployment benefits 
The three regressors are expressed in real terms. That is, they are 
corrected for changes in the retail price index. 
The positive and significant relationship between merger intensity 
and expenditure on other costs indicates that rising administrative 
expenses acted to stimulate merger activity. Two principal reasons can 
be deployed''regarding this association. Firstly, 'Latta (1972: 404) 
comments that 'with the exception of the NGA, because of its policy on 
superannuation payments, ... -all amalgamations in the 1960s have led to 
higher expenditure relative to income than the two (or more) merging 
unions had separately. The need to protect the employment position'of 
officials is an obvious factor in this'. Brooks and` Gamm (1976) drew 
similar conclusions from their review of post-merger American union 
expenditure which they found to- be higher than combined pre-merger 
expenditure. The point here is that' the rise in other costs can be 
attributed to the merger- process itself. The large diversifying 
proportion of merger--activity during the second merger wave lends 
support to this explanation. -, Diversification in recruitment bases 
necessitates the acquisition of negotiating expertise in 'new' areas of 
organisation for the-'absorbing union. The retention of full-time 
officers from the absorbed unions as a means of acquiring such expertise 
may, therefore, account, for the rise in 'post-merger expenditure and 
other costs in particular. 
This explanation 'is based purely upon the merger process. That- is, 
it is the cause and the rise in other costs is the effect. Several 
findings presented earlier in this study suggest that a more complex 
process forms the basis of the explanation. For example, the level of 
funds per member added no explanatory power to the economic variables 
which were at their most effective in accounting for the variance in 
merger intensity during the operation of institutionalised industrial 
relations. This would suggest, therefore, that there was an economic 
underpinning to merger activity. The rise in other costs within the 
terms of this second explanation may be either cause or effect. The rise 
may be assigned to the professionalisation of bargaining procedures, 
requiring an enhanced level of administrative support. Hence unions 
merge because they cannot afford to meet increases in administrative 
costs. During the implementation of collective bargaining the combined 
effect of economic and political influences promoted organisational 
instability and, thereby, merger, activity within certain craft oriented 
unions through their impact on workshop organisation. Merger activity.. in 
this context is a policy whereby trade union officials may re-establish 
authority within unions. If a similar process were to have occurred 
during the operation of institutionalised industrial relations, the rise 
in administrative costs could again be reasonably viewed as an 
intervening factor. The increases, for example, could be attributed to 
the higher costs of absorbing workshop organisation into existing trade 
union structures. Merger in this setting has two purposes. Firstly, to 
increase financial reserves thereby providing a more secure financial 
basis to the absorption of workshop organisation and, secondly, to 
ameliorate the contradictions between workshop organisation and the more 
sectional national organisation. These explanations are not mutually 
exclusive. They are examined in the next section, the object of which is 
to elaborate the nature of the -impact of the economic influences upon 
the merger process. I 
Chapter 6'examined those influences 'external' to trade unions that 
promoted the pursuit of merger as a policy choice by trade-union 
leaderships. Political` influence, achieved by means of membership size 
and through the agencies of the TUC and Labour Party, " was -, found to be 
the dominant perspective. Stability within political relationships was 
established as being' essential to their efficient functioning, By 
comparison with' merger Wave I, internal mechanisms of ensuring such 
stability were'more pronounced during Wave II. For example, newly formed 
unions tended tobe absorbed into existing structures during Wave II and 
the TUC policy to restrict affiliation of such organisations 'limited 
their ° capacity to 'achieve organisational stability. Political 
factionalism within'both the TUC and Labour Party acted to promote 
mergers as union leaderships sought to influence policy formulation in'a 
direction consistent with their'own political perspectives. The previous 
section showed a significant increase in other costs concurrent with 
Wave II. The purpose of this section is, therefore, to explain this 
increase and examine how it 'relates to merger intensity within the 
confines of these political relationships. 
Pollard (1969: 101-15) has indicated that the inter-war depression 
stimulated a process of re-education among the trade union leadership. 
No doubt assisted by the increased professionalisation of services 
provided by the TUC, interest became , focused on policies directed 
towards full employment with the accompanying acknowledgement that the 
influence of the City, Treasury and Civil Service over economic policy 
should be reduced. Hobsbawm (1964: 330) reports a change in consciousness 
at the base of the trade union movement. Simultaneous with these 
attitudinal changes, the depression also promoted a gradual industrial 
transformation with expanding new industries based upon automobiles, 
chemicals, electronics and synthetic fibres which presented different 
problems for trade union organisation as such industries were founded 
upon mass production techniques. 
Significant institutional innovations were alsq introduced. At the 
Bridlington TUG Congress, held in 1939, recruitment boundaries of 
affiliates were defined. During World War II the (usually) factory based 
Joint Production Committees (JPCs) were established with the agreement 
of management. These constituted an institutional acceptance of workshop 
trade union organisation. 'By June 1944 over 4,500 JPCs had been set up 
covering 3% million workers in factories throughout Britain' 
(Jeff@ ys, 1979: 12). Although employers disbanded the JPCs after the war, 
their demise was not accompanied by that of shopfloor trade unionism 
which, based on shop stewards committees, 'had arrived for good'. 
The election of the Attlee government in 1945 allowed for the 
continuation of the wartime close working arrangements between 
government and the higher echelons of trade union officialdom. The 
fulfilment of electoral promises in terms of the establishment of the 
National Health Service, the nationalisation of a substantial proportion 
of the economy and the extension of compulsory education dampened 
resistance to what JeffOys (1979: 16) describes as the significant cut 
in the workers' share of the national product which occurred between 
1945 and 1950. In tandem with and, partially accounting for, the 
emergence of the state as a major employer was the failure of private 
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capital to re-structure with the result that from the mid-1950s Britain 
suffered a- relative decline by comparison with- international 
competitors. The post-war expansion, however, allowed for. absolute 
growth within, the British economy promoting a heightening of economic 
expectations. 
-Within these long term trends there was a degree of short term 
fluctuation. Unemployment peaked -in 1946 at 1.9 per cent and remained 
minimal throughout the-1950s and early 1960s. Real wages declined during 
the two post-war Labour administrations but after 1951 began to 
increase. Figure 8.4 shows that trade union membership increased 
relatively sharply prior to 1950 and then very steadily until the-late 
1960s. between 1946-and-1968 a total increase in trade union, membership 
of 1,143,000 is recorded. Manual trade union membership fell by 14,100, 
however, whereas white-collar- membership rose by 1,156,000, - reflecting 
the changing patterns of employment and, fürparticular, the growth of 
unionism in local government, health and education and - in banking, 
insurance and finance., - 
Cronin (1979: 139) characterises 1957 to 1962 as the first -of two 
strike waves occuring ; during the operation of institutionalised 
industrial relations. The strikes were, in the main, small-scale and 
unofficial suggesting that workshop organisation acted as a catalytic 
force in their instigation. The strike wave, however, had a firm 
economic underpinning in' the 'stop-go' character of contemporary 
economic growth. Cronin (1979: 141) draws upon Runciman's work on social 
deprivation in concluding that during the strike wave 'frames of 
reference remained limited in scope, and there is little evidence... of 
any so-called revolution of rising expectations'. This factor may 
account for the low level of merger activity prevalent during this 
period, although it should be noted that 1962 marked the first year in 
the upturn in- merger intensity which developed into the merger wave-of 
1966-83. ' Between 1964 and 1968 real' wages stagnated, yet strike 
frequency continued to decline. Merger intensity continued to rise, a 
process no doubt assisted by, the -enactment of the Trade Union 
(Amalgamation) Act 1964 by-the Conservative government after lobbying'by 
the TUC and with the agreement of employers' organisations. -- 
1968-1979 
Accompanying the 1967 devaluation of the pound was a surge in 
prices which induced the 'pay explosion' of the following years. Cronin 
(1979: 48) dates the concurrent strike wave as 1968-72 but, as is 
indicated in Figure 8.4, a later termination date would appear to be 
more appropriate. The strikes were conducted in defense of living 
standards on the recognition of the slowing down of the rate of economic 
growth. Both official and unofficial strikes took place. Furthermore, as 
Jeffc(ys (1979: 23) comments, some of the unofficial strikes 'proved that 
action in one part of an industry like the motor industry with its 
highly inter-dependent processes could have a national impact'. Jackson 
et al. (1975: 89-95) report that the high inflation of the period acted 
to squeeze 'differentials thereby amplifying the extent of strike 
activity. Unlike the 1957-62 strike wave, however, the later wave was 
accompanied by a, ' widening ý of 'orbits of comparison' -(Phelps- 
Brown, 1975: 17-20). In other words, not only did unofficial strike 
activity attain a national status but it was also established on the 
basis of a broadening of the extent of co-ordination' between work 
groups. 
This period also saw a steepening in the rate of increase of both 
trade union membership and merger intensity. Between 1968 and 1974 total 
membership rose by 15.3 per cent from 9,746,000 to 11,235,000. Within 
this aggregate trend manual trade union membership increased by 6.7 per 
cent, a figure surpassed by that recorded for white-collar membership 
which rose by 33.6 per cent. While these` membership increases were a 
source of organisational stability through 'membership contributions, 
there were significant differences with respect to the notion of 
bargaining strength by comparison with earlier periods of membership 
growth. Throughout the 1970s employers, in conjunction with union 
officials, promoted union organisation by allowing the expansion of the 
closed shop. In other words, to a degree; unionisation was promoted from 
above rather than arising from below. Dunn and'Gennard (1984: 145) report 
that the 'closed shop population reached a peak in the late 1970s'. As 
Hyman (1980: 71) comments, however, 'union membership recruited on this 
basis need not represent collective organisation in any meaningful 
sense'. 
Glyn and Sutcliffe (1972) have argued that the years of the Wilson 
administration, 1964-69, were marked by a re-direction of the thrust of 
government economic policy away from the City of London towards the 
interests of industry. The Redundancy Payments Act 1965, the publication 
of In Place of Strife, incomes policies and the appointment of the 
Donovan Commission were explicit indicators of this shift in policy, 
reflecting the centrality assigned by the Labour government to the 
reform of workplace industrial relations, 'Reform and restriction' were 
also the central themes of the Industrial Relations Act 1971 enacted 
under the following Heath administration (Lewis, 1983: 370). In promoting 
the registration of staff associations as trade unions, the Industrial 
Relations Act provided an indirect stimulus to merger activity. Existing 
unions viewed these recently registered unions as competitors for 
membership and, as, a means whereby their recruitment bases may be 
extended. 
Friedman (1977: 78) argues that 'responsible autonomy' was the 
, 
prevalent managerial strategy until the end of the 1960s. Within 
management-defined limits, workers were afforded a degree of autonomy 
thereby reducing workplace conflict and facilitating autonomy. Such an 
approach is typically associated with the involvement of shop stewards 
in negotiating piecework rates. The vilification of the Bullock 
Committee's findings by employers demonstrates the limits which 
managements were prepared to tolerate. As a result of the close contact 
between shop stewards and those they represent, coupled with prevailing 
managerial strategies, Beynon (1973) argues that 'factory consciousness' 
became the dominant outlook. Re-inforced by the 'rediscovery of the cash 
nexus' the membership emphasis upon the improvement of their economic 
circumstances acted to separate them further from their full-time 
officials. Furthermore, this isolation curtailed membership interest in 
the promotion of union reform. For example, Cronin (1979: 214) reports 
that only 4.5 per cent of the, 14,125 strikes between 1968 and 1972 were 
called over 'trade union status'. 
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The numerical development of shop stewards is traced by Terry 
(1983: 67-68) who puts their number at 90,000 in 1961,175,000 in 1968 
and more than 250,000 in 1978. Coupled with this numerical increase was 
a spread in their industrial dispersion. Initially concentrated in 
engineering, shop steward organisation had spread 'to engineering and 
associated industries' with 'significant increases in other areas, 
especially in distributive and service occupations' by 1968. This 
expansion continued throughout the 1970s by the end of which shop 
stewards 'were all but universal among manual workforces with more than 
100 workers'. Additionally, in both public and private service sectors 
shop steward organisation developed although not to the same extent as 
in manufacturing. 
Coupled to this numerical proliferation is a shift in the nature of 
workshop organisation, a shift accentuated following the publication of 
the Donovan Report in 1968. Of the 'two systems' of industrial relations 
identified by Donovan, it was that located within the plant which was 
viewed as the source of 'anarchy and disorder'. Specifically, four 
aspects of the 'informal' system were regarded as problematic: the 
'direct democracy' of the relationship between shop stewards and those 
they represented, the independence of shop stewards from full-time union 
officials which was exacerbated as a 'problem' by the multi-union 
composition of joint shop steward committees, the inadequacy of systems 
of managerial control arising from the lack of intervention by senior 
management and the phenomenon of 'wages drift' with the associated 
involvement of shop stewards in issues of job control or 'restrictive 
practices'. While these aspects of shop steward organisation have tended 
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to be exaggerated to the neglect of countervailing tendencies the 
central point is that shop steward organisation was defined as an 
industrial relations 'problem' and, therefore, an object of reform. 
Terry (1983: 85) argues that 'the changes in shop steward 
organisation and coverage over the past decade can best be understood in 
the context of managerial and state responses to a crisis of 
profitability, seen in part as emanating from the shopfloor challenge to 
managerial control over labour costs and the labour process'. From 
managements' perspective, the turn into the downswing of the economic 
long' cycle around 1968 brought with it a 'crisis of profitability' as 
internationally relatively slow rates of economic growth further 
declined. Hannah (1983: 178) reports that throughout the 1960s and 1970s 
company restructuring by merger activity with the object of improving 
productivity through economies of scale was pronounced. As a consequence 
tighter company 
, 
financial controls were introduced (Beynon and 
Wainwright, 1979: 31-43 and 63-72) and, as part of this strategy, single 
employer multi-plant bargaining. Integral to this approach was the 
formalisation of both negotiating and disciplinary procedures at plant 
and company level (Hyman, 1979: 57), more widespread use of work study and 
job evaluation techniques (Brown, 1981: 110-14), alterations in methods 
of payment usually characterised by a diminution in the scope of 
piecework to be replaced by productivity bargaining and measured day 
work (JeffKys, 1979: 21), and the extension of plant and group bonus 
schemes (Terry, 1983: 80). 
At around the time of the publication of the Donovan Report 
profitability was also defined as a political issue, the strategies 
instigated by the state constituting the second spur to realignment 
within work shop organisation. The incomes policies of the late 1960s 
attempted to restrict the tendency towards wages drift although Clegg 
(1971: 62-64; reported in Terry, 1983:, 83) suggests that they were 'in part 
frustrated by the autonomous strength of shop steward organisations'. 
The direct legislative assault upon the bargaining power and autonomy of 
shop steward organisation, enshrined within the Industrial Relations Act 
1971, united both the official and unofficial sections of trade unionism 
in opposition and proved similarly ineffective. 
As was discussed in Chapter 6. the Labour governments of 1974-79 
retained the support of official unionism yet still maintained a policy 
directed towards shop floor reform. The Health and Safety at Work and 
Trade Union and Labour Relations Acts of 1974 promoted the integration 
of shop steward organisation both within established union organisation 
and the more formalised management negotiating structures. Health and 
safety committees and provisions covering unfair dismissal, time-off for 
union education, the four fold increase in the number of full-time shop 
stewards (Brown, 1981: 65-67) and the 'centralisation of control within 
stewards organisations' (Hyman, 1979: 57) are all evidence of the enhanced 
formalisation established within workshop organisation. The 'success' of 
this policy is evidenced by Brown (1980) in arguing that the Social 
Contract was operable due to the degree of collaboration between senior 
stewards and convenors and full-time officials. 
The impetus provided by both management and state initiative was 
institutionally consolidated within trade union structures. Hyman 
comments that 
in some cases, employers themselves took the initative in 
providing recognition facilities and 'training' for work- 
place representatives. In others, shop steward organisation 
was 'sponsored' by national union leaderships: at times 
anxious to collaborate with such managerial strategies, at 
times motivated by a genuine interest in greater membership 
involvement in union affairs, at times alarmed by the 
militant revolts against national negotiators which were 
a feature of the late 1960s and early 1970s (1979: 59). 
Integration between shop stewards and formal trade union structures was 
implemented by means of rulebook-defined rights and obligations for 
workplace representatives and the provision of places on national 
negotiating committees. This integration was facilitated by the 
establishment of a hierarchy within steward organisation, the immediate 
consequence of which is characterised by Terry (1983) as a shift from 
direct democracy to representative democracy within such organisation. 
Of course, these factors in combination impinged upon the financial 
status of unionism and are influential in accounting for the burgeoning 
of 'other costs' during the 1970s as is evidenced in Table 8.4. Several 
trends can be discerned. The establishment and/or increased staffing of 
bargaining support departments - research, legal, health and safety - 
within unions to service both the increased professionalisation and 
specialisation within bargaining and the more widespread demands for 
such services arising from the integration of workshop representatives. 
Similarly, the provision of education and training services has become 
more widespread. Rather than focusing upon the mobilisation of the 
membership, the courses provided have tended to emphasise the 
acquisition of bargaining skills and techniques further consolidating 
the tendencies mentioned above. Furthermore, the published output of 
trade unions in terms of conference papers, bargaining briefs and 
negotiating handbooks is rising thereby imposing further financial 
outlay. Additionally, the integration of the shop stewards network 
within the structures of official trade unionism has necessitated the 
provision of transport costs in order to ensure attendance at the 
various bargaining committees whether they be national or regional. For 
example, Lane graphically makes the point that 
the move towards company bargaining with shop steward parti- 
pation has gained a new clientele for the British Rail break- 
fast as shopfloor representatives have sat cheek by jowl with 
managers on their way to London. Symbolic too has been the TGWU's 
purchase of a London hotel to reduce the expenses of shop stewards 
and other delegates on overnight stays in the capital (1982: 13). 
The development of shop steward organisation during the operation 
of institutionalised industrial relations can, therefore, be seen to 
impinge upon the merger process. Shop stewards established an autonomy 
from official trade unionism which threatened the political status and 
stability nurtured by the trade union leadership. The threat posed by 
this autonomy was exacerbated by the multi-union character of workplace 
organisation which acted to inhibit effective control by outside union 
officials. However, the dominance of 'economism', 'the cash nexus' and 
'factory consciousness' in shaping the ideology of shop floor 
organisation posed no direct threat to the authority of trade union 
leaders within their own organisations. In other words, unlike the shop 
stewards movement during the implementation of collective bargaining, 
which defined trade union structural reform as an explicit policy 
objective, the shop stewards of the 1960s and 1970s emphasised the 
improvement of the economic circumstances of their members, the autonomy 
of their organisation leading to a relative neglect of policies towards 
national union mergers. This was no doubt exacerbated by the failure of 
national wage bargaining to meet membership expectations as reflected by 
locally induced wages drift. 
As a result of the perceived negative effect of workshop 
organisation on profitability, management and the state intervened to 
influence its character. The multiplication of autonomous bargaining 
centres also curtailed the capacity of trade union leaders to formulate 
national industrial policy on the understanding that they would be 
supported from within these bargaining centres. A third aspect of the 
policy directed towards the formal integration of workshop organisation 
was, therefore, established: namely, its formalisation within trade 
union structures. Mergers were an aspect of this policy. On the one hand 
they reduced the extent of shop floor multi-unionism thereby 
facilitating the re-establishment of external union authority over shop 
floor organisation. On the other hand, the added financial burden placed 
on union funds in pursuing the policy of integrating work shop 
organisation promoted mergers as a means whereby financial control could 
be further centralised. The accumulation of larger bodies of funds in 
merged unions eased the incorporation of the higher administrative costs 
arising from the integration policy. Of course, these higher costs 
induced in some unions a financial instability, providing a further 
impetus to merger as they sought to re-establish stability within the 
constitutional framework of a larger merged organisation. 
This chapter has examined organisational instability within a 
variety of institutional contexts: namely, merger intensity among unions 
of different size, the dissolution rate and the life cycles of breakaway 
unions. The sensitivity of merger intensity to direct economic 
influences was inversely related to union membership size, unions from 
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Size Group 1 being most influenced. Political and unionisation factors 
had a greater influence upon the merging of unions from the larger size 
groups. The sensitivity of organisational stability to economic 
influences among smaller unions was confirmed by the strong impact of 
high inflation in the promotion of dissolutions. 
That recently formed unions are inherently unstable was illustrated 
in two contexts. Firstly, the formation rate had a positive effect upon 
the dissolution rate. Secondly, the formation rate was strongly 
associated with the intensity of merger activity among unions from Size 
Group 1. The inhibiting effect of the formation rate on merger intensity 
in Size Group 2 points to differences in the ease whereby a union may be 
absorbed by merger, the larger the union the more complex is this 
process. Breakaways, a specific form of small union, were also found to 
be organisationally unstable. The survival time of breakaways was 
markedly less than that of dissolving unions as 
.a 
whole suggesting that 
the institutional hostility towards breakaways is influential in 
curtailing their independent existence. 
Chapter 4 demonstrated that the level of union funds per member was 
closely associated with environmental economic factors. The proportional 
rise in other costs was found to be the most influential component of 
aggregate union expenditure. During the operation of institutionalised 
industrial relations, membership interests were primarily focused upon 
'economistic' issues to the exclusion of trade union structural 
realignment. In combination with institutional and economic development, 
this economistic focus was reflected in the development of workplace 
organisation. Two aspects of organisational instability were induced by 
" the development of this workplace organisation both of which impinged 
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upon the merger process. Firstly, workplace organisation threatened the 
stability attained in the relationships between representatives of the 
polity and union officials in so far as it precluded the latter from 
reliably 'delivering the goods' to the former and, in consequence, the 
formulation of national industrial policies. In this context mergers 
reduced workplace multi-unionism thereby facilitating the re-assertion 
of leadership authority over workplace organisation. Secondly, a 
component of the policy directed towards the integration of workplace 
organisation was its formalisation within both bargaining and union 
structures. This process of integration is reflected in the proportional 
rise in union administrative costs. Merger, therefore. served a second 
purpose: the centralisation of financial control and the accumulation of 
larger bodies of funds necessary to support this integration, 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. The reason why union financial data are unavailable for 1971-74 is 
provided in Appendix A. 
2. Footnote 3 of Chapter 7 explains the presentation of a regression 
result with a Durbin-Watson statistic outside the limits of 
acceptability. 
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CASE STUDY I: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IN THE PRINTING INDUSTRY 
Several studies have suggested that technological change has a 
stimulating influence upon merger activity. For example, Lerner (1968) 
and Buchanan (1974 and 1981) suggest that technological change blurs 
demarcation lines which promotes inter-union competition for membership 
and, in turn, merger activity. Chapter 4 included aggregate equations 
showing the influence on merger activity of economic, unionisation and 
political variables. A productivity variable was employed as a proxy for 
technological change, but this variable was not successfully entered 
into the aggregate equations. The object of this case study is to 
examine why the productivity variable did not appear. Two explanations 
can be advanced. Firstly, technological change may not have an 
independent impact upon the merger process. Secondly, the productivity 
variable may be an inadequate proxy for technological change, failing to 
'capture' its impact upon merger activity. 
This case study examines merger activity among unions recruiting 
from within the printing industry during two periods of technological 
innovation. The conclusions drawn relate specifically to the printing 
industry and cannot necessarily be generalised across other industries 
or unions. The conclusions do indicate some additional lines of 
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CASE STUDY I: TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE IH THE PRINTING INDUSTRY 
Several studies have suggested that technological change has a 
stimulating influence upon merger activity. For example, Lerner (1968) 
and Buchanan (1974 and 1981) suggest that technological change blurs 
demarcation lines which promotes inter-union competition for membership 
and, in turn, merger activity. Chapter 4 included aggregate equations 
showing the influence on merger activity of economic, unionisation and 
political variables. A productivity-variable was employed as a proxy for 
technological change, but this variable was not successfully entered 
into the aggregate equations. The object of this case study is to 
examine why the productivity variable did not appear. Two explanations 
can be advanced. Firstly, technological change may not have, an 
independent impact upon the merger process. Secondly, the productivity 
variable maybe an inadequate proxy for technological change, failing to 
'capture' its impact upon merger activity. 
This case study examines merger activity among unions recruiting 
from within the printing industry during two periods of technological 
innovation. The conclusions drawn relate specifically to the printing 
industry and cannot necessarily be generalised across other industries 
or unions. The conclusions do indicate some additional lines of 
investigation, however, which might be usefully pursued in order to 
elaborate the generalised influence of technological change upon the 
merger process. The two periods chosen for study are 1893 to 1924 during 
which linotype machinery was introduced. Child (1967: 155) states that 
this introduction took place in the twenty years preceding 1914. The 
case study is extended to 1924 to incorporate any effects arising from 
wartime labour practices, in particular those relating to dilution. The 
second period covers the years 1966 to 1983 which are associated with 
the implementation of silicon chip based systems. 
Period Trends 
Between-1893 and 1924 trade union membership in printing rose from 
42,200-to 135,300 having peaked at 220,100 during 1920. Throughout the 
labour unrest, 1910-1914, printing trade union membership increased 
from 75,400 to 95,600 (21.1ýper cent), -. whereas during World War Ia 34.7 
per cent increase was recorded bringing membership to 146,400, Trade 
union density rose from 27.7 per cent in 1892 to 58.3 per cent by 1921. 
Underlying these increases was the formation of new unions in printing 
organising women and grades of workers excluded from membership of the 
existing craft unions. Dominant among the new unions were the National 
Society of Operative Printers and Assistants (NATSOPA) formed in 1889, 
the Printers' and Stationers' Warehousemen, Cutters and Assistants Union 
(PSWCAU) in 1890 and the National Union of Paper Mill Workers (NUPMW) in 
1889. 
The emergence of the new unions stimulated competition for 
membership for intermediate grades of workers not clearly falling within 
the ambit of craft union recruitment. As many of the craft unions were 
founded upon geographical recruitment, inter-union competition for 
membership was already pervasive. For example, Musson (1954: 227-245) 
describes the repeated adjustments made in the recruitment boundaries 
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between the Typographical Association (TA) and the London Society of 
Compositors <LSC). Such inter-union competition promoted hostilities and 
the defensive protection of self-interest reflected in a-variety of 
organisational` influences that thwarted many of the numerous- merger 
iniatives of the period. Particular among these was the different 
degree of autonomy afforded to branches within union constitutions. 
Child (1967: 203) describes the 'change in the regulation of terms 
F of employment from unilateral enforcement of union rule to bilateral 
agreement [as] the dominant feature of the period' 1890 to 1914. He 
reports that by 1914 50,000 workers were covered by over eighty written 
agreements. These were further consolidated during 1919 'in a 
comprehensive set of National Agreements covering the basic terms of 
employment' (Child, 1967: 226). - A final aspect to the circumstances of the 
printing industry into which technological change was introduced was its 
rate of expansion. Child comments that 
newspaper circulation rose to heights undreamed of in the 
Victorian era, and the reduction in the costs of books by 
mass production of both printing and bindings opened up the 
great, untouched market for those cheap editions which were 
the foundation of the prosperity of many large printing houses. 
Improvements in colour printing and photographic reproduction 
coincided-conveniently with the rapid development of poster and 
display advertising, and gave renewed stimulus to the job 
printing trade (1967: 159). 
'In the-quarter century before the Great War the printing industry 
was in a turmoil of technical and industrial development the outcome,.. 
(of which]... was nothing less than a profound and general change in 
both the processes of production and the methods of organisation' 
(Child, 1967: 155). Three principal technical innovations gained 
widespread acceptance. The linotype was the first type-composing'machine 
to be introduced on a nationwide basis. Four times faster than hand 
composition and producing a superior product the first such machine was 
installed in 1889. Whereas the linotype required a single operative the 
monotype was worked by two. The monotype was developed ten years later 
than the linotype and was concentrated in book publishing. The third 
technical innovation of the pre-war period was the high speed rotary 
press which brought with it differences between employers and unionists 
concerning the relative merits of speed and reliability on the one hand 
and safety'of operation on the other. 
The introduction of these devices into an expanding industry did 
not necessitate the displacement of large numbers of skilled workers. 
Indeed, Child (1967: 162) reports that there was a growth of such workers 
although this growth was smaller than that of general workers in the 
industry. Changes in absolute numbers of workers in specific grades were 
of less significance than the relative changes between grades. In 
particular, the relative increase in the number of machine tenders was 
marked. For example, the newspaper rotary presses required between 
twenty and thirty minders only the supervisor of which was eligible for 
craft union membership. Accentuating this tendency was the growth in the 
number of workers engaged in the storage and handling of both raw 
materials and product. Skills tended to become developed within a more 
specialised area based upon the machinery worked with at the expense of 
generalised craft skills. 
There can be little doubt, therefore, that the introduction of the 
new technology of the period created a tension between unions arising 
from the relative changes in employment patterns within the, industry. 
This would appear to confirm Lerner's (1968: 172) contention that new 
competing skills arising from technological change induce inter-union 
competition. Two features are. however, of particular salience to the 
argument to follow. The first is the rapidity with which the change was 
achieved., In twenty-five years hand-composing, which had been the 
principal printing method for four centuries, was effectively replaced. 
Secondly, the introduction of the linotype'displaced the hand-composing 
skills possessed by workers organised into 'tightly knit, - highly 
disciplined, aristocratic and exclusive craft unions' (Child, 1967: 1650). 
In other words, the technological change had its most direct impact upon 
workers organised into 'ideal typical' craft-unions. 
Three aspects of the impact of technical change upon industrial 
relations in printing are examined: the formation of new unions, the 
rise of national agreements and employer organisations, and company re- 
structuring. The technical changes of the period 'led to the formation 
of the unions of semi-skilled workers' -(Child, 1967: 163). NATSOPA 
primarily recruited the assistants working on the rotary presses in 
newspaper printing. Initially based in London, NATSOPA's recruitment 
base was extended geographically and vertically with the recruitment of 
a limited, number of printers during the pre-war period. Two long 
established unions, the London Society of Warehousemen (LSW) and Caxton 
Printers Warehousemens' Association (CPWA), organised supervisory and 
craft workers-in -printers and stationers' warehouses. The PSVCAU with 
Alfred Evans, an advocate of industrial unionism, at-its head organised 
the labourers excluded from membership of the older organisations. -With 
a leadership of similar political complexion, the NUPMW recruited the 
less skilled workers, regardless of age or gender, within paper mills 
again in competition with longer established unions. 
In response to the recruitment activities of these, and other, new 
unions the craft unions gradually abandoned their exclusive traditions 
and opened their recruitment bases to women and the less skilled. The 
introduction of new technology was the fulcrum to this development. 
Craft exclusiveness was based on control over a specific process within 
the industry. The new devices altered the nature of these processes. For 
example, the ratio of printers to assistants and apprenticeships was 
reduced. In order to restrict the loss of control arising from the 
technical changes, craft unions expanded recruitment bases to organise, 
where possible, -all the skilled workers within the relevant process and 
reduced the time required to complete apprenticeships. Competitive 
recruitment was also heightened by the geographical recruitment patterns 
of the various unions. The provincial craft unions had established loose 
federations throughout the nineteenth century which were not formalised 
by merger because of difficulties arising from localised payment 
structures (Musson, 1954 and Bundock, 1959). By contrast, the non-craft 
unions were initially based in London extending their bases of 
recruitment into the provinces. In other words, not only was the 
geographical locus-of-competition in flux but the union structural basis 
to this competition was also changing. 
Child (1967: 202) argues that the impetus to the spread of 
collective agreements was the introduction of the linotype and monotype 
machines. Inter-union competition and the inherent organisational 
instability of the new unions promoted a union interest in the signing 
of agreements as they both established a basis for inter-union relations 
and conferred organisational stability through employer recognition of 
the new unions. The expanding market for printing products and the 
possibility of inter-union disputes disrupting production promoted a 
similar interest among employers who viewed the signing of collective 
agreements as a means of facilitating technological change and 
standardising the rates and procedures associated with its operation. In 
the main, collective- agreements were initially concluded between 
individual firms and unions organising the different employed grades. 
The coverage of these agreements is reported by Musson (1954: 131-154) to 
have spread geographically to local and regional status, albeit 
irregularly and with marked procedural and substantive differences. The 
exceptions to this pattern of development were the national agreements 
covering the working of linotype machines on 'stab' (1898) and 'piece' 
(1903) concluded by the TA and employers affiliated to the Linotype 
Users Association (LUA). The 1898 agreement laid down that 'all skilled 
(linotypel operators were to be members of the TA, ... apprentices must 
have served three years before being put on the machines ... and 
linotype wage rates were to be 121k per cent above the existing case 
rates in the various towns' (Musson, 1954: 201). In other words, - the 
introduction of technological change directly stimulated the conclusion 
of national agreements which were the first in the industry and included 
both procedural and substantive clauses. 
Concurrent with these developments in collective agreements were 
those in employers' associations. The LUA was the first national 
employers' association formed in 1895 with the express purpose of 
achieving procedural and substantive consensus regarding the 
introduction of linotype machines. The LUA was reconstituted in 1920 as 
the Newspaper Society which absorbed other principal newspaper 
employers' associations. The Monotype Users Association was established 
with similar objects as the LUA. 
Both the growth of firms and their geographical location was 
influenced by the technological developments. Economies of large-scale 
production were particularly marked in newspapers on the implementation 
of rotary - presses. The growth of the London daily papers was most 
pronounced during this period, no doubt assisted by the improvements in 
transportation from the capital.. -Child, (1967: 160) reports similar 
increases in size among publishers. - As was argued in earlier chapters, 
employer bargaining strength is enhanced by such increases in size. The 
location of different sections of the industry also exhibited a degree 
of flux with. the changing demand for labour to operate the new 
machinery. Expanding London-based firms set up plants throughout the 
South-East where there was both non-union labour and lower site costs. 
In consequence, the geographically organised printing unions were placed 
under further competitive pressures for membership. In 1907 the LCS 
extended its recruitment boundary from a radius of 15 miles to 40 miles 
from Charing Cross in an attempt to secure unionisation within some of 
the new plants. Additionally, new unions were formed within these plants 
often with the support of-their established counterparts. 
The Merger Process in Printing : 1893-1924 
Between 1893 and 1924 there were 24 mergers involving printing 
industry unions in which-31 unions were absorbed and from which 7 unions 
were formed.. Appendix D, Table D. 1, lists the merger cases in question. 
Of 
. the unions with known formation dates dying in mergers, .. 11 were 
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formed prior to` 1889,9 between 1889 and 1893'and 11 after 1893. Only 
Merger Number 14, involved non-printing. industry unions, ' both of which 
organised in paper-and board. It would appear that merger activity was 
evenly distributed across unions organising the different grades of 
workers. -l" , 
Within this aggregate'pattern several trends can be discerned. Both 
unions involved in Merger Number 1 primarily organised overseers and 
found their status threatened with the emergence of' the forceful PSWCU 
which attempted to recruit all workers from within the warehouse section 
of the industry. Merger overtures from the PSWCU were rejected"due to 
its expressed preference towards industrial unionism and its policy with 
respect to the recruitment of apprentices. Merger Number 1 can, 
therefore, be viewed, as Bundock (1959: 111-127) suggests, as 'an 
amalgamation to withstand 'the aggressive recruitment policies of the new 
union. This resistance was, however, ' short lived as the Amalgamated 
Printers' Warehousemen merged with the PSWCU in 1900. In accord with its 
explicit commitment to industrial unionism the resultant union from this 
merger, the National' Printers' Warehousemen and Cutters (NAPWC), 
extended both geographically with Merger" Number 7 and vertically in 
Merger Number 9. The absorption of the Manchester union as a branch of 
the NAPWC marked the culmination of a campaign to establish branches in 
the provincial cities with established printing interests 
(Bundock, 1959: 139)'. 
Two further mergers, Numbers 14 and 21, also reflected the 
NAPWC's predisposition towards industrial unionism. Merger Number 14 was 
the only one in which unions organising a membership predominantly 
employed in another industry amalgamated with a printing industry union. 
The National Union of Paper Mill Workers (NUPMW) had rejected previous 
merger offers dating back to 1897 on the grounds that there was 
sufficient scope for natural membership- growth. However, the increasing 
degree of overlap between memberships, as warehousing facilities became 
larger to accomodate=the supply of paper required by the new machinery, 
and the rapid post-merger growth of the industrially oriented NUR (which 
was fromed through merger in 1913) broke down rest once to the merger 
initiative of 1914 as it was -felt that industrial organisation in 
printing might stimulate a similar rate of membership growth. 
The National Union of Bookbinders and Machine Rulers (NUBMR) had 
come into being in 1911 after a protracted series of merger negotiations 
had resolved differences in financial provision. The four long- 
established constituent societies had recorded a stagnation in their 
memberships in the face of competition from'new unions. The failure of 
the NUBMR to organise women arising from the-long-held craft traditions 
of its constituent unions -precluded - the consummation of merger 
initiatives from- the National Union of Printing and Paper Workers 
(NUPPW). The slowing of membership growth led to a change in NUBMR 
policy- regarding the recruitment of women reflected in the formal 
absorption of the two womens' sections in Mergers Number 18 and 22. This 
change in policy and the declining living standards experienced during 
World War I led to it yielding independence in Merger Number 23, 
resulting in -- the fbrmation of the National-> Union of Printing, 
Bookbinding and Paper . 
Workers (NUPBPW). The Platen Printing Machine 
Minders (PPMM), a, technologically-(specific union organising minders to a 
particular machine, were absorbed by the NUPBPW in 1924 to form a 
Printing Machine branch. 
NATSOPA absorbed the Stereotypers and Electrotypers Assistants and 
the Printing Revisors and Readers Assistants in Mergers Number 15 and 
16. Both these unions had been formed during or after the onset of new 
unionism. Their acquisition reflected NATSOPA's policy of organising 
workers minding newspaper` printing presses and ancillary occupations 
thereto. Recruitment in practice, however, excluded the skilled grades 
as is indicated-by the absorption of these two assistants' unions. 
The pattern of merger activity among the new unions was, therefore, 
dominated by the notion of craft exclusiveness. Some older craft 
oriented unions were absorbed by the new unions although these' primarily 
organised overseers- and supervisors rather than apprenticed craft 
workers. Where these older unions were in direct competition with their 
newer counterparts, they succumbed to the latter's relatively higher 
growth rates, their wider scope of recognition, and their policy of 
attaining political influence through the emergent Labour Party. The 
growth of collective agreements in numerical and geographical terms 
further strengthened the hand of the new unions which strove for 
national organisation, ' whereas the older unions relied upon 
geographically specific recruitment bases. 
The influence of technological change on the pattern of merger 
activity among new unions can, therefore, be viewed as indirect but with 
a number of strands. Firstly, the policy of the craft unions to retain 
their status effectively precluded the new unions from organising all 
grades. Thus mergers among the new unions was limited in the vertical 
direction. The relative numerical dispersion of craft and non-craft 
workers was altered in favour of the latter by-the implementation of the 
new devices. Coupled to this was the proliferation of new unions, the 
memberships of which overlapped. initially occupationally and latterly 
geographically, as they expanded. The second indirect effect of the 
technological change was, therefore, to promote a geographical 
consolidation to reduce inter-union competition and enhance bargaining 
status. Thirdly, technological change induced a centralisation within 
industrial relations through the promotion of collective agreements and 
employers' associations. Membership size was the primary means whereby 
the new unions could attain influence within such a tendency towards 
centralisation. Only those new unions pursuing active merger policies 
were affiliated to the Printing and Kindred Trades' Federation through 
which central bargaining influence was achieved. 
Before 1908 mergers among printing industry craft unions were 
geographical. In Mergers Number 2 and 4 the TA, which had a policy to 
organise all provincial composing staff, acquired two Leeds-based unions 
recruiting grades of workers previously organised by the TA in other 
localities. Similarly, Mergers 10 and 11 were absorptions by regional 
unions recruiting compositors of local unions organising the same grades 
of workers. -Given that the technological changes promoted alterations in 
the geographical location of printing industry establishments, these 
mergers can be viewed as ensuring that union rates were both 
standardised and applied to the new printing centres thereby protecting 
the rates established by the acquiring union. For example, Musson 
(1954: 234) reports that the LCS was 'alarmed at the low wage rates 
outside the London radius, the consequent competition and exodus of 
firms into the provinces'. The 1907 absorption of the Reading 
Compositors, formed in 1905 as a result of this 'exodus' represents a 
merger with the objective of consolidating rates. 
The formation of the National Electrotypers and Stereotypers in 
1900 and the subsequent absorption by the National Union of the, London 
Electrotypers and Stereotypers again constituted a national 
consolidation of craft organisation achieved without either vertical or 
horizontal expansion. Albeit remaining within the geographical confines 
of London, the formation of the London United Plate Printers was 
achieved on the same basis. 
Subsequent mergers among craft unions exhibited a divergent pattern 
comprising a vertical-component in the merger. Mergers 13,17,19 and 20 
involved the amalgamtion of unions organising workers directly vertical 
in the occupational hierarchy. But the unions absorbed in these mergers 
were small, their- combined membership totalling 906. Similarly, the 
acquiring unions also organised relatively few workers by comparison 
with the principal craft unions of the period. In other words, any 
vertical expansion achieved by merger was done so on a small scale, 
suggesting that organisational instability among smaller unions made 
them more amenable to vertical expansion. 
Musson (1954), Bundock (1959) and Child (1967) report a number of 
other merger initiatives which failed to come to fruition because of the 
incompatability of organisational influences. The expansion of the 
printing industry during the period facilitated the attainment of union 
growth , thereby allowing for a more vigourous defense of these 
organisational principles. It would appear that Lerner's (1968) 
proposition regarding the erosion of demarcation lines through 
technological change promoting mergers is not valid in printing during 
the implementation of collective bargaining. Not only were demarcation 
lines between the older established craft unions and the new unions 
maintained but mergers did not, in the main, cross these lines. The few 
that, did involved particularly small unions. Within craft organisation, 
established demarcation lines were retained, the geographical expansion 
of recruitment bases appearing to take precedence to a vertical 
expansion. The impact of technological change upon the geographical 
location of the industry and the introduction of collective agreements 
would appear to have had a more marked impact upon merger activity than 
its effect upon the erosion of demarcation lines. The change in the 
printing industry's geographical location both promoted the- growth of 
local unions and an interest in their absorption by the larger unions in 
an attempt to maintain stability in wage rates. The centralisation 
associated with the implementation of collective agreements was achieved 
on-the union side through merger and the establishment of the PKTF. 
THE ADVENT OF SILICON-CHIP BASED SYSTEME, 1966-1983 
Period Trends 
Between 1966 and 1979 trade union membership in printing rose from 
306,400 to 326,000 or 6.4 per cent. The density of this membership 
increased to 93.8 per cent by 1979 from 83.4 per cent in 1966 reflecting 
the decline in - potential union membership employed in printing which 
fell from 367,500 to 347,700. Gennard and Dunn (1983: 17) report that 'in 
1948 there were ten craft unions in printing ... organised within two 
broad printing processes - letterpress and lithography'. Between these 
two processes demarcation was firmly established with only the principal 
non-craft manual unions organising within both processes. Lithographic 
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processes were expanded relative to letterpress as the result of the 
technological developments of the 1950s and early 1960s. 
The growth of television and radio adversely` affected the 
financial status of the printing industry, the share of the advertising 
market won by newspapers 'shrinking very gradually' (Martin, 1981: 9). In 
consequence, the finances of national newspapers in particular, and 
printing in general, remained weak throughout the -period under study. 
The marked rise in inflation in 1974 and 1975 induced a sharp decline in 
disposable income and a diminution in newspaper circulation further 
exacerbated the general trend. Additionally, the price of raw materials, 
in particular newsprint, rose steeply thereby imposing further financial 
constraints upon the industry. Furthermore, the technological 
developments that did take place led to the establishment of alternative 
printing facilitiies in banks, local government, civil service and 
certain sectors of manufacturing industry in addition to instant print 
shops, studio printing and advertising agencies. Not only did these 
alternative printing facilities lead to market pressures within 
established print houses but they also introduced a wide range of 
organising 'problems' for the printing unions in so far as other unions 
attempted to organise these alternative print shops. 
The Technology and its Implications 
In the late 1960s web-offset printing, employing both the 
letterpress and lithographic processes, gained widespread usage within 
the provincial newspaper industry. This system provided the basis for 
the re-structuring of provincial newspaper production and was the first 
stage in the break-up of the distinction between letterpress and 
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lithographic processes. More central to the production of national 
dailies was the development of tape-fed composition techniques which led 
to computerised hyphenation and justification and, latterly. the use of 
photocomposition. 
These changes were only intermediary, however, by comparison with 
the silicon chip-based systems introduced during the 1970s. Direct entry 
systems enable journalists and advertising staff to keystroke material 
into computers which are programmed to prepare it for direct transfer to 
the printing machines thereby eliminating the need for the composing 
room staff and directly threatening the recruitment opportunities of the 
National Graphical Association (NGA). For example, Martin (1981: 75-76) 
reports that on Fleet Street between 1971 and 1974 'there was a large 
drop in [employment within] traditional sectors (12.0 per cent in hot 
metal hand compositors, 10.0 per cent in process workers) and a massive 
increase in film and paper make-up compositors (from 408 to 1,054, or 
160 per cent)'. The absolute decline in the numbers from traditional 
sectors was matched by the lack of a craft apprenticeship required to 
operate the new machinery. In other words, direct entry systems 
undermined the traditional basis of craft control. 
Furthermore, the nature of the systems shifted the potential basis 
of their control to members of unions not traditionally associated with 
printing. The EETPU and the AUEW organised the maintenance staff, 
whereas the potential control of the transmission systems lay within the 
Association of Broadcasting Staff (ABS), the Association of 
Cinematograph, Television and Allied Technicians (ACTT) and the Post 
Office Engineering Union (POEU). In alternative printing houses APEX, 
NALGO, TASS, IPCS and BIFU organised printing workers. In response to 
these technologically induced changes in occupational patterns the print 
unions attempted to restrict the number of apprentices, opened their 
recruitment bases for natural growth, attempted to enter into inter- 
union agreements covering demarcation issues, and advanced a series of 
new technology agreements to employers. In accepting the onset of these 
chip based developments the print unions attempted to impose conditions 
upon the terms of their introduction to protect existing memberships. 
In contrast, several of the non-craft manual printing unions stood 
to gain influence with the introduction of the new systems. NATSOPA 
members, for example, traditionally restricted by NGA-imposed 
demarcation lines to semi-skilled jobs viewed the advent of the new 
technologies with anticipation of higher earnings for, in the words of 
the union's General Secretary, such 'lines of demarcation will not be 
blurred, they will be obliterated' (quoted in Martin, 1981: 115). 
Moreover, with the decline in the rate of aggregate membership growth, 
unions organising print workers in the alternative printing houses were 
reluctant to yield membership to the print unions. Gennard and Dunn 
(1983: 22) report that of such unions only APEX was prepared to enter 
into a dual membership agreement with the NGA. 
Between 1966 and 1983 10 mergers involving unions organising in 
printing took place. One union was absorbed in each merger and two 
unions were formed through merger. The two unions formed were SOGAT and 
SOGAT 82. The constituent unions of SOGAT split and then 're-merged' 
after re-organising their branch structures during the intervening 
period of independence. Three unions organising memberships in 
industries other than printing were absorbed by printing unions and a 
single union from printing was acquired by the GXWU which had no 
previous history of organisation in the industry. There were no 
geographical mergers, the recruitment bases of printing unions being 
nationally organised since 1964 when the NGA was formed with the merger 
of the London Typographical Society and the Typographical Association. 
As in the period associated with the introduction of linotype, 
there, are several distinct patterns of merger activity concealed within 
these aggregate trends. The NGA absorbed four unions between 1967 and 
1982, one of which, the National Union of Wallcoverings, Decorative and 
Allied Trades (NUWDAT), recruited from within the paper and board 
industry and constituted_a marked extension in the NGA's recruitment 
base. NUWDAT was a small union organised on an industrial basis. 'It 
represented all production workers in the wallcoverings industry - the 
unskilled workers, the semi-skilled and the skilled - as well as those 
on the finishing, warehouse and despatch side' (Gennard and 
Dunn, 1983: 27). The extension of the recruitment base for the NGA was, 
therefore, both occupational and industrial. The National Electrotypers 
ands Stereotypers (NES) organised within the letterpress 'side' of 
printing as did the NGA, the merger between the two unions representing 
a limited vertical expansion in the recruitment base of the NGA. Both 
the Amalgamated Society of Lithographic Printers and Auxilleries (ASLPA) 
and the Society of Lithographic Artists, Designers, Engravers and 
Process Workers (SLADE), however, recruited from within the lithographic 
processes. These mergers involved a more marked vertical expansion into 
the, organisation of lithographic workers and, secondly, both absorbed 
unions represented workers from a wider range of grades than did the 
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NGA. The absorption of both the lithographic process unions took place 
after technological change had induced, direct competition for members 
between these 'unions. Martin (1981: 103) reports that inter-union 
agreements between the unions, initiated by the NGA, presaged the merger 
negotiations in both instances, suggesting that technical convergence 
eroded lines of demarcation between the processes involved. In 1978 
SLADE members voted narrowly against a merger with the NGA, preferring 
to retain the independance of their craft subsequently, 'however, SLADE 
lost a lot of members as a result of the introduction of the new 
scanning machines which make colour printing much more straightforward' 
(Industrial Relations Review and Report, 1981: 7). This technologically 
induced loss of organisational stability ensured that the merger 
proposals submitted to the membership four years later were carried. 
The NGA was 'the union generally most affected... by the changes 
which occurred in printing technology' (Martin, 1981: 74). Given that the 
primary purpose of the technological changes was to reduce labour costs 
and hence membership, it is apparent that the NGA extended its 
recruitment base in order to retain a membership sufficient to maintain 
organisational stability. In other words, when employment is declining, 
the impact of technological change is to promote mergers among craft 
oriented unions across demarcation lines. This tendency is also 
illustrated by Merger Number 6 in which SLADE, which was 
ro) later merge 
with the NGA, absorbed the United Society of Engravers, a union 
recruiting from within the cotton industry. 
The merger in 1966 between NATSOPA and NUPBPW amalgamated the 
principal non-craft unions in the printing industry. In 1970 the two 
unions separated due to their failure to agree terms for the integration 
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of their internal branch structures. In particular, the difficulty of 
accommodating the different degrees of autonomy afforded to branches 
within the two union structures of government precluded re-organisation 
within a single constitution. Subsequent to the separation the two 
unions embarked on policies directed towards internal re-structuring. 
Simultaneously both unions pursued independent merger policies. NATSOPA 
absorbed the Sign and Display Trade Union in 1972, representing a 
development of NATSOPA's recruitment interests into the timber and 
furniture industry. Occupationally, however, the merger did not 
constitute an extension of recruitment base. The NUPBPW, which retained 
the name SOGAT after the failure of the initial merger with NATSOPA, 
absorbed the Scottish Graphical Association (SGA) in 1975. The SGA had 
rejected the opportunity to be involved in the merger resulting in the 
NGA formation on the grounds that its, regionally specific interests 
could not be adequately safeguarded within such a structure. For SOGAT 
the merger with the SGA presented the opportunity to expand its 
recruitment interests into the craft areas of organisation. As the SGA 
had incurred a marked membership decline, partly arising from technical 
developments, its organisational stability was threatened. SOGAT's offer 
to, protect regional membership interests through the provision of a 
trade group and the financial security achieved through absorption into 
the larger organisation outweighed the protection of regional craft 
identity. 
For the non-craft unions the extension of recruitment base was the 
primary characteristic of their mergers. Both-NATSOPA and SOGAT achieved 
this independently albeit with a different basis to expansion. NATSOPA 
extended by absorbing a union organising from within another industry 
whereas SOGAT achieved a vertical expansion within the printing 
industry. The eventual unification of NATSOPA and SOGAT to form SOGAT 82 
allowed for the combination of non-craft interests, as such constituting 
an occupational expansion of recruitment base within the industry. 
Merger activity in the printing industry during two periods of 
technological innovation has been reviewed. The introduction of linotype 
occurred during the upswing of a long economic cycle, the deployment of 
silicon-chip based systems during a downswing. Divergent patterns of 
merger activity between the two periods are apparent. The introduction 
of linotype was accompanied by mergers which did not involve the 
recruitment bases of the unions concerned expanding across craft 
boundaries. Furthermore, some regional distinctions remained insuperable 
to the merger initiatives of the period. By contrast, merger activity 
during the later period was characterised by the marked expansion of 
recruitment bases across traditional lines of demarcation. 
Linotype machinery was introduced during the upswing of a long 
economic cycle when the printing industry was expanding and there was, 
consequently, potential for membership growth. The development of 
linotype technology allowed for a degree of geographical relocation of 
printing establishments which acted to promote geographical mergers. 
Such mergers were pursued in order to defend the bargaining position and 
terms and conditions of employment of union members in areas where 
unionism was firmly established. This tendency was accentuated by the 
growth in both number and coverage of collective agreements which, in 
the printing industry, arose from the deployment of linotrype machinery. 
The signing of agreements was viewed as a mechanism whereby the changes 
in production necessitated by the introduction of linotype could be 
facilitated. Linotype operation stimulated the emergence of a 
substantial section of semi-skilled and unskilled workers in printing. 
'New unions' organised these grades of workers. Merging between the new 
unions was directed towards the achievement of national organisation. It 
also acted to promote a limited expansion of the recruitment bases of 
the longer established unions as they strove to maintain control of the 
processes affected by the technological changes. 
A stated purpose underlying the introduction of silicon-chip based 
systems was to reduce labour costs in a financially insecure industry. 
The concurrent stagnant or declining memberships of the printing unions 
stimulated the pursuit of mergers which crossed established lines of 
demarcation. Such mergers would appear defensive with the object of 
preserving organisational stability. Numerous failed merger intiiatives 
launched across demarcation lines - for example, the NATSOPA-NGA and 
NUJ-NGA proposals - suggest that even though membership growth is not 
being attained and new technologies are being deployed mergers across 
lines of demarcation are limited in scope. 
Lerner (1968: 172-173) suggests that technologically induced 
blurring of demarcation lines induces merger activity with the result 
that 'demarcational problems become internal union matters'. In the case 
of printing this thesis would appear to hold when the technological 
innovation is accompanied by a decline in employment. In other words, 
organisational stability can only be retained by mergers involving the 
extension of recruitment bases across established demarcation lines. By 
contrast, when employment is expanding union organisational stability 
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can be maintained without the expansion of recruitment bases across 
lines' of demarcation. ' The impact of technological change on the merger 
process in printing can, therefore, be viewed as a positive influence, 
the extent and nature of which is dependent upon its inter-relationship 
with other factors and'how they impinge upon organisational stability. ` 
.ý. a.. 
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CASE STUDY II: STRUCTURAL DEVELOPXEITS II TATIOJAL GOVERJXETT 
The purpose of this chapter is to elaborate upon the aggregate 
understanding of the inter-relationships between trade-union structural 
events by means of an examination of these inter-relationships within a 
single industry, national government. It is selected as the focus of the 
chapter because almost the entire development of unionism within the 
industry has taken place during the period for which data are available. 
There are three sections to the chapter. The first comprises a 
data review of structural events in national government and allows for 
comparisons to be drawn between the aggregate pattern and that within 
national government. The second section analyses this pattern and the 
influences impinging upon it from the wider environment. While all forms 
of structural event are discussed, particular` attention is paid to 
merger activity in order that the understanding of the merger process 
can' be further developed. This theme is pursued in the third section 
which is based-upon a review of merger activity among unions organising 
membership employed in the clerical and executive classes of the grading 
structure within the civil service. This section allows for an 
examination of the-strategic use of mergers in promoting the emergence 
of particular unions, 
Throughout the chapter attention is focused on the structural 
events occurring among unions organising' clerical workers as opposed to 
those organising in the manipulative and industrial sections of the 
civil service. Furthermore, the structural activity of unions organising 
in the post and telecommunications industry is excluded from direct 
examination even though many of the workers employed in this industry 
are clerical civil servants. These exclusions are justified on the basis 
that they allow for a more detailed understanding to be gained of union 
structural dynamics within the selected area. Where activities occurring 
among these excluded groups impinge upon the central area of analysis 
they. are, of course, considered. 
THE DATA 
Mortimer and Ellis report that 'one of the first recorded examples 
of -collective representation took place as long ago as 1834 when a 
number of civil servants protested against the terms on which new 
pension arrangements were introduced' (1980: 8). While such collective 
representation suggests the earlier existence of collective 
organisation, by 1893 only three institutions organising members in 
national government had registered as unions under the terms of the 
Trade Union Act 1871. As, for the purposes of this study, it is the 
completion of this registration procedure that defines the existence of 
a union. The series covering the number of extant unions in national 
government, illustrated in Figure 10.1, and the annual number of 
formations, shown in Figure 10.2. are effectively based upon 
registration dates. The data are extracted from Bain and Price 
(1986: 106-17) covering the years 1892 - 1974 supplemented by reference 
to the original Department of Employment records for the years 1975 to 
1979. These original data series on trade union structural events in 
national government are detailed in Appendix E. 
rs ý" 
Figure 10.1 illustrates the 'external shape' of trade unionism in 
national government in terms of annual membership and extant unions 
organising this membership. During the implementation of collective 
bargaining similarities in the patterns of the indices prevail. In 
particular, marked increases in both indices are recorded in the period 
between 1909 and 1920. Following the 1920 peak in the number of trade 
unions a decline was recorded to 1923 subsequent to which the total 
number of unions showed little variation until 1945 when the formation 
of the Institution of Professional Civil Servants <IPCS) resulted in a 
substantial decline. By comparison, the plateau in trade union 
membership is of relatively short duration, lasting between 1923 and 
1929. The initially gradual and latterly steep rise in trade union 
membership between 1931 and 1944 illustrates that an increase in the 
number of trade union members need not necessarily be co-incidental with 
an increase in the number of trade unions. Indeed, within national 
government it would appear that the concurrence of these events is 
limited to the formative stages in the development of unionism within 
the industry. 
The divergence in the trends of the two indices heightened during 
the operation of institutionalised industrial relations. Whereas trade 
union membership exhibits, albeit unevenly during the 1950s, a tendency 
towards increase, the number of trade unions consistently declines. This 
consistency in decline is maintained during the latter years of 
institutionalised industrial relations even though a substantial rise in 
trade union membership is recorded. 
Trade union 'births' by both formation and merger are graphically 
presented in Figure 10.2. The implementation of collective bargaining 
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exhibits a greater degree of organisational flux than the operation of 
institutionalised industrial relations.. The significant peak in union 
formations in 1919, when no less than 85 unions were formed, is preceded 
by a minor peak in 1910 comprising 24 unions. Despite the plateau in the 
number of extant unions between 1923 and 1944 recorded in Figure 10.1, a 
substantial number of unions were formed during the same period. The 
number of births by merger shows markedly less variation than that of 
the formations. Between 1920 and 1924 ten unions were formed through 
merger, which is more than were formed throughout the remainder of the 
implementation of collective bargaining. During the operation of 
institutionalised industrial relations the number of union births was 
limited. Between 1946 and 1979 twelve unions were formed from scratch 
and only two unions were formed through merger. Moreover, these 
structural events appear to be evenly distributed across the period with 
no obvious clustering. 
Figure 10.3 illustrates the pattern of union 'deaths' in national 
government. Prior to 1917 a single union was acquired through merger. 
Between 1917 and 1945, however, unions were absorbed in mergers, with 
the sole exception of 1936, during every year. There would appear to be 
some support for the position that the impact of the depression 
stimulated merger activity in so far as during 1930 and 1932 minor peaks 
in the' number of unions absorbed were recorded. This position is, 
however, not substantiated by reference to the incidence of union 
dissolutions over the same period. The number of dissolutions was most 
pronounced immediately following the 1919 peak in union formations, 
indicating that organisational instability prevailed among recently 
formed unions even when aggregate union membership was increasing. In 
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the years following 1927, which co-incide with the onset of the 
depression, the number of dissolutions declined. 
As it is assumed that absorption is a means whereby the decline of 
organisational stability towards dissolution can be arrested, two 
explanations arise. The first is that the increasing number of 
absorptions indicates that organisational stability was retained through 
mergers, the decline in the number of dissolutions reflecting the 
increased use of merger as a means to arrest the decline of 
organisational stability. The second explanation rests upon the 
particular circumstances of employment in national government. Workers 
employed by the state were, to a degree, protected from the harshest 
effects of the depression with the consequence that variations in 
employment were less marked than in other sectors of the economy. This 
is evidenced by the rising trend in trade union membership between 1923 
and 1945 recorded in Bain and Price (1980: 78). In other words, within 
the terms of this second explanation the decline in the number of 
dissolutions during the depression arises from the growth in trade union 
membership within national government which restricted the spread of 
organisational instability. These alternative explanations are examined 
in detail below. 
During the operation of institutionalised industrial relations, 34 
unions died in mergers by comparison with 25 dissolutions. Indeed, the 
last recorded dissolution occurred in 1962 suggesting that merger had 
become dominant as a means to prevent dissolution in national government 
prior to the onset of merger Wave II. Given that only two unions were 
formed through merger during the operation of institutionalised 
industrial relations it is, however, apparent that the dominant form of 
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merger recorded for merger Wave II, the absorption into an extant union, 
was applicable throughout the entire period in the specific case of 
national government. 
In Chapter 2 it was noted that absolute measures of structural 
events, as shown in Figures 10.1,10.2 and 10.3, are necessarily biased 
given the variation over time in the total number of extant unions. 
Clearly, this tendency towards bias is replicated within a single 
industry. Figure 10.4, therefore, graphically represents five year 
moving averages of the indices of the formation and dissolution rates 
and merger intensity. As with the aggregate data, the primary 
characteristics of these plots are their wave forms. The initial 
unionisation of national government was marked by a wave in the 
formation rate between 1909 and 1925 which slightly precedes but is 
largely concurrent with the aggregate formation wave of 1917 to 1925. 
Arguably this initial wave in the formation rate within national 
government could be regarded as two, for there is a trough in the 
formation rate between 1914 and 1917. From 1925 onwards during the 
implementation of collective bargaining the formation rate showed a 
gradual tendency towards decline. 
During the operation of institutionalised industrial relations this 
tendency towards decline is maintained. Between 1953 and 1959 a minor 
wave in the formation rate is recorded. This is, however, largely 
explained in terms of the significant decline in the denominator of the 
formation rate equation, on the formation through merger of the IPCS, of 
the number of extant unions organising in national government. A second 
minor wave is recorded for 1973 to 1979 which is co-incidental with the 
third aggregate formation wave 1970 to 1979. 
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As with the aggregate pattern of merger intensity, three waves are 
observed in merger intensity among unions organising in national 
government: The first, between 1919 and 1925, is concurrent with the 
initial massive wave in the formation rate. In Chapter 6 it was noted 
that an important contributory factor to the rise in aggregate merger 
intensity during merger Wave I was the antra-merging of recently formed 
unions. Given the concurrence in the waves of merger intensity and the 
formation rate among unions organising in national government, it would 
appear that a similar process might account for a proportion of the rise 
in merger intensity between 1919 and 1925. The second wave in merger 
intensity within national government is explained purely in terms of the 
formation by merger of the IPCS. This merger also accounts for the 
second, analytically disregarded, aggregate merger wave. The third 
merger wave in national government is 'dated' from 1971 to 1979 and 
occurs within the limits of merger Wave II. 
Both the'"patterns in the formation rate and in merger intensity 
among" unions in national government bear some similarity to the 
aggregate wave form observed in the same indices. This similarity is, 
however, not duplicated in the patterns of the dissolution rate. The 
only marked peak in the dissolution rate is recorded between 1947 and 
1950 and results from the effect of the IPCS merger on the denominator 
of the index. A rise in the dissolution rate occurs during the latter 
years of 'the initial formation wave, suggesting that organisational 
instability among the recently formed unions was pronounced. This 
confirms the 'results derived from the aggregate data. 
Humphreys (1958: 57) reports that most of the early unions 
organising in national government 'tended to follow a departmental 
pattern of organisation'. The desire to achieve permanent employment; 
improvements in pay, promotion prospects and pensionable status; and the 
elimination of compulsory overtime were the principal issues underlying 
the formation of the first unions. Initially, the rigid departmental 
organisation of the civil service acted to divide the interests of the 
employees. Such divisions were compounded by the isolation of women by 
both entry and grade. During the first two decades of the twentieth 
century, however, standardised grading systems were introduced which cut 
across departmental boundaries and acted to reduce the accentuation of 
sectional interests leading Humphreys to'assert that 'grading reforms 
made strong associations possible, while standardised classes (of civil 
service employment] made strong associations neceý ssarry, if employees 
were to influence conditions within a grade' (1958: 57). The Treasury was. 
responsible for the setting of terms and conditions within the civil 
service. The extended and convoluted procedures required to complete the 
submission of a'grievance guaranteed Treasury officials flexibility in 
their approaches to the first unions in terms of both acknowledgement of 
their existence" and the implementation of policy changes, -' In 
consequence, Wigham (1980: 18) reports that many of the unions pursued 
change through directly enlisting the support of Members of Parliament 
sympathetic to civil service trade unionism. 
The labour unrest immediately preceding World War I included a 
heightening. of activity among workers within the civil service. 
Membership rose from 2,700 in 1909 to 21,800 by 1914. Humphreys 
(1958: 66) suggests that tensions arising from downgrading, inadequacies 
in the method of promotion to higher grades and the steadily rising cost 
of living stimulated the rapid rise in recruitment. The increase in 
trade union membership was accompanied by a rise in the number of 
registered unions from 13 to 49 during the same period. Two series of 
events were of particular note regarding the structural development of 
unionism in national government. 
Firstly, the Civil Service Court of Appeal Committee was 
constituted in 1909 with the object of securing support from Members of 
Parliament for the establishment of a joint union/Treasury board to 
assess civil service grievances. The Committee was composed of 
representatives 'of the more vigorous unions'. In striving to achieve 
this object support was requested and was forthcoming both from other 
unions and in terms, of enhanced membership. Arising from this Committee, 
the Civil Service Federation was formed in 1911 comprised of twenty-two 
unions. In other words, the impracticability of individual unions 
achieving advance on general issues was recognised and a federation 
established to facilitate progress. This is not to imply that 
departmental and other divisions inherent in union organisation were 
overcome. Indeed, the Civil Service Federation was constituted with two 
branches, one catering for established staffs. the other for temporary 
staffs due to an inability to agree terms. It is to suggest, however, 
that the initial basis upon which union organisation in the civil 
service was constituted became subject to question. A further 
illustration of this change in attitude was the merger in 1912 to form 
the Custom and Excise Officers' Association which was preceded by much 
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wrangling over pay and recruitment. The merger allowed for the 
development-of a single employee side policy as to the means whereby 
these issues could be resolved within the department. 
A second principal influence upon structural development, was the 
approach towards unionism adopted, and the conclusions drawn, by the 
)(acDonnell Commission which was appointed in 1912. 'The commission 
encouraged the associations by taking oral evidence from the more 
important of the general service unions at an early stage in (their] 
proceedings' (Clegg, 1985: 95). This encouragement was influential in 
promoting the registration of civil service unions. The 'indirect' 
recognition arising from the Commission's acceptance of the unions' 
evidence was consolidated by the recommendation that the unions be 
accorded recognition by the appropriate heads of departments within the 
civil service 'in the sense of receiving from them direct 
representations on matters affecting their interests' McDonnell 
Commission quoted in Clegg. 1985: 96). 
While the outbreak of World War I curtailed the rate of change 
regarding both recognition and procedures for recognition, other 
developments were to lead to a heightening of tension within the civil 
service. The vast increase in the number of women employed led to debate 
regarding their eligibility for membership of extant unions and, in some 
circumstances, the formation of unions exclusively recruiting women' 
members. Additional to the ambivalence of existing unions towards the 
recruitment of women was that towards temporary workers. As a 
consequence. in many departments unions duplicating the departmental 
recruitment base of established unions were formed for the specific 
purpose of" representing temporary workers. The tendency towards the 
formation of new unions was further propelled by the establishment of 
new ministries to handle wartime related affairs. Furthermore, many of 
the traditional customs and practices associated with civil service 
employment were"replaced by procedures from private industry on the 
influx of business executives appointed to improve efficiency, thereby 
leading to the spread of unionism among existing employees. 
Initially, the precedence afforded to the support of a wartime 
'national interest' reduced pressure both for bargaining and trade union 
structural reform. Substantial rises in the, cost of living, which were 
not accompanied by equivilent wage increases, and overtime working 
'speeded up the development of unions by causing greater- and more 
widespread discontent' (Humphreys. 1958: 96). The planned introduction of 
an eight hour day, replacing the existing seven hour day, - was 
universally viewed by civil servants as an attempt to cut costs through 
the elimination of an hour's overtime pay. "This universality of feeling 
created the circumstances for the establishment of the Civil Service 
Alliance, a federation of unions which by 1920 had 35 unions affiliated 
to it. It is apparent that in attempting to introduce terms of 
employment which applied to all civil servants the Government, as their 
employer, promoted greater cohesion among unions still beset by 
departmental and grade rivalries. 
A further wartime stimulus to union structural realignment was the 
formalising of the means-whereby grievances relating to employment terms 
and conditions were dealt with through the establishment of the 
Conciliation and Arbitration Board in 1917. The procedures-enshrined in 
the operation of the Conciliation and -Arbitration Board constituted a 
further step towards formal recognition of the civil service unions in 
- 
so far as it allowed for claims to be submitted by 'official 
representatives' of appropriate associations. This concession towards 
recognition co-incides with a sharp increase in the formation rate as is 
evidenced in Figure 10.4. During 1919 the Conciliation and Arbitration 
Board extended arbitration rights to civil servants on salaries up to 
£1,500 with the result, as Humphreys (1958: 89) reports, that 'three 
associations were formed in the higher grades' in order to secure 
effective representation. 
Whitleyism was initially introduced to the civil service during 
1920 after a protracted union campaign. Its introduction coincided with 
a peak in the formation rate and a heightening in the intensity of 
merger activity. Whitleyism had a three-fold effect upon the development 
of union structure in national government. Firstly, in campaigning for 
its introduction a marked degree of inter-union cooperation was 
established in order to secure parliamentary influence. This was also 
reflected in terms of standardised claims submitted by groups of unions 
rather than by individual unions and the formulation of a scheme for the 
reorganisation and reclassification of the civil service by the Civil 
Service Alliance. 
Secondly, Whitleyism represented a final stage in the formal 
recognition of civil service trade unionism constituting for 'the more 
conservative civil servants... the official seal of approval on a step 
which previously might have been regarded as harmful to the dignity of a 
public servant or opposed to the best interests of the state service' 
(Humphreys, 1958: 116). In consequence. the recruitment base of civil 
service trade unionism as a whole expanded to include some of the 
professionally based occupations. This expansion, no doubt, partially 
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explains the steep rise in the formation rate recorded in Figure 10.4. 
Associated with the recruitment base expansion and subsequent membership 
increase was the resurgence of radicalism, * particularly among lower 
clerical staff, arising from the realisation that influence achieved 
through the unions could induce change. These attitudinal changes were 
compounded by the further deterioration in the living standards of civil 
servants and the difficulties arising from the influx of soldiers 
returning to civil service employment after World War I. While this 
radicalism did not` result in the widespread adoption of syndicalist 
objectives, as in the cases evidenced in Chapter 7, it was associated 
with the broadening of the recruitment bases of individual unions, the 
affiliation of some unions to the TUC and Labour Party and the promotion 
of parliamentary candidates. 
The third immediate effect of Vhitleyism on union structural 
development arose from the boundaries of representation adopted. for the 
Whitley Committees. These boundaries of representation cut across 
existing recruitment jurisdictions necessitating the reorganisation of 
recruitment boundaries and, in turn, 'requiring entirely new settlements 
and compromises with fellow unions' (Humphreys, 1958: 124). Effective 
representation on the Staff Side of the Whitley Council was largely 
precluded by the sheer number of unions organising civil servants. As is 
illustrated in Figure 10.1, by 1920 this number had risen to 235. 
Compounding this pressure for structural realignment was - the 
implementation of the Reorganisation Committee recommendations covering 
wages and conditions which reduced departmental differentiation through 
the establishment of four principal grades within the civil service. In 
other words, these recommendations eliminated one of the' primary 
ý` -q 
barriers to the successful conclusion -of merger negotiations. The 
example of the Assistant Clerks' Association -and the -Women Clerks' 
Association is a case in point. The introduction of the grading changes 
placed the. membership of both these unions in the same clerical class 
with uniform terms and conditions whereas previously there, had, been 
marked differences. Furthermore, the , 
implementation of the 
recommendations directly undermined the organisational, stability of 
certain unions. For example, the recommendations led to the membership 
of the Second Division Clerks' Association being allocated into two 
different grades: Executive Officers and Higher Clerical Officers. In 
this instance internal instability precluded the-continuation of the 
organisation as a single entity. 
Humphreys(1958: 132) reports that it was only, during 1920 that 
unions organising in the civil service began to appoint full-time 
officers. Merging was, therefore, facilitated by the absence of any 
widespread need to reconcile personality differences within post-merger 
organisations. The increase in merger intensity recorded in the 
immediate post-war period can, at least., partially be attributed to the 
combined environmental influences of deteriorating terms and conditions 
of employment; the formalisation of bargaining arrangements with the 
consequence of employer recognition; and the reorganisation of grading 
structures which acted to inhibit the 'barrier effect' of the 
organisational influences to mergers. 
Hughes (1972) notes that one of the stimulating effects of company 
mergers on trade union structural realignment was their impact upon 
payment systems. = For the multivariate analysis included in Chapter 4, 
the number of manufacturing company mergers, COMER, was employed as a 
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regressor to 'capture' this and the other theoretical influences of 
company merger activity upon the trade union merger process. During the 
implementation of collective bargaining, the regressor COMER was 
significant. but never at the one per cent level, in the equations 
comprised purely of economic variables. The regressor CORER, however, 
failed to attain significance on the introduction of the unionisation 
variables and was only included in a single aggregate equation. Chapter 
4 notes that a partial explanation of the failure of this regressor to 
fulfill theoretical expectations lay in its exclusion of non- 
manufacturing company mergers. The examination of the impact of the 
environmental influences upon merger activity among unions organising in 
the civil service allows for further specification of the limitations of 
this regressor. If it is assumed that one of the effects of company 
mergers on trade union mergers is to disturb payment structures, it is 
apparent that the regressor COMER does not 'capture' such disturbance 
effects within the civil service. These effects. however, appear to have 
had a positive influence on the promotion of union mergers during the 
post-war period when mergers in national government were numerous. It 
is, therefore, reasonable to suggest that a further reason underlying 
the failure of the regressor to attain one per cent significance lies in 
its exclusion of the effects of civil service reorganisation. 
Following the onset of recession during 1921 Figure 10.4 records an 
increase in the dissolution rate. This increase is concurrent with the 
beginning of the second aggregate dissolution wave in 1920. Trade union 
membership in national government declined between 1920 and 1923 from 
136,200 to 97,400 inducing organisational instability which is likely to 
provide a partial explanation for the inq¬ase-in the dissolution rate 
particularly in the light of the large number of recently formed unions. 
Exacerbating the impact of organisational instability arising from 
membership loss was that arising from the failure of some unions to 
secure recognition on, the Whitley Councils. It was noted above that a 
number of unions were.. - formed - organising temporary , workers and ex- 
servicemen - as extant unions were reluctant to recruit such workers. 
These unions were specific to the civil, service and were particularly 
prone to dissolution suggesting that, the impact of -dissolution was 
uneven in so far as it was marked among unions, with a peculiar basis to 
recruitment. 
By comparison-with the structural turbulence of preceding years the 
period of the implementation of collective bargaining from 1925. -was 
relatively placid. -The prohibition of unions organising civil servants 
from affiliation to-, the ý TUC and- Labour Party enacted ,, under,. the 
provisions of, the Trades Disputes and Trade Union -Act 1927 appears--to 
have had no significant, impact upon merger intensity. 4A slight decline 
is recorded confirming the negative sign attached to the repressive 
legislation variable in Equation 1. Table, 4.4. The unionisation of the 
civil service was, however, clearly not completed in, the years before 
1925 for, despite the large number of extant unions, the formation rate 
shows a minor peak for 1929. The majority of the unions, formed -during 
this period organised professional workers, - lending some support to the 
notion that such workers are more resistant to unionisation than white- 
collar, workers generally-and that when unionised they wish to retain a 
degree of organisational autonomy. - 
The onset of the operation of institutionalised industrial 
relations is marked by the formation of the IPCS by merger. This merger 
'arose from reorganisation reasons' (Buchanan, 1974: 42) and was achieved 
through the formal merging of unions which had been affiliated to a 
single federal structure. Simultaneous with this de-federalisation was 
the reorganisation of the grading structure for civil servants employed 
in professional and technical grades from which the IPCS recruited. 
Mortimer and Ellis (1980: 133) state that this reorganisation created 
'nine new Treasury classes... which transformed large areas of 
professional, scientific and technical employment from a chaotic medley 
of departmental grades into a coherent, tidy and compact group of 
Treasury classes'. In other words, the reorganisation of the grading 
structure which impelled the widespread union structural realignment of 
the years immediately 'after the culmination of World War I among 
administrative, executive and clerical' grades was replicated among 
professional and technical grades twenty-five years later with asimilar 
effect upon trade union structure. As the overwhelming majority ofýthe 
unions affiliated to the pre-merger' federation limited their recruitment 
bases to specific departments, the reorganisation acted to undermine 
departmental differentiation. Furthermore, as is discussed in Chapter 6, 
the federal structure of union organisation is prone to-internal 
fragmentation. The formalisation- of this federal structure would, 
therefore, have reduced the likelihood -ofinternal fragmentation ', and 
thereby simplified the staff side of bargaining. 
The large number of unions involved in the the formation of the 
IPCS largely explains the drop in the number of unions organising in 
national government from 179 in 1944 to 83 in 1945. Of course, this 
substantial decline j, the sensitivity of the relative measures 
employed in Figure 10.4 to small absolute numbers of structural events 
during the operation of institutionalised industrial relations, Given 
this. it would appear that the primary series of structural events 
requiring explanation is the wave in merger intensity recorded for 1971 
to 1979, a wave concurrent with merger Wave II. 
Between 1971 and 1979 trade union membership organised in national 
government rose by 10.1 per cent from 581,000 to 639,500 suggesting that 
organisational instability arising from membership -decline does not 
underpin the protracted rise in merger intensity. During the same 
period, the density of union organisation rose from-85.4 per cent to 
91.3 per cent indicating that the intensity of competitive recruitment 
arising from the saturation effect is likely to have heightened. Intense 
competition for membership is likely to stimulate- merger activity 
through its impact. upon the costs of recruitment activities. Two 
alternative arguments, however, apply to the assessment of the impact of 
competitive recruitment within the civil service. Firstly, demarcation 
of recruitment boundaries between the major unions is established within 
the framework of the -civil service grading structure. To a degree, 
therefore, it must be recognised that competitive recruitment is 
institutionally restricted by the nature of recruitment demarcation. 
Secondly, while these boundaries are agreed between the major unions. 
there were 34 unions organising civil servants in-1971, indicating that 
smaller unions existed which recruited from grades in competition with 
their larger counterparts. The inequality of competitive recruitment in 
e 
these conditions in terms of membership support services and financial 
reserves might, therefore, underpin the rise in merger activity. 
The character of merger activity in this period allows for the 
relative impact of these influences to be assessed. In all,, sixteen 
unions 'died' in mergers whereas only a single union was formed through 
merger. Of the sixteen unions 'dying' in mergers, eight were absorbed 
into major civil service unions - two by the Civil and Public Services 
Association (CPSA), and three each by the Society of Public and Civil 
Servants (SCPS) and the First Division Association (FDA) - and one by 
the GXWU. The remaining seven departmentally based unions died in'the 
merger resulting in the formation of the Custom and-Excise Officers'- 
Association. The acquisitions of the CPSA, SCPS and FDA were achieved 
with unions organising within the civil service classes that comprised 
their recruitment bases. In other words, the character, of the 
predominant form of merger activity suggests that the inequality, of 
competitive recruitment conditions influenced the rise in merger 
intensity. This form of merger activity is similar to the dominant 
pattern discerned as characterising merger Wave II. 
The report of the Fulton Committee was published in 1968. Among the 
report's principal recommendations was one advocating the removal of 
rigidities from within the existing class system. Through the auspic/es 
of the National Vhitley Council this recommendation was implemented and 
accompanied by a simplification of grading structures. Given the 
relatively larger membership size of unions in the 1970s by comparison 
with the early-1920s, it should be recognised that many of these 
alterations in the class and grading structures took place within the 
recruitment bases of extant unions thereby not inducing any effects 
towards the promotion of merger. While larger union size provides an 
explanation for the absence of widespread merger activity, it is 
initially surprising that merger activity was not more pronounced on the 
implementation of the Fulton, Committee recommendations given the impact 
on union structural re-a/lignment of previous regradings. An explanation 
for the relative infrequency of merger activity, lies in the 
organisational stability of the major unions arising from membership 
increase. Such -stability reinforced the barrier effect of the 
organisational influences upon merger activity. This is evidenced by the 
failure of merger negotiations among the principal unions. For example, 
Buchanan (1981: 47) reports that the Civil Service Union (CSU) rejected a 
merger initiative launched by the CPSA on the grounds that its members 
did not wish to become embroiled in the extensive political manoeuvrings 
within the CPSA. Similarly, several merger proposals to combine the CPSA 
and the SCPS have failed, most notably on the grounds that CPSA members 
rejected being in the same union as those staff who supervise them in 
employment. In other words, the regrading arrangements instigated post- 
Fulton stimulated merger initiatives between the major unions which 
foundered because of the organisational stability of these unions. 
MERGER ACTIVITY AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRINCIPAL. UNIONS 
The firstýtwo -sections to this chapter have illustrated a wave 
pattern in -the formation rate and merger intensity among unions 
organising in-national government and related this pattern of structural 
events to- wider `environmental influences. In particular, the 
implementation of 'collective bargaining arrangements in the form of 
Whitleyism was found- to have had a pronounced effect on both the 
formation of *unions and merger activity. This effect is-'due to the 
recognition afforded to unions within the Whitley structures and the 
associated regrading and reclassification which acted to reduce the 
divisive" "effects of departmental differentiation. The third section 
analyses 'merger activity among the principal unions' organising within 
the'clerical and'executive classes of the civil service with the object 
of further specifying the processes identified in the second section. As 
such, `the intention is not to detail the specific circumstances relating 
to'each merger but to isolate the' different trends among the mergers 
undertaken by the major unions and to move towards an explanation of why 
these unions emerged from among the numerous unions of the initial 
stages of unionisation in national-government. 
The post-World War I reorganisation of the civil service led to the 
establishment of the clerical class" into which it was' envisaged that 
40,000 civil servants would be allocated. The assistant clerks class was 
absorbed into the clerical class. " The Assistant Clerks' Association 
(ACA), under the leadership of W. J. Brown, became the "largest union 
organising in the clerical "class. -On merging with the (Post Office) 
Clerical Assistants' Association, which recruited from within the 
clerical "class in the Post Office, the ACA was renamed the Clerical 
Officers' Association (COA), the representatives of which declared its 
recruitment base to include the whole of the newly "created clerical 
class. These- declarations were, however, not matched by a similar 
membership commitment for two unions exclusively organising women were 
excluded from the merger as a result of an ACA ballot. In the years 
between 1920 and 1922 several departmentally based unions were absorbed 
into the COA including those comprise f women originally rejected on 
the formation of the COA. -Humphreys (1958: 135) reports that several of 
these mergers were preceded by COA recruitment drives for membership 
into these other departments which undermined the organisational 
stability of the departmentally-based unions. In this manner the COA 
membership viewpoint, - as. expressed in the merger ballot, ' - was 
circumvented and inter-departmental hostilities rendered relatively 
obsolete by the direction of-natural growth over which the membership 
could bring little influence to bear. 
The Civil Service Clerical Association (CSCA) was the direct 
forerunner of the CPSA, the latter title emanating from a name change 
during 1969 instituted in recognition of members in the Post Office and 
in other sectors outside the civil service. The Civil Service Union 
(CSU)' was the largest competitor of the COA organising in the clerical 
class with a slightly larger membership consisting primarily of 
temporary clerks, a grouping largely rejected by the COA as their 
organisation posed special recruitment problems. The CSU had, however, 
gradually extended its recruitment base to cover the entire clerical 
class. In other words, it was in direct competition for membership with 
the COA and was expanding at a similar rate to the COA. The merger 
between these unions to form the CSCA in 1921 resulted in a union of 
16,500 members which, in terms of membership size, dominated other 
unions organising within the clerical class. Integral to the merger 
agreement was the understanding that no further temporary clerks would 
be recruited into membership, indicating the the preference, afforded to 
the COA's reluctance to organise such workers. 
" 
The numerical dominance achieved by the CSCA within the clerical 
class was influential; in promoting the. absorption of a further seven 
departmentally based unions between 1922 and 1929. Humphreys (1958: 138) 
reports that in those cases where an initial merger offer was rejected 
the CSCA launchedwa recruitment campaign over the heads of the reluctant 
representatives thereby undermining the organisational stability of the 
smaller unions. In consequence, the membership acquired in these mergers 
was small,, totalling 938. While the acquired membership was marginal, it 
was the influence gained in terms of representing the entire clerical 
class that was the primary objective of the CSCA. .., 
Four primary unions organising within the clerical class, however, 
remained beyond the ambit of the CSCA: the Association-of Officers of 
Taxes (AOT), the Ministry of Labour Staff Association (XLSA), the 
Valuation Clerks' Association -(VCA) and the County Court Officers' 
Association (CCOA). The AOT had been able to maintain slightly better 
rates than the CSCA (Wigham, 1980: 55) and had, therefore, been able to 
resist the merger initiatives from the CSCA. Furthermore, this factor 
precluded the-CSCA making inroads into the membership of the AOT through 
natural growth. During 1929 an agreement between the two unions 
regarding recruitment spheres was concluded which acted to restrict 
competition. The acquisition in 1933 by the CSCA of the Inland Revenue 
Stamping Department' Association, while within the terms of this 
agreement, reflected the continued interest within the CSCA of achieving 
universal recognition within the clerical class. 
In contrast after the XLSA 'broke away from the amalgamation talks 
with the Clerical Officers' Association, it was subject to intermittent 
attack' (Wigham, 1980: 55). These attacks were particularly marked after 
the NLSA accepted inferior terms to those advocated by the CSCA 
regarding the assimilation of its membership into the clerical class. As 
late as 1932 the CSCA campaigned to recruit all clerical workers 
employed by the Ministry of Labour. The CSCA offered to curtail these 
raids in return for the opening of merger negotiations. This offer was 
rejected with the result that the raids continued throughout the 1930s 
which 'meant a steady, and profitless drain in energy and finances' for 
the CSCA and 'continual disruption and diversion from primary functions' 
for the XLSA. Only in 1939 with the establishment of a fresh Civil 
Service Alliance were recruitment boundaries stabilised' and raiding 
terminated. 
Similar agreements covering jurisdictional boundaries were struck 
between the CSCA, VCA and CCOA prior to that concluded with the XLSA. 
Relations between these three unions did, therefore, not attain the same 
intensity of hostility as those between the CSCA and I4LLSA. While the 
CSCA was not able to absorb these unions, a further four departmentally 
based organisations were acquired during 1934 and 1935. The 
implementation of collective bargaining, therefore, saw the emergence of 
the CSCA as the principal union organising in the clerical class. The 
formation of the CSCA by merger allowed it to gain numerical ascendency 
over its competitor unions, twelve of which were acquired between 1922 
and 1935. With the four principal unions resistant to merger overtures, 
the CSCA entered into recruitment jurisdiction agreements thereby 
reducing the damaging efects of hostile inter-union competition. 
Only three unions were absorbed by the CSCA during-the operation of 
institutionalised industrial relations. The Association of Assistants of 
the Investigation Branch, GPO was absorbed in 1950 and reflected the 
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representation of- GPO employees on the Staff Side of the National 
Whitley Committee. The XLLSA and CCOA were absorbed in 1973 and 1974 
respectively. In other words, the accord on jurisdiction and closer 
working arrangements achieved within the Civil Service Alliance acted to 
dissipate inter-union hostility and allowed for the consolidation of 
interests within the clerical class. That the Civil Service Alliance was 
the representative body on the Staff Side of the National Whitley 
Committee representing the- clerical class and included only 
organisations recruiting from the Clerical Class no doubt fostered 
cooperation between these unions. Additionally, it was noted in Chapter 
8 that a factor impinging upon the- rise in merger intensity during 
merger Wave II was the increase in the financial threshold of union 
solvency arising from the implementation of the Donavan Report 
recommendations regarding the incorporation of shop stewards and the 
extension of trade union education. Both the MLSA and CCOA were small 
unions with limited recruitment bases and, hence, capacities to secure 
large financial reserves. It would, therefore, seem likely that this 
factor may have also influenced these mergers. 
Society of Civil and Public Servants (SCPS) 
The establishment of the executive class of civil servants within 
the terms of the 1920 reorganisation cut across the recruitment base of 
the Second Division Clerks' Association (SDCA). Retaining its membership 
in the executive class, the SDCA"was renamed to become the Association 
of Executive Officers of the Civil Service (AEOCS) in recognition of its 
new scope of recruitment. In 1921 the AEOCS amalgamated with the Staff 
Clerks and Other Civil Servants to form the Association of Executive 
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Officers and Other Civil Servants (AEOOCS) which became the largest 
union organising within the executive class. Three departmentally based 
unions were acquired between 1922 and 1926. By comparison with the CSCA 
the, acquisition rate of the AEOOCS was markedly lower, reflecting the 
greater emphasis placed upon the retention of the status of a staff 
association with concomittant restrictions on membership. This emphasis 
is, likely to have originated in the professional status afforded to 
civil servants in the executive class. 
Prior to 1920 intermediate class clerks were organised by the 
Society of Civil Servants (SCS). In the 1920 reorganisation the 
intermediate class clerks were allocated to the executive class thereby 
creating competitive recruitment conditions between the AEOOCS and the 
SCS. Several merger initiatives launched by the AEOOCS were rejected by 
the SCS which maintained an idiosyncratic course tending 'to disregard 
Whitleyism and [taking] independent action at the expense of its Staff 
ij 
Side fellows' (Humphreys, 1958: 150). The relationship between the two 
unions was also hampered by the recruitment activities of the SCS which 
were regarded as poaching by its contemporaries. As a result of the 
costly internecine disputes which arose from these activities, a merger 
was concluded in 1930 between the AEOOCS and SCS in order that the costs 
of recruitment could be restricted when civil service employment was 
contracting, albeit temporarily. 
The union resulting from this merger, also called the Society of 
Civil Servants (SCS), assumed the rights of representation for the 
entire executive class on the Staff Side of the National Whitley 
Committee. In consequence. no less than eight departmental unions merged 
with the SCS between 1931 and 1941. In other words, the recognition 
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secured by the SCS undermined the bargaining position of these smaller 
unions impelling them towards merger in. order to secure representation 
within national bargaining arrangements. All of the acquired unions 
organised within the executive class; their acquisition allowed for the 
consolidation of the recruitment base of the SCS within the Class. 
During the operation of institutionalised industrial relations 
three further unions were absorbed into the SCS. All of them recruited 
from within the Ministry of Labour (or its successor. the Department of 
Employment). A similarity in the pattern of merger activity is, 
therefore, apparent regarding both the clerical and executive classes, 
for in both cases the unions organising the different grades within the 
Ministry of Labour remained apart from the principal unions organising 
in the class. An explanatory factor underpinning this protracted 
isolation is the presence of the Federation of Ministry of Labour Staff 
to which the unions were affiliated. This federation formed an 
additional bargaining outlet, thereby enhancing the organisational 
stability of its affiliates. This enhanced organisational stability may 
have acted to increase resistance to merger. 
Unlike the class-based CPSA and SCPS, the IRSF has retained a 
departmental recruitment base. In consequence, the pattern of merger 
activity leading to its formation during 1938 is different to those 
pursued by the CPSA and SCPS. Insecurity of employment and low pay had 
stimulated 'a solidarity uncommon among clerks before 1918' within the 
Association of Tax Clerks (ATC). The ATC was the first of the unions 
organising in the civil service to affiliate to the TUC and was an 
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active affiliate of the Civil Service Federation, the first of the union 
federations in the civil service. Following the 1920 reorganisation of 
the civil service, the ATC was renamed the Association of Officers of 
Taxes (AOT) and full-time staff were appointed. 
Whereas the merger activity of the class-based unions was focused 
upon the extension of recruitment bases through the acquisition of 
departmental unions, the object of the AOT merger policy was the 
consolidation of union organisation within a single department. 
Therefore, unlike the CPSA and SCPS, membership differences such as 
established/unestablished and gender were not regarded as inhibiting 
factors to mergers to the same degree. In consequence, the Association 
of. Women Tax Clerks was absorbed as early as 1923. The desire to retain 
its exclusively departmental recruitment base was the reason provided in 
rejecting several merger approaches from the CSCA throughout the 19206. 
In 1933 a further merger initiative was declined on the basis that the 
competition between the CSCA and MLSA should cease before meaningful 
merger negotiations could commence. Such negotiations began during 1934 
but little progress was recorded primarily because the AOT, with their 
special responsibilities within the Inland Revenue. 'were able in the 
early 1930s to negotiate somewhat better terms than those obtained... 
for Clerical Officers generally' (Wigham, 1980: 55). Personal animosity 
between the full-time officers of the two unions is also cited as 
clouding the atmosphere within which the negotiation were conducted 
(Wigham, 1980: 54). 
The National Association of -Assessors and Collectors of Taxes 
(NAACT) organised unestablished local officials within the Inland 
Revenue, many of whom were employed on a part-time basis. Amalgamation 
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discussions commenced in 1932 after the assessors and collectors became 
established. The peculiarities of their employment and the desire on 
behalf of the NAACT to retain its separate identity prevented these 
discussions from reaching a successful conclusion. Three years later, 
however, 97.7 per cent of the NAACT membership voted in favour of 
federating with the AOT on the understanding that the independence of 
the NAACT was retained within the federation. This federation was called 
the Inland Revenue Staff Federation. 
The Valuation Office Clerical Association (VOCA) had been absorbed 
in the initial flurry of departmentally based union acquisitions by the 
CSCA, but had later seceeded from the CSCA when an agreement was struck 
between the CSCA and AOT regarding jurisdiction. In the year following 
the establishment of the IRSF, the VOCA affiliated, thereby completing 
the departmental recruitment base. The close working arrangements 
fostered within the federation allowed for a formal merger to be 
achieved during 1938. In 1939 the Civil Service Alliance was established 
which formalised jurisdictional boundaries among affiliated unions 
thereby limiting the adverse effects of competitive recruitment and 
allowing the IRSF to maintain organisational stability with a restricted 
departmental recruitment base. 
The Government Minor and Manipulative Grades Association (GMXGA) 
was formed by messengers mainly employed in the Board of Education who 
were among the poorest paid civil servants (Edwards, 1975: 13). The impact 
of the civil service reorganisation of 1920 appears to have stimulated 
an expansion of the recruitment base of the GMMGA achieved through both 
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natural growth and merger. While this expansion was achieved across the 
boundaries of the newly created classes,, it remained consistent with the 
initial recruitment base of the union in so far as only minor grades 
were organised. Four unions organising a total of 385 members were 
absorbed between 1920 and 1923. These unions organised civil servants 
that were not regarded as central to the recruitment drives of the CSCA 
and SCS. In other words, the GMMGA organised around the recruitment 
interests of the most rapidly expanding civil service unions in the same 
manner as the principal general unions organised around the established 
recruitment interests of the craft unions during the same period. 
The GMMGA's organisational stability was enhanced through 
recognition achieved on the Staff Side of the National Whitley 
Committee. This factor, in combination with the vigorous amalgamation 
policies pursued by the CSCA and SCS, may have acted to inhibit the 
merger activity of the GXXGA for no mergers are recorded between 1924 
and 1938. The 'openess' of the GXXGA to women, unestablished and ex- 
service civil servants allowed for a significant rate of natural growth 
to be maintained which also might have curtailed the interest in an 
active merger policy. 
Four additional unions were absorbed between 1939 and 1944 when a 
policy of expansion was pursued culminating in the adoption of the name, 
the Civil Service Union (CSU), the GIOIGA title being considered 
'unhelpful to recruitment' (Edwards, 1975: 23). These four unions 
organised ý, a total of 166 members illustrating the restricted 
opportunities available for the expansion of a union's recruitment base 
by the final years of the implementation of collective bargaining. Two 
more unions were absorbed in 1950 and 1961. Both of these unions, were 
361 
rapidly losing members and had not secured recognition on the Staff Side 
of the National Whitley Committee, Merger for these two unions, 
therefore, constituted the means whereby their membership could. be 
represented on the Whitley Council. Furthermore, being within the ambit 
of-the CSU's recruitment base precluded the poaching of their members by 
other civil service unions. 
The formation rate and merger intensity among unions organising in 
national government exhibit a wave form in their pattern of occurrence. 
Unlike the aggregate pattern, however, the dissolution rate shows 
greater stability with no marked wave form. The evidence suggests that 
this divergence' is likely to be based upon the stability inherent in 
civil service employment which acts to limit the onset of organisational 
instability arising from membership decline and the adoption of active 
merger policies by surviving unions which absorbed many of those unions 
incurring a membership loss. The departmental recruitment bases of the 
original unions in national government combined with the 'standardising' 
effects of civil service reorganisation and the paucity of such unions 
with full-time staff facilitated the achievement of these mergers. 
Structural turbulence among unions organising in national 
government was most pronounced during the formative period of the 
industry's unionisation. -This coincided with both the introduction of 
formal bargaining arrangements and-the reorganisation of the existing 
structure of civil service employment. The road to the achievement of 
formal bargaining in the form of Whitleyism was marked by several 
intermediary stages, each of which is associated with the formation of 
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new unions. Some evidence is available suggesting that unions were first 
formed among-the lower grades of civil. servants, those organising the 
higher grades being formed at a greater rate as progress towards formal 
bargaining was advanced. The stimulating effect of civil service 
reorganisation on merger activity is beyond doubt. That this factor is 
omitted from the regressor COMER partially explains the failure of the 
variable to meet theoretical expectations in the equations presented in 
Chapter 4. 
Three waves in the merger intensity of unions organising in 
national government are recorded. The first is associated with the 
formative years of unionisation in the industry. The second is largely 
comprised of the single merger by means of which the IPCS was formed. As 
with the first merger wave the formation of the IPCS can be attributed 
to the reorganisation of the grading class structure within those 
sections of the civil service in which IPCS members were employed. The 
third wave in merger intensity lasting between 1971 and 1979 is similar 
in character to the second principal wave in aggregate merger activity. 
This suggests that the wave was stimulated by the threat of financial 
insolvency of the smaller unions with limited recruitment bases. 
The examination of merger activity among the principal unions 
organising workers in the clerical and executive classes revealed a 
number of points of- similarity. Firstly, three of the four unions 
examined were formed by mergers of competing unions and all the unions 
employed a merger strategy as a means to expand upon their initial 
recruitment bases. These expansions were, however, restricted by the 
class structure of civil service employment introduced in 1920. Even 
during the operation of institutionalised industrial relations merger 
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initiatives intended to cut across these class boundaries have failed. 
The rigid demarcation inherent in these class distinctions has, however, 
acted to limit competitive recruitment. 
Secondly, where repeated merger negotiations were unsuccessful 
formal federal structures were established to curtail the negative 
effects of competitive recruitment. Such structures were ususally 
preceded by the operation of less formal closer working arrangements. 
Although there was a marked variation in the duration of their 
existence, the principal federations were dissolved on the merging of 
their primary affiliates, confirming the view advanced in Chapter 6 
that federations can be seen as intermediary between organisational 
independence and merger. It should be noted that the commonality in the 
terms and conditions of employment within the civil service is likely to 
promote this tendency. 
The achievement of a large membership size facilitates the securing 
of employer recognition. This is particularly the case regarding the 
achievement of a large membership size relative to that of other unions 
organising within the same class of civil service employment. Membership 
also confers organisational stability in circumstances of competitive 
recruitment. As mergers are the quickest route to an increase in 
membership size, they can, therefore, be seen as both a policy option to 
achieve recognition and are promoted as unrecognised unions seek formal 
representation for their memberships by merging with their recognised 
contemporaries. 
1. There were two unions named the Civil Service Union. The first merged 
with the Clerical Officers' Association to form the Civil Service 
Clerical Association in 1921. The second arose from the renaming of the 
Government Minor and Manipulative Grades Association. Both are 
independent of one another and do not directly impinge upon each others' 
development. 
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COHCLUSI01 
The 'conclusion to the study consists of three sections. The first 
is an' overview of the major findings arising from the research. To be 
consistent with earlier chapters there are three sub-divisions to this 
initial section, covering the implementation of collective bargaining, 
the operation of institutionalised industrial relations and the inter- 
relationships between trade union structural events. Such sub-divisions 
allow the nature 'of the merger process and its association with the 
environmental influences to be contrasted between the two periods. The 
sub-division on trade union structural events directs attention towards 
the similarity in this pattern of occurrence between the two periods, 
suggesting that despite fundamental changes in bargaining structures 
there is some consistency in causal relationships. 
The second section reviews existing explanations of the aggregate 
merger process by comparison with the findings unearthed during this 
study. The central purpose of this review is not to dismiss these 
existing explanations in the light of new evidence but to extract from 
them aspects which can be integrated to form a more comprehensive 
understanding of the merger process. These explanations are, therefore, 
not counterposed against one another in an attempt to formulate an 
understanding' based on the opposition of different sets of variables, 
but are integrated, employing aspects of existing explanations 
consistent with the data. 
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The third section considers likely future trends in merger 
activity. The focus of this section is upon the-developments in the 
environmental influences since the election of a Conservative government 
in 1979. Where possible, examples of recent mergers and merger 
initiatives are drawn upon to illustrate the current issues central to 
the creation of tension within union structure. 
AN OVERVIEW OF FINDINGS 
Trade union structural events - mergers, formations, dissolutions 
and breakaways - occur in waves. Two principal merger waves were 
identified, 1918-1924 and 1966-1983. A third wave in trade union merger 
activity was attributed primarily to the formation of two unions - the 
NUM and IPCS - and hence disregarded. An explanatory framework was 
established in which the period 1893-1983 was considered in terms of two 
long economic cycles. The first of these, 1893-1939, was regarded as 
being characterised by the implementation of collective bargaining 
whereas the second, 1946-1983, features the operation of 
institutionalised industrial relations. Each long economic cycle 
included a wave in the intensity of merger activity. In addition, during 
the implementation of collective bargaining, two dissolution waves and a 
single formation wave were recorded. A second formation wave was 
inferred from the sharp decline in the formation rate between 1897 and 
1900. The operation of institutionalised industrial relations included a 
single wave in the rate of both formations and dissolutions. 
Arising from a literature review, two categories of influence upon 
the merger process were delineated: environmental and organisational. As 
the focus of this study is upon the merger process in the aggregate, the 
analytical emphasis was placed upon the operationalisation of the 
environmental influences. Three types of environmental influence were 
operationalised: -economic, unionisation and political. The relative 
neglect of the impact of the organisational influences has its basis in 
the primary focus of the study: the aggregate merger process. This is 
not to imply that the organisational influences are not pivotal to 
merger activity but to argue that particular organisational influences 
impinge upon specific mergers rather than all mergers. In other words, 
the impact of the organisational influences cannot be generalised across 
the entire merger process at any specific point in time. Moreover, 
organisational influences are regarded as changing over time as trade 
union structure and purpose develop. 
During the implementation of collective bargaining the application 
of regression analysis indicated that the merger process was most 
sensitive to the impact of unionisation and political influences. 
Economic influences were found to be mediated in their effect upon the 
merger process by the unionisation influences. Particularly significant 
in this regard was the rate of change of union membership, thereby 
confirming the impact of economic factors on membership growth which was 
the central focus of several-earlier studies. The marked sensitivity of 
merger intensity to the influence of unionisation and political factors 
suggests that organisational stability and its preservation were central 
to the pattern of merger intensity and that membership activity also 
strongly impinged upon the form of this pattern. 
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By comparison with the operation of institutionalised industrial 
relations, geographical merger activity was pronounced' during the 
implementation of collective bargaining. This was anticipated as the 
rise of collective bargaining is regarded as promoting a centralisation 
within trade union structure. The vertical dimension of the merger 
process was dominant throughout the implementation of collective 
bargaining, whereas the horizontal component was marginal. Diversifying 
mergers increased as a proportion of the aggregate merger process 
throughout the long economic cycle. The increase was particularly marked 
during the post-war depression with'the formation of the general unions. 
The tendency towards increase in the diversifying proportion of merger 
activity continued during the downswing in the long economic cycle; 
suggesting that adversity in economic circumstances promotes a 
broadening in recruitment base. 
The wave in merger intensity' during the implementation of 
collective bargaining, merger Wave 1, was distinguished by substantial 
realignments within trade union structure. A high incidence of 
composite 'mergers and unions formed by merger, the merger activity of 
the ten largest unions and the inter-merging of recently formed unions 
during merger Wave I are all indicators of the pronounced degree of 
structural realignment. A number of factors are associated with the 
attainment of this realignment, particularly the sharp decline in the 
number of trade union 'federations, indicating that merger activity 
during merger Wave I was directed towards the formalisation of existing 
loose structures. The inter-merging of recently formed unions during 
merger Wave I was primarily directed towards the attainment of 
organisational stability through the achievement of recognition and 
bargaining status. In other words, -the state, through its implementation 
of the Whitley recommendations regarding, bargaining structures, acted to 
stimulate merger activity among the smaller unions. This effect was 
assisted by the passing of the Trade Union (Amalgamation) Act 1917 which 
immediately pre-dated the sharp rise in merger intensity. 
The 'new unions' of 1889-93 had pursued political campaigns from 
the outset as a means of achieving improvements for their memberships 
while compensating for their lack of direct bargaining strength. By 
affiliating in federations the effectiveness of this influence was 
enhanced. Due to dissension within these federal structures,. however, 
collective inter-union action was hampered. The centralisation of 
industrial relations on the implementation of collective bargaining 
accentuated the problems arising from the factionalism within federal 
structures. Merger for the labourers' unions was, therefore, the 
mechanism whereby their organisation was reinforced to secure benefits 
from the formalisation of bargaining arrangements, the centralisaation 
implicit in merging acting to reduce the effect of the inherent 
instability of the federal structures. , 
Organisational instability during the implementation of collective 
bargaining was examined by applying regression analysis to two of its 
dimensions: the dissolution rate and trade union finances. In addition, 
the promotion of organisational instability through internal political 
differences was examined. The regression results indicated that mergers 
and dissolutions are promoted by similar environmental influences, 
confirming the view that merger is a means whereby the decline towards 
organisational instability can be arrested. The component of union 
financial expenditure most closely associated with the pattern of merger 
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intensity was that of 'other costs'. Since a principal component of 
'other costs' is administrative expenses, this association suggests 
that the introduction of national pay bargaining was influential in the 
promotion of merger activity,, for such bargaining necessitates the 
constitution of union administrative systems. 
The nature of this association was examined within the context of 
the impact of the external economic influences and internal- union 
politics. Economic factors were found to influence the development of 
workshop organisation within certain craft oriented sectors of the trade 
union movement; a tendency exacerbated by the separation of procedural 
and substantive issues within the development of bargaining. Workshop 
organisation transcended the sectional boundaries of national union 
organisation in so far as it was comprised f-representatives from 
several unions constituted on the basis of a plant or more widely shared 
interests rather than the particular interests of a craft. In other 
words, the overcoming of the more pronounced constraining effect on 
merger activity among craft-oriented unions of the organisational 
influences was assisted by the emergence of workshop organisation which 
threatened to undermine the benefits accruing to union officialdom 
arising from the-implementation of collective bargaining. 
During the operation of institutionalised industrial relations, 
merger intensity was most sensitive to the influence of economic and 
political factors. The signs attached to the political regressors, CON 
and MP, however, were opposite to those recorded for the implementation 
of collective bargaining, indicating the changing purposes to the merger 
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process. Moreover, the institutional aspects of unionisation rather than 
those associated with fluctuations in aggregate membership had a more 
marked impact on the pattern of merger activity. The variation in the 
pattern of association between the environmental influences and merger 
intensity across the two long economic cycles indicates that the stage 
reached in the development of bargaining is a mediating factor upon the 
nature of trade union structural realignment and the environmental 
influences. Furthermore, the changing pattern of influence of the 
environmental variables suggests that the purpose to which a merger 
policy is directed is not a constant but varies with the development of 
bargaining institutions. 
The shape of the merger process exhibits similar tendencies during- 
institutionalised industrial relations as during the implementation of 
collective bargaining. The horizontal component was limited whereas the 
vertical component was dominant. -During-the downswing of the economic 
long cycle the diversifying component constituted a greater proportion 
of the total merger process than during the upswing when it was 
marginal. This consistency between waves suggests that independently of 
the stage of development attained by bargaining institutions, economic 
adversity encountered during the -downswing acts to promote a 
diversification within trade union recruitment bases. 
Merger Wave II differed substantially from its predecessor. Merger 
activity between 1966 and 1983 was characterised by the acquisition of 
unions into union structures extant prior to the onset of the wave. 
Composite mergers, unions formed through merger and the inter-merging of 
recently formed unions were infrequent by comparison with their 
occurrence during merger Wave I. The object of much of this merger 
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activity appeared to be the attainment of influence at the political 
centre, a policy option made more desirable by the enhanced factionalism 
within both the TUC and the Labour Party. The achievement of increased 
relative membership size was the key to the establishment of this 
influence; merger was the means whereby this increase could be most 
rapidly attained. Furthermore, during merger Wave II the maintenance of 
trade union organisational stability was, in part, a function of the 
policies enacted by the TUC. These policies, dominated in their 
formulation by the influence of senior officials from large unions, 
prevented smaller unions from affiliating to the TUC and thereby 
restricted their recruitment bases. 
That small unions are particularly unstable during the operation of 
institutionalised industrial relations was illustrated, firstly, by the 
strong positive influence of the formation rate upon the dissolution 
rate and, secondly, by the strong association between merger activity 
among unions from Size Group 1, organising 2,499 members or less, and 
the formation rate. In addition, the formation rate inhibited the 
acquisition of unions from Size Group 2, organising between 2,500 and 
14,999 members, suggesting that union size is a determinant of the ease 
whereby a union may be absorbed by merger. Further evidence of the 
institutional effectiveness of TUC hostility to the small union was 
provided by the limited, survival times of breakaway unions. 
The substantial rise in the 'other costs' component of trade union 
expenditure induced a degree of financial instability during the course 
of merger Wave 2. Evidence was presented to indicate that a factor 
explaining this rise in other costs was the incorporation of workshop 
organisation into 'official' trade union structure and government. This 
-373- 
incorporation occurred concurrently with managerial strategies to 
involve formally representatives of workshop organisation in bargaining 
and the introduction of legislative changes formally extending the scope 
of bargaining. In addition to the consolidation of union finances, 
mergers also assisted in the re-assertion of leadership authority over 
workshop organisation in so far as they reduced workplace multi- 
unionism. 
The Inter-Relationships Between Structural Events 
Trade union structural events are marked by the wave pattern of 
their occurrence. The 'dating' of these waves is as follows: 
FORMATION WAVES 1889 - 931 1917 - 25 1970 - 79 
DISSOLUTION WAVES 1899 - 1907 1920 - 33 1973 - 80 
MERGER WAVES 1918 - 24 1966 - 83 
There are several inter-relationships between these structural events 
indicated by the pattern of occurrence in the waves. The initial date of 
each dissolution wave, for example, follows that for the formation 
waves, suggesting that the impact of the environmental influences 
promotes dissolution among the inherently unstable recently formed 
unions. This inter-relationship was confirmed for the three dissolution 
waves with unions formed during the preceding or concurrent formation 
wave constituting the most numerous category of dissolving unions. This 
tendency was particularly marked during the implementation of collective 
bargaining when a substantial proportion of the unions dissolving during 
the dissolution waves were recently formed. During the operation of 
institutionalised industrial relations this tendency was in evidence but 
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less pronounced due to the absorption patterns of the larger unions 
during merger Wave II. 
Both principal merger waves are concurrent with dissolution and 
formation waves suggesting that organisational initiative, instability 
and realignment are broadly simultaneous processes within trade union 
structure. The initial formation and dissolution waves, however, were 
not accompanied by a merger wave. Figure 6.4 illustrates that the number 
of trade union federations rose significantly during and immediately 
following the dissolution wave of 1899 to 1907. This would seem to 
suggest that the terms of the 1876 legislation acted to prohibit 
organisational realignment through merger -a realignment which was 
achieved instead through the establishment of federal structures. On the 
relaxation of the legislative provisions in 1917, these federal 
structures were consolidated by mergers into centralised single union 
structures. 
Each formation wave co-incided with an 'explosion' of unionism into 
a previously unorganised sector of the national workforce. The wave of 
1889-93 represented the initial stages of the organisation of semi- and 
un-skilled; that of 1917-25 the onset of union organisation into the 
public sector and limited areas of private sector white-collar 
employment; and that of 1970-79 the organisation of the professions, 
scientific and technical workers and workers employed in the service 
sector. The organisational instability of the unions formed during these 
explosions was pronounced. Initially, federation and, latterly, merger 
were the means whereby organisational stability of the 'young' unions 
could be enhanced. During merger Wave I. the increase in merger 
intensity was partially explained by the inter-merging of recently 
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formed unions. In contrast, the impact of the newly formed unions on the 
intensity of merger activity during merger Wave II was through their 
absorption into existing union structures. 
ALTERNATIVE. EXPLANATIONS OF TRADE UNION STRUCTURAL DEVELOPXRNT 
Undy et al.: The Centrality of the Leadership Role 
Undy et al. (1981) restrict their analysis to merger activity 
during the 1960s and 1970s, a period concurrent with merger Wave II. 
Their examination is also firmly focused upon internal union 
organisational dynamics resulting in a relative neglect of the study of 
the environmental influences and the inter-relationships between 
environmental and organisational influences. Several specific points of 
the Undy et al. account of merger activity have been examined earlier in 
this presentation. Attention is directed here to the explanation 
provided by Undy et al. of aggregate merger causation. 
The formulations of Bain and Elsheikh (1976) and Clegg (1976) 
regarding the impact of 'external factors' and the 'level and scope of 
collective agreements' upon trade union development are rejected in 
favour of one laying emphasis upon a 'significant role to union 
leadership' (Undy et al., 1981: 349). With respect to merger activity, 
they comment that 'all the unions examined, regardless of their systems 
of government, were led into mergers by their national full-time 
officials' (1981: 214). This position is developed by adopting the stance 
that trade union leadership exerts a relatively independent influence 
upon trade union development. Furthermore. those external 'agents for 
change' that stimulated the pursuit of mergers 'made themselves felt at 
the national level mainly through those process that by-passed the 
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constitutionally prescribed policy-making channels' (Undy et 
al., 1981: 214). 
The primary agents for change are absolute and relative membership 
size. Given that there is little discussion of the inter-relatedness of 
other factors, it is difficult to understand how the occurrence of 
merger waves is to be explained. In an attempt to resolve this dilemma, 
Undy et al. state that 
Mergers, however, gathered considerable momentum of their own 
as the past absolute and relative size changes interacted with 
the existing structure of UK unions to produce a scramble for 
mergers that developed its own dynamic. The individual 
merger was turned by this combination of circumstances into a 
merger movement. In the first instance, a merger stimulated by 
absolute size reasons disturbed another union's relative size 
considerations. These disturbed unions, in turn, sought mergers 
in order to restore the status quo in respect of their relative 
size, or to reduce the competitor union's recently gained size 
advantage (1981: 215-16). 
In adopting this explanation the authors do not allow for the periods 
during which merger intensity has slackened. For, if merger activity has 
'its own dynamic' which gathers 'considerable momentum' based upon 
absolute or relative size considerations, there is no reason to suggest 
that merger activity will ever slacken once started. Indeed, the logic 
of their position is to suggest that once unions have started to merge 
they would continue to do so with an increasing momentum. In other 
words, Undy et al. do not allow for the wave form of merger activity 
and, in particular, the decline in merger intensity after 1977 recorded 
in Figure 2.1. 
The evidence provided in this study suggests that there are more 
change agents than are conceded by Undy et al. For example, the role of 
the trade union leadership in the promotion of merger activity during 
merger Wave II would appear to be of intervening rather than independent 
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status. While the legislative involvement in the merger process 
necessitates an executive role in ratifying any merger agreement, this 
does not mean that this role is causal even though it may be ubiquitous. 
Chapters 6 and 8 demonstite that a combination of factors influenced 
trade union leaderships in the pursuit of mergers. The enhanced strength 
of workshop organisation raised three inter-related-issues which pivoted 
around trade union leadership: managerial prerogative, a governmental 
concern with industrial relations, and a weakening of the authority of 
trade union leaders within the unions themselves thereby threatening 
relationships within the national polity. The incorporation of workshop 
organisation within formal bargaining and union structures promoted an 
interest in mergers as a mechanism whereby such an incorporation might 
be facilitated. The growth in strength of workshop organisation which 
promoted this interest in merger, however, arose from a combination of 
factors, most notably relatively-full employment. The leadership role 
within the merger process was, therefore, intermediate among a series of 
factors, the inter-action between which promoted merger activity. 
Further evidence of the Undy et al. account's failure to 
incorporate the broader implications of the environmental influences 
upon merger activity arises from their defense of the impact of absolute 
and relative size changes. A decline in membership coupled with rising 
inflation, Undy et al. argue, threatens the financial viability of 
unions. They state that the unions' 'common problem was that they could 
not independently maintain or improve their existing levels of services 
and benefits over the short or medium term' (1981: 214). The point is, as 
was evidenced in Chapter 8, that in real terms the 'threshold of union 
solvency' rose substantially during the course of merger Wave II because 
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of the additional costs incurred in incorporating workplace organisation 
into formal union and bargaining structures. Aýdecline in membership is, 
therefore, only one aspect of the processes impelling unions towards 
merger in this period. Indeed, if the real level of contributions- were 
to remain constant, - given the rise in administrative costs, a stagnant 
membership would prove insufficient to maintain financial viability. 
In summary, the Undy et al. account of merger activity isolates 
some of the factors that impinge upon its occurrence. Undy et al., 
however, - fail to acknowledge the broader range and impact of the 
environmental influences because of their over-emphasis upon the 
organisational aspects of the merger process, a failure which also 
precludes an understanding of the relationships between the 
environmental and organisational influences. The emphasis placed upon 
the leadership role within the merger process has some validity in so 
far as all merger proposals are subject to executive ratification. It is 
to overstate the case, however, to argue that trade union leadership 
exerts an independent causal influence, for the leadership acts within a 
complex of both environmental and organisational influences; hence its 
impact is of intervening status. 
Collective Bargaining 
Clegg (1976: 8) maintains that variations in union behaviour-. can be 
explained in terms of differences in the character of collective 
bargaining. Union structural realignment is explicitly regarded as a 
component of union behaviour in the statement that 'another aspect of 
union, behaviour... not so far... mentioned in relation to the theory of 
union behaviour under collective bargaining is union structure' 
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(1976: 9). Amalgamations occur, according to Clegg's thesis, 'due to the 
pressures of internal union politics, or to boundary revisions inspired 
by-doctrines of union organisation' (1976: 10). Unfortunately, Clegg is 
not specific regarding the impact of these pressures upon merger 
activity. Certain propositions, however, may be derived from Clegg's 
consideration of union government. For example, he concludes that 
'although union constitutions and methods of administration have an 
effect on the distribution of power and the extent of factional conflict 
within unions, the theory contends that the level of bargaining is the 
primary explanatory variable' (1976: 54). 
If internal union politics are a function of the 'distribution of 
power and the extent of factional conflict within unions', it is to be 
concluded, given Clegg's -other propositions, that the level of 
bargaining is the determinant of mergers. Moreover, as 'the main 
influence upon the level of -collective bargaining is the structure of 
menagement and employers' organisations' (1976: 54), the determination of 
mergers may be represented as follows: 
structure of 
management and -º 
employers' 
organisations 
variations in the pressures on 
level of collective 4 internal union -4 merger 
bargaining politics activity 
Furthermore, -Clegg acknowledges the 'waves of amalgamation' that have 
occured during the history of British trade unionism, thereby implying 
that there is cyclical variation in the pattern of the determinants. 
Evidence is available to support Clegg's contention. Merger Wave I 
was co-incidental with the establishment of the Whitley Committee in 
1917 and the later implementation of its recommendations. Additionally, 
Bristow (1974: 273-4) reports a burgeoning in the number of profit- 
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sharing schemes in an attempt to involve workers in the running of firms 
during the years 1912-14 when merger intensity began to rise sharply, 
Ramsay (1980: 111) also points out that the zenith of Whitleyism was 
passed by 1926 when only '47 of the 78 established schemes remained', a 
date not' dis-similar to that for the culmination of the merger wave. 
Similarly, merger Wave II was concurrent with the onset of productivity 
bargaining, 'Donovanism' and experiments with industrial democracy. It 
would appear, therefore, that variations in the level of collective 
bargaining are co-incidental with intense periods of merger activity. 
It might also be speculated that differences in the form of the 
bargaining changes could account for the variation in the pattern of 
merger activity among the ten largest unions between the two waves, 
Whitleyism involved the establishment of national industrial bargaining 
structures necessitating a centralisation of authority within union 
structure in order to maximise effectiveness within the union side. Such 
authority was attained by the 'inter-merging of large unions to reduce 
the multiplicity of executives. ' The impetus of bargaining arrangements 
instigated during merger Wave II was directed towards the incorporation 
of workplace organisation within 'formal' bargaining and union 
structures. During the same period merger activity among the ten largest 
unions primarily took-the form'of the absorption of smaller unions into 
existing structures, the achievement of the goal to' which changes in 
bargaining were directed. 
There are, however, a number of areas of shortfall in Clegg's 
explanatory framework. For example, Ramsay (1980) identifies two further 
periods of fluctuation in the level of collective bargaining which are 
not associated with widespread merger activity. These were 1889-92, when 
there was a sharp rise in the number of profit-sharing schemes involving 
participation, and the joint consultation arrangements of World War II 
embodied in the Joint Production Committees. In partial mitigation of 
Clegg's explanation it should be noted, however, that the first of these 
periods was marked by a wave in the formation rate and constitutes the 
third of Cole's (1924: 77) 'closer unity' movements distinguished by the 
establishment of trade union federations. 
Variations in the level of collective bargaining cannot, therefore, 
be regarded as the conclusive explanation for the observed pattern in 
merger intensity. Furthermore, as Korpi (1974: 1569) has concluded, the 
establishment of a particular bargaining structure is a function of the 
balance of power between workers and employers existing prior to its 
implementation, In other words, a particular bargaining structure, once 
established, may influence the pattern of merger activity but any 
bargaining structure is itself a function of the conflicts existing 
prior to its establishment. The patterns of strike and merger activity 
during the operation of institutionalised industrial relations 
illustrate the point. Workplace organisation came to be perceived as an 
industrial relations 'problem' during the late-1960s as a result of the 
disrupting effects on production of 'unofficial' trade union activity. A 
variety of measures were introduced with the object of incorporating 
workplace organisation into formal union and bargaining structures 
thereby establishing a 'new' bargaining structure. In consequence, union 
structural realignment was stimulated. The point here is that the 
alterations in bargaining structure were promoted by conflicts between 
workplace trade unionism and employers, the object of the alterations 
being defined by the nature of the conflict. 
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The level of bargaining structure also does not provide an adequate 
explanation for other dimensions of the merger process, most notably 
merger shape. Chapter 5 demonstrated that within both of the delineated 
periods, the implementation of collective bargaining and the operation 
of institutionalised industrial relations, the diversifying component of 
the merger process became more pronounced during the downswing of the 
long economic cycle. In other words, while the alteration in bargaining 
structures differed between the two periods, the shape of merger 
activity remained similar. Furthermore, regression analysis has 
demonstrated that merger intensity is also associated with short- and 
medium-term business cycle fluctuations which the explanation based upon 
the level of collective bargaining does not address. Business cycle 
fluctuations influence the relative bargaining positions of both workers 
and employers with a degree of cyclical regularity inducing similar 
patterns within that of merger intensity. This suggests that not only 
bargaining structure, but also the objects of bargaining and the 
relative success of the parties to it in achieving these, influences the 
merger process. 
The collective bargaining and econömic explanations can, however, 
be combined to provide a complementary explanation of the various 
aspects of the merger process. The focus on a single explanatory factor 
to the-exclusion of others necessarily leads to an oversimplification of 
any explanation of merger activity. Moreover, the primacy assigned by 
Clegg to- developments in collective bargaining leads to a relative 
neglect of the 'creative role of the main parties in industrial 
relations (union members, representatives and officials; employers and 
their organisations; and the state and the legislature) in shaping both 
collective bargaining institutions and actual behaviour within the 
constraints of a wider-set of environmental exigencies' (Poole, 1981: 88). 
Korpi (1974) has illustrated that a variety of economic factors can be 
integrated within a broader explanation incorporating aspects of both 
conflict and bargaining accounts of strike activity. It is towards this 
incorporation regarding merger activity that the subsequent section is 
directed. 
Expanding Upon the 'Level of Bargaining Account' 
The merger process exhibits a constancy in shape throughout the two 
delineated periods suggesting that the influences impelling unions to 
merge in particular directions do so in a similar pattern during each 
long economic cycle. Two explanations to this constancy in shape can be 
derived from existing literature. The first is that offered by, Bernstein 
(1960) based on the notion of 'structural cycles'. The second 
explanation is founded upon the intensity of struggles for job control; 
the thrust of the argument being that mergers, as a means whereby 
bargalhing strength can be enhanced, are entered into to improve 
relative bargaining position. Both are related and are not exclusive to 
the explanation based upon the level of collective bargaining as the 
following discussion illustrates. 
Bernstein (1960) delineates periods of union membership growth into 
two distinct categories: one associated with the 'long run passage of 
time', the other with 'crisis'. These two periods are also dividable in 
terms of the extent of structural realignment that occurs, for as 
Bernstein states 
When unions are growing slowly and steadily, they need make 
only slight changes in form to accomodate themselves to their 
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environment;... With crisis, however, both the rate and direction 
of growth shift drastically. As a consequence, the really critical 
developments in the morphology of unions... tend to cluster in 
these brief time spans (1960: 73). 
The causation of crises is sub-divided into 'periods relating to social 
unrest' and 'wartime', with the former being particularly associated 
with union structural changes such as mergers, jurisdictional changes 
and union formations. Bernstein traces the underlying cause of social 
unrest and, therefore, crisis to economic factors such as increases in 
industrial concentration, high inflation and the rate of unemployment. 
Compounding the impact of these economic factors, Bernstein suggests, 
are the effects of political policies enacted to ameliorate economic 
hardship. In combination these factors have induced 'workers and their 
trade union leaders [to embark] upon adventures in organisation only in 
those short spans of time when they have been so disillusioned as to 
challenge the existing social order' (Bernstein, 1960: 88). 
While Bernstein writes of American trade union development there 
are a number of points arising from his analysis salient to the history 
of the British trade union merger process. Firstly, the onset of both 
merger waves was marked by the co-incidence of adverse economic and 
political circumstances for labour. Merger Wave I was preceded by the 
labour unrest of 1910-1914, argued by Hobsbawm (1964: 126-57) to have 
arisen from the failure to meet economic aspirations, and co-incided 
with the heightening of governmental intervention in production as the 
result of wartime stringencies. Similarly, the onset of merger Wave II 
marked the termination of the period of pronounced economic growth 
stemming from World War II and the definition, by successive 
governments, of industrial relations ýas an issue requiring political 
intervention. , 
Secondly, Bernstein alludes to the co-incidence of trade union 
structural events, in particular that of mergers and formations. This 
study not only demonstrated a similar co-incidence but has also 
illustrated that increases in the rate of union formations have a direct 
and positive effect upon mergers in so far as recently formed unions 
have a high propensity to merge, albeit in different circumstances in 
the two merger waves. 
Thirdly, the dating of the periods of social unrest in America 
bears some resemblance to, those experienced in Britain. Bernstein notes 
1884 to 1886 and 1917 to 1920 as periods in which trade union structural' 
development was most marked. By, comparison, 1889-93 and 1918-24 are : the 
periods associated with the, formation of the labourers' unions and 
merger Wave 1. Writing in 1960 Bernstein was olearly unable to cover the 
later periods of -intense trade-union structural development, The point 
here is that the structural cycles identified by Bernstein for America 
are replicated in Britain in terms of causative agents, the conjunction 
of economic and political events; in terms of effect, the formation and 
merging of unions; and in terms of date. The question arises, therefore, 
as to-the nature of the processes underlying this cyclical pattern of 
events. 
In analysing strike activity in the United States, Edwards 
(1981: 233-42) suggests that issues of job control constitute the central 
explanatory thread to its pattern. In so-doing, he counterposes a job 
control interpretation of strike activity to a political explanation as, 
for example, advanced by Shorter and Tilly (1974). This simple dichotomy 
is rejected here. The initial purpose is to sustain the position that 
job control and political explanations are mutually inter-dependent. 
This position is then expanded with specific reference to the pattern of 
merger activity. 
Two notions regarding the concept of job control emerged from the 
debates in academic industrial 'relations during the 1970x, 2 In its 
broader sense job control' refers to workers domination over production 
necessitating arelative decline in the authority of management. More 
narrowly the concept refers to the capacity to maintain a degree of 
autonomy within the immediate work environment. The two notions are, 
however, historically connected for job control in the narrow sense 
emerged from an earlier failure to achieve job control in the broader 
sense. The political component to the notion'is, therefore, necessarily 
involved for integral to the failure to achieve job control in the 
broader sense was the withdrawal from the direct conflict for power at 
the national polity. 'The institutionalisation of industrial conflict is 
nothing more nor less than the narrowing down of conflict to aggressive 
economism and defensive control' (Mann, 1973: 21). In other words, job 
control in the narrow sense is a political outcome of the failure to 
achieve job control in the broader sense. 
Regarding merger activity, the evidence to support this position 
arises from two sources. Firstly, after the implementation of collective 
bargaining the signs attached to certain of the political regressors 
change, suggesting that the nature of the relationship between trade 
unionism, together with its capacity for structural change, and the 
national polity alters. The combined evidence from Chapters 4 and 6 
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suggests that during the implementation of collective bargaining trade 
union organisational stability is dependent to a degree upon political 
circumstances. In contrast, during the operation of institutionalised 
industrial relations one of the purposes of merger activity would appear 
to have been to attain influence, by means of increased membership size, 
within the Labour Party and TUC, thereby influencing the national 
polity. This objective became more central to union purpose during 
merger Wave 2 as government intervention in industrial relations 
increased and factionalism within the Labour Party developed as policy 
differences surfaced as to the means whereby 'free collective 
bargaining' could be protected within a context of government 
intervention. The impetus for merger activity directed towards enhanced 
Labour Party influence did not arise from workplace organisation but 
partially in response to the disrupting influence of workplace 
organisation on formal bargaining and union structures. 
The second source of evidence regarding the inter-relationship 
between the job control and political explanations of trade union 
behaviour allows for further integration of aspects of the bargaining 
account of trade union structural development. Ramsay (1980) shows that 
innovations in the procedures of worker participation have been cyclical 
in their pattern of occurrence. While Allen (1971: 65-82) supports 
Ramsay's position with evidence from the nineteenth century, attention 
is focused here upon the two cycles co-incidental with the two merger 
waves. 
The onset of Whitleyism was preceded by a period of mounting 
pressure on employers and management. The ideas of syndicalism and Guild 
Socialism were influential in spreading the economic basis to the labour 
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unrest of 1910-1914. The outbreak of war further heightened this 
pressure as the bargaining position of trade unionism" was further 
strengthened by full employment. While both employers and governments 
were able to exert 'heavy moral pressure [on unionists] to co-operate in 
a... common interest' (Ramsay, 1980: 109), the incidence of strikes rose. 
Whitleyism, therefore, emerged as 'a measure to reduce mounting pressure 
excerted by organised labour on employers, thereby facilitating the 
prosecution of' the war effort. The growth in both the number and 
coverage of the Whitley Councils as is recorded by Charles (1973), ' was 
marked, providing union organisational stability. 
While Whitleyism became quickly established, it also declined with 
some rapidity. Furthermore, Child (1969: 48) notes that 'even before 
1920, it was becoming obvious that some employers had only dealt with 
the idea of shared control [inherent in Whitleyism] as a device to buy 
time'. The Balfour Committee reinforced this view stating that 
the decline in the number of Works Committees would appear 
to have been fairly rapid since 1920, and it is probably 
true to say that they have only survived in establishments 
in which there is a very definite desire on the part of 
both managements and workpeople to make the Committees 
a success (quoted in Clegg, 1985: 441). 
Coupled with and associated to the rapid loss of employer interest 
in Whitleyism was the government's support for strategies implemented to 
weaken union effectiveness represented in their most extreme form by 
'strike breaking machinery' (see Desmarais, 1973). In other words, when 
post-war changes in economic circumstances swung in favour of employers, 
their interest in Whitleyism declined to be replaced by a reliance upon 
these economic circumstances to promote union moderation. To employ 
Bernsteinis terminology, a crisis of job control arising from the 
particular conjunction of economic and political circumstances was 
temporarily ameliorated by the implementation of bargaining arrangements 
in the form of Whitleyism, the structures of which were neglected when 
the sources of the crisis had abated. 
The threat to management prerogatives was also a theme of 
industrial relations at the time of merger Wave II. The enhanced 
strength of workplace organisation arising from relatively-full 
employment coincided with a 'crisis of productivity' which, in turn, 
induced a political interest in industrial relations. A plethora of 
innovative bargaining strategies were implemented to repeat the 
incorporation attained by the Whitley approach. These were supplemented 
by a number of legislative enactments facilitating and promoting the 
introduction of bargaining innovation. Issues covered within such 
strategies included health and safety, productivity improvement, 
training and welfare but fell short of financial planning thereby 
safeguarding central management decision making. The, election of a 
Conservative Government in 1979, which was hostile to the achievement of 
any consensus with trade unionism, and the deterioration in labour 
market conditions weakened the position of trade unions. Management and 
government interest in new forms of participation again receded in the 
light of this diminution of union bargaining strength. 
Suggestions Towards an Integrated Explanation of the Merger Process 
In the, previous sections explanations of the merger process founded 
upon the centrality of a single factor were shown to provide only a 
partial understanding of the merger process. Furthermore, the earlier 
data analysis suggest that the opposition of economic, unionisation and 
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and political variables is a fruitless avenue in the search for an 
explanation of merger activity. Such analyses, however, point to the 
development of an explanation based upon the integration of explanatory 
factors. Indeed, the evidence suggests that the manner in which such 
factors combine' during the two periods is subject to some variation. 
Aspects of existing explanations of the merger process were found to be 
both consistent with the evidence provided and with components of other 
explanations. For example. the cyclical nature of the bargaining and job 
control accounts of structural development were found to be quite 
compatible. 
The purpose of this section is, therefore, to develop further the 
explanation of merger activity through the combination of these 
abstracted components of existing explanations. Underpinning this 
development is the notion of the long economic cycle. For ease of 
description the discussion is arranged schematically. Three features of 
the processes underlying merger activity have been shown to be central. 
Firstly, particular combinations of economic and political circumstances 
promote changes in the institutions of collective bargaining co- 
incidental with which are peaks in the intensity of merger activity. 
Secondly, the character of merger activity is similar to the policy 
objectives stimulating the introduction of the 'new' collective 
bargaining institutions. Thirdly, the similarity in the shape of merger 
activity during both the implementation of collective bargaining and 
operation of institutionalised industrial relations indicates that while 
the nature of the changes in bargaining was dissimilar other factors 
impinged upon the merger process in a consistent pattern during both 
periods. 
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`Regression analysis demonstrasted that the impact of the economic 
influences was-mediated by that of the unionisation influences during 
the implementation of 'collective bargaining but was more direct during 
the operation of institutionalised industrial relations. Furthermore, in 
both periods the impact of workshop organisation on the merger process 
was , found to have its basis 
in the effect of economic circumstances on 
the . capacity to maintain or improve standards of 
living. It would, 
therefore, appear reasonable to commence the development of an 
integrated explanation of the merger process with an elaboration of the 
cyclical movements in economic indicies which promote these effects. 
The starting point lies in the outline of long economic cycles 
provided in Chapter 2. In broad terms each long cycle is comprised of 
two periods: a period of economic upswing and an economic downswing of 
similar duration. - "Within the two long economic cycles covered by this 
study, the turning points from upswing'to'downswing were around 1913-14 
and; 1967-68. Both-merger waves immediately follow the onset of the 
downswing whereas the upswings were-relatively free of merger activity. 
Dunlop assumes that during the upswings each successive business cycle 
peak is higher than its predecessor, the converse applying during the 
downswing (1948: 191). During the period of change from the upswing there 
is a slowing in the rate of expansion as the long cycle peaks. 
This period of, slowing in economic growth is crucial with respect 
to'the merger process in several respects. Firstly, managements and 
employers experience a tightening in profit margins reducing their 
capacity to meet trade union demands for improvement in terms of 
employment. Prior to World War I this was expressed as 'the continued 
fall in the rate of growth of-productivity' (Clegg, 1985: 25) and-as a 
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'crisis of profitability' during the operation of institutionalised 
industrial relations (Glyn and Sutcliffe, 1972). Secondly, the general 
expansion experienced during the upswing promotes heightened 
expectations and aspirations among trade unionists. These expectations 
are not met as the upswing peaks because of the tightening of economic 
pressures on managements and employers. As a result strike activity is 
pronounced, as evidenced by the labour unrest of 1910-1914 and the 
growth in the frequency of unofficial disputes during the 1960s and 
early-1970s. Differences in the character of the disputes throughout 
these two periods, as was discussed in Chapters 7 and 8, is partially 
explained in terms of the stage reached in the development of trade 
unions as intermediary organisations. 
Thirdly, and arising from the preceding two points, strategies are 
implemented to ameliorate the heightened degree of conflict. Hence 
Ramsay (1980) regards both these periods as peaks in the cycle of 
innovation in mechanisms of worker participation. Such policy innovation 
is not the result of the actions of a single party to industrial 
relations but arises from combined activity. Facilitated by the 
involvement of some trade union leaders and employers in the 
organisation of war production, policies were enacted during merger Wave 
I on the initiative of the wartime coalition government. During merger 
Wave II innovative policies were 'successful' partly because of their 
triple-headed character with particular, but corresponding, initiatives 
being launched by governments, employers and trade union leaders. 
While the object of these policy reforms was the regeneration of 
previous rates of economic growth, the institutional modifications were 
primarily directed towards the reform of bargaining arrangements. 
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Clearly, the nature of this reform differs between waves as the result 
of both the form of industrial conflict preceding it and the stage of 
development of the institutions within which the conflict is expressed. 
Furthermore, the period over which the rate of institutional reform was 
maintained with alacrity was limited to that marking the turn from the 
upswing to the downswing. Once the economic downswing was firmly 
established the deterioration in the relative economic position of trade 
unionists precluded their exerting. a similar degree of bargaining 
pressure upon employers thereby eliminating the need for the 
ameliorative effects of the bargaining reform. Interest in the 
maintenance of these institutions, therefore, declines. 
Alterations- in the methods of collective bargaining directly 
impinge upon trade union organisation creating internal tension. This 
tension is additional to that arising from the conflict that underpins 
the initial bargaining alterations. For example, during the 
implementation of collective-bargaining industrial conflict generated 
organisational instability through its impact upon internal union 
authority relationships and the promotion of disputes within existing 
federal forms of union organisation. Similarly, organisational 
instability during the operation of institutionalised industrial 
relations arose from the increased factionalism within the TUC and 
Labour Party which promoted a desire to achieve greater influence and 
the, challenge to the authority of trade union leadership within the 
unions themselves. 
In order to regain or maintain organisational stability within the 
context of changes in collective bargaining institutions and internal 
tension, trade unionists adopt the policy of merger. On both occasions 
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of intense reform of bargaining institutions, such a policy has been 
facilitated by the relaxation in the legislative requirements to its 
enactment, illustrating the degree of co-operation within the national 
polity between the interested parties. The character of merger activity 
during the two merger waves differs. These differences are largely 
explained in terms of the nature of the industrial conflict preceding 
each merger wave and the collective bargaining institutions introduced, 
as was evidenced by the different patterns of merger activity among the 
ten largest unions and recently formed unions between the two waves. 
Further variation in the form of merger activity between the two 
merger waves is explained in terms of the stage of development attained 
by trade union organisation. For example, the impact of environmental 
economic influences was more direct during institutionalised industrial 
relations whereas it was mediated by the unionisation influences during 
the implementation of collective bargaining, suggesting that 
organisational stability was more prone to membership fluctuation in the 
earlier stages of union development. The variation in the pattern of 
association between the environmental influences and merger activity 
among different union size groups during institutionalised industrial 
relations suggests that the capacity to maintain organisational 
stability is closely related to membership size. Given that average 
union membership size shows a tendency to increase throughout the period 
under study, it would appear that variation in membership size may 
account for the mediating effect of the unionisation influences during 
the implementation of collective bargaining. 
In assuming trade unions to be intermediary organisations, it 
follows that the relationship between the leadership and the membership 
i 
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is not constant throughout the two delineated periods. This variation is 
also influential in accounting for the, changing nature of the merger 
process. Among certain craft unions, for example, the membership 
directly influenced the pursuit of a merger policy during merger Wave 1 
whereas during merger Wave 2 such influence was not recorded. 
Furthermore, the leadership influence on merger activity during merger 
Wave 2 was bolstered by their impact upon the formulation of TUC policy 
which effectively precluded 'new', emergent unions from establishing 
their recruitment bases. 
THE FUTURE 
Throughout the preceding chapters organisational instability has 
been shown to be the key factor mediating the promotion of merger 
activity. Four inter-related influences stimulate the onset of 
organisational instability: the failure to maintain a viable growth 
policy; inter-union competition for -membership; the failure to achieve 
recognition for bargaining purposes; and the lack of union financial 
viability. Assuming that organisational stability remains dependent upon 
these factors, the purpose of this section is to speculate as to the 
likely pattern of merger activity over the next decade. 
Since the election of a Conservative government during 1979, there 
has been a-substantial rise in the level of unemployment. This rise has 
been particularly marked in manufacturing where trade union 
organisation is traditionally well represented. According to the 
Institute for Employment Research (1985) this trend will continue at 
least until 1990. The proportion of total employment located in 
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manufacturing industries is forecast to decline from 23.6 per cent to 
21.3 per cent between 1984 and 1990, that in primary industries from 3.8 
per cent to 3.3 per cent whereas employment in service industries is 
predicted to rise from 64.9 per cent to 67.8 per-cent. It is likely, 
therefore, that unions with recruitment bases restricted to the 
manufacturing sector will be particularly hard-hit in terms of 
membership loss. 
The rate of technological innovation is also expected to continue 
apace, thereby further threatening existing union recruitment - bases. 
This threat is heightened, as Chapter 9 demonstrates, during periods of 
high unemployment and union membership decline. Furthermore, the 
potential for natural growth is restricted because of the saturation of 
union organisation and the difficulties of organising in the 'private 
services', where the bulk of unorganised potential membership is 
employed. Bain and Price (1983: 32) list the obstacles to the achievement 
of union organisation in this sector as being 'a large number of small 
establishments, part-time working and high labour turnover, and employer 
opposition to union recognition and collective bargaining'. 
Organisational instability arising from the failure to maintain viable 
growth policies and inter-union competition for membership is, 
therefore, likely to heighten. Moreover, policies adopted to maintain 
existing membership and make recruitment inroads into the sectors of 
potential membership growth are likely to raise further the threshold of 
union solvency. Evidence that internal union costs are continuing to 
rise is provided by the recent attempts to merge branches within unions 
in order to restrict the rate of increase of such costs (The Guardian, 5 
January, 1987). 
- 397 - 
Compounding these tendencies are the policies adopted by 
governments and employers. The legislative changes enacted by the 
Conservative governments since 1979 have weakened the relative 
bargaining strength of unions. Additionally, the high rate of extension 
of union recognition, witnessed during the 1970s, has now been curtailed 
as unions are no longer able to rely upon statutory procedures to assist 
them in recognition disputes, and legislative measures have been 
introduced to restrict the closed shop. The effect of the recent dispute 
at Wapping on the organisational instability of the printing unions, 
SOGAT and NGA, illustrates these tendencies, albeit in a pronounced 
form. News International, the employer, was able to introduce 
technological change, relocate the work site and achieve a reduction in. 
employment levels while relying on recent legislation to support its 
actions. The resultant dispute has undermined the financial viability of 
the principal printing unions which are now engaged in merger 
negotiations. 
While these influences point towards an increase in merger 
intensity in the immediate future, marked counter-tendencies are also in 
evidence in the form of organisational influences. Differences in policy 
between executives were cited as preventing further progress on the 
NUT/NAS, UWT merger; the EETPU pulled out of merger negotiations with the 
AEU, fearing 'a loss of identity' (The Guardian, l October, 1986: 3); while 
the proposals to form 'Union 2000', involving the AEU, APEX, UCATT and 
IPCS, have been rejected by the executives of UCATT and IPCS because a 
satisfactory representative structure could not be agreed. Similarly, 
the SOGAT/NGA merger is threatened because a financial structure to the 
post-merger organisation cannot be agreed; the General secretary of 
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SOGAT stating that 'it is apparent we cannot, as the figures show, 
merely have a coming together of the two. unions based on old structures, 
especially financial ones' (quoted in The Guardian, 18 October, 1986: 2)., ' 
It is likely, however, that the pressure to achieve greater 
influence within the national polity will continue to promote interest 
in merger activity. High unemployment and, hence, reduced union 
bargaining strength is perceived by trade unionists as emanating 
directly from the present Conservative government's economic policies. 
To achieve influence within the national polity, particularly should a 
Labour government be elected, is, therefore, viewed by trade union 
officials as allowing them to bring enhanced influence to bear on the 
policy options that will be adopted. Further promoting this tendency is 
the continued factionalism within the TUC and the Labour Party regarding 
these policy options. The AEU/EETPU, 'Union 2000' and ASTMS/TASS merger 
proposals demonstrate the influence of these factors as they all involve 
unions which have adopted similar political stances. To conclude, 
therefore, it would seem likely that if the rate of unemployment and 
technical change remain high and union membership stable or declining, 
then merger intensity will remain marked; its future direction most 
strongly influenced by political factors. 
0 
FOOTNOTES 
1. The formation wave 1889-93 is inferred from both the shape of the 
graph on the formation rate (Figure 2.6) and from various commentaries 
on the period; for example, Hobsbawm (1964) and Lovell (1977). 
2. For the major contributions to this debate see Clegg (1975), Fox 
(1973 and 1975), Hyman (1978), Wood (1976) and Wood and Eliot (1977). 
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APPENDIX A 
The first section of this appendix details, on an annual basis, the 
primary data extracted from the Department of Employment records on 
which this study is based. The second and third sections describe how 
these series were constructed. The forth section refers to the sources 
for the secondary data utilised throughout the study. 
TABLE A. 1 THE PRIMARY DATA 
YEAR NUMBER NUMBER MEMBERSHIP NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER 
OF OF ABSORBED OF OF OF 
MERGERS UNIONS FORMATIONS DISSOLUTIONS BREAKAWAYS 
ABSORBED 
1893 8 8 5,307 82 7 0 
1894 12 12 3,518 88 33 1 
1895 9 9 2,345 65 31 4 
1896 12 13 1.881 73 38 2 
1897 17 29 17,377 62 39 1 
1898 19 22 7,578 52 52 0 
1899 15 15 14,449 44 27 1 
1900 13 17 7,801 64 54 0 
1901 12 31 4,267 44 47 0 
1902 9 16 3.737 27 62 0 
1903 12 14 5,238 38 33 2 
1904 11 15 6,546 33 44 3 
1905 9 9 734 32 36 2 
1906 8 10 1,265 69 22 2 
1907 11 31 3,711 59 25 0 
1908 18 19 4,548 38 36 2 
1909 8 8 2,079 31 34 1 
1910 6 6 1,596 41 20 2 
1911 15 26 12,052 58 22 3 
1912 28 41 16,384 46 43 1 
1913 12 13 27,039 45 17 3 
-401- 
YEAR NUMBER NUMBER MEMBERSHIP NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER 
OF OF ABSORBED OF OF OF 
MERGERS UNIONS FORMATIONS DISSOLUTIONS BREAKAWAYS 
ABSORBED 
1914 24 26 22,799 41 19 1 
1915 18 23 18,623 20 25 2 
1916 20 20 8,672 31 12 1 
1917 29 29 11,162 51 14 0 
1918 42 43 43,824 90 22 0 
1919 46 78 25,710 175 19 0 
1920 54 78 303,785 125 33 1 
1921 56 83 335,152 46 68 3 
1922 19 35 226,498 28 39 4 
1923 16 17 16,314 17 36 1 
1924 12 13 117,019 29 14 2 
1925 8 8 5,524 22 32 2 
1926 13 13 24,606 32 33 0 
1927 9 9 11,679 25 27 5 
1928 9 11 2,221 30 33 0 
1929 8 8 121,062 19 18 0 
1930 9 22 15,468 18 9 1 
1931 6 6 4,973 7 14 1 
1932 8 17 11,092 11 20 1 
1933 6 6 2,578 15 8 0 
1934 14 14 21,780 12 17 0 
1935 11 11 8,794 13 15 1 
1936 9 10 41,765 17 19 0 
1937 8 8 17,515 15 11 0 
1938 4 5 4,513 21 22 0 
1939 6 6 4,579 13 18 0 
1940 9 9 4,951 17 13 1 
1941 3 3 99 11 12 0 
1942 9 9 6,852 15 10 0 
1943 6 10 2,104 14 6 1 
1944 11 22 53,817 13 13 0 
1945 8 174 575,561 9 18 4 
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YEAR NUMBER NUMBER MEMBERSHIP 
OF OF ABSORBED 
MERGERS UNIONS 
ABSORBED 
1946 20 23 40,673 
1947 17 19 139,634 
1948 11 11 7,838 
1949 7 8 10,663 
1950 5 5 1,700 
1951 2 2 496 
1952 6 9 15,774 
1953 3 3 1,706 
1954 4 4 293 
1955 5 5 7,049 
1956 8 8 8,385 
1957 2 2 839 
1958 2 2 1,241 
1959 2 2 7.623 
1960 1 1 1,000 
1961 7 9 1,166 
1962 8 8 12,555 
1963 9 9 48,013 
1964 6 6 20,639 
1965 12 12 14,900 
1966 8 8 54,318 
1967 8 9 99,144 
1968 21 21 122,207 
1969 12 14 33,435 
1970 20 26 101,406 
1971 14 16 139,783 
1972 21 37 95,588 
1973 14 14 32,023 
1974 15 19 66.507 
1975 23 23 38,717 
1976 13 16 60,033 
1977 9 9 14,998 
NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER 
OF OF OF 
FORMATIONS DISSOLUTIONS BREAKAWAYS 
17 24 1 
10 12 3 
14 21 1 
9 10 3 
790 
950 
9 15 0 
431 
2 12 0 
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3 16 2 
552 
260 
690 
323 
6 16 1 
5 11 0 
5 15 0 
550 
530 
551 
2 11 0 
13 90 
560 
684 
11 15 1 
19 72 
16 71 
24 17 0 
30 19 0 
27 30 1 
26 14 0 
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YEAR NUMBER NUMBER MEMBERSHIP NUMBER NUMBER NUMBER 
OF OF ABSORBED OF OF OF 
MERGERS UNIONS FORMATIONS DISSOLUTIONS BREAKAWAYS 
ABSORBED 
1978 12 12 67,856 11 11 0 
1979 13 13 13,660 31 14 0 
1980 13 14 77,048 / 7 / 
1981 4 4 7,690 / / / 
1982 7 16 293,121 / / / 
1983 10 10 75,413 / / / 
The merger series for this study is based upon records kept by the 
Department of Employment and its predecessors for the years 1893 - 1983 
which are now maintained at the University of Warwick. For each trade 
union the Department of Employment recorded the date of its 'birth', 
annual membership at each year end for the course of its 'life' and the 
manner and date of its 'death' if it did not survive beyond 1983. From 
this information it is possible to compile a list of mergers for each 
year of the period and attach to the unions involved in each merger 
their membership figure. For an assessment of the strengths and 
weaknesses of the operational definition of a trade union used by the 
Department of Employment see Bain and Price (1980: 2-4 and 12-14). 
The series derived from the Department of Employment's records was 
checked against the information on mergers held by the Certification 
Officer, the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies and the TUC, The 
records of the Certification Officer published in the Annual Reports of 
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the Certification Officer date from 1976 and include a breakdown of 
mergers into amalgamations and transfers of engagements as defined by 
the Trade Union (Amalgamation) Act 1964. 
In a number of instances the Chief Registrar reported a merger 
whereas the Department of Employment recorded a dissolution for the same 
union. These instances were concentrated in the early years of the 
period under` study. 'These discrepancies were checked by reference to 
other sources, primarily union histories. The checks revealed that 
several of the unions recorded as dissolving did so in order to merge, 
the dissolutions enabling these 'unions to circumvent the provisions of 
the legislation operative at the time. Where a merger was verified, it 
was added to the series and the record of a dissolution removed from 
that on dissolutions. 
The Annual 'Reports of the TUC- also include details of mergers 
involving TUC affiliated unions, but the Department of Employment's 
population of unions was, throughout the course of the period under 
discussion7, ' considerably larger than those compiled by other 
organisations. Unions included in the Reports of the Certification 
Officer and the Chief Registrar are those voluntarily registered under 
the terms of the Trade Union Act 1871 and, latterly, the Trade Union and 
Labour Relations Act 1974. The Donovan Commission (1968: para. 789) 
reported that registered unions 'together account for over 85 per cent 
of total trade union membership'. It is, therefore, likely that the 
outstanding 15 per cent of trade union membership is to be found in a 
number of smaller trade unions which would not derive substantial 
benefit in terms of exemption from income tax in respect of interest and 
dividends applied solely to provident benefits which is conferred on 
registration. Similarly. the coverage included by the TUC is devoted 
exclusively to TUC affiliated unions or mergers in which one of the 
merger partners was a TUC affiliated union thereby restricting coverage. 
It is likely that the checking procedures carried out are 
'weighted' in terms of the accuracy of the final merger series in, favour 
of the larger unions. Not only might mergers involving smaller unions be 
excluded from the series but whether unions dissolved in order to merge 
is impractical to check in every instance and, therefore, may lead to 
further limited distortion. The effect of any failure to, check all 
dissolutions is likely to be marginal, however, as the procedure of 
dissolving in order to merge was practiced primarily among larger unions 
when it was felt that the legislative requirements set a goal, in terms 
of membership vote, that was impossible to achieve if a merger was to be 
successfully concluded. The merger series is likely to be more complete 
in the later years of the period studied. This is because the structure 
of unionism in the early years was characterised by a large number of 
smaller unions, some of which may have escaped the attention of the 
Department of Employment. 
In an attempt to 'capture' any outstanding mergers arising from the 
deficiencies mentioned above reference was made to other sources and 
trade union histories. It should be emphasised that the review of trade 
union histories was by no means systematic; the task of reviewing all 
such histories being beyond the scope of a study of this nature. 
The Dating of Mergers 
For each trade union the Department of Employment maintained 
membership records until the year preceding the 'death' of the union 
irrespective of how this death took place. A record was also kept of how 
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the death occured. In the case of a merger the date of the merger was 
taken to be the year after the last entry for membership. As the 
Department of Employment recorded membership as of 31 December of the 
year rather than at the exact date of the merger, it is inevitable that 
some discrepancy in dating may result. Indeed, in the 'worst case', a 
merger occuring on 30 December, the membership figure may be almost one 
year out of date. Taking into account the large number of mergers it is 
not practical to date the mergers exactly and then determine the precise 
membership of the unions concerned. 
Where possible the dates of mergers were cross-checked against the 
records of the TUC and the Certification Officer or its predecessor. The 
TUC Annual Reports were, however, not particularly useful in this 
respect as the year to which they apply runs from mid-calendar year to 
mid-calendar year which, when coupled with no precise date for each 
merger, allows for a check to be made only within two calendar years. 
The Certification Officer's Reports were compiled on the same annual 
basis as that utilised by the Department of Employment and were more 
useful as a check on dating. The overwhelming majority of the 
discrepancies between these two sources amounted to no more than one 
year. Such discrepancies can be explained in terms of the procedures 
employed by the Certification Officer to obtain registration and that 
unions involved in mergers may not have immediately cancelled their 
registration. If a date could not be confirmed, the date provided by the 
Department of Employment was used. This option was chosen as a 'last 
resort' because the Department of Employment records, in effect, consist 
of two sources. The first being the membership records of the 'acquired' 
union and the second being the reference number of the union to which 
the acquired union was transferred, thereby allowing for a cross-check 
on the membership increase of the acquiring union. 
As in the compilation of any such series, a limited number of 
extreme cases were upturned. It is not the intention to describe each 
of these separately. However, a comment of the timing of events 
surrounding the merger of the TGWU and the North Wales Quarrymen (NWQ) 
will inform the reader of the procedures adopted to resolve such 
anomolies. From the Department of Employment's records the merger 
between these two unions took place in 1923, whereas the TUC reported 
the merger for 1960. Why is there a discrepancy of almost forty years? 
Resulting from merger negotiations held in September 1922 agreement was 
reached whereby the NWQ maintained the autonomy of conducting its 
internal affairs, existing legal benefits were to remain unchanged and 
it would affiliate as a separate union to the TUC. The TGWU would, 
however, take over the financial obligations of the NWQ. This 
arrangement was beneficial to both unions for it allowed the TGWU 
additional representation within the TUC and afforded the NWQ the right 
to nominate for the General Council which it would otherwise have lost 
as it ceased to be an independent union. The merger agreement operative 
from 1923 enabled the General Secretary of the NWQ to sit on the TUC 
General Council as a representative of the Mining and Quarrying trade 
group while the TGWU could nominate only in the Transport (other than 
railways) trade group. For this reason the NWQ retained its separate 
affiliation with the TUC until 1960 when further TUC reorganisation 
precluded the holding of the additional General Council seat. For the 
purposes of this study the merger is considered as being operative from 
1923 as at this time an additional TGWU region was constituted in North 
Jý - 408 = 
Wales which elected representatives to the TGWU' National Executive and 
the General Secretary of the NWQ became a TGWU national official. The 
point is that the NVQ lost its identity as a separate union, the 
maintenance of a separate affiliation being no more than 'part of a 
strategy to retain additional representation by the TGWU on the TUC 
General Council. 
The 'Value' of a Merger 
For the purposes of this study the 'value' of a merger refers to 
the membership involved. Before discussing in detail how value is 
attributed to mergers, a word of caution regarding membership figures is 
required. Trade union membership figures recorded by the Department of 
Employment are supplied directly by trade unions to the Department. This 
introduces 'three sources of bias' into the membership statistics. Bain 
and Price (1980: 15) list these as being substantial differences in 
unions' definitions of what constitutes paid up membership, " the 
imperfect systems of recording and maintaining membership information of 
many British trade unions and that unions may inflate their membership 
figures for 'reasons of prestige, inter-union rivalry or publicity; or 
they may deflate them in order to avoid paying higher affiliation fees 
to the TUG and other external bodies'. Without question these factors 
act to distort the series and their effect is likely to be more 
pronounced during the earlier years of the period when the collation of 
union membership records was less sophisticated than in recent years. 
Bain and Price state, however, that 
the character of the statistics suggests that this element 
(of error] is generally slight and by no means of a type to 
inhibit their use as an indicator of both the level and rate 
of change of British trade union membership. 
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As it is the 'level' of trade union membership with which this study is 
concerned the issues mentioned above will not be considered as vitiating 
the use of the Department of Employment's membership data. 
Buchanan employs the following procedure for determining the value 
of a merger: 
Mergers have been recorded here as those unions and members 
which were acquired by the largest or larger unions involved 
(1974: 37). 
This, as Buchanan concedes, is a procedure derived from a method 
employed by the Department of Trade and Industry in measuring company 
mergers. The Department outlined its measure as follows: 
Mergers of the type where A and B were acquired by a newly- 
formed C have been included as if the larger (in net assets) 
of A and B had acquired the smaller'(1970: 3). 
For this study the same measure is employed. 
It should be recognised that this measure necessarily introduces a 
degree of ambiguity into the notion of merger value. This degree of 
ambiguity arises from the failure to date mergers exactly. Minor shifts 
in time may lead to what is, at least in value terms, a similar set of 
events producing different results as the following example illustrates. 
Assume that three unions A. B and C have memberships of 100,000,50,000 
and 25,000 respectively. If A were to absorb B and C, a total membership 
of 75,000 would be acquired in terms of the value series. However, if B 
were to acquire C to form D and then A were to acquire D in separate 
mergers, the total membership acquired would be 100,000 (25,000 in the 
formation of D plus 75,000 as A acquired D). The central point here is 
that there is no unambiguously 'correct' index for merger activity, A 
variety of measures are, therefore, employed throughout the study all of 
which are based upon this principle of assigning value to a merger. All 
1v 
of these measures can be faulted to a degree. The 'appropriateness' of 
each index is dependent upon the nature of the task in hand. 
These three series were derived from the Department of Employment 
records in order to be consistent with those on trade union mergers. 
The Department of Employment records usually include'the date of 
formation for each union constituted throughout the period covered by 
the study. This date is substantiated within the same record through the 
entry of a membership figure for the new union which applies to the end 
of the year of formation. Two variants from this 'norm' were discovered. 
Firstly, where there is no specific formation date provided, but 
membership figures are available. In such cases it is assumed that the 
date of formation is the year for which the initial membership figure is 
provided. 
Secondly, where a formation date is provided but the membership 
figures commence from a year-subsequent to that to which the formation 
is ascribed, the formation date employed in the formation series is that 
provided by the Department of Employment. This procedure is also applied 
where the interval between the formation date and the initial membership 
figure is small. In the limited number of instances where this gap is 
large (greater than four years) a cross-check was attempted by reference 
to union histories and source books. This sort of check was possible in 
a restricted number of cases and revealed the Department of Employment 
formation date to be accurate, the original omjission applying to the 
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membership figures. Where a check was not possible the formation date 
provided by the Department of Employment was, therefore, used. 
Despite relying upon a formation date cross-referenced with an 
initial membership figure, it is likely that there is a degree of 
unwanted lagging in the series. This is attributable to the delay in 
registering with the Department of Employment. As such it is unavoidable 
for the only means whereby this may be remedied is to trace each 
formation as a separate event. Clearly, such a task constitutes the 
basis of a study in its own right. Given the large number of formations 
and that the liklehood of this source of error being systematic is 
limited, it is assumed that its impact upon the recorded rate of 
formations is marginal. 
Dissolutions 
Included in the Department of Employment records are the date and 
manner of a union's 'death' which coincides with the cessation of 
membership figures applicable to the union in question. If the manner of 
death was dissolution, a record was entered into the dissolution series. 
As is mentioned above, in some instances a dissolution was reported by 
the Department of Employment whereas, for the same union(s), the Chief 
Registrar of Friendly Societies records a merger. These instances were 
cross-checked, where possible, by reference to other sources. Where it 
was discovered that merger was the object of dissolution an entry was 
made to the merger series and a deletion from the dissolution series. 
The point here is that dissolution is regarded as the end point for 
organisational instability. Dissolution as an intermediary stage of a 
strategy to merger does not constitute such an end point but represents 
a tactic to overcome legislative restriction. 
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Breakaways 
Of the series covering trade union structural events, it is that on 
breakaways that is most open to question. Those unions reported within 
the Department of Employment records as a 'secession' form the basis of 
the breakaway series. Reliance upon this single source introduces a 
degree of ambiguity for it is only this record of the union being a 
secession that separates it from being a formation, In other words 
within the Department of Employment series it is not possible to cross 
reference and thereby confirm a breakaway. If this record of secession 
was omitted, the breakaway would be recorded in the formation series. As 
a consequence the formation series is likely to be overstated and that 
on breakaways understated. The implications of this degree of inaccuracy 
are, however, likely to be more pronounced for the breakaway series as 
this 'type' of structural event is more infrequent than formations. 
Reference to further sources is limited for, as Lerner comments, 
'most splinter (breakaway] unions die after a short period' (1961: 19? ). 
Hemingway (1978: 174-75) provides corroborating evidence for the period 
following World War II. For the preceding years cross-checks were 
achieved by reference to general sources such as Clegg, Fox and Thompson 
(1964) and Clegg (1985). Case study material specifically covering 
breakaways was limited to that of Lerner (1961) and various union 
histories. 
Three 'exceptional cases' were unearthed from the Department of 
Employment series. These refer to instances where a merger agreement was 
ratified, amalgamation entered into, only to be followed by a failure to 
achieve full integration thereby promoting a split into the original 
constituent unions. These three instances were not included in the 
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breakaway series. This exclusion is justified on the basis that the 
unions involved maintained independence of operation within the terms of 
the merger agreement. The impact of the organisational influences on 
merger activity could be further examined by studying these instances. 
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Aggregate Number of Unions. The figures covering the number of unions 
for 1892 - 1968 are from British Labour Statistics: Historical Abstract 
(London: HHSO, 1971) table 196. For 1969 - 83 the figures are taken from 
various issues of the Employment Gazette. 
Number of Unions Disaggregated by Size Group. The figures are extracted 
from various issues of the Employment Gazette, for example, Vol, 60 
(February 1982), 54-55, The publication of the union size group series 
has had a mixed history and, as a consequence, analyses based upon it 
should be treated with some circumspection. For example, between 1938 
and 1960 the series was published only in a 'provisional' form: that is, 
before returns were received from all unions. As a result there is an 
understatement implicit in the series regarding the number of included 
unions. This is likely to result in a bias with respect to the data 
relating to smaller unions in particular. The selected size groups are 
also not constant throughout. Between 1958 and 1960 unions with under 
500 members were included in a single size group whereas before and 
after this period two size groups were employed, 'under 100 members' and 
'100 - 499 members'. Similarly, prior to 1958 the largest size group is 
that comprised of unions organising '100,000 and over' whereas since 
1959 a '250,000 and over' category has been introduced. 
Trade Union Membership. The trade union membership figures are taken 
from the series published in Bain and Price (1980) covering 1892 - 1974. 
Figures for 1975-79 were unpublished data provided by kind permission of 
the authors. A description of the assembly of this series is included in 
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Bain and Price (1980: 13-15). As this series has yet to be extended to 
cover the years 1980-83 it was spliced with figures published in the 
Employment Gazette for these years. 
Concentration Ratio. The membership figures for the ten largest unions 
in any year are taken from the TUC Annual Reports. The extracted figures 
apply to specific unions and therefore exclude those relating to 
federations. In calculating this series, for example, the Miners' 
Federation of Great Britain is regarded as being comprised of a number 
of unions rather than as a single entity. Where unions have merged yet 
retained separate TUC affiliation the membership of the absorbed union 
is included in that of the acquiring union should the latter be one of 
the largest ten unions. 
Union Ifembership Density. The union membership density figures for 1892 
- 1974 are taken from Bain and Price (1980). For 1975-79 unpublished 
data in the same series was kindly provided by the authors. An 
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the 'potential union 
membership' series, the numerator of the union membership density 
measure, is provided in Bain and Price (1980; 18-20). 
Federations. The figures covering the number of federations are 
extracted from various issues of the Employment Gazette; see for 
example, October 1936, page 357. 
Retail Prices. For 1892 - 1970 the figures are taken from Bain and 
Elsheikh (1976: 134-35). The figures for 1969-83, comparable to those 
covering 1950-68, were supplied by the Department of -Employment. The 
compilation of this index together with an analysis of its merits and 
limitations is available in Bain, Bacon and Pimlott (1972: 107-9). 
a ý, j 
Productivity. The index was taken from Feinstein (1971), covering 1892 - 
1965. For 1966-83 the series was derived from data supplied in the 
Employment Gazette manipulated in a manner so as to be consistent wih 
the Feinstein series. 
Manufacturing Company Mergers. The series employed is that compiled by 
Hannah covering 1892 - 1979. The methods underlying its construction and 
a description of its strengths and weaknesses are provided by Hannah, 
(1974: 1-20) and (1983, Appendix 1). 
Wage Rates. For 1892 - 1970 the figures are. taken from Bain and Elsheikh 
(1976: 134-35). The figures covering 1969-83 were provided by the 
Department of Employment. Bain, Bacon and Pimlott (1972: 105-7) discuss 
the compilation, merits and weaknesses of the index. In particular it 
should be noted that figures are not available for the years. 1937 and 
1939. Following Bain and Elsheikh a figure for 1937 was obtained by 
taking the mid-point between those for. 1936 and 1938. A similar approach 
could not be used to derive a figure for 1939 as the gap between those 
for 1938 and 1940 is too large. There is, therefore, no figure in the 
index for 1939. 
Unemployment. For 1892 - 1965 the data used are those compiled by 
Feinstein (1971). The figures for 1966-83 were derived from those 
Yr 
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released in the Employment Gazette manipulated so as to be consistent 
with the Feinstein series. 
Number of Trade Union Sponsored liPs. Mullen (1977) was the source of the 
data between 1900 and 1917. For 1918-75 the figures were taken from 
Butler and Sloman (1975). For 1976-79 the data were obtained from the 
Labour Research Department. 
State Expenditure as a Proportion of GNP. for 1895,1905,1910,1913,1915 
and 1917-55 the figures were taken from Peacock and Wiseman (1961). The 
data covering the period 1956 to 1979 were taken from various issues of 
National Income Expenditure published by the Central Statistical Office. 
Union Funds. The source of the data for 1892 - 1970 are the various 
reports of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies. For example, 
Report of the Chief Registrar of Friendly Societies 1961, (London: HMSO, 
1962) Part 4, (Trade Unions), tables on page 7 and 9-10. For 1976-79 the 
figures were extracted from the annual reports of the Certification 
Officer. A strategy employed by the TUC in its resistance to the 
Industrial Relations Act was to discourage its affiliates from 
registering under the Act. Therefore, for 1971-5 little financial 
information is published and that which is excludes coverage of unions 
affiliated to the TUC. These years were, therefore, regarded as missing 
values. Tables 7.2 and 8.4 include the data series on union funds. 
Strikes. For 1893-1974 the data were taken from-Cronin (1979). Appendix 
B. The data covering 1975-83 were obtained from various issues of the 
Employment Gazette. 
YEAR TRADE UNION 
TABLE A. 2(i) 
TRADE UNION 
SECONDARY DA 
NUMBER OF 
TA 
NUMBER OF NUMBER OF 
MEMBERSHIP DENSITY TRADE FEDERATIONS TRADE UNION 
(000s) (%) UNIONS SPONSORED 
KPs 
1893 1463 10,9 1279 / 15 
1894 1419 10.5 1314 / 15 
1895 1388 10.1 1340 / 9 
1896 1471 1016 1358 / 9 
1897 1597 11.4 1353 120 9 
1898 1627 11.5 1326 112 9 
1899 1775 12.4 1325 112 9 
1900 1908 13.1 1323 109 1 
1901 1907 13.0 1322 106 1 
1902 1871 12.6 1297 95 1 
1903 1872 12.5 1285 90 1 
1904 1837 12.1 1256 93 1 
1905 1858 12.1 1244 89 1 
1906 2068 13.3 1282 94 21 
1907 2355 15.0 1283 106 21 
1908 2310 14.5 1268 109 21 
1909 2285 14.2 1260 113 21 
1910 2605 16.0 1269 113 38 
1911 3129 19.0 1290 110 39 
1912 3394 20.6 1252 117 39 
1913 4107 24.8 1269 125 39 
1914 4118 24.7 1260 137 39 
1915 4335 25.9 1229 148 39 
1916 4611 27.4 1225 163 39 
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YEAR TRADE UNION TRADE UNION NUMBER OF NUMBER OF NUMBER OF 
MEMBERSHIP DENSITY TRADE UNIONS FEDERATIONS TRADE UNION 
SPONSORED 
MPs 
1917 5452 32.3 1241 182 39 
1918 6461 38.1 1264 152 49 
1919 7837 46.0 1360 134 49 
1920 8255 48.2 1368 112 49 
1921 6512 37.9 1258 101 49 
1922 5573 32.1 1213 91 49 
1923 5382 30.7 1173 88 86 
1924 5463 30.9 1173 86 102 
1925 5430 30.4 1156 78 88 
1926 5152 28.6 1143 78 88 
1927 4860 26.8 1137. 75 88 
1928 4753 25.9 1124 68 88 
1929 4804 26.0 1114 69 88 
1930 4783 25.7 1098 67 114 
1931 4569 24.3 1081 67 114 
1932 4395 23.3 1081 65 35 
1933 4350 22.9 1081 66 35 
1934 4539 23.8 1063 65 35 
1935 4803 25.1 1049 63 35 
1936 5225 27.2 1036 63 78 
1937 5757 29.9 1032 61 78 
1938 5969 30.8 1024 62 78 
1939 6206 31.9 1019 60 78 
1940 6519 33.4 1004 55 78 
1941 7048 36.0 996 56 78 
1942 7722 39.3 991 57 78 
1943 8031 40.7 987 56 78 
1944 7936 40.0 963 57 78 
1945 7684 38.6 781 51 78 
1946 8603 43.0 757 51 120 
1947 8931 44,5 734 50 120 
1948 9100 44,9 735 51 120 
YEAR TRADE UNION TRADE UNION 
XEXBERSHIP DENSITY 
1949 9058 44.6 
1950 9002 43.7 
1951 9247 44.6 
1952 9261 44.6 
1953 9147 43.8 
1954 9180 43.3 
1955 9459 44.1 
1956 9897 43.3 
1957 9441 43.2 
1958 9256 42.4 
1959 9236 43.2 
1960 9437 43.4 
1961 9496 43.1 
1962 9494 42.4 
1963 9515 42.4 
1964 9623 42.4 
1965 9727 42.5 
1966 9665 41.9 
1967 9750 42.7 
1968 9746 42.9 
1969 10009 44.2 
1970 10682 47.4 
1971 10566 47.2 
1972 10746 47.9 
1973 10957 48.2 
1974 11235 49.2 
1975 11622 50.4 
1976 11955 51.3 
1977 12283 52.2 
1978 12579 53.2 
1979 12702 53.6 
NUMBER'OF NUMBER OF NUMBER OF 
TRADE-UNIONS FEDERATIONS TRADE UNION 
SPONSORED 
MPs 
726 51 120 
715 52 120 
711 49 111 
695 49 108 
690 46 108 
677 46 108 
666 46 95 
685 45 95 
685 46 95 
675 45 95 
668 43 92 
664 43 92 
655 43 92 
649 43 92 
643 42 92 
641 41 92 
630 42 120 
622 42 127 
604 45 127 
583 46 127 
562 47 127 
540 47 112 
522 46 112 
507 47 112 
507 49 112 
507 46 126 
470 46 127 
473 46 127 
481 44 127 
462 44 127 
456 44 114 
YEAR RETAIL WAGE UNEMPLOYMENT PRODUCTIVITY STATE COMPANY 
PRICES RATES (', G) EXPENDITURE MERGERS 
(1930=100) (1930=100) AS A% OF GNP 
1893 57.0 43.0 7.5 73.9 / 11 
1894 54.2 43.0 6.9 77.5 / 17 
1895 53.1 43.0 5.8 78.1 10.4 32 
1896 53.1 43.0 3.3 78.5 / 69 
1897 54.2 44.0 3.3 78.5 / 83 
1898 55.8 45.0 2.8 81.0 / 151 
1899 54.7 46.0 2.0 82.8 14.4 255 
1900 58.1 49.0 2.5 81.6 / 244 
1901 57.6 49.0 3.3 81.4 / 49 
1902 57.6 48.0 4.0 83.2 / 76 
1903 58.1 48.0 4.7 82.2 / 53 
1904 58.7 46.0 6.0 83.1 / 32 
1905 58.7 46.0 5.0 84.0 12.3 39 
1906 59.2 48.0 3.6 84.8 / 34 
1907 60.9 50.0 3.7 85.7 / 42 
1908 59.2 49.0 7.8 85.1 / 18 
1909 59.8 49.0 7.7 86.2 / 72 
1910 60.9 49.0 4.7 85.5 12.7 38 
1911 62.0 50.0 3.0 85.7 / 63 
1912 63.6 51.0 3.2 86.5 / 58 
1913 65.3 52.0 2.1 88.0 12.4 31 
1914 63.6 52.0 3.3 89.1 / 32 
1915 79.5 56.0 1.1 93.2 35.0 44 
1916 91.3 62.0 0.4 93.9 / 43 
1917 113.9 74.0 0.6 94.1 39.0 41 
1918 130.1 99.0 0.8 94.1 51.7 112 
1919 140.8 120.0 2.1 85.1 / 228 
1920 170.9 148.0 2.0 80.4 26.2 336 
1921 126.8 142.0 12.9 83.6 29.4 78 
1922 115.0 110.0 14.3 88.1 27.8 67 
1923 112.8 98.0 11.7 89.8 24.2 124 
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YEAR RETAIL WAGE UNEMPLOYMENT PRODUCTIVITY STATE COMPANY 
PRICES RATES (%) EXPENDITURE MERGERS 
(1930=100) (1930=100) AS A% OF GNP 
1893 57.0 43.0 7.5 73.9 / 11 
1894 54.2 43.0 6.9 77.5 / 17 
1895 53.1 43.0 5.8 78.1 10.4 32 
1896 53.1 43.0 3.3 78.5 / 69 
1897 54.2 44.0 3.3 78.5 / 83 
1898 55.8 45.0 2.8 81.0 / 151 
1899 54.7 46.0 2.0 82.8 14.4 255 
1900 58.1 49.0 2.5 81.6 / 244 
1901 57.6 49.0 3.3 81.4 / 49 
1902 57.6 48.0 4.0 83.2 / 76 
1903 58.1 48.0 4.7 82.2 / 53 
1904 58.7 46.0 6.0 83.1 / 32 
1905 58.7 46.0 5.0 84.0 12.3 39 
1906 59.2 48.0 3.6 84.8 / 34 
1907 60.9 50.0 3.7 85.7 / 42 
1908 59.2 49.0 7.8 85.1 / 18 
1909 59.8 49.0 7.7 86.2 / 72 
1910 60.9 49.0 4.7 85.5 12.7 38 
1911 62.0 50.0 3.0 85.7 / 63 
1912 63.6 51.0 3.2 86.5 / 58 
1913 65.3 52.0 2.1 88.0 12.4 31 
1914 63.6 52.0 3.3 89.1 / 32 
1915 79.5 56.0 1.1 93.2 35.0 44 
1916 91.3 62.0 0,4 93.9 / 43 
1917 113.9 74.0 0.6 94.1 39.0 41 
1918 130.1 99.0 0.8 94.1 51.7 112 
1919 140.8 120.0 2.1 85.1 / 228 
1920 170.9 148.0 2.0 80.4 26.2 336 
1921 126.8 142.0 12.9 83.6 29.4 78 
1922 115.0 110.0 14.3 88.1 27.8 67 
1923 112.8 98.0 11.7 89.8 24.2 124 
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YEAR RETAIL WAGE UNEMPLOYMENT PRODUCTIVITY STATE COMPANY 
PRICES RATES EXPENDITURE MERGERS 
AS A% OF GNP 
1924 115.0 102.0 10.3 92.2 23.7 129 
1925 111.8 103.0 11.3 95.5 24.2 116 
1926 110.7 102.0 12.5 92.0 25.7 153 
1927 105.3 103.0 9.7 96.6 24.1 180 
1928 105.3 101.0 10.8 97.4 24.2 270 
1929 104.3 101.0 10.4 9819 23.9 431 
1930 100.0 100.0 16.0 100.0 26.1 158 
1931 92.4 99.0 21.3 97.1 28.8 101 
1932 90.3 97.0 22.1 97.4 28.6 86 
1933 89.2 96.0 19.9 98.3 25.7 92 
1934 89.2 97.0 16.7 101.8 24.5 121 
1935 92.4 100.0 15.5 103.8 24.4 187 
1936 94.6 103.0 13.1 105.2 24.7 274 
1937 100.0 106.0 10.8 105.5 25.7 174 
1938 98.9 109.0 13.5 106.3 30.0 127 
1939 101.0 n. a. 11.6 103.3 35.3 94 
1940 114.5 141.0 9.7 109.7 60.1 36 
1941 124.7 154.0 6.6 115.1 72.5 44 
1942 132.3 174.0 2.4 114.2 72.8 23 
1943 138.0 191.0 0.8 115.7 73.9 65 
1944 140.6 198.0 0.7 112.6 72.6 85 
1945 145.7 196.0 1.2 109.8 66.0 88 
1946 150.8 207.0 2.5 110.6 51.6 99 
1947 159.0 221.0 3.1 108.4 44.0 125 
1948 169.8 239.0 1.8 112.1 40.6 109 
1949 174.9 249.0 1.6 116.1 40.0 104 
1950 180.5 262.9 1.6 118.7 39.0 49 
1951 197.1 289.5 1.3 120.8 40.7 78 
1952 215.0 312.3 2.2 120.7 41.5 185 
1953 221.8 331.6 1.8 124.7 40.7 122 
1954 225.9 353.2 1.5 127.8 37.6 197 
1955 236.0 386.0 1.2 131.0 36.6 196 
1956 247.8 416.9 1.3 131.7 37.1 181 
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YEAR RETAIL WAGE UNEMPLOYMENT PRODUCTIVITY STATE COMPANY 
PRICES RATES EXPENDITURE MERGERS 
AS A% OF GNP 
1957 257.0 436.2 1.6 134.0 36.1 223 
1958 264.6 451.2 2.2 135.1 37.0 251 
1959 266.0 471.7 2.3 139.6 36.7 385 
1960 268.8 502.2 1.7 145.1 36.5 513 
1961 278.0 532.7 1.6 147.4 34.4 486 
1962 289.8 551.6 2.1 148.5 32.6 479 
1963 295.7 574.8 2.6 154.2 31.2 583 
1964 305.4 624.5 1.7 161.4 31.2 700 
1965 320.0 674.7 1.5 164.8 32.8 668 
1966 332.5 714.1 1.6 167.0 35.8 572 
1967 340.5 742.3 2.5 172.0 35.8 525 
1968 356.6 803.3 2.5 180.3 37.1 631 
1969 375.9 870.4 2.5 183.9 38.7 478 
1970 400.0 988.6 2.6 187.8 39.4 426 
, 
1971 437.6 1097.6 3.5 193.1 37.6 424 
1972 468.6 1270.4 3.8 197.8 35.9 576 
1973 511,8 1462.8 2.7 205.3 34.9 619 
1974 593.8 1755.4 2.6 201.4 38.5 265 
1975 737.5 2166.4 4.2 198.6 39.4 164 
1976 859.8 2452.2 5.7 203.8 38.4 192 
1977 995.8 2662.8 6.2 208.9 38.4 271 
1978 1078.9 3036.0 6.1 214.0 37.0 275 
1979 1223.2 3515.8 5.7 217.0 37.8 229 
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APPENDIX B 
The following tables detail the simple correlation coefficients between the 
different regressors employed in the reported regressions. 
TABLE B 
THE PER 
.1 
IOD OF THE IM PLEMEN TATI ON OF C OLLECTI VE BARGAIN ING: 18 93 -1 939 
AP ARW RW AWR PROD COMER TROUGH PEAK UDEN AMEX 
ARW . 64 
RW -. 48 -. 21 
AWR -. 40 . 44 . 34 
PROD . 08 . 08 . 66 . 02 
COMER . 11 . 19 . 37 . 13 . 35 
TROUGH -. 38 -. 36 . 83 . 03 . 66 . 24 
PEAK -. 24 -. 14 . 76 . 16 . 69 . 34 . 49 
UDEN . 12 . 32 . 35 . 23 . 50 . 42 . 15 . 13 
AMEX . 74 . 64 -. 38 -. 05 . 04 . 05 -. 35 -. 21 -. 02 
FUNDS . 01 -. 11 -. 06 -. 10 -. 12 -. 27 -. 03 -. 10 -. 65 . 16 
FORM . 27 . 51 -. 44 . 32 -. 56 . 06 -. 60 -. 48 . 16 . 39 
STCONC . 05 . 16 . 49 . 11 . 68 . 31 . 45 . 42 . 67 -. 14 
1917 -, 22 -. 02 . 77 . 26 . 69 . 55 . 67 . 44 . 74 -. 30 
REPLEG -. 11 -. 12 . 46 . 01 . 46 . 09 . 41 . 43 -. 10 . 08 
CON -. 11 -. 23 -. 17 -. 13 -. 32 . 22 -. 13 -. 05 -. 40 -. 20 
MP -. 12 -. 01 . 53 . 14 . 70 . 43 . 48 . 51 . 65 -. 15 
BREAK -. 33 -. 40 -. 12 -. 11 -. 22 -. 31 -. 09 -. 10 -. 09 -. 31 
FORM STCONC 1917 REPLEG CON MP BREAK 
STCONC -. 32 
1917 -. 20 . 73 
REPLEG -. 44 . 10 . 19 
CON -. 09 -. 24 -. 17 -. 03 
MP -. 31 . 64 . 58 . 17 -. 21 
BREAK -. 09 -. 06 -. 12 . 01 . 09 -. 03 
FUNDS -. 26 -. 45 -. 49 . 43 . 19 -. 52 -. 06 
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THE OPE RATION OF I NSTITUT IONALI SED IND USTRIAL RELATION S: 194 6- 197 9 
oP &RW RW tWR PROD COMER TROUGH PEAK UDEN &MEM 
ARW . 82 
RW . 67 . 76 
, &WR -. 44 . 15 . 02 
PROD . 61 . 68 . 88 . 02 
COMER . 27 -. 05 . 39 . 38 . 44 
TROUGH . 71 . 59 . 19 -. 32 . 18 -. 27 
PEAK . 61 . 56 . 70 -. 16 . 71 . 04 . 26 
UDEN . 81 . 77 . 75 -. 20 . 72 -. 21 . 42 . 63 
oMEM . 44 . 56 . 38 . 09 . 34 -. 03 . 33 . 18 . 46 
FUNDS -. 82 -. 74 -. 74 . 39 -. 70 . 30 -. 43 -. 77 -. 65 -. 52 
FORM . 88 . 76 . 72 -. 34 . 67 -. 15 . 50 . 74 . 86 . 35 
STCONC . 32 . 24 -. 02 -. 16 -. 03 -. 37 . 33 -. 02 . 19 . 21 
1964 . 56 . 62 . 87 . 01 . 79 . 39 . 19 . 53 . 61 . 35 
REPLEG . 29 -. 15 . 48 . 30 . 43 . 25 . 04 . 07 . 30 . 02 
CON -. 35 -. 15 . 10 . 36 -. 08 -. 22 -. 34 . 02 -. 18 -. 26 
MP . 10 . 02 . 01 -. 15 -. 02 -. 01 . 03 . 54 -. 08 . 19 
BREAK -. 14 . 05 -. 06 . 31 -. 09 -. 02 -. 07 -. 27 -. 01 . 37 
STCONC 
1964 
REPLEG 
CON 
MP 
BREAK 
FUNDS 
FORKS 
. 17 
. 58 
. 31 
-. 27 
-. 11 
-. 12 
-. 86 
STCONC 1964 REPLEG CON MP BREAK 
. 14 
. 04 
-. 35 
. 24 
. 14 
-. 14 
. 41 
-. 35 
. 23 
-. 03 
-. 53 
. 16 
. 11 
. 13 
. 33 
. 21 
. 13 
. 04 
. 28 . 06 
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APPENDIX C 
1893 - 1939 
PEAK RW ARW COMER UDEN R2 D-W 
-0.528'**r 0.096 0.249-"** 0,085 0.690*** -0.299"(MP) 0.70 1.71 
-0.831*** 0.154 0.347*** 0.049 0,299* -0.304*(STCONC) 0.78 2.19 
-0.744'*** 0.148 0.262'*** 0.128 0.446*** -0.090 (CON) 0.68 1.72 
-0.757'*** 0.139 0,266*** 0.077 0.463** 0.062 (1917) 0.68 1.77 
-0.730*** 0.225 0,249'**'* 0.081 0.463*** -0.121(REPLEG) 0.69 1.76 
1946 - 1979 
-0.505* 0.982-«-* 0.130 - 0.065 0.174 0.151(NP) 0.60 2.27 
-0.239 0.832** 0.194 0.093 0.212 0.425** (STCONC) 0.62 2.46 
-0.353« 0.780** 0.208 - 0.049 0.263 -0.060(CON) 0.55 2.05 
-0.325« 0.463 0.208 -0.071 0.279 0.348(1964) 0.58 2.09 
-0.330 0.748*-r 0.165 - 0.057 0.249 0.084 (REPLEG) 0.55 2.08 
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APPENDIX D 
Where: Union names in italics are those formed in the merger. 
The last union name provided in each merger is the acquiring union, 
Merger No. Merger Date Unions Involved Formation 
Date 
1 1893 London Society of Warehousemen 1840 
Caxton Printers' Warehousemen 1860 
Amalgamated Printers' Warehousemen 
2 1895 Leeds Typographical Association N/A 
Typographical Association 1849 
3. 1896 Friendly Copperplate Printers N/A 
Philanthropic Copperplate Printers 1840 
London United Plate Printers 
4 1897 Leeds Letterpress Printers N/A 
Typographical Association 1849 
5 1900 Amalgamated Printers' Warehousemen 1893 
Printers' and Stationers' Warehousemen and Cutters 1899 
Na t. Aural. Frinters' Warehousemen and Cutters 
6 1900 Edinburgh Electrotypers and Stereotypers N/A 
Glasgow Electrotypers and Stereotypers N/A 
Leeds Electrotypers and Stereotypers 1893 
Liverpool Electrotypers and Stereotypers 1893 
Manchester Electrotypers and Stereotypers 1893 
Oxford Electrotypers and Stereotypers 1894 
National Electrotypers and Stereotypers 
7 1901 Manchester Printers' and Stationers' Cutters N/A 
,I 
Nat. Amal, Printers' Warehousemen and Cutters 1900 
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8 1902 London Electrotypers and Stereotypers 1864 
National Electrotypers and Stereotypers 1900 
9 1904 Nat. Bookfolders and Kindred Trades Union 1894 
Nat. Amal. Printers' Warehousemen and Cutters 1900 
10 1907 Reading Compositors 1905 
London Compositors Society 1785 
11 1908 Edinburgh Press and Machinemen N/A 
Scottish Typographical Association 1852 
12 1911B ookbinders and Machine Rollers Consolidated Uni on 1836 
London Consolidated Journeymen Bookbinders 1784 
Vellum Account Bookbinders (London) 1823 
Day Working Bookbinders of London 1849 
National Bookbinders and Xachine Rulers 
13 1912 London Lithographic Printers 1833 
Anal. Lithographic Printers and Auxilleries thereto 1880 
14 1914 National Union of Paper Mill Workers 1890 
United Vellum and Parchment Makers 1872 
Amal. Printers' Warehousemen and Cutters 1900 
Nat. Union of Printing and Paper Workers 
15 1915 Stereotypers and Electrotypers Assistants 1893 
Nat. Society of Operative Printers and Assistants 1889 
16 1916 Printers' Revisors and Readers Assistants 1909 
Nat. Society of Operative Printers and Assistants 1889 
17 1918 General Union of Plate Printers 1917 
- London Printing and Machine Managers 1839 
18 1918 Womens' Section Nat. Bookbinders (London) 1917 
Nat. Bookbinders and Machine Rulers 1911 
19 1919 Lithographic, Stone and Zinc Plate Preparers 1889 
Amal. Lithographic Printers and Auxilleries thereto 1880 
20 1919 London United Plate Printers 1896 
London Printing Machine Managers 1839 
21 1919 Male Relief Stampers 1901 
Nat. Union of Printing and Paper Workers 1914 
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22 1919 Womens' Section Nat. Bookbinders (Edinburgh) 
Nat. Bookbinders and Machine Rulers 
23 1921 Nat. Bookbinders and Machine Rulers 
Nat. Union of Printing and Paper Workers 
Nat. Union of Printing, Bookbinding and Faper Workers 
24 1924 Platen Printing Machine Minders 
Nat. Union of Printing, Bookbinding and Paper Workers 
1917 
1911 
1911 
1914 
1890 
1921 
1 1966 
TABLE D. 2 
PRINTING INDUSTRY MERGERS : 1966 - 1983 
Nat. Society of Operative Printers and Assistants 1889 
Na t. Union of Printing, Bookbinding and Paper Workers 1921 
Society of Graphical and Allied Trades 
2 1967 National Electrotypers and Stereotypers 1900 
National Graphical Association 1964 
3 1968 Amal. Soc. of Lithographic Printers and Auxilleries 1880 
National graphical Association 1964 
4 1968 H. M. S. O. Machinery Repair Staff Association 
General and Municipal Workers' Union 1924 
5 1972 Sign and Display Trade Union 
Nat. Society of Operative Printers and Assistants 1889 
6 1973 United Society of Engravers 
Soc. of Lithographic Artists, Designers, Engravers and Process Workers 
7.. ' 1975 Scottish Graphical Association 
Society of Graphical and Allied Trades 1921 
8 1979 Nat. Union of Wallcoverings, Decorative and Allied Trades 
National Graphical Association 1964 
9 1982 SLADE 
National Graphical Association 1964 
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10,1982 Nat. Society of Operative Printers and Assistants 1889 
Society of Graphical and Allied Trades 1921 
Society of Graphical and Allied Trades 1982 
F 
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APPEIDIX E 
TRADE UNION STRUCTURAL 
TABLE E. 1 
EVENTS IN NAT IONAL GOVERN MENT 1893 - 1979 
YEAR NUMBER OF NUMBER OF NUMBER OF NUMBER OF NUMBER OF NUMBER OF 
EXTANT UNIONS DISSOLVING UNION UNIONS BREAKAWAYS 
UNIONS DYING IN UNIONS FORMATIONS FORMED 
MERGERS THROUGH 
MERGER 
1893 3 0 0 0 0 0 
1894 3 0 0 0 0 0 
1895 3 0 0 0 0 0 
1896 3 0 0 0 0 0 
1897 4 0 0 1 0 0 
1898 4 0 0 0 0 0 
1899 4 0 0 0 0 0 
1900 5 0 0 1 0 0 
1901 5 0 0 0 0 0 
1902 5 0 0 0 0 0 
1903 6 0 0 1 0 0 
1904 6 0 0 0 0 0 
1905 7 0 0 1 0 0 
1906 13 0 0 5 0 1 
1907 13 0 0 0 0 0 
1908 13 0 0 0 0 0 
1909 13 0 0 0 0 0 
1910 37 0 0 24 0 0 
1911 39 0 0 2 0 0 
1912 39 2 .2 
3 1 0 
1913 45 0 0 6 0 0 
1914 49 0 0 4 0 0 
1915 51 ' 0 0 2 0 0 
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1916 57 0 0 6 0 0 
1917 70 2 0 14 1 0 
1918_ 111 2 1 44 0 0 
1919 191 3 2 85 0 0 
1920 235 14 8 63 3 0 
1921 209 26 17 14 3 0 
1922 198 5 12 5 1 0 
1923 189 10 7 6 2 0 
1924 192 3 3 8 1 0 
1925 191 2 10 11 0 0 
1926 193 4 9 15 0 0 
1927 189 2 10 7 1 0 
1928 196 4 6 16 1 0 
1929 197 2 4 7 0 0 
1930 195 17 2 15 2 0 
1931 188 2 6 1 0 0 
1932 176 14 3 3 1 1 
1933 181 1 1 6 0 1 
1934 182 3 3 7 0 0 
1935 176 5 2 1 0 0 
1936 179 0 3 6 0 0 
1937 182 2 1 5 1 0 
1938 181 3 6 7 1 0 
1939 182 2 3 6 0 0 
1940 187 2 3 10 0 0 
1941 185 1 3 2 0 0 
1942 191 3 0 11 0 0 
1943 191 3 1 4 0 0 
1944 179 10 6 3 1 0 
1945 63 115 3 1 1 0 
1946 55 4 6 1 0 1 
1947 54 0 2 0 0 1 
1948 52 1 3 2 0 0 
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1949 50 4 0 1 0 1 
1950 48 2 0 0 0 0 
1951 47 1 0 0 0 0 
1952 46 0 2 0 0 1 
1953 46 0 0 0 0 0 
1954 46 1 1 2 0 0 
1955 43 1 2 0 0 0 
1956 40 2 2 0 1 0 
1957 40 0 0 0 0 0 
1958 40 0 0 0 0 0 
1959 38 0 2 0 0 0 
1960 37 0 1 0 0 0 
1961 34 1 3 1 0 0 
1962 33 0 1 0 0 0 
1963 33 0 0 0 0 0 
1964 34 0 0 1 0 0 
1965 34 0 0 0 0 0 
1966 35 0 0 1 0 0 
1967 35 0 0 0 0 0 
1968 35 0 0 0 0 0 
1969 34 1 0 0 0 0 
1970 34 0 0 0 0 0 
1971 34 0 0 0 0 0 
1972 27 8 0 0 1 0 
1973 26 3 0 2 0 0 
1974 25 2 0 1 0 0 
1975 22 3 0 0 0 0 
1976" 22 0 0 0 0 0 
1977, 23 0 0 1 0 0 
1978 23 0 0 0 0 0 
1979 23 0 0 0 0 0 
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